

Journal of the United Service Institution of India

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THE UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The headquarters building of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan in Simla is open daily, including Sundays, from 9 a.m. to sunset. It contains a reading room, in which is available a wide range of illustrated periodicals, newspapers, magazines, etc., as well as a number of Service journals. A well-stocked library is also open to members, who may borrow volumes without charge, while members stationed elsewhere may obtain books on loan post-free.

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
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THE FLAGS OF THE DOMINIONS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

INDIA

Saffron symbolises courage and sacrifice; white, truth and peace; green, faith and strength. The Asoka chakra represents the welfare and progress of the masses.

PAKISTAN

Green is the colour of Islam. The crescent and star were introduced for the first time by the Turks, early in the 14th Century, and occupy a place in the flag of almost every Muslim state. White signifies tolerance for the minorities.

FOR REFERENCE

Not to be taken out

The Journal of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan

Vol. LXXVIII

JANUARY 1948

No. 330

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

THE United Service Institution is to continue. If the numerous letters we have received on this subject be any criterion, all members of the U.S.I. will welcome this news, which was briefly referred to in the last issue of the *Journal*. At a special meeting of the Council, held in Delhi

A last November, representatives of India and Pakistan
Change unanimously confirmed the decision taken at the annual
of meeting in July that the Institution would continue as
Name a joint organisation embracing both Dominions. It was considered that the Institution could in a large measure effectively assist in maintaining the spirit of comradeship which has for so long existed among members of the Armed Forces now serving in India and Pakistan. Members will, we feel sure, endorse the views and the decision of the Council. As was pointed out, the Institution has no concern with politics. We are devoted entirely to the professional advancement of officers of the fighting services; to the enlargement of their knowledge, and to all matters associated with an officer's career. This policy will be carried on as it has been since 1871, when the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor founded the U.S.I. The only change will be in name. Henceforth we will be known as "The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan." We will continue to work, as we have always done, for the benefit of every officer in this subcontinent, and in any other country, of whatever race, religion, caste or creed. There is much to be done, but with the support from official sources and members that we have always received so wholeheartedly in the past, we will carry the Institution to even greater heights of service in the future.

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We are also glad to announce that, despite the present difficulties of communication and the like, the *Journal* will continue to be published. Until conditions improve it may have to be reduced in size, due to paper shortages, but its standard will be maintained. There is one point, however,

Thinking Caps

to which we would like to draw attention. The great majority of the articles are still being contributed by British officers. Now, with nationalisation and the gradual passing of the British officer from the scene, we feel that the time has come when the *Journal* should contain more material submitted by Indian and Pakistani officers. Almost all the officers who are now becoming members of the Institution are from the two Dominions, and we would like to see them adequately represented in these pages. Admittedly the standard is high, which is as it should be in a specialist publication of this nature, but it is well within the reach of any officer who cares to set down his ideas, experiences, etc., in a pleasing and interesting manner. Time spent in thought about one's profession is time well spent. To commit those thoughts to paper, having turned them over in the mind and decided upon the best approach to the subject, is an invigorating experience; and the satisfaction to be gained from seeing the result of one's labours in print is considerable indeed. It can be remunerative too! In addition to articles, the *Journal* also accepts original short stories, poetry and photographs which, of course, should be of a service nature or of interest to military men. A glance through this and previous issues of the *Journal* will indicate the length and type of suitable material. It will be noticed that, although this is a specialist publication, the scope is wide—so put those thinking caps on and send in your contributions!

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AT MIDNIGHT on 31st December 1947, the ten Gurkha Regiments were divided up, four being transferred for service with the British Army, the balance remaining with the Indian Army. "His Majesty's Gurkha Troops" will be stationed in Malaya and will retain their British officers.

Johnny Gurkha

The Gurkha Regiments of the Indian Army will, for the first time, be led by Indian officers. It is good to know that these fine soldiers, who fought so splendidly in Burma and the Middle East theatres in the last war, will continue to serve with their old comrades-in-arms from India. Their valour is a by-word; their smartness, keenness and discipline of the highest order. The Indian officer who is posted to a Gurkha unit will consider himself fortunate. He will have first-class troops to lead; troops who fear nothing; troops who really enjoy soldiering; and last, but certainly not least, troops with a sense of humour. British officers

are very proud of their Gurkhas and have every reason to be so. As the Adjutant-General of the British Army said in a message welcoming the four regiments: "The constant loyalty and magnificent fighting qualities of the Gurkhas, till recently members of the Indian Army, have always been a source of admiration to the British Army, who now welcome them into the service with affection and pride. Their arrival will cement still further the friendship between Gurkhas and British men and units. The Army Council and the British Army as a whole look forward with complete confidence in their ability to deal with tasks that may fall to their lot. That confidence is reinforced now that the Gurkhas will continue to fight side by side with the British soldier, as he has done so magnificently in the past." The Indian officer will have complete confidence in and be very proud of his Gurkhas, too.

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THE ANNOUNCEMENT that the War Office has strengthened the Directorate of Military Training by the appointment of a Director-General, and a Director as his assistant, is of more than usual interest to India and Pakistan as one of the Director-General's duties will be the

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**Military
Training**

maintenance of liaison with the armies of the Dominions. His other tasks will be to direct the broad policy of the military training of the regular and territorial armies at home and overseas, and to co-ordinate the army side of combined training with the other services. He will be relieved as far as possible of detailed responsibility for the training organisation, which will remain with his assistant, the Director of Military Training. Training establishments and schools in the United Kingdom, and the army's requirements of land for training will be the particular concerns of the latter, who will also develop and continue the functions of the Director of Tactical Investigation. A series of pamphlets on military training, now being prepared at the War Office, will embody the results of the tactical investigations carried out during and since the recent war. The establishment of new machinery and the brief account of how it is to function indicate a raising of status of the directorate in more than name. It would appear that the appointment of a Director-General of Military Training, with wider scope than the Director formerly at the head of that branch, is in itself a good move, though its value must naturally depend upon the use which the Director-General finds it possible to make of the new post. It is to be expected that he will be much abroad, and having a Director at home in charge of detailed organisation will be an advantage.

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IN THE October issue of the *Journal* a contributor referred to radar and how it was used during the war to detect and locate bombers and ships, and for navigating ships through dense fog. From the U.S.A. comes the latest news of that inspired invention. Its range has been

**More
About
Radar**

extended far beyond what it was a year or two ago and it is now possible to detect high-flying missiles 1,000 miles away, although the detection of low-flying guided missiles is still a matter of some difficulty. This is due to the fact that radar-waves, like other micro-waves such as those used in television, travel in straight lines and do not follow the curvature of the earth as do longer radio-waves. Consequently, radar detection of guided missiles, like the V-1 "buzz-bomb", which fly at 5,000 feet or lower, is now engaging the attention of scientists. Meanwhile, as experiment and development proceed apace, radar in its present form is proving a boon to air forces the world over. Navigational and blind flying aids, the detection of storms and the calculation of upper-air wind velocity are some of the facilities provided by radar. It is used to train pilots in the interception of enemy aircraft and in bombing through cloud, the ground target being invisible to the crew. The R.A.F. used the latter method over Germany during the closing stages of the war in Europe. With radar a long coastline can be covered so as to detect the approach of enemy aircraft and surface vessels well before they are within attacking distance, giving the defenders time to make or change the dispositions of their forces and to intercept the raiders. Will radar eventually prove to be the antidote to the atomic bomb, long-range rockets and other weapons of destruction?

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If a great deal of man's time and genius are taken up with the invention and development of offensive weapons it is only fair to say that thought and ingenuity are also given to more humane subjects. For example, scientists working on the peace-time applications of war weapons

**Swords
into
Plough
Shares**

have produced a "life-saving bomb". Aimed by a bomb-sight and released from a plane in a similar manner to its war-time counterpart, this new type of "bomb" will help to save the lives of people stranded in remote places. It is fitted with a time-fuse which at 400 feet causes a parachute to open, bringing down slowly to the ground canisters containing food, medical supplies and comforts. Another instance of such conversion of "swords into plough shares", is a parachute container similar to that used by Nazi spies. This enables doctors to be dropped to the rescue fully loaded, with very little risk of injury to their medical equipment. The container falls so gently that in a recent test a dozen eggs which had been packed into one arrived on the ground unbroken. Work is also in progress on a parachute device which was used to release

fighter pilots from planes travelling at high speed. It is hoped to modify it so that it can be used to drop to safety passengers seated in airliners that are about to crash. Finally, there is an ingenious apparatus by which analgesia (absence from pain) can be self-administered. It is a small, metal cylinder weighing only ten ounces. The apparatus is an inhaler designed on the principle of the cigarette-lighter, and uses a substance called "Trilene". It is a development of the war-time use of "Trilene" which, soaked in a wool plug in an ordinary benzedrine nasal inhaler, induced satisfactory, though short, analgesia. In a demonstration of the new apparatus a man used it for about a minute and then felt no pain when a needle was stuck in his leg. The great advantage of "Trilene" is that it cannot render one unconscious and is, therefore, suitable for use by non-medical men.

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IN MANY places in this subcontinent, some very remote, are British cemeteries in which lie the graves of people who served India well in the Armed Forces or in civil life. Some of these cemeteries are of historical interest, but of more practical importance is the future of those in which lie near relatives of persons still living. Last year, it was suggested in the British Press that some cemeteries in remote places would be levelled, since it would be unpractical to maintain them, but a recent announcement would appear to belie that suggestion. With effect from 1st April 1948, the High Commissioners for the United Kingdom in India and Pakistan will assume responsibility for the future maintenance of those British cemeteries which, until the passing of the Indian Independence Act, were maintained by the Government of India. The Governments of India and Pakistan have made the necessary provision for their upkeep until 1st April. His Majesty's Government have sanctioned the provision of a small temporary staff in the offices of the High Commissioners for the purpose of organising the system under which the cemeteries shall in future be maintained. It is emphasised that no responsibility will be accepted in respect of those which before 15th August 1947 were not maintained by the Central Government. Thus a Christian cemetery belonging to a Mission will continue to be the Mission's responsibility, and a private family burial-ground will remain the concern of the family. Large problems are involved and time is short, but it is hoped that before long it will be possible to make a further announcement on the subject.

British Cemeteries

A CALL TO DUTY

LIEUT.-GENERAL K. M. CARIAPPA, O.B.E.*

WHAT ARE our duties as officers to our country? As soldiers we are the servants of the State, and as such it is our duty to serve our Government loyally at all times. We must refrain from expressing our personal views on the wisdom or otherwise of Government policy. Our duty is to contribute our best to the maintenance of a well disciplined, well trained and happy Army—an Army which can effectively and efficiently support our Government in whatever manner the Government may wish to use us. To attain that object demands much individual effort.

Consider the essential qualities required of us. First, we must have a thorough professional knowledge, which can only be got from constant study and practice. Many of us are now holding appointments and commands very much earlier in our service than we would have done normally. Don't let this go to our heads. Nationalisation of the Forces has got to proceed rapidly. The country's leaders realise that many of us have not the long experience desirable in the jobs we are now given to do, but they have confidence that we will do our best to build up a really first-class Army in time. We must not—we will not—let them down.

Morning, noon and night we must work to keep ourselves morally, mentally, physically and professionally fit. We must not waste our time in useless pursuits. Every minute is valuable. We are being watched with critical eyes not only by other countries, but by our own countrymen. We must show them that the Indian Army will be just as gallant and great under our command as it has been under the command of British officers, if not better.

Good man management is essential. Without it discipline and morale weaken. The comfort of men in barracks and camps; their feeding; their pay and pensions; the welfare of their families—all these are vital factors in man management. Insist on the highest standard of discipline at all times in turn-out, in saluting, in general behaviour. These are matters which, alas, are not at this moment up to pre-war standard, but we can have a very high standard, if we get down to it seriously and earnestly.

We must look to smartening up our men. It must be done by personal example—not by bullying. Occupy their minds with work, study, recreation. Get to know your men; give them the correct background of current happenings so that they do not get the wrong picture; cheer them up. Many of them have suffered badly in the disturbed areas; they may have lost their belongings, their families, their lands. They will have a natural feeling of bitterness and retaliation. It is imperative that you and I, as officers, must ensure that these feelings do not get the better of them.

Tell them that we, the soldiers of the Army, can and must save our country from getting embroiled in wholesale destruction of life and property. We have a sacred duty to mankind in general, and to our countrymen in particular. We

*Condensed from a broadcast talk from Delhi, on 8th October 1947, to the Indian officers of the Indian Army.

must be impartial in our communal feelings when our men are escorting Muslim evacuees, when they are guarding their camps, or when aiding the civil power, we must as soldier be non-communal. The sooner we demonstrate that, the sooner will we be able to help to restore order, both here and in Pakistan.

Only by being impartial can we check the spread of the 'ordeal' through which our country is passing. We must protect the minority communities, for our Government has promised to do so, and we must not let our Government down. It must, of course, be reciprocal, and senior Muslim officers of the Pakistan Army have themselves promised me that they will do their level best to reciprocate. As officers we must restrain our feelings over the losses some of us have suffered; we must not allow those feelings to influence our actions.

It is said that some young officers of our Army have shown unfriendly feelings to some officers of the Pakistan Army now waiting to be sent to Pakistan. That attitude is most unbecoming to us as officers, whether we are of India or of Pakistan. For years we have lived, worked played and fought together. I cannot think how this feeling of comradeship and fellowship, built up over so many years, can suddenly have changed to unfriendliness. It must stop. As officers of the two Armies we must work together for the common good of our respective Dominions. Be as friendly and co-operative as you can. Two wrongs have never made one right. See that Pakistan officers leave India with a friendly feeling towards us and a feeling of genuine regret at this parting.

As officers we must look to our relationship with civilians. Hitherto, the Army has probably been a closed book to the man in the street; in some degree it may even have been so to the politician and the intelligentsia of the country. We must change this. We must endeavour to show the people of the country that the Army is theirs to serve them and help them. Give them every facility and opportunity to understand us, to appreciate us. Take away from their mind the idea that the Army is here only to shoot people during disturbances and that it is an unnecessary financial burden to the State. Mix with them freely; tell them how the Army is organised, housed, fed, trained. Let them see for themselves how we live and what we live for.

Remember that all our weapons, equipment, vehicles and everything else we work with are the property of the State. Always urge your men to see that they are well looked after; stress the importance of avoiding wastage; see that all this Government property is maintained, cared for, and stored really well. Carelessness can result in tremendous losses, and you must remember that the loss is not to the individual, but to the State and therefore to the people.

What of the nationalisation policy? You all know it is the Government policy that nationalisation as far as the executive command of the Army as a whole is concerned should be completed earlier than was originally intended. But for certain reasons it is necessary for us to invite a number of British officers to continue to serve our technical services, such as the R.I.E. and I.E.M.E., until we have enough of our own qualified officers. The offering of short service commissions in these Corps to Indian civilians is under consideration.

As to the selection of Indian officers for Command and Staff appointments, our C-in-C's general policy is to continue past practice. Whilst promotion to higher appointments is by selection, normally an officer is not passed over unless

he is unsuitable. We have two Selection Boards at Army Headquarters, India. One consists of the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, the two Army Commanders, and Major-General Rajendra Singhji. No. 2 Selection Board has the C. G. S. as President, and the A.G., the Q.M.G., the D.M.T., the D.S.D. and the Director of Organisation as members. Both Boards may obtain the opinion of senior Indian officers when required and this is often done.

The Military Secretary's Branch is almost completely nationalised. So you will see that there is now a predominantly Indian representation on these Boards. Although dossiers of officers are consulted, previous "adverse reports" have not always been allowed to influence selections. The claims of officers who are on courses out of India are very much borne in mind by members of the Boards.

Let me utter a word of warning on the subject of present ranks. When the peace-time size of the Army has been fixed in keeping with the role given to the Army and the limits of the Budget allotment, it may be necessary to "downgrade" certain Command and Staff appointments. Thus some of us may find ourselves holding lower ranks. We must not be disappointed if we do. It may not happen, but it is possible that it may.

A few cases may occur of officers being passed over by officers junior to them. The reasons may be many; one may be that officers so passed over may not as yet have applied for permanent or short service commissions, and as appointments have to be filled, those who hold permanent commissions and are found suitable will naturally be promoted. The results of the Yol selections will shortly be announced, and all those graded "V" by the Selection Boards will get regular commissions.

I fully appreciate the feeling of disappointment in the minds of some officers over the new Pay Code. That Code was, however, the result of a unanimous report of a committee which sat for a considerable time; it had among its members a number of Indian service and civilian officers; it studiously considered every aspect of the problem before arriving at its conclusions, so that whatever feeling of disappointment may exist it must be said that its decisions were made after long thought and consideration.

In the training sphere every effort will be made to see that our officers receive training of the highest possible standard. We shall continue to send officers to attend courses in other countries, in the United Kingdom and in America. Many officers are at this moment on courses in Great Britain and there is one at the American Staff College at Leavenworth; one we have recently sent to the Senior Officers' Gunnery Course in Oklahoma, U.S.A.

Later we may send other Indian officers to other countries, but we shall have to seek to overcome the language problem. I would advise young officers to learn Russian, Chinese, French and Spanish in their leisure time. Choose your language and get down to it. Self-help is the best help, and though the Army is anxious to assist don't wait for it. We must have officers who can speak those languages, for we shall have to send abroad Military Attachés, officers to make lecture tours, and officers to attend as students at courses of instruction. The answer is clear. Study foreign languages now; don't wait to be told.

Our Army is outside political parties. We are the servants of the State, and as such we must in no circumstances criticise either our Commanders in the Army or our Government. Our Government has quite sufficient to do without having to be embarrassed with the Army's domestic troubles in such times as these. When normal times return, then we can approach them with our requests and problems. Some officers talk a lot of "hot air" with civilians as to how the Army should be run, how senior officers are not doing their jobs properly and how they would run it if they were in charge. Don't be one of them. Don't indulge in loose talk over other people's affairs. To put it bluntly, do your own job to the best of your ability.

Our duty is to do our work well, and to train our Army to the highest standard possible. Every minute must be devoted to the task. The division of the Army has admittedly made things difficult—but we can and we will overcome it. Thus we shall save our country—yours and mine. Our country has won for itself its freedom, and unrelenting work will ensure that we keep it for all time. It must, however, be work as a team, with everyone doing his level best. Thus and thus only shall we ensure of our giving our best to our Government to provide for the safety and security of this great land of ours.

KEEP THE WHEEL TYRES TURNING

LIEUT.-COLONEL W. I. MOBERLY, O.B.E.

THIS article is based on the experience of an Indian infantry division operating in the poorly roaded country of the Italian Appenines during the winter and autumn months.

Without any doubt the two biggest causes of staff headaches during this period were traffic control and the allocation of accommodation in the forward areas. These two problems were to some extent interdependent, and involved to such an extent with the actual conduct of operations, that it was found essential to centralise responsibility for them in the G Branch of the divisional staff.

The roads in and around the Appenines generally were of two main categories. The main numbered routes were mostly good "two-way" highways, well surfaced and well graded, and presenting no obstruction to traffic except in towns and at demolitions. Once off the main routes, however, a metalled road of "two-way" capacity was rarely met with. The normal road was a narrow gravel-surfaced lane, bordered by grass verges and neglected drains. The gradient construction was generally good but the hilly nature of the country traversed by these roads lent itself to easy and frequent demolitions at bridges, defiles and cliff edges.

Down below on the main routes, which were centrally controlled by higher formation H.Qs., the eventual basis of all road movement was the 13 Corps progeny "road capacity." This largely replaced the pre-war rigidity of timed convoy movement at fixed speeds and densities. Road capacity was estimated in terms of "vehicles per hour" past a point, over the slowest portion of the road, when divided into sectors.

Where no bottle-necks existed full road capacity amounted to the sum of the number of vehicles past a point in one hour, when travelling at the safe speed either of the road, or of the slowest normal vehicle using the road, whichever was lower; and at the normal safe vehicle interval for that speed. Alternatively, on a fully used road, it could be calculated by actual count checking at various points in each sector.

On the biggest routes, working on figures of the maximum permissible speed for loaded 3-tonners, 25 m.p.h., and the safe braking interval for that speed, 25 yards, the capacity figure became approximately 1,500 vehicles per hour. Convoy road allotments were then made in terms of any proportion of this 1,500 vehicles per hour for any number of hours required. It was implicit in the system that the allotted number of vehicles would be fed on to the road evenly spread over the full sixty minutes of each hour.

Once on the road all vehicles moved "free running" at the maximum speed of the road, or, within this speed, of each vehicle. Groups of vehicles unable to maintain the speed of the road were moved by slow convoy at night, or by day at very low density. In the forward areas, this aim of using roads to their full capacity was conditioned by several conflicting factors. The main ones were the absolute priority of claim of the troops engaged in a battle, which

demanding the prevention of traffic congestion and jams; and the vital necessity of avoiding undue damage to unmetalled roads. Both were the source of much staff neuralgia.

Traffic in the forward areas cannot be controlled in watertight compartments or even categorised for priority. There is movement directly concerned with the shuttling to and fro of men and material and of immediate reserves of both for the battle itself. There is casual traffic for liaison and forward reconnaissance; for H.Qs and for supporting arms moving up behind the battle; there is normal establishment and maintenance, both supply and evacuation, and of communication. Its flow depends on many things, such as smooth running on the roads further back; availability and convenience of circuits; demolitions and bottle-necks; road surface states; dust, shelling and enemy observation; and last but by no means least, the standard of road courtesy of unit drivers.

In the Apennines, the condition of the roads was often such that one clumsy, thoughtless, or inconsiderate driver could block a vital road for, literally, hours. This fact obviously made a necessity of not only driving skill and continuous concentration over protracted spells of bad driving conditions, but also of rigid and individual traffic discipline. Generally this last was not at first forthcoming. Too many drivers were too self-reliant, or too selfish of their personal convenience, to stay with the stream and resist the temptation to take a chance over double-banking.

Propaganda concerned with the necessity of knowing and obeying traffic rules fell short of results, because it did not reach the drivers of the innumerable units of neighbouring divisions, and of corps and army troops, who had legitimate occasion to use the roads in the forward areas. Enforcing of traffic discipline was greatly handicapped by the fact that pre-war planning had failed to make provision for an adequate strength of traffic control personnel on the divisional establishment.

Units' strengths were almost throughout depleted to the point where any call for men to do a job not directly concerned with the fighting was regarded as an intolerable imposition. In most divisions this problem, like many others concerned with shortages of man-power, was partially solved by improvising from the divisional anti-tank regiment. Rarely can the motto *Ubique* have been so aptly earned by any gunners.


In the actual battle area, avoidance of damage to road surfaces had initially to give way to the immediate needs of winning the battle, but as heavy damage to wet road verges and drains could often result from a single heavy vehicle trying to move against the traffic, the weighing up of short-term advantages against future handicaps had to figure in the commander's appreciation.

The responsibility for traffic control planning in a forward brigade area was another item of pre-war organisation which was found to be at fault. As one of the many matters requiring the simultaneous and immediate attention of the single Q staff officer of the brigade H.Qs it was liable to be crowded out. In any case, the problem was found to be best treated as part of the whole traffic set-up in the divisional area. On the other hand a forward brigade commander cannot tolerate having only indirect control over a matter closely concerned with the direction of his battle.

A workable solution was found to be to make the divisional provost and traffic control organisation the equivalent of a "supporting arm" with a provost liaison officer living at the H.Qs of the leading brigades. At least one T.C.P.

unit was immediately available to him with reserves at call through the A.P.M. This provost L.O. was particularly concerned with direct liaison with divisional and corps troops engineer units in support of the leading brigades, for the provision of T.C. personnel for fresh commitments created by the engineers opening fresh routes, and bridges on the forward axes.

The place of this link in the divisional T.C. organisation is best seen in a diagram showing the whole set up as finally built up by improvisation, together with a table detailing the allocation of responsibilities.



RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIVISIONAL STAFF

Subject	Planning by	In consultation with	Executive action by	Remarks
Traffic circuits (on paper).	G.S.O.I.	Fwd. Bdes. C.R.E. A.Q.	G. (Ops.) or G. (Mov) e.g. publication of diagrams.	Vital to plan well AHEAD. A.Q. links up with Corps circuits at Div. rear bdy.
Signing.	G.S.O.I. (standard policy).	A.P.M.	Div. Pro. Coy. Fwd. Bdes. in own areas OFF axes routes only.	Pro. Coy. responsibility extended along all Div. and Bde. axes, from Div. rear bdy. to fwd. edge F.D.Ls.
Estimation of road capacities.	A.P.M.		T. C. Ps and Officer T. C. Patrols. Publication by G (Mov).	
Priorities. Convoy road allotments, serial Nos. etc.	G.S.O.I. G. (Ops.)	Fwd. Bdes. A.Q. Comds. Sp. Arms. Staffs of neighbouring formations.	Routine applications and publication by G. (Ops.).	
Organisation of T.C.P. layout and reliefs.	A.P.M.	G.S.O.I. Bdes. C.R.E. D.P.M. (Corps)*	Div. Pro. Coy. T.C. H.Q.s	*for take over of Div. responsibilities from the rear as the battle moved forward.
Discipline and follow up of offenders.	Div. Comd's standing policy.		A.P.M./A.Q.	Reports by T.C.Ps and officer T.C. Patrols.

The background to this organisation was the publication, on a very comprehensive distribution, of Divisional Traffic Control Standing Orders, and of frequent reminders to them. The more important of them are enlarged upon below.

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Road classifications and "single-way" traffic.—Four classifications were used, signed as shown below. These signs were additional to the normal axis and directional signing.

Type of Road.	Classification.	Special signing. (Used against the direction of circuit.)	Remarks.
All weather.	TWO WAY.	GIVE WAY.	At diversions only.
Two-way negligible diversions or long one-way stretches.	TWO WAY MINUS.	NO ENTRY FOR CONVOYS. GIVE WAY.	
Single-way with verges capable of taking jeep traffic when dry.	ONE WAY PLUS.	NO ENTRY EXCEPT JEEPS. NO ENTRY.	Dry weather. Wet weather but unus permanently on jeep drivers. Not to use the road against circuit if verges obviously wet.
Single-way.	ONE WAY.	NO ENTRY. YOU ARE GOING AGAINST THE TRAFFIC. TURN ROUND HERE.	

The aim of these classifications was to allow for occasional journeys being made on as direct routings as possible, consistent with avoidance of damage to road verges. On "two-way minus" and "one-way plus" roads, truck and lorry traffic moving with the circuit had absolute right of way, to the extent that they were required to drive with all four wheels on the berm at all times, even when being overtaken. Short bridges and diversions were normally left unpoliced. Long bridges could be handled by one traffic sentry, provided that he was elevated on a platform to a level above that of the bridge girders. Long diversions or one-way stretches required policing at each end, with either L.T. communication, or a shuttle system of fixing a prominent removable tally sign on to the last vehicle of each group allowed through in either direction.

Alternatively, for a "one-way" axis or portion of an axis, such as a jeep track constructed behind a brigade cross-country advance, a more detailed control lay-out was found necessary. The basis of this control was the division of the track into named sectors, each controlled by a T.C.P. established at a place convenient for holding vehicles off the track. If the track was likely to be used to capacity, up and down set timings were published. These changed at hourly or two hourly intervals according to the length of the track. This length factor also governed the time allowance calculation for the last vehicle of a set timing to clear the length of the track; *e.g.* for a 12 m.p.h. track 3 miles long, "up" traffic timings closed approximately 20 minutes before the opening hour of the next "down" timing.

Speed Limits.—Speed limit signs were used only on stretches of road where the safe limit was less than the normal safe speed for loaded 3-ton trucks, 25 m.p.h. Speed restrictions were applied for a variety of reasons, such as

poor road surface, blind bends, steep downhill gradients, and, most frequently, the dangers of dust blinding, or of dust drawing enemy shelling. "We live here" was a frequently seen adjoinder scrawled on "Shelling watch your dust" warning signs. Speed limit signs when used were used liberally.

Only signed priority vehicles, such as urgent bridging lorries, bulldozer transporters, urgent ambulance cases, motor-cycle convoy shepherds and S.D.R. or liaison officer vehicles on urgent missions, were exempt from speed restrictions, within reasonable limits of safe driving. In addition unit commanders were required to apply local permanent speed limits to individual drivers, or to vehicles in poor mechanical condition, which might not be safely capable of maintaining the normal maximum speed allowed for the type of vehicle. It was found that a restriction to 10 m.p.h. was the minimum practicable. Any attempt to limit speed to 5 m.p.h., except over temporary bridges, merely tended to encourage a normal proclivity towards a disregard of all speed limit signs.

Convoys and overtaking.—Any group of 12 or more vehicles were classed as a convoy. Only two types were run—fast and slow. The basis of fast convoy movement was free running at low density; the maintenance of all vehicles in the convoy of either the maximum speed allowed for loaded 3-tonners, or of the speeds of the various restricted road stretches met with along the convoy route. To allow for overtaking, and for the inevitable heavy weight of casual traffic, only 75% of road capacity was allocated to convoys, and convoy vehicles were required to maintain low density intervals. Trucks and lorries were only permitted to overtake tank transporters or equivalent heavy typed of casual traffic, "lame ducks" or halted single vehicles. No overtaking whatsoever of a stationary traffic stream or convoy was permitted, unless signalled on.

To aid enforcement of this vital rule, all officers were required to report particulars of any vehicle guilty of cutting in to the 15 yards minimum vehicle interval laid down for all halts, unless closed up under C.M.P. or T.C.P. arrangements at blocks. All this was designed to combat the prevailing irresponsibility of the majority of drivers in double banking on the off chance of finding a space farther down the halted stream. Jeeps and staff cars were similarly debarred from overtaking whenever it was apparent that a traffic stream was slowed down on the approaches to a bottleneck.

Any vehicle unable to keep to the speed of the road either travelled independently of the convoy, or in slow convoy, normally at night. So that they could be easily overtaken, within the speed limit, by a loaded 3-tonner, "slow" vehicles were ordered to drive as far as possible off the crown of the road, at a sufficient distance from the next vehicle in front and at a speed sufficiently below the speed of the road. Further, a driver's mate had invariably to be carried to assist by "give way" signals, to his own and to the overtaking driver, in promoting this easy overtaking.

The sole drawback encountered to fast convoy running by this method was the risk of vehicles getting lost by straggling. This was minimised by efficient directional signing and by units deploying the maximum number of motor-cycle convoy shepherds. These leapfrogged through to act as traffic pointsmen at any tricky points on the route, especially in towns. Breakdowns interfering with a traffic stream were initially man-handled, by all available bodies organised by any officer in the vicinity, to the nearest available place on the road where a stationary vehicle could stand clear of the stream, or, failing that, jettisoned into a ditch, or over a cliff. Recovery of breakdowns normally had to await the hours of reduced traffic flow late in the night.

Directional Signing.—Route signing was primarily based on the formation shoulder flash sign and unit serial number. The divisional main circuit for administrative traffic was signed as the divisional axis; in the divisional sign with black directional arrows for the UP route, and red arrows for the DOWN route back to the rear areas. Subsidiary circuits were either named, *e.g.*, Blue Route, Yellow Route, etc., and signed with arrows of the appropriate colour, or given symbol names, *e.g.*, Ace Route, Bottle Route, etc., and the symbol coupled with the formation sign and normal axis black and red arrows.

Changes of direction were normally signed "in triplicate." A warning arrow several hundred yards short of the junction *e.g.* :—



etc; an executive sign on the junction itself; and, at the nearest turn-round beyond the junction, a modified "Out of bounds" cum-axis sign with "Turn round here" wording, signifying a missed turning.

Lower formations and units generally superimposed their own signing along the divisional and brigades' axes. It was found necessary, in order to reduce the bewildering multiplicity of signs at and on the approaches to road junctions, to forbid the placing of brigade and unit signs on junctions, except at the actual junctions where their routes took off from the axis of the higher formation. This veto, of course, did not apply to straight stretches of the route between junctions.

One benefit of this emphasis on signing was that route briefing could be limited to instructions as to how to recognise the particular road junction where brigades' units' routes left the main axis. As an additional precaution all drivers using a route not already well known to them had to carry a route card, made out in terms of the axes to be followed, and showing the final destination in block capitals.

A further requirement in connection with signing technique was insistence that all unit drivers should be specially trained to recognise, in English, the standard speed limit and traffic warning signs such as "No Entry"; "Jeeps Only"; "Crater Ahead"; "Dust Shelling"; "All traffic LEFT"; "Bad Bends"; etc., and to understand "T.C. language" *e.g.*, common standardised gestures, signals and phrases used when assisting a driver to manoeuvre in a confined space.

It was found necessary for the Divisional Commander personally to demand co-operation from all unit drivers in accepting without demur T.C. personnel's orders, and arrangements on the spot for sorting out emergencies such as traffic jams; and to suppress an evident proneness towards arrogance on the part of such personnel, especially officer drivers. In this connection the U. S. Army appeared to have extended into their military T.C. set-up the "take-a-ticket" powers of their civil traffic policemen, and to have evolved a system of expediting disposal of such charges without multiple correspondence.

Although this may seem to amount to assigning dictatorial authority to military traffic policemen, it is no more than is commonly accepted in civil life. Fines, as the most efficacious treatment for traffic offences, are recognised in the Highway Codes of most countries, and in the Army Act where "other ranks" are concerned. Officers, however, when guilty of motoring misdemeanours, have under present regulations to be brought, with due formality and great waste of time, all the way up to the Divisional Commander's mat. And there they may only receive punishment affecting their seniority or military reputation, instead of their, for the non-regulars anyway, slightly more vulnerable pockets.

Another difficulty that was never satisfactorily overcome, owing to lack of luminous paint, was the lighting of signs in forward areas where night driving had to be done without lights. The collective conscience of the soldiery presented no obstacles to the indiscriminate removal of electric batteries or hurricane lamps for more personal uses, and no less lootable apparatus existed. American equipment was adequate in this respect, and included excellent luminous painted bend warnings, dry cell miniature flood lamps and neon intermittent flash lights.

Responsibilities for signing.—The A.P.M. kept the divisional axis signed right up to the forward edge of the battle. Divisional provost signed all named subsidiary routes and circuits appearing in the divisional traffic plan. In the same way, the C.R.E. handled the mine-signing of all axes, main laterals, and planned circuits. To assist uniformity all mine-signs were supplied by R.E., and only the four standard wordings were used: "Safe Lane"; "Verges Checked"; "Verges NOT Checked" and "Road NOT Checked Beyond Here". Signs were reinforced by white tape fencing when the presence of mines was suspected.

Brigades and units were responsible for directional signing only on the routes to their own H.Qs; for signing, with a one-way arrow, all vehicle exits from a H.Qs area or vehicle harbour which debouched on to a one-way road; and for traffic-sentrying exits on to any axis route, whenever a vehicle was emerging. They were also responsible for the mine-signing of all roads and tracks brought into use by them. Periodical mines forecast traces were issued by G (Ops.), based on G (Intelligence) information, compiled in the preceding weeks from interrogation, captured enemy documents and air reconnaissance reports.

Responsibilities for road maintenance.—Demands for sapper assistance in the Italian campaign always far exceeded the capacity of the available engineer units, in spite of their cheerful acceptance of hours of work and continuous periods of employment, which appeared entirely to ignore the normal cycle of refit and rest interludes allowed to other front line units.

This fact led to the enforcing of certain brigade and unit responsibilities for the maintenance of roads and tracks in their own areas. Unit areas obviously did not include long stretches of road between scattered sub-units, or between units' "B" and "A" transport echelon areas. The intention was to make units responsible for "scrubbing their own front door steps" by the use of local fatigues for non-technical tasks. These included all minor repairs, such as the filling in of potholes and disused tank crossings, etc., with road metal locally available from demolished buildings; the keeping of road surfaces clear of mud and snow slush; and most vital of all, the clearing and maintaining of road drains. The organisation of a working party from all available bodies to do an unskilled road repair job on any sudden road break that might be holding up traffic, was made an obligation to be assumed by any officer on the spot.

Units' vehicle harbours were entirely their own concern. This was particularly so in work such as the widening of a corner to ensure access to any axis route or harbour without the necessity of backing; the bridging of vehicle entrances; and the construction, immediately inside the exit, of a hard standing to facilitate the removal, before emerging on to the road proper, of wheel chains, the use of which was often essential to all movement within the harbour.

A further complication of road maintenance inevitably occurred during the building up periods for fresh local offensives at the end of semi-static pauses in the advance. The lack of ground suitable for cross-country movement by tanks, and of alternative road circuits, caused by the fact that the line of advance ran directly against the grain of the hill ranges, caused a perpetual clash of

interests between the supporting arms and the engineers. Any movement of heavy tracks along a wet hill road would largely write-off the results of hours of sapper labour, especially on corners.

The only solution arrived at was to move the tanks right up into the forward areas in the very early stages, and then to re-make the road behind them. This was not a popular solution with anyone except the sappers. The infantry objected to the unwelcome attentions paid to tank engine warming noises by the enemy gunners; and the armour found that their tank maintenance, living routine, and reliefs were all complicated by residence in the F.D.Ls.

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To summarise the system of control evolved. Co-ordination was centralised in the G.S.O.1; execution in the improvised G (Mov.) Section, on paper; and in the A.P.M. on the roads. Routine applications, such as for convoy road allotments, were made to G. (Mov.). Any suggestions for change in policy, temporary or otherwise, or demands which conflicted with standing routine were dealt with by the G.S.O.1 personally. Signing and co-ordination of all T.C. arrangements was the A.P.M.'s responsibility, assisted by the Os.C. provost company and T.C. H.Qs.

Arrangements were zoned in two "belts". From the F.D.Ls back to, normally, the most convenient lateral on the line of the forward brigades' H.Qs was the brigade belt. Behind this the divisional belt extended to the divisional rear boundary, as laid down by corps H.Qs. As a matter of principle, the divisional H. Q. G. staff kept forward brigades informed of projected moves into the brigade belt, in all cases where units (other than small detachments) did not move in under the orders of the brigade or as part of the brigade tactical plan. To allow for this, all units were required to register with G main division as early as possible, and in any case before committing a detailed reconnaissance party into it, warning of their designs on any forward area. G main division then obtained for the unit, by reference to the brigade concerned, either the brigade "OK", or, if complications existed, a date for direct discussions at brigade H.Qs.

In addition, the unit was given any relevant information on restrictions on movement in the forward areas imposed by the brigade H.Qs on either the reconnaissance, or the occupation, on account of tactical considerations. Normally during inter-brigade reliefs, or at any time in emergency, Units were entitled to contact brigade H.Qs direct. The latter were responsible in all cases for maintaining an up-to-date register of accommodation and road allotment booking, and for keeping G (Mov./Accdn.) main division immediately informed. Corps H. Q. was asked to work on a similar system for forward moves of corps and army troops into the divisional belt. This procedure was resorted to after a period of almost uninterrupted ululation arising from uncontrolled "muscling in" by units, in search of the hard standings for vehicles which was the paramount consideration in deciding on winter accommodation in Italy. On two occasions a troop of 7.2 howitzer pieces, caught up in the wheels of a high level move, arrived in on the site of the Divisional Commander's caravan on the day after his arrival!

It was also made necessary by the laudable urge of commanders at all levels to site their H.Qs on the forward edge of their domain. One brigade H.Q. Christmas card depicted vividly the tactical soundness of their defence platoon, who were shown defending the forward edge of a newly-acquired brigade H.Qs farm house against a Boche counter attack, and the rear edges against

infiltration by a divisional H.Qs accommodation reconnaissance party! In addition, the system quickened the routine procedure of adjusting with corps H.Qs., the divisional rear boundary when the extension forward of T. C. responsibilities by an advance looked like out-running the divisional T. C. resources.

On the ground these resources were distributed between T.C. H.Qs., T.C. patrols, and T.C.Ps (posts), the latter self-contained for accommodation and moves. Suggested ideal requirements of personnel and equipment for a standard T.C.P. are given at the end of this article. No mention has been made of the necessity, peculiar to a mixed language division, of duplicating British and Indian personnel.

The only non-standard component mentioned is the "block-breaker" motor cycle flying squad of three men included in each T.C.P. These were summonable through T.C.Ps or T.C. patrols, normally to assist, with expert advice and assistance, any officer in charge of a local traffic jam-breaking operation. All officers were specifically required by the Divisional Commander to display energy in investigating and sorting out the cause of any traffic block in which they might find themselves involved; but it was found that the breaking of a two-way block was a job requiring both commonsense and drive, and some knowledge of how to set about it, if confusion was not to be worse confounded.

T.C. officer patrols were normally found on an as required basis from outside divisional T.C. resources, and worked on the set *pro forma* given at the end of this article. The purpose of these patrols was partially to enable some check to be kept on the collective traffic discipline of individual units' drivers; and partially to assist T.C. H.Qs in deploying resources to any sector of the divisional traffic circuits where a breakdown had occurred, or appeared imminent. They were normally composed of one officer on a motor cycle, paired off with one wireless operator also on a motor cycle.

The basic considerations in the siting of T.C.Ps were found to be road space, or hard standing off the road in the immediate vicinity, to allow of a traffic stream in either direction being conveniently held while an emergency was being sorted out; and availability of L/T communications to T.C. H.Q. at main divisional H.Q., with the minimum of laying necessary by the T.C. H.Q. linesmen. A further requisite, which was not attainable without considerable efforts on the part of provost and T.C. officers, was adequate briefing of T.C. pointsmen. T.C.Ps must be kept supplied by the staff with up-to-date details of "Loc. Stats." and traffic circuits in map form; and pointsmen must be capable of giving clear and accurate route-finding directions.

It is a legacy of the peace-time efficiency of "our wonderful London policemen", and of the motorists' associations, that Army drivers seem to expect from any man with a provost or T.C. armband answers befitting the encyclopædic local knowledge of an A.A. patrolman, rather than the dumb sympathy of the "stranger in these parts myself" so inevitably met with by lost drivers.

The length of this article may invite comment that a comparatively minor aspect of warfare seems to have become over-organised. Far from it. Efficient traffic control arrangements in difficult country will sooner or later affect not only the fighting ability of the forward troops, but also the comfort and convenience of every man in the divisional area. Furthermore, the effect on morale of the working of Movement Control throughout the Army seems to have been consistently underrated.

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SUGGESTED ESTABLISHMENT FOR A T.C.P.

(Administered centrally by T.C. H.Qs., but self-contained for accommodation and movement.)

<u>Personnel.</u>	<u>Number.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
N.C.Os	.. 2.	Trained m/cyclists.
Pointsmen	.. 8.	May be L/Cpls.
Block breaker m/c squad	.. 3.	Ditto.
Storeman cook	.. 1.	Trained in T.C. and telephone duties.
Cook	.. 1.	Ditto.
Telephone orderlies	.. 2.	Trained in line repair work.
W/T operators	.. 2.	
Drivers	.. 2.	

All trained in the use of mine detectors.

Equipment and Transport.

15 cwt. truck	.. 2.	
Trailer 10 cwt.	.. 1.	
M/cycles	.. 4.	
Radio set	.. 1.	Equivalent of Bn. set, free tuning.
Telephone hand set	.. 1.	
Tent 180 lb.	.. 2.	
Tent 80 lb.	.. 1.	
Blackboard.	.. 1.	
Mine detector.	.. 1.	
Bailey bridge pointsman platforms.	.. 2.	

Signs, tape, lighting equipment, etc.

Personnel attached from T.C. H.Qs, on an as required basis.

Sign painter.

Breakdown vehicle.

Signal linemen.

Medical orderly.

Additional pointsmen.

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PRO FORMA AIDE-MEMOIRE FOR T.C. PATROL OFFICERS.

All applicable details obtainable will be reported, quoting time, place, unit serial number, vehicle number, and/or driver's name; degree of offence, etc., of any instance seen of the following traffic crimes:

1. Speeding. Exceeding the speed limit either of the road, or of the class of vehicle.
2. Abuse of priority signing. Empty vehicle, or vehicle with non-priority load, etc.
3. Flagrantly bad driving. Cutting in; failure to give way, etc.
4. Overtaking or double-banking.
 - (i) By equivalent vehicles in a traffic stream moving at a reasonable speed.
 - (ii) By ANY vehicle of a stationary traffic stream, unless signalled on.
 - (iii) By jeeps and staff cars of a traffic stream approaching a bottleneck.
5. Moving against the circuit. By any vehicle except jeeps and staff cars on "one-way plus" roads.
6. Free halting on a single-way road. By any convoy of vehicles; by single vehicles for more than 3 minutes, except on a two-way portion of a single-way road provided a sentry is posted.
7. Failure to post a traffic sentry on a halted or broken down vehicle.
8. Failure by the occupants of a vehicle to debus immediately to manhandle a broken down vehicle off the road; or to assist a vehicle over steep or bad going.
9. Failure by "lame duck" or awkward slow vehicles to give every assistance to normal traffic wishing to pass on a clear road.
10. Any case of engine failure causing a block, and obviously attributable to bad maintenance.
11. Any case of a vehicle being obviously not roadworthy.
12. Any case of unit vehicle exits on to an axis route being used without a traffic sentry.
13. ALL cases of vehicle harbour or H.Qs vehicle exits to an axis route which (a) compel a vehicle to back while getting in or out or (b) have been constructed without any concern for damage to road drains.
14. Particulars of stretches of roads running alongside a unit tpt. echelon or H.Qs area which are not adequately ditched or drained, kept free of mud, standing water and potholes.

I.M.A. CRICKETERS VISIT GREAT BRITAIN

MAJOR J. P. DALVI

THE Indian Military Academy Cricket Team toured the United Kingdom in June-July 1947. We travelled about 15,000 miles and spent a fair amount of money in the process. Our many friends, old and new, are probably interested to know whether the time and money spent was worth it. They would like to know what we thought of England; what did the English think of us; what were our impressions of the places we visited and whether we achieved anything worthwhile? This article is an attempt to answer these questions, and in so doing, to place on record our sincere thanks to those in India, who made this tour possible and to the people in England who made it so memorable and enjoyable an experience for every member of the team.

The tour was a purely private enterprise undertaken in the first place to play a challenge cricket match against our opposite numbers in England, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. The second, but not secondary object, was to take a group of young Indians to see the English on their own ground and thus try to appreciate their true character. At the same time the Englishman would meet us and get to know, first hand, what an ordinary young Army officer in embryo from India was like.

I think it is fair to say that the average Briton does not know much about India or Indians. This is largely due to insufficient individual private contact, and to the fact that literature on India available to him, is written mainly by ex-soldiers and administrators and consequently often not entirely unbiased. We in India do not know the Englishman, his troubles and difficulties; to us he has in most cases appeared as the unapproachable *sahib* who ran this country exclusively for his own benefit. We were not presumptuous enough to think that in six weeks we could change this century-old mutual ignorance. But we did hope to sow the seed of better understanding, though realising that our audience would be small, and perhaps not fully representative of the whole of the British Isles; at the same time, we hoped to come back with a more realistic and tolerant attitude towards the Englishman.

Although the tour was not sponsored or financed by the Army, we owe a great debt to the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck, for giving us his private blessing and identifying himself with the project by donating a sum of money from his funds. Incidentally, the team was very elated to receive a telegram through the India Office from the Chief, wishing us the best of luck on our arrival in England. The India Office helped us in every way. They obtained our ration cards and arranged for some discreet publicity. It was very reassuring to know that the full weight and resources of this vast organisation were at our disposal.

At this juncture it is proper to mention the encouragement and financial assistance we received from the Cricket Board of Control for India. By donating Rs. 5,000/- towards our tour expenses the Board showed a real interest in the encouragement and development of Indian cricket. It was good to know that this daring venture had the support of the highest cricket authority in

India. This augurs well for the future of Indian cricket. Great credit is due to Mr. A. S. DeMello, the President of the Board of Control, for representing our case to the Board. Finally, we thank all those who contributed money towards our tour fund so kindly and generously.

But however widespread and heartening the support received in India, the real success of the tour naturally depended upon the reception awaiting the team in England. We were not disappointed. We were well received and often overwhelmed with hospitality and kindness. Everything was done to ensure that the visit was comfortable and interesting.

Our first experience of England was the docks and customs sheds Liverpool. To the Indian eye, the most noticeable difference between Bombay and Liverpool was the absence of the swarm of coolies to which we are accustomed. Electric trolleys and a few sturdy stevedores proved sufficient to clear the holds and get our baggage through the customs to our train. Euston Station is not the best place to introduce London to a foreigner. It is a dark and dingy place rather like Calcutta, but about fifty years older. We missed the noise normally associated with an Indian station and were glad to note that there were no people strewn all over the platform.

But Euston Station was soon forgotten as we got down to the serious business of practising at the nets and exploring the sights and sounds of London. For the first two days we were forced indoors by the weather and had to practice at Sandham and Gover's Indoor School. For the remainder of the week we played at Lords—the home of cricket. As far as overseas cricketers are concerned, this privilege is normally accorded to Test players only and we all realised how unique our experience was. For this never-to-be-forgotten opportunity, we are deeply indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel R. Aird, the Assistant Secretary of the M. C. C., and the M. C. C. Committee. During this period of practice at Lords we were allowed free use of the pavilion, and watched several county matches.

The Long Room at Lords is justly world famous. But to feel the sense of tradition which is almost overpowering, you have to see for yourself the paintings and photographs of famous incidents, personalities and teams of the past. You find these in the Long Room, the bar and even on your way up to the dressing-rooms on the first floor. They constitute a valuable and interesting link with the past. Not content with affording us practice facilities, the M. C. C. invited us to an official luncheon party at which Lord Lucan, an ex-president of the M. C. C., presided, and which Mr. Findlay, the present secretary of the M. C. C., attended. We were most grateful to Lord Lucan for welcoming us to England and for saying so many pleasant things about us.

Our arrival at Lords was accepted almost as casually as if the sight of 14 Indians appearing at the doors was an everyday affair. Presumably our cricket bags were sufficient credentials because nobody asked any questions or seemed surprised. At the nets on the other hand we received a real Test Team welcome. We soon became the main target of the many schoolboy autograph hunters who seem to haunt Lords! From the zeal with which they sought our autographs they must have thought we were a Test Team; and judging from the speed and willingness with which we signed our names we evidently felt like one!

During our first week in London we visited the Houses of Parliament. Brigadier A. R. Low, Conservative M. P. for Blackpool and a Member of the Parliamentary Mission to India in 1946, arranged this and took us round himself. We all owe him a debt of gratitude for the trouble he took to make our visit interesting and in particular for getting the team an opportunity to hear a debate.

We saw the old, bombed-out House of Commons and the baptismal font where the Black Prince was christened. Having passed through the magnificent main hall with its paintings, depicting some famous incidents in the life of the House, we came into a twentieth-century scene—policemen, people checking passes, and telephone booths.

From the main lobby we passed through many corridors, occasionally peeping (for we never stayed long in any one room) into rooms and halls, and were shown everything. The Supreme Court, presided over by Lord Simon, was in session and we heard a few words of high-level legal argument. Eminent lawyers all, they were trying to decide whether the words "services" and "attendances" provided by a landlord had the same breadth of meaning. Everything was done quietly and meticulously. The law in England does not take any chances. All aspects of the case must be argued freely before judgment is made. The process is long but the result is just.

The library was a long rectangular room. It seemed very comfortable with all its leather-covered chairs, and tables fitted with reading-lamps. But this was no lounge, for the book-cases round the walls, fitted with copies of Hansard and the laws and enactments passed by Parliament through the ages, showed clearly that this place was for reference. It must be a great boon to all M. Ps. You will even find a copy of every issue of the *London Times* from its inception! So there is no excuse for any M. P. to make vague, unsubstantiated remarks on any matters of precedent or law, at least.

The actual debating chamber is an extraordinarily small hall. I have since been told that all the 600 odd members cannot attend at the same time. Presumably this has the effect of making debates more intimate. It is not the loudest speaker who is effective but the one with the best facts or arguments. The seats seemed unbelievably uncomfortable, possibly this is an insurance against members sleeping through uninteresting debates. During the short time we listened to a debate on the Ulster Government Emergency Powers Bill, there were a few members making a creditable attempt at snatching forty winks! Mr. Anthony Eden walked in, nodded to a few friends, listened for a short while and walked out again. I was glad that we were not too sophisticated to be thrilled at seeing a world-famous figure in person. From the Houses of Parliament it is a few minutes walk to Westminster Abbey. This historic place of worship with its famous chapels, tombs and stained glass windows, cannot be appreciated in a thirty-five minute walk around.

The following day we motored to Sandhurst to witness the ceremony of the presentation of new colours to the R.M.A. by His Majesty King George VI. We drove through some beautiful countryside. Small fields, hedges, country tea-shops, public-houses and country clubs passed with bewildering swiftness. There are no vast expanses in South England. It was a cold, grey day but the historic nature of the ceremony more than made up for personal discomfort. The parade was very good despite the atrocious weather conditions and reflects great credit on all concerned. My most vivid impression at Sandhurst was of that unique institution—the British Crown. General Matthews, Commandant of the Royal Military Academy thanked his Majesty for the honour he had done them in presenting new colours. He pledged the loyalty of all those present and all who in future would pass through the Academy. Governments may come and go, social systems and ideas change with the times but the British will always feel a sense of solidarity and continuity through their King. It is the

King's Army, the King is the people and the people are represented by the King. On our return from Sandhurst we attended the monthly reunion of the Indian Community at India House, at the invitation of Brigadier (now Lieut-General) Cariappa. We might have been in the Imperial Delhi Gymkhana—with the saris, bearers, Indian refreshments and Indian friends.

Wellington College is a first-class English Public School. Modern by English standards, it has separate buildings for the various Houses. The grounds are vast and lovely. Set right out in the country (like most public schools) there is an undefinable atmosphere of an institution that turns out men of character rather than matriculates. My stay was very short, and I realise I am not in a position to give any reasoned judgment or make any shrewd observations on the public school system, but within this limitation I would like to say that the few schoolboys I met impressed me by their poise, good manners and sense of discipline. These qualities, generally speaking, are lacking in our schoolboys. Character building is at least as important as imparting knowledge—we shall have to appreciate this fundamental fact soon. Environment is so vital in education; this was proved in everything we saw during our fleeting visit.

And so to Sandhurst for the match of the tour. There are two colleges at the R. M. A. called, logically enough, Old College and New College. The cadets live and work in these two main buildings. The late war has produced the usual crop of temporary hutted buildings; I hope these are but a passing disfiguration. Sport is well catered for; there are beautiful grounds, professionals for coaching in the major games, and a large up-to-date gymnasium. The R. M. A. is particularly lucky in having a natural lake right in the middle of the grounds, and not more than 100 yards from the main drill square. We stayed a night there and can vouch for the comfort of the cadets' quarters, and for the excellence of the conveniences provided for them. In England, people realise the value of having schools and colleges in the country away from the din and distraction of cities.

Very fortunately our visit coincided with that of the Commandant of West Point, General Maxwell Taylor, late Commander of the famous 101 U. S. Airborne Division. The General showed great interest in us, and in a very witty after-dinner speech, said he was still not convinced we had actually travelled 12,000 miles to play a cricket match. Obviously there's more to cricket than meets the American eye. With his quick perception he realised the tremendous value of such visits in establishing good will. Perhaps one day it will be possible to arrange triangular meetings.

General Matthews, after welcoming us, said he was proud to be the first Commandant to have the honour of entertaining us on our first visit. He ended on a humorous note by admitting that he was rather surprised at our cricketing skill, and confessed that he was "sweating" at certain stages of the game. The match was appropriately enough a draw, honours were even and the issue remains undecided.

But the real success of our visit was in the social contact between the cadets of the R. M. A. and ourselves. Our game was played in the best traditions of amateur sport; we liked their good manners, hospitality and efforts to give us a good time; I think they enjoyed having us if only for the obvious delight we showed at being with them. They were, I hope, impressed by our general bearing and behaviour. It is impossible to describe vividly the friendliness and good relations between the two sets of young men—from two different countries but

not different in upbringing and interests. It was fascinating to note how much we had in common—not superficially, but deep down.

I hope I am not exaggerating when I say that Sandhurst will long remember us as we shall remember them. We have established a bond between our institutions. More such visits will ensure that the future officers of both Armies will get nearer understanding each other and, whether or not we remain in the Commonwealth, this understanding is vital. This is not to suggest that cricket tours are the sole means of achieving this object; there are many other ways; the main thing is to get together, live together and play together. We must ~~not~~ leave Sandhurst without thanking the officers of the R.M.A. staff for their hospitality to the officers of our team. It was perfect, and we hope to have the privilege of entertaining General Matthews and some of his staff and cadets in our own country.

The test match against Sandhurst over, we ventured further afield for our cricket and sight-seeing. At Nottingham, we had our longest single visit and saw as many places as was physically possible—from a dairy farm to a cricket-bat factory. Nottingham is a large town (with some 300,000 inhabitants), prosperous and very progressive. As usual in England, you find the mixture of the very old and the very new. The oldest public-house in England is ten yards away from the most modern police station you will find anywhere; narrow, old lanes lead you into a twentieth-century town square. One of the two leading hotels overlooks the railway marshalling-yards. Possibly the hotel was built first. The hotel we stayed in was very comfortable, well up to the standard of the best in India. The great difference is in the service. There are no room-bearers, one maid looks after 10-15 rooms. At meals, two or three waiters are all you will find and they manage to feed 40-50 guests quite speedily.

For the first two days we were the guests of the Nottingham City Police. The word "hospitality" will always be associated in our minds with Captain C.F. Popkess, O.B.E., Chief Constable of Nottingham. Without actually tucking us into bed there was nothing more he could have done for us. We are unlikely ever to forget him. After our cricket match, a most enjoyable affair, we had dinner at Police Headquarters, which is a modern building but very tastefully furnished. The wives and daughters of some of the police officers assisted in preparing and serving the meal—a homely touch that made a deep impression on us, something we will not see for a long time yet in India. Obviously there is no loss of prestige in serving your guests personally. Dinner was followed by a visit to a music-hall. The entrance of 14 Indians surrounded by a galaxy of high police officials must have caused a flutter in the theatre. We enjoyed the show judging from the raucous laughter emanating from Mohoni (our Captain) and the others. ■

On the following day we were taken round the C. I. D. laboratories by the Chief Constable himself. Any intending criminals in our party made a new appreciation of their chances while half way round the scientific paraphernalia of crime detection! Seriously, I think every young citizen should be shown round a police headquarters to make him realise the odds against a criminal getting away with any crime, as this will have a valuable deterrent effect. From Police Headquarters we went to Trent Bridge, the famous cricket ground. The stands here are very modern but the pavilion itself is small. From the Committee Room, we watched Nottinghamshire play Gloucestershire.

In the afternoon we visited Mr. Ashton Smith Milne's dairy farm at Southwell, near Nottingham. This was not a model or experimental farm and yet

we found it was run exactly like a Military Dairy Farm. No crops were grown here and the grass was used to feed the cows; in summer by allowing them to graze and in winter by giving them artificially-dried grass. A very simple machine dries the grass. The finished product is claimed to have immeasurably more vitamins than hay—the old winter feed. In our country, with monsoon grass and dry months, the large-scale use of such machinery will solve our greatest cattle feeding problem—the scarcity of grass in the summer.

An English cow is incredibly big and fleshy with large udders. This is due to the fact that breeding is done scientifically—cows are bred to yield milk. Science is also called in to help provide disease-free milk. Cow-sheds are hygienic; the cows are inoculated regularly against cattle diseases; and, finally, the milk is untouched by hand from cow to bottle. Records and statistics of weekly, monthly and annual yields are maintained separately for each cow. Farming in England is a science. This visit was an eye-opener to most of us who come from villages ourselves.

From the farm we drove to Sir William Starkey's country home, Norwood Park, with its fine buildings and acres of orchards. Unfortunately, due to rain, we were prevented from going over the vast grounds. The once attractive lawns were now overgrown with vegetables, and the park had been ploughed up as part of the war effort. I am told there are comparatively few such country family houses left in England. In these days of socialism and high income tax they are difficult to maintain. But the people bred by such families and houses have helped to make England great. The many portraits of those now gone must act as a kind of stern conscience, reminding the present generation of what has been done in the past, and what is demanded of the present and future.

We had an enormous English tea, enormous despite austerity, and chatted freely with the local gentry. We discussed architecture, flowers, farming and politics. Everyone was very interested in India and her future. I think we surprised some by our general knowledge and we came off well in the discussion. We gave some of them a new angle from which to view India. My most vivid impression of this visit was of the English rationing system. Sugar is scarce in England and we used saccharine. The rich and the poor suffer shortages to the same extent. In the evening, we were honoured by an invitation from the Lord Mayor of Nottingham to drinks at the Council House. This invitation was appreciated by all of us, as was the Lord Mayor's action in showing us his chain of office.

Our last morning in Nottingham was spent at Gunn and Moore's bat factory. Our guide was Mr. Sherwin, the manager of the works. Looking at this pleasant, middle-aged man you would never think he is one of the world's foremost authorities on bat-making. By looking at a willow tree he can tell whether it is worth £150 or £20, and as he has been in business for 20 years, it is reasonable to deduce that he has not erred often! We saw how a bat is made from a lump of wood to the finished product—all done by hand by master craftsmen. Some had 30 years practical experience. Apprentices start at fifteen or sixteen and spend the first year stamping the maker's name on each bat. This is done to ensure that they learn the "feel" of a bat. Mr. Sherwin very generously allowed us a bat each as a memento of our visit. After Nottingham we went to Bournemouth, to play the Bournemouth and District team. It was an enjoyable affair but our visit was too short for detailed comment.

Here then, are some of the places we saw and the people we met "semi-officially." People were glad to have us with them; they said so in no uncertain

terms, and we were glad to meet them. But the most satisfying success of our trip was the natural meetings between ourselves and casual strangers in public-houses, restaurants, tubes, buses and elsewhere. We had no ulterior motive of selling India to them, and they were chiefly concerned with our enjoying ourselves in their country. Their interest in Indian affairs is astonishing—their ignorance is amazing. I think some of us were rather pleasantly surprised to note that the Englishman in his home is kind, hospitable and ever ready to help you; and I think we disillusioned many of the ill-informed people we met by confessing to the complete absence of tigers in our main cities and streets, and acknowledging ignorance of the technique of the rope-trick!

What has England meant to us? This is a difficult question to answer considering the duration of our stay. Even Hitler with his highly organised espionage system failed miserably in his assessment of the English character. But what I can do is to jot down some random reflections of the things we liked and the things we remember.

We liked the theatre. You have a feeling that you are peeping through a keyhole at something actually happening; everything is so real. The cinema seldom has this effect. The musical comedies we saw were inclined to produce cheap laughter by frank vulgarity and did not compare with good musical films. Operas are tuneful and spectacular but inclined to be a strain, as it is difficult to follow the sung dialogue. We liked the English tea-shops. You have the feeling of having tea in a private home. Usually you are served tea by the proprietress who trusts you to declare what you have eaten. This is an impressive demonstration of the honesty of the average man. We liked the efficient underground system which was inexpensive, speedy and reliable. We appreciated the concern felt by most Londoners if they saw any of us looking the least bit lost in their metropolis. They invariably offered to direct or help us.

This list could be stretched to fill a book but space is short and we must come to the things we shall always keep in our memories. We remember the many ex-Indian Army officers and other ranks we met who insisted on speaking Urdu to us. Whether it was just good manners or genuine feeling we do not know, but they all wanted to return to India. I, personally, shall always remember the English workman who insisted on buying me an ice-cream at the Hammersmith Palais de Danse because he felt he was my host. Who can ever forget the staff of the Officers' Club, Cromwell Road, for looking after us so well? We could not have been treated any better in our homes, and there is no higher praise we can give to a hostel.

There is a tremendous amount of work to be done before our two nations can re-establish mutual respect and understanding. Our cultures are different but that is no insurmountable barrier. Prejudices die hard and long established beliefs and teachings are difficult to change. The obvious place to start building anew is from the foundation—let the ordinary people on both sides meet freely and as friends. The way has been shown but it remains for others to follow. Private clubs could go across; there could be an exchange of students; colleges can take out parties of disciplined students to meet the English. The ways and means are endless. Further initiative is required on the part of those in India who have the interests of Indo-British relations at heart.

MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICES IN WAR

LIEUT.-COLONEL B. L. RAINA, I.A.M.C.

THE soldier is the most vital factor in war. In the not too distant past his lot, when wounded in the field was far from satisfactory. The rapid development of medical services; the recent advances in preventive medicine; the employment of surgical, neuro-surgical and transfusion units in the forward areas; the evolution of air evacuation of casualties; and the discoveries of D.D.T., the sulphanilamide group of drugs and penicillin have completely revolutionised the care of the fighting soldier.

He can be kept fit, protected from disease and provided with all the help medical science can offer. Specialists are within his call. The doctors, nurses and medical personnel follow him wherever he goes whether it be in wild rocky mountains, burning desert sand, snow-clad hills or steaming tropical jungle. The medical personnel live with soldiers like soldiers. There is just one difference. When the soldiers after an engagement get a little rest, the medical staff remain busy healing the wounded.

It is not often realised that troops operating in the field, especially in the tropics, are threatened more by disease than by the enemy. In April 1942, a large railway project was rendered ineffective as 90% of the labour was struck down with malaria. In the same year, a quarter of the force on the Assam front became casualties from a small winged enemy—the *Anopheles minimus* mosquito. In 1942, the troops in Burma and Eastern Army suffered 1,850 sickness casualties per 1,000. No army can go through this and win battles! The Medical Services, who had not been warned to expect war of the type and extent that developed, quickly took steps which were destined to be a major factor in the success of the Allies against the Japanese.

115 anti-malaria units and the anti-malaria research organisation in India took over the great task of fighting malaria. In Manipur Base alone 600 miles of drainage was constructed and maintained during 1944-45; over four million tons of D.D.T. and over 800 million tablets of mepacrine were distributed. All the troops East of the Brahmaputra were given suppressive mepacrine. The malaria rate dropped rapidly. In 1945 malaria incidence was reduced to one-tenth of what it was in 1943. Over the whole Allied Land Forces South East Asia, the malaria sick rate dropped from 3.65 per 1,000 to 0.20 per 1,000. The success was mainly due to the most rigid anti-malaria discipline and to the use of suppressive mepacrine.

Small-pox, the enteric group of fevers, typhus, the dysenteries and other preventable diseases were a lesser threat to the success of military operations, as preventive vaccination and inoculations, protective clothing impregnated with D.D.T. or D.M.P., chlorination of water supply, strict hygiene discipline and early treatment of the sick protected the troops. India provided 66 Indian hygiene sections which played no small part in the success of the Indian Army.

The feeding of troops raised enormous problems. A special timed ration was designed for patrols operating ahead of the main force, Long Range Penetration Groups and for garrisons cut off from road communications. Rations were frequently reinforced by multivite tablets. In one corps 1,500,000 multivite tablets were issued in two weeks. A team of nutrition experts investigated the nutritional status of Indian troops and advised various changes in the standard scale of rations. They also advised on the rations required under different conditions. The military food laboratories kept a constant watch on the quality of the food issued. The troops were thus protected from deficiency diseases.

Panels of blood donors were maintained in almost all military stations. Medical officers were trained in the technique of giving various transfusion fluids. Specially trained field transfusion units worked at advance surgical centres. The officers of the transfusion service toured the country in a special blood transfusion railway coach and collected blood from about 90,000 donors. The vital transfusion fluids were dropped in special parachute containers wherever required. The transfusion service alone issued 90,000 bottles of plasma, 21,000 bottles of blood, 250,000 bottles of saline and various drugs in solution for intravenous injections.

Over 1,500 specialists including surgeons, physicians, pathologists, radiologists, psychiatrists, anaesthetists and venerealologists, etc., with all their staff and equipment took their specialist aid to the forward fighting areas. 1,200 medical officers were trained in various specialities and many thousands of orderlies trained to assist them. The specialist units included 24 mobile surgical units, 25 mobile E.N.T. surgical units, 3 mobile neuro-surgical units (sent out from the United Kingdom), 3 maxillo-facial units, 84 X-ray units (34 mobile), 3 mobile X-ray servicing units, 32 ophthalmological units, 30 dental mechanic units, 83 dental units, 58 field laboratories, 1 entomological unit, 1 field typhus research team and 2 malaria research teams.


The mobile surgical units were located close behind the front line and on many occasions right in the front line. Survival rate of battle casualties in the 14th Army was 95% which compares favourably with other theatres. Of the gun-shot wounds of the abdomen, formerly one of the most fatal types of casualties, 64% survived. The aim of neuro-surgical units was to deal with head injuries within 72 hours of the casualty occurring. Sulphamezathine, penicillin and skilled brain surgery saved many valuable lives. From March 1944 to August 1945, one of the neuro-surgical units in Comilla handled over 3,000 cases. In 1944 over 90% of the head wounds associated with penetration of the dura were treated in one or the other of the neuro-surgical units.


Maxillo-facial units, peripheral nerve centres, orthopaedic surgeons and physiotherapists saved many men from permanent disablement. The artificial limb centre, by August 1944, was fitting 100 limbs every month. For the first time in medical history, psychiatrists carried on the treatment of cases in operational areas in Burma at divisional level and succeeded in returning on an average 56% of cases to their units, all of whom otherwise would have been evacuated to base hospitals.

Garrison and base hospitals in India, and field hospitals raised or maintained in India during 1939-1945, treated approximately five million sick or wounded. Over a quarter of a million casualties from the Eastern Theatre and about 40,000 from the Middle East and P.A.I.C. were evacuated from field units to base hospitals in India. The magnitude of the problem of evacuating and distributing the sick and the wounded from the operational fronts to hospitals




CASUALTY EVACUATION FROM THE WAR FRONTS
(Reproduced by courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla)





CASUALTY EVACUATION FROM THE WAR FRONTS
(Reproduced by courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla)



in India, can be appreciated from the fact that the evacuation from Upper Assam to base hospitals in Secunderabad, involved a chain of evacuation by road, river and railway over a distance equal to that between London and Leningrad.

The problem of evacuating large numbers of casualties was covered by provision of 15 Indian stretcher-bearer companies, 18 broad-gauge air-conditioned ambulance trains, 15 medium and narrow-gauge ambulance trains, 18 ambulance coaches, 76 motor ambulance sections (25 ambulance cars in each), 13 hospital river steamers, 5 hospital ships, 4 ambulance transports and 2 hospital carriers.

The sick and wounded from the forward areas were evacuated in all sorts of ways imaginable—on the backs of men, mules, camels, bullocks and elephants; on stretchers, jeeps, lorries, ambulance cars and trains; along rope-ways, in sampans, boats, landing crafts, mine sweepers and ships. War in the East, involved the evacuation of casualties through dense jungle over mountainous country with no or inadequate communications and necessitated a new technique. The India Command working with the Medical Services of the Allied Land Forces South East Asia and the American Air Force, pioneered a degree of air evacuation unprecedented in history.

Approximately 200,000 casualties were evacuated by air. Often they reached the specialist treatment centres within a few hours of being wounded, when by ordinary routes they would have been days or weeks on the way. During the siege of Imphal the wounded were evacuated to Comilla or Dacca by air within an hour of being wounded. It was not only delay that was avoided. The wounded were spared the formidable risk of trauma during the long journey, especially along the dusty tracks of Burma. Three D. C. 3s per day from Chittagong to Calcutta represent a greater evacuation potential than a hospital ship of 300 bed capacity on a six-day turn round.

To accommodate the casualties, 172,000 beds were provided in hospitals and convalescent depots. This is an amazing figure in view of the fact that the total number of beds in civil hospitals in India was less than 75,000. Over 1,000 field medical units were raised and employed in India and overseas. These units moved around as the changing conditions demanded. In addition to treating Allied troops, medical arrangements were also made for 68,780 Italians and 24,970 Japanese prisoners of war and a large number of internees and refugees including 5,000 Poles.

Just before the final collapse of Japan it was realised that immediate help must be sent to 244,000 prisoners of war (including 24,935 Indians) in Japanese hands. Parachute medical teams, emergency equipment and nutrition packs were collected at air strips near Colombo, Rangoon and Calcutta. The medical teams and equipment were dropped in various prison camps immediately hostilities ended. After initial relief 7,000 R.A.P.W.I. were nursed back to health in an Indian base hospital. An opportunity was taken to study the effects of starvation on 2,000 Indian cases in Jalahali hospital. The results of the detailed researches (clinical and biochemical) made on these cases will be of the greatest value to India and, indeed, to the world.

8,772 doctors (including 1,369 civil medical practitioners employed in military hospitals) and 4,306 nurses (excluding Q.A.I.M.N.S. and including auxiliaries) were employed in the Army. The Indian doctors earned for their country a high renown and admiration wherever they went. Licentiates played a not unimportant part in this creditable performance. Special mention must be made of nursing sisters (Q.A.I.M.N.S., I.M.N.S. and A.N.S.) who tended the sick and wounded under the most trying conditions of terrain and weather, and

enhanced the reputation of the nursing profession by their exemplary devotion to duty.

In the spring of 1943, the Indian Army Medical Corps was formed. All the different sections of the Medical Services were seconded or amalgamated in this Corps. This was a great landmark in the Indian Military Medical Service, as whatever distinction in status which had existed before between graduates and licentiates in medicine was abolished. By the end of the war the Indian Army Medical Corps rank and file totalled 153,000. In addition, about 3,000 officers and 15,000 men of the Royal Army Medical Corps served in both Indian and British medical units and did invaluable service.

The provision of medical stores and equipment, vaccines and sera was an immense problem. During 1939—45, a total of over 57 million ccs. of vaccine was prepared and issued. In addition, anti-venom sera and numerous other vaccines and sera were also distributed. India was also responsible for the provision of diagnostic sera and suspensions to the Middle East Land Forces, Syria, Palestine, Paiforce, India and South East Asia Command. The story of the trials and tribulations through which the medical stores organisation passed is a long one. Only a few of its aspects can be referred to here.

Before 1939, no surgical instrument industry of any capacity existed in India nor were satisfactory manufacturing facilities available. Early in 1943, an organisation was set up to stimulate the manufacture and supply of surgical instruments. A practising surgeon was appointed as Deputy Chief Inspector of Medical Stores and production engineers and staff were recruited. As a result of these efforts, 500,000 surgical instruments of 270 different types were produced during 1945. The average monthly rate of production rose to 21,500 instruments.

The production of iron lungs was also developed in ordnance factories in India. In addition, about 1,600 items of medical equipment were produced. Up to 1944 the Indian manufacturer provided 85% of equipment required. India initiated all developments, carried out trials, and later supplied all stores to S.E.A.C. in the form (quantitative and qualitative) best suited to the type of warfare and the terrain of the theatre.

India's reputation as a centre of research of international importance was maintained. Various research teams carried out investigations on anaemia, penicillin, typhus, protozoal dysentery, neuropathology, marasmus and mass radiography. The investigation carried out at the Mass Radiography Centre at Kunraghat revealed that 10 recruits per thousand were suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, whereas clinical examination during 1941—44, had shown only 1.4 per thousand suffering from respiratory diseases.

This brief review provides enough evidence of the capacity of the Indian medical profession and medical services in India to fulfil their obligations to the troops and the country. It is not claimed that no mistakes were made or that there is no room left for improvement. But it is claimed that we have seen a great achievement—a triumph of the forces of medical science over wounds and disease such as the world has never seen before.

Had the efficiency or standard of the medical services been lowered, many more lives would have been lost and many more would have been maimed for life; and we certainly would not have succeeded in beating the Japanese in the jungles of Burma as quickly as we did.

A SHORT STORY

THE QUESTION

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. WILSON STEPHENS

RIFLEMAN Ranbahadur Rai hated the Japanese. He hated them from the moment when, in the company of Captain Sommerville of the 25th King's Own Gurkha Rifles whose batman he was, he first set foot on Japanese soil early in 1939. He made no attempt to explain this antipathy but accepted it without thought. Now, as he stood on the steps of the Chancery at Tokyo watching a party of troops marching down the road, he grumbled to himself and spat disgustedly; "Yellow dwarfs," he muttered. "Little yellow monkeys."

The door behind him opened and Captain Sommerville, Assistant Military Attache, came down the steps and handed him a brief-case. "We go to the big hotel," he said. "It is no distance; we will walk."

Throwing away the stub of his cigarette, Ranbahadur followed his officer through the gates of the Embassy and across the road to the pavement beyond which, on the far side of the wide moat, the outer wall of the Imperial Palace stood, pine-fringed and massive. Turning right-handed, the two men made their way past the dilapidated wooden structure of the Air Ministry and the scarcely more impressive War Office, towards the splendid building of the Diet.

Ranbahadur glanced at the green water below him where a number of wild duck and cormorants swam and fed unconcernedly. "Duck, *sahib*," he said. "When shall we again shoot duck in Hindustan?"

"In a year, perhaps sooner. Who can say? Why? Dost thou tire of this country then?"

"Nay, *sahib*. The country is well enough. But the people, the men. I do not like the men of Japan."

"And the women? That is another matter, eh?" The Gurkha smiled and said nothing.

Wonder what he has against them, thought Sommerville. Resents the racial resemblance I expect, though he doesn't realise it. "Yes, another year," he said. "We should be with the regiment again by then." They turned in through the entrance of the Imperial Hotel.

With the exception of one Japanese, they had the lift to themselves. As they waited for the gates to close, he looked at Ranbahadur with interest, a puzzled expression in his eyes. He coughed. "*Gomen nassai*," he addressed himself to the Gurkha. "*O'kuni wa doko des'ka?*"

Ranbahadur shook his head frowning. He did not understand this language which sounded like damp logs hissing and spluttering on a fire.

"*Nihon-jin des'ka?*", the Japanese persisted.

"My servant does not understand *Nippon-go*," Sommerville came to his aid. "Perhaps I can help?"

The man smiled and bowed. "Thank you," he said. "I was asking him if he was a Japanese and where his home was. I cannot place either his clothes or his features, yet he would appear to be of my country?"

What a joke, thought Sommerville. Mistaken for a yellow-belly by a yellow-belly. "Ranbahadur, this gentleman said *nihon-jin des'ka* which means, art thou a Japanese? He mistakes thee for a fellow-countryman."

"What?" The Gurkha's eyes were red with anger, and for a moment the discipline of years deserted him. "Thinks I'm a miserable dwarf of a Japanese does he?", he shouted. And before Sommerville could stop him his fist shot out and the son of Nippon sank unconscious to the floor.

II.

Ranbahadur, now promoted to the rank of havildar, leant against the taffrail and watched the other ships of the small convoy gliding effortlessly through the placid waters of the Straits of Malacca. As the one seasoned traveller amongst a ship-load of Gurkhas, not one of whom had previously seen the sea, he pretended to a certain air of nonchalance. Inwardly he was excited. To be repeating the first stage of that journey he had done with Sommerville *sahib* four years ago, this time with Malaya as his destination; to know that he would in all probability be called upon to fight, certainly not to fraternise with, those Japanese he so disliked; that indeed was something to look forward to. He would get his own back for that business in Tokyo. There, he had been made to apologise to that creature whose nose he had so satisfactorily flattened. There had been much talk and bother, and Sommerville *sahib* has been very angry with him. True, he should not have lost his temper, but then. . . .

In the 25th, Ranbahadur was a man to be treated with respect. Did he not know about ships and the sea? Had he not lived in the country of these very *Japanis* who they were going to fight? He even knew a few words of their language. Three in particular—*nihon-jin des'ka*—he had been known to use with effect as he demonstrated to a squad of recruits exactly how a bayonet should be stuck into the limp, hanging, straw-filled sacks on the assault-at-arms course. By reason of his often expressed dislike of the Japanese, he was held in high esteem by his officers who saw in him, not only a good N.C.O., but also a valuable source of anti-Jap propaganda. Yes, Ranbahadur was happy enough. He could think of nothing better than a chance to blood that kukri of his on a Nipponese neck.

He turned and made his way forward to where a young rifleman stood wide-eyed with astonishment at the antics of a school of porpoises.

"And what manner of beast be these, Havildar Ranbahadur?", he asked. "Some kind of water-man, perhaps? No! Then without doubt they be elephants, elephants of the sea? Never have I seen such things before. Fish? Whoever saw fish of such a size indeed! Nay, surely thou art mistaken?"

"Fish they be, young one, or so my *sahib* assured me on that other journey. But they are of no importance, for we can neither catch nor eat them. But as regards these *Japanis* we go to fight." He took the boy by the arm and led him towards a hatch-cover. "I would have you know that in the whole world there are none so base or of such low caste or so like the monkey-folk of our own country as these same pig-eating dwarfs of Japan. Listen thou and I will tell thee how once, in the great *hotel-khana* at Tokyo, I had reason to correct such a one."

III

In the quiet that follows after battle, Havildar Ranbahadur wiped the sweat from his close-cropped head with the palm of his hand and eased his back against the bole of a rubber tree. He was near exhaustion, and there was a

smouldering pain in his chest which seemed to burst into flame whenever he moved. The front of his shirt was soaked with blood, his legs and thighs caked in mud, and he was bare-headed. The excited stutter of rifle and light-automatic fire ceased, even the guns were silent, for the battle of Jitra was over, and the jungle had returned to normal again.

The division to which the 25th belonged had been forced to retire in the face of superior numbers; behind them they left the dead and many of the wounded, including Havildar Ranbahadur Rai. Early that morning, he had led his platoon in an attack on a section of tanks temporarily halted by a road block. They had dealt with the crews, but had almost at once been over-run by the fast advancing infantry. Ranbahadur, happy at last to be at grips with the hated Japanese, had accounted for three of these with his kukri before he fell, a bullet through his chest. In the general confusion, he had been taken for dead and left behind. Now, some three hours later, wounded and unarmed, he had managed to struggle as far as the shade of the rubber trees.

Extracting his water-bottle with difficulty, he swilled out his mouth and spat, shaking his head to clear it. "Pigs," he whispered, and dozed off into semi-consciousness.

An enemy patrol found him there an hour later and the corporal in charge kicked him in the side and prodded him with the butt of his rifle. Ranbahadur opened his eyes and swore. The N. C. O. gave an order and two men came forward and jerked the wounded man roughly to his feet. Painfully he stumbled with them as far as the road where impatient hands hoisted him quickly into a waiting truck. As the driver threw in the clutch, he again drifted away on the tide of unconsciousness.

He came to to find himself seated on the ground outside a wood and *attap* building, a Japanese soldier holding a bottle to his dry lips. Unwillingly, for the man's presence angered him, he gulped a mouthful of the raw spirit. Later, in the company of an armed sentry, he was taken in front of the Japanese commander. By the general's side stood a local interpreter, oily and subservient. At the sight of the prisoner, however, he swelled with importance.

"You are a Gurkha?" He spoke in Urdu and Ranbahadur answered in the same language.

"I am. And you?"—he used the *tum* of disrespect—"What do you think you are doing here, babu?"

"Mind your own business and keep a civil tongue in your head. I am here to act as interpreter to His Excellency the Japanese general, and unless you want to get yourself into trouble you will do well to answer my questions. What is the number of your brigade?"

"I will not answer."

"He refuses to give an answer, your Excellency. These Gurkhas are stubborn fellows, stubborn and thick-headed."

"Tell him that I mean him no harm," replied the general. "If he will listen to what I have to say and do as he is told he will be sent back to his people. But first he must agree to work for *Dai-Nippon*. He must be prepared to spread our propaganda amongst his comrades. Tell him this, and that, if he remains obdurate, I shall soon find a way to make him change his mind."

But the Gurkha shook his head. "I have taken an oath of allegiance to the King-Emperor, *babu*," he said, "and we Gurkhas are loyal to our salt

and no turn-coats. I will not obey." The effect of the spirit was beginning to wear off and he was feeling weak again, his surroundings were becoming blurred and unreal. Where was he? What was he doing here with this *Japani* sitting in front of him? Was he back in Tokyo, perhaps? Back in the lift where there had been trouble. His anger mounted at the memory and with an effort he forced his mind back to clarity.

The door opened and a colonel of the Intelligence entered, bowed and saluted. Taking a seat at the general's side, he looked closely at the blood-stained, swaying figure on the far side of the table.

"A Gurkha?" He glanced at the interpreter. "Good! I want some of them. I have ideas as to their use." He smiled. "Excuse me, Your Excellency, but would you permit me to carry out a small experiment?"

"Of course."

"Here, you," the colonel spoke to the sentry. "Take off your helmet and place it on the prisoner's head."

What were they playing at now? Ranbahadur's anger came to boiling point. Putting the sentry's filthy helmet on his head were they; making a fool of him. His knees were beginning to give and his head was swimming. He couldn't last much longer. He must act, do something.

The colonel raised his eyebrows and nodded. "You see the likeness, Excellency? The infinite possibilities?"

The general smiled. "You are right," he said. "And as you say, there are many possibilities. Quite extraordinary how like one of our men he looks in that helmet." His thick lips parted in a gold-embellished grin and he leant forward across the table: "*O-kuni wa doko des'ka*," he said with a laugh "*Nihon-jin des'ka?*"

Nihon-jin des'ka. The words exploded like a bomb in Ranbahadur's fuddled brain and at once his mind was clear and he was strong—furious.

"No, damn you," he answered between shut teeth. "I'm a Gurkha." In one swift movement he wrenched the rifle from the sentry and drove the bayonet deep into the be-ribboned chest below the grinning face. As he did so, the colonel drew his pistol and fired twice.

But Havildar Ranbahadur Rai was already dead.

MAN MANAGEMENT

COLONEL C. W. MORTON, M. C.*

MAN management is a world-wide product. It is not confined to any one community or class. Since man is such a complex machine, it covers a wide field and such factors as psychology, geography and economy have to be studied in relation to man in order to obtain a comprehensive grasp of the subject.

Man management has been defined in the official pamphlet *Man Management of British Troops in Peace* 1946 as the creation and maintenance of an efficient and contented unit. But although this definition is a good one in so far as man management is studied from a unit's point of view, it is too narrow a one for the purposes of this essay. We are told that education is the ability to meet life's situations and that the great aim of education is not knowledge but action. Man management likewise means action, and may be defined as the ability to express ideas, to assume leadership, and to arouse enthusiasm among men.

Never has the need for study and realisation of the many problems of man management been of such importance and urgency as they are today. This not only applies to the armies of the world but also to its civil populations. Modern democratic life is growing more and more complex, both politically and industrially. Because of this and the swift march in scientific inventions brought on by the recent war, the means whereby democracy can be safeguarded and defended against attacks of aggressive dictators are becoming in their turn problems of great intricacy.

In peace, man, especially in India, is swayed this way and that by political uncertainties, experiments in governments, shortages and high prices of food and clothing, insecurities of employment and property, uncertainties as to what the future holds, labour troubles and communal riots. Over and above all this, as if it was not enough, we have the insidious propaganda of the modern radio and the daily papers tuned up to influence him in his judgments.

In war, he faces new, hidden and even more devastating weapons of destruction than have ever before been loosed upon humanity. He will come through safely to the other side only if helped and guided by his leaders, who must be imbued with a high sense of man management.

Leadership and man management are one. No man can be a leader in the true sense of the word if he is not also a good man manager. Conversely, neither can a man aspire to be a manager of men if he does not possess the instincts and training of leadership. We can attain wonderful results if we will only study this subject and constantly apply it in practice. Most troops react favourably to officers who study their points of view and wants, Indian troops especially so.

* This essay by Colonel Morton has been awarded the Gold Medal for 1947, in the annual competition conducted by The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan.

Everything depends on how we handle our men; their happiness, your happiness; the contentment, *esprit de corps* and morale of the whole unit; their training efficiency in peace and war; their behaviour in times of stress and anxiety; and last but not least, their ability "to beat without question any force opposed to them in the field." (Wellington).

True man management demands a close comradeship and respect between officers and men, a sure knowledge of their mental make up and the motives influencing their actions in their daily tasks, and a deep sympathy and understanding. These things do not come from the surface, they come from within—from the heart. It follows then, if we are to obtain and keep the respect and devotion of our men, and justify ourselves as their officers and leaders, we must first of all study and apply the principles of human psychology.

The day has long passed when officers swaggered about in gorgeous uniforms, preening themselves before their lady friends, and when men were just men—so much cannon fodder. True, much was accomplished in those days chiefly by virtue of the ingrained national characteristics of the soldier, and through the brilliancy of some general, such as Napoleon or Wellington. It is, however, certain that if the customs prevailing in those days were practised in the world of today, as we know it, the results would come as an unpleasant shock to those two generals if they were alive. But, of course, if they were alive today, they would undoubtedly have changed their methods.

The reasons are obvious. Man is no longer an uneducated, unthinking pawn of war. He is no longer recruited from the dregs of society, from the failure, from the unemployed, from the ne'er-do-wells. He is now very carefully selected from the educated town classes and from the fine, independent rural types. Many are highly skilled technicians. He is a thinking member of a nation's society. He has selected the Army as a career not because he is unable to obtain any other employment, but because it is hereditary in his blood; because it is a fine, honourable profession of immense interest and scope; and because of the comradeship he expects and has a right to expect to find and enjoy.

Let us therefore examine the term "Man Management", and seek to improve our knowledge and methods to be employed in its successful application. No task was ever more worthwhile or of more potent urgency.

* * * * *

SOME BROAD PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

"Psychology, once of interest only to philosophers and professors, has now been found of vital use in everyday life, and especially in that sphere where human beings are concerned with managing other human beings—in business, in factory, and in industry. Labour functions most efficiently when it is led, not driven, and the leader in industry today is more successful than the despot. The basis of all leadership is a sympathetic understanding of the nature of those who are being led. It follows, therefore, that only a full knowledge of the mental make-up of the worker, and the motives influencing his actions in his daily task, can enable us to use with the best effect that most delicate and sensitive of all machines—the human individual." (*Psychology in Practice* by R. Simmat, M.A.).

Although the above quotation was written from the point of view of industry and the management of labour, it is equally applicable to the Army, where human beings are also concerned with managing other human beings. Dealing with people is probably the biggest problem we have to face today. "Investigations into civilian technical industries such as engineering revealed that about 15 per cent of one's financial success is due to one's technical knowledge, and about 85 per cent is due to skill in human engineering—to personality and the ability to lead people.....The man who has technical knowledge plus the ability to express his ideas, to assume leadership, and to arouse enthusiasm among men—that man is headed for higher earning power." (*How to Win Friends and Influence People* by Dale Carnegie.).

"A leader usually reacts in one or more of the arts of expression, i.e., he is proficient in selling himself to others, and in communicating his ideas. Often, indeed, the essence of leadership has been found in the force of personality. It was so in the case of Napoleon. The sight of 'the little Corporal' revived affection, and developed new and mighty resolves on the part of a sometimes dispirited Army." (*The Qualities of a Leader* by T. Sharper Knowlson.).

More recent examples are the outstanding leaders of the recent world war in Roosevelt, Churchill, Wavell, Alexander, Montgomery, Auchinleck, Mountbatten and Slim. All possessed force of personality; all in different ways impressed their troops or countrymen with the magnetism of their characters so that all were listened to and respected, and in all was reposed unbounded confidence. Some leaders are born and some are made. Leadership is by no means the product of one class. The outstanding mental quality of all leadership is dynamic force, obtained we are told through the emotions more than through the intellect. This means that the leader, whatever else he has or has not, has tremendously strong motives.

Other qualities are mental force, i.e., "ability to analyse a fact, an idea, a proposition, into its component parts; to relate it intelligently to similar items elsewhere: to draw out comparison and contrast; finally, to gather together all the points and arrive at a conclusion which is felt to be inevitable." (*The Qualities of a Leader* by T. Sharper Knowlson.); mental fertility; an intimate knowledge of human nature in general; a close student of the signs of the times; and a man of will.

Tacitus speaks of reason and calm judgment as being the qualities specially belong to a leader. In dealing with troops other and more simple qualities are also essential—impartiality, absolute fairness and integrity. "Never forget that personal example is the pre-requisite of leadership. This means self-discipline, self-control. If you cannot control yourself, you will never be able to control others."

The standard of discipline of an officer must be higher than that of the men he leads. By that I mean an officer must set himself a standard of turnout, behaviour, physical fitness, integrity, loyalty, efficiency and everything else, higher than he expects from his men. Never forget that all these things are watched by your men, and when they see the high standard you set, by your example you will have gained the first requisite of man management—you will have gained the respect of your men. You will have then convinced your men that you are their leader, and you have gained and earned their confidence." (Extract from the final address in December 1946 to cadets of the the I.M.A. Dehra Dun by Brigadier A. B. Barlthrop, O.B.E., Commandant of the Acad my.).

"An essential condition to good morale is good leadership. Leadership depends on simple and straightforward human qualities. A leader must have the confidence of his men. He will gain it by commanding their respect. To do so, he must possess intelligence, commonsense, determination, enthusiasm, energy and tact. He must display a sense of justice and a sense of humour; cheerfulness in the face of difficulties, readiness to share his men's hardships, and indifference to personal dangers; initiative, and readiness to take responsibility, and an obvious pride in his command. Above all, he must possess confidence in himself." (*A.I.T.M.*).

CRITICISM.

Dale Carnegie says: "Criticism is futile because it puts a man on the defensive, and usually makes him strive to justify himself. Criticism is dangerous because it wounds a man's precious pride, hurts his sense of importance and arouses his resentment."

This type of criticism amounts to condemning people, writing insulting letters, ridiculing people—in fact, bitter criticism. It is so easy to give way to our feelings at times, and "let the other fellow have it." It is grand for us and we feel immensely relieved and important. But what about the other fellow? He will try to justify himself and condemn us and the episode will finish up by arousing hard feelings which will take a long time to live down, if ever. "When dealing with people, let us remember we are not dealing with creatures of logic. We are dealing with creatures of emotion, creatures bristling with prejudices and motivated by pride and vanity.....Any fool can criticise, condemn and complain—and most fools do. It takes character and self-control to be understanding and forgiving."

Healthy, friendly and helpful criticism is, however, a very different thing. In the Army, one must learn to accept such criticism in the right spirit, commanders and staff officers especially so. We go on learning from the time we receive our first commission until, perhaps some 30 to 40 years later, we retire. No man can truthfully feel he knows everything; therefore, he should not resent criticism. We learn by our own mistakes and we must not mind having them pointed out to us. Man management comes in through the critic having a sound knowledge of human foibles and knowing how to criticise without causing offence or resentment. We must study our men's prejudices, learn their individual characters, and by a knowledge of their respective sensitiveness, guard against wounding their feelings.

Some of us have experienced, at some stage of our Army careers, bitter criticism that has been nothing short of condemnation without any opportunity of an appeal—of putting our point of view forward before final judgment is passed. This type of criticism naturally arouses hard feelings and tends to destroy that feeling of mutual confidence, especially between commanders and their staff or their unit commanders, if indulged in too frequently. There is no necessity for it. The critic no doubt feels fine and important, but what about the other fellow?

Officers should not criticise their superiors in the presence of subordinates since it tends to undermine that confidence reposed in a senior officer and affects morale. By doing so they are being disloyal, and disloyalty is as catching as loyalty and can have a boomerang effect. Likewise, officers should not criticise

their own men to their superiors. They must be loyal to their men and stand up for them. If the men are thought bad, then it is usually not they who are bad, but the unit commander.

"A great man shows his greatness," said Carlyle, "by the way he treats little men." Dr. Johnson said: "God Himself, Sir, does not propose to judge man until the end of his days. Why should you and I?" On the other hand Emerson tells us that men of character like to hear of their faults; the other class do not.

* * * * *

THE DESIRE TO BE IMPORTANT.

We human beings insist on having such necessities of life as health, sleep, food, money, sex, the well-being of our children. There is one desire, however, for which we crave with equal persistence—the desire to be important; the craving to be appreciated. Everyone desires to be important in a big or small way. We express that desire in many ways; owning big houses, the latest cars, the latest styles in clothes, titles, honours, rank, social standing.

We desire the feeling of importance by craving for honest appreciation. How many of us get it? How many of us indeed think of giving it to others? Most of us are content to criticise and find fault, and to say nothing when things are going well. It is a paradox that although we crave for appreciation, we seldom satisfy that craving in others.

A certain industrialist who had many men working under him once said: "I consider my ability to arouse enthusiasm among the men the greatest asset I possess, and the way to develop the best that is in a man is by appreciation and encouragement. There is nothing else that so kills the ambitions of a man as criticism from his superiors. I never criticise anyone. I believe in giving a man incentive to work. So I am anxious to praise and loath to find fault. If I like anything, I am hearty in my approbation and lavish in my praise."

Everyone of us puts in better work and greater effort under a spirit of approval than under one of criticism. Honest appreciation, however, is not flattery. The former is sincere and the latter insincere. One comes from the heart; the other from the mouth. One is unselfish; the other selfish. One is universally admired; the other is universally condemned.

A Chinese proverb says: "Flattery is sickness whilst reproof is medicine." Flattery can be defined as praise insincerely given for an interested purpose. It can be easily seen through. Another definition of flattery is: "Flattery is telling the other man precisely what he thinks about himself." Emerson once said: "Every man I meet is my superior in some way. In that I learn from him."

Let us, therefore, cease thinking about our own importance and accomplishments. Let us study our fellow creatures and think out their good points—and then give honest, sincere appreciation. Let us be hearty in our approbation and lavish in our praise. Although some of us may remember at times to say a few kind words of appreciation to an occasional officer or V.C.O., how often do we trouble to stop and praise our N.C.Os, especially junior ones, and men. We are far more likely to inspect them, criticise if things are wrong, say nothing if things are right. And yet they are human beings, such as you and I, with the same failings and the same wants.

If you, an officer, resent condemnation or ridicule, so do they; if you crave to be appreciated and to feel an important part of the machine, so do they—probably even more so since they have not the outside interests that the officer has. Their whole life—especially the Indian soldier—is ineradicably wedded to soldiering. We officers are inclined to take too much for granted. We commit the common fault of only seeing our own point of view. We seldom go to the bother of tiring our brains by trying to think out the other fellow's point of view. Our aim is so well known to us and is after all of far greater interest!

Let us study our N.C.Os and men. Take the question of turn-out; especially for an occasion such as a ceremonial parade or unit quarter-guard. Do we stop to consider how much effort, devotion and enthusiasm the average man puts in to achieve that standard, while we in all probability were playing tennis or golf? On many occasions, men sit up half the night cleaning and polishing in order not to let the unit down. What are their feelings if either they are inspected coldly and impersonally, and get only criticism for their pains, or perhaps are not looked at at all?

If troops have worked hard to present a really high standard of turn-out, they like to be looked at *and* appreciated. So do you. So do we all. We all like to feel ourselves important to the unit. Only to criticise or to ignore a unit or any part of it, is to convey indirectly the feeling that either, it is not much good, or is of very little importance in the eyes of the inspecting officer. This leaves a corresponding vacuum feeling in the minds of the men. Morale suffers. You have not aroused in the men that eager want, that enthusiasm, that feeling that good though they are, they can do even better next time. Be hearty in your approbation and lavish in your praise.

There are many ways in which this can be done besides the spoken word. There is the complimentary paragraph in a unit's daily orders. This is important and should invariably be utilised since its effect is to convey approval either to the whole unit or to show up a part of a unit in a favourable light before the remainder, thereby making it feel important and satisfying their craving for appreciation. There is the extra holiday given as a sign of appreciation. The tea in the canteen, the conferment of some special badge to wear, the award of extra points towards a champion flag or shield and so on.

In recruit training, this sign of approval is often conferred weekly on the champion recruit in each squad by giving him a red armlet to wear during the following week. The wearing of a distinctive armlet naturally makes him feel important, satisfies that craving to be appreciated and makes him feel on top of the world—for a week anyway! All this is good for morale and *esprit de corps*.

A further development of this theme is to parade the whole of the champion recruits in one or two squads on the weekly ceremonial parade, march them on to the parade led by the band, and form them up in the place of honour in front of and in the centre of the whole parade. Inspect them first and let them lead the parade in the march past. This should be followed by a tea in the canteen.

Squads for attestation should be treated in a similar manner, and the parade can be elaborated with a march past in slow time, all by themselves, with the rest of the parade looking on, followed by leading the parade in a march past in quick time. All this quite naturally makes them as proud as

fighting cocks. You have made them important in the eyes of the whole unit, and you have shown your appreciation of their efforts in attaining a high standard of efficiency through much hard work.

There are many other methods which are even better known to officers of experience such as introducing the competitive spirit and team rivalry between sub-units in work and play with rewards in the form of champion flags, challenge cups, shields etc. To obtain the maximum benefit from these competitions, they must be carefully worked out, supervised, and carried through, year in and year out, by the officers with that conscientiousness and devotion to duty that were bywords in a peace-time officer's training. Any slackening up is fatal to the purpose and spirit of the competitions.

To make them successful and to arouse that eager want and enthusiasm among the men means hard work and constant effort on the part of the officers. Their reward is in the resultant high morale and *esprit de corps*. To achieve these highly desirable and soldierly qualities is worth any effort. You will find your time has not been wasted when you have to call on your men for a special effort either in peace or war. They will respond at once and always. They will respect you. You will have gained their confidence. They will have accepted you as their leader.

In war-time, methods must of course be changed and must be adapted to conditions of war. There is no longer the time or opportunity to carry out, to the same extent, the competitive team rivalry by which the peace-time soldier is trained. Time is short, and training in all the complicated weapons and tactics of modern war is arduous, and must take first place. There is little time left for play.

That eager want and enthusiasm can still be produced by the skilful leader of men not only by use of the competitive spirit in the efficient handling of weapons, but also by keeping always before the men the war picture, and in particular, the triumphs and doings of their own regiment and individual officers, V.C.Os, N.C.Os, and men. Let them know of the honours won by their regiment, and arouse in them that determination to do likewise when they get the chance. Point out the good and weak qualities of the enemy and show that by good training, discipline and morale, they are capable of "beating any force opposed to them in the field."

Napoleon was above all a student of character, and of the passions and feelings which influence men's conduct. By means of spirit-stirring proclamations, by appeals to their love of glory and all those points upon which he knew Frenchmen to be susceptible, he was able to extract from his soldiers everything that they were capable of. He also obtained enthusiasm by his personal magnetism, and by creating the Legion of Honour—distributing 1,500 of them to the troops—by making eighteen of his Generals "Marshals of France" and by calling his troops the "Grand Army." Napoleon was criticised for giving "toys" to war-hardened veterans. He replied: "Men are ruled by toys."

We have carried on these practices. "Toys" in the form of honours and decorations still count for a lot and are quite rightly extolled. The Victoria Cross is the most coveted decoration of all, and its recipients are publicly eulogised for all time. Other "toys" utilised in the recent world war were emblems worn on the arm denoting armies, corps, divisions, special formations, commands, areas, and sub-areas. The Crusaders' Sword figured in many of them and was especially chosen for the emblem of the 21st Army Group commanded by Field Marshal Montgomery in his invasion of Hitler's Europe.

It also formed part of the emblem of the Fourteenth Army and A.L.F.S.E.A. Such emblems not only serve the purpose of seeing what formation anyone belongs to, but instils a great sense of pride in its wearer, especially if his formation has been in the forefront of the battle and in the news.

We, too, have our Field Marshals, many of them created in the field in honour of their services. Field Marshal Montgomery was one of them, and like Napoleon, created enthusiasm amongst his troops by his personal magnetism and ways of making himself known to his men. His method of creating confidence in the high command by ensuring that all men knew exactly what they were being asked to do and how it fitted into the larger plan is well known.

In his *Military Leadership*, Field Marshal Montgomery says: "The soldiers of today have different standards, and require more enlightened handling than the soldiers of bygone days. They will no longer follow blindly and unquestioningly to an unknown end. Today, therefore, a commander must ensure, that his troops always know what they are being asked to do, and how that fits in with the larger plan. I have always insisted that before a battle, the essentials of the plan are known right through the chain of command, and finally down to the rank and file. The troops must know how a commander is going to fight the battle and what part they are to play in it; this must be explained to them by word of mouth, for that counts far more than the written word. And then, when the battle has been won, and the troops see that the battle has gone as the commander said it would, their confidence in the high command will be very great. This confidence is beyond price."

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A MAN'S NAME.

Dale Carnegie says: "A man's name is to him the sweetest and most important sound in the English language." Lord Byron talks of "the glory and the nothing of a name." We all know what pleasure it gives us if people we have not met for a long time remember our names. One of the most important ways of gaining good-will is by remembering names and making people feel important.

All big leaders know the truth of this statement and go to great lengths to find out people's names and remember them. This is not easy, and takes trouble and concentration. Most of us do not remember names because we do not attempt to fix them in our minds. We are too busy. It all takes time but "Good manners," said Emerson, "are made up of petty sacrifices."

Few of us in the Army, with the exception perhaps of certain high commanders who have learnt better in the course of their experience and reading, bother much about names. We remember those with whom we are in daily contact and forget them almost as quickly once they leave. We fail to find out, let alone remember, the names of many of our N.C.Os., and seldom know the names of more than a sprinkling of sepoy. We say: "We are too busy; we really haven't the time."

We must find the time. Where there is a will, there is a way. If we understand the importance in our relations with the men of remembering their names, we might perhaps make the effort. If we remember that a man's name is to him the sweetest and most important sound in the English or Indian languages we will realise what a psychological weapon we have at our disposal for improving our relations with our men and thereby increasing their morale and respect.

Many tales can be told of the lengths some general officers go to to find out officers' or men's names. For a junior officer, V.C.O. or other rank to find that his general addresses him by name, or recalls some past meeting with him is a thrill to be experienced. Napoleon, before inspecting a regiment used to arrange that the third man of the front rank should always be one who had fought with him at Jena. He would then go up and greet him with the words: "Ah, surely I remember you at Jena." The effect of such an utterance from *mon bon Generale* to a private soldier is terrific and instantly instils a supreme feeling of pride and importance in the man, making him feel he is capable of anything his general may ask him to do.

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CHEERFULNESS.

Everyone likes a cheerful disposition. No one appreciates the pessimist—the melancholy face. Byron once said: "Always laugh when you can; it is a cheap medicine. Merriment is a philosophy not well understood. It is the sunny side of existence." Cheerfulness is catching and warms the other fellow's heart towards you. A real sincere smile comes from within and says: "I like you. I know we are to be friends."

Two Chinese proverbs tell us: "It is the melancholy face that gets stung by the bee" and: "A man without a smiling face must not open a shop." The same importance can be attached to cheerfulness in the Army as it is in civil life. No one likes a gloomy face especially when things are not going too well.

The Gurkha and the Indian soldier react to a smile and a joke even more perhaps than the British soldier. A good, sincere smile denotes respect and friendship. Men work better and feel better in such an atmosphere, rather than in one of cold criticism.

There is a passage in a book called *Three years with Eisenhower*, which says that when things were seriously wrong in the Ardennes, Eisenhower opened an address to senior generals with these words: "I want only cheerful faces." Sophocles tells us that it is the part of a good general to talk of success, not of failure.

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A FEW OTHER WISE SAYINGS.

Be a good listener. Encourage others to talk about themselves. Remember that we mortals are more interested in ourselves and our wants than we are in the other fellow's problems. We must curb this human failing and let the other man talk if we aspire to man management.

Be genuinely interested in other people. Dale Carnegie tells us: "You can make more friends in two months by becoming interested in other people than you can in two years by trying to get other people interested in you." A famous old Roman poet, Publilius Syrus, remarked: "We are interested in others when they are interested in us."

Avoid an argument. "You can't win an argument. You can't because if you lose it, you lose it; and if you win it, you lose it. Why? Well, suppose you triumph over the other man and shoot his argument full of holes, and prove

that he is *non compos mentis*. Then what? You will feel fine. But what about him? You have made him feel inferior. You have hurt his pride. He will resent your triumph. And.....

A man convinced against his will
Is of the same opinion still." (Dale Carnegie).

The *Boston Transcript* once pointed this bit of significant doggerel:

"Here lies the body of William Jay,
"Who died maintaining his right of way
"He was right, dead right, as he sped along,
"But he's just as dead as if he were wrong."

Show respect for the other man's opinions. Never tell a man he is wrong
Use a little diplomacy. It will help you gain your point.

If you are wrong, admit it quickly and emphatically. "Any fool can try to defend his mistakes—and most fools do—but it raises one above the herd and gives one a feeling of nobility and exultation to admit one's mistakes." (Dale Carnegie). There is a proverb which says: "By fighting you never get enough, but by yielding you get more than you expected."

Let the other man save his face. Don't gloat over your personal triumphs. Let the other man save his face. There will then be no bitterness or resentment.

Give a man a fine reputation to live up to. Warden Lawes, a warden of Sing Sing says: "If you must deal with a crook, there is only one possible way of getting the better of him—treat him as if he were an honourable gentleman. Take it for granted he is on the level. He will be so flattered by such treatment that he may answer to it, and be proud that some one trusts him." If this is true of crooks, how much truer you will find it in dealing with ordinary, normal people.

The other man's point of view. The other man's point of view! How often do we even bother about it? We are far more interested in proclaiming what we think. It is our point of view that is all important to us mortals.

Dale Carnegie says: "I go fishing every summer. Personally I am very fond of strawberries and cream; but I find that for some strange reason fish prefer worms. So when I go fishing, I don't think what I want. I think about what *they* want. I don't bait the hook with strawberries and cream. Rather I dangle a worm or a grasshopper in front of the fish and say: 'Wouldn't you like to have that?'" We know what we want and are always interested in it. But no one else is. So why not forget about what we think and want and try to find out what the other fellow wants.

Here is another simple illustration taken from animal life. "Emerson and his son one day tried to get a calf into a barn. But they made the common mistake of thinking only of what they wanted. Emerson pushed and his son pulled. But the calf did just what they did; he thought only of what he wanted; so he stiffened his legs and stubbornly refused to leave the pasture. The Irish housemaid saw their predicament. She couldn't write essays and books; but, on this occasion at least, she had more horse-sense, or calf-sense, than Emerson had. She thought of what the calf wanted; so she put her maternal finger in the calf's mouth, and let the calf suck her finger as she gently led him into the barn." (Dale Carnegie).

Professor Overstreet says: "Action springs out of what we fundamentally desire.....and the best piece of advice which can be given to would-be persuaders, whether in business, in the home, in the school, in politics, is: first arouse in the other person an eager want. He who can do this has the whole world with him. He who cannot, walks a lonely way." Henry Ford once said: "If there is any one secret of success, it lies in the ability to get the other person's point of view and see things from his angle as well as from your own."

All of these sayings are worth study by every officer whether senior or junior. It will take time to change one's habits. Assiduous daily practice and a daily or weekly check-up to see whether we have succeeded in carrying out those maxims or whether we have failed, will eventually enable us to become good man managers. And what is more, we shall become better and happier officers and commanders because the results are certain to be striking.

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SOME ECONOMICAL ASPECTS.

Health. I suppose health is of primary interest to the majority of people. If we are feeling fit, we are willing to take on anything. If, however, we are off-colour, or have a sprained ankle or wrist or any other minor complaint—even a common cold—we cannot put our best foot forward.

It is therefore of supreme importance that we watch our men's health, especially young recruits or boy recruits who have to undergo very long days training for a very long period, generally extending up to a year. Boy recruits' training is of two-year duration followed by nearly another year of recruit training—a total of three years.

We should watch them not only on parade but also off parade. We must see that our M. I. rooms are efficiently run and properly equipped; that proper arrangements are in force for the prompt dealing, at any time of the day, with minor ailments, such as cuts and sprains, common to recruit/boy training. We must ensure that our lines, cookhouses and food stores are always spotlessly clean, and that anti-malarial precautions are obeyed. Malingersers do, however, exist in any Army, and we have to guard against them missing unpleasant or arduous tasks by reporting sick.

There are many good yarns as to the various ways in which malingersers have been defeated and the sick parade reduced in size. One such story tells of a certain battalion having to do a weekly route march. Inevitably the sick parade swelled to alarming proportions on this ill-omened day. However, this situation was defeated by all men marked medicine and duty, having to commence their route march just as the battalion was nearing home. To rub it in still more, timing was so co-ordinated that the malingersers on their outward march passed the battalion when it was having its final halt before arrival back. Thus the malingersers had to march to attention past the ranks of the resting battalion to the accompaniment of laughter, jeers and insults. Shortly afterwards, the battalion sick parade miraculously reduced itself to quite small numbers of really sick men.

Food. We must eat to live and to remain fit. Ill-fed men cannot reach their highest potential endurance; and they take long to recover from wounds and sickness. The variety, quality and preparation of food are therefore of supreme importance to the health of our men. Such time-honoured expressions

as "An Army marches on its belly" and "The way to a man's heart is through his stomach" undoubtedly have a certain amount of truth in them. A poorly fed man is invariably an unhappy one and certainly not in fighting fit condition.

Food and all that appertains to food has generally in the past been given a back seat in unit administration—being left to conscientious quartermasters and messing officers. The recent world-wide war, with its speed and mobility, its frequently difficult countries in which to fight, and with its periods of intense mental and physical strain, has vividly laid bare the vital necessity for the best possible food management if Armies are not to be wasted away through sickness and disease.

Man management in respect of food arrangements is therefore the province of all officers, and can no longer be left to a devoted few. The food chain must be meticulously watched. This includes the drawing of the rations and ensuring that they are up to specification, of the varieties required, and up to correct scales and weights; the proper storage in unit ration stores, making sure that everything is clean and rations are well stacked, and that the rations longest in store are issued first so as to ensure a regular turn-over; the preparation of weekly diet sheets to produce variety and a balanced diet; the handling of rations by the cooks and insisting on proper cutting-up arrangements.

Intelligent preparation and cooking is also essential, using clean utensils and pots; as is the serving of food in the dining halls and seeing that it is cooked to perfection in accordance with the diet sheet, and properly and evenly distributed, making use of clean utensils and plates, and eaten off well-scrubbed and clean tables. Lastly, it includes arrangements to ensure that each man can properly wash, rinse and sterilise his cup/plates/mess tins on completion of his meal.

"The average Indian recruit does not know what is good for him, because he is used to unbalanced feeding and likes it. He will not complain so long as the Army is giving him enough food of the kinds to which he is most accustomed. Therefore, lack of complaints in an Indian unit is no guarantee whatever that rations are of the right quality. It is the duty of O.C.'s units to ensure that men are supplied with a properly balanced ration and that they are trained to eat it." (*Army in India Training Memorandum No. 23, 1943, Para. 23*).

So much for the actual food aspects of the problem. But for the Indian Army, with its different classes, races and religions, there is still the problem of carrying out the new policy of communal cooking and feeding as laid down in the G.H.Q. pamphlet called *Man Management of All Class Units*. Before the war, regiments with their carefully selected class compositions and organisation into class sub-units, tended to encourage separate communal and religious differences. The recent war has, however, broadened the minds of many people, chief of whom are the V.C.Os and I.O.Rs themselves, who, through force of circumstances and, no doubt, absence from the strict supervision of their religious leaders, many a time have "mucked-in" with all and sundry.

In view of complete nationalisation and enlistment of any class as long as found mentally and physically fit, the standard now to be attained is communal cooking and feeding. In a certain Recruit Training Centre, this has already been completely attained. In spite of its class composition consisting of Madrassis, Bengali Mussalmans, Brahmins, Chamars and other trainees from the Punjab, cooking is completely communal, the only exception being that some cookhouses are reserved for the preparation of *chappaties* whilst others are reserved for the preparation of rice. All classes, however, sit down and feed in the same dining

hall. If all these things are constantly watched by officers, not only will the health of the unit remain high, but its morale will improve by the men seeing that their officers are looking after their interests and will not let them down.

Canteens. Akin to messing arrangements are canteens, since in them men buy and partake of food and drink. These cannot be left to the tender mercies of the unit contractor. Food, and arrangements for its preparation, must be inspected frequently. Prices must be displayed and checked quarterly by a committee, and the contractor's servants must be clean and properly turned out.

On the amenity side, the men's relaxation hours must be catered for. This includes the supply of wireless sets, gramophones, games of all sorts, daily papers and periodicals in the appropriate languages, and writing material. The canteens should be brightly furnished and lit. They should be attractive and a complete contrast to barrack rooms. They must in fact attract men, so that they look upon this side of their military life as their home.

Officers can do much in attaining this object by constant thought and inspection, and by periodically strolling in at evening times to see how things are and to play a game or two with the men. Close comradeship of this sort engenders mutual respect and affection.

Sleep. Not many, perhaps, would include sleep within the terms of man management, and yet sleep is of vital importance to the health and happiness of a unit. Certainly we cannot do without it. Opinions vary as to how much sleep people really require. The generally accepted belief appears to be that one needs a lot of sleep when young, decreasing gradually in length as the years roll by. There is, however, a limit to this alarming decline, otherwise really old men would not require any sleep at all, whereas I believe the opposite to be the case. As a rough average, a good six to eight hours probably meets the requirements of most people. We do not, however, always get it.

Officers should see that their men get the required amount of sleep under the best possible conditions. These include good, strong, clean *charpoy*s with tightly-drawn *bhan* that is not in need of repair; clean and airy barrack rooms; mosquito-nets with no holes in them; and lights out at an early hour, usually 2200 hours.

Reveille should not be sounded much more than one hour before the time for parade. With Indian troops, the tendency is for N.C.Os to get the men up at an impossibly early hour so that they are all ready well before they are required to be! This is bad man management and must be firmly stopped. If latrines and wash houses are inadequate, necessitating early rising, then steps must be taken to increase the number available. The point to remember is, however, that nothing will be done to ensure that men get adequate sleep unless officers take an interest in this aspect of man management.

Amenities. After food and sleep, amenities and the things money will buy, are probably of next importance. Amenities include time off and, may be, amenity transport, otherwise men will get no opportunity to spend their money other than in the canteen. In a large training unit, a central broadcasting room with loud speakers erected throughout the lines is a necessity. Music and news can thus be "laid-on" in off hours for all to hear whatever they may be doing.

Amenities in canteens have already been discussed. Don't forget chairs and games in guard rooms. Men spend long hours on guard duty. Why let

them be bored? Brighten up guard rooms with suitable pictures etc. Such things do not make the modern soldier soft. They assist in keeping his intellect keyed up. Other amenities include games and sports and all that these recreations embrace, *i.e.*, suitable grounds and equipment.

In training units, one or two half days weekly should be set aside for "organised" games for recruits. Every available playing ground should be utilised to include all games, *i.e.*, football, hockey, basket ball, volley ball wrestling, boxing and any game peculiar to a particular class. Good organisation is required to make sure that teams are correctly "staggered" and changed over in order to ensure that the maximum number participate and not merely a few "gladiators." "Potted" sports are another very popular feature with both men and recruits. They need little organisation and take a minimum of time, and yet they achieve a lot of exercise, recreation, and team spirit for the majority.

Officers, especially junior officers, should fully participate in these games, either by playing with the men or by organising them and seeing that they are functioning properly and recruits are being taught correctly. Competitive "ladders" for various games between officer, V.C.O., N.C.O. and sepoy teams provide tremendous excitement and keenness, and help greatly to keep a unit happy, and foster that close comradeship between officers and their men.

Finally, there are the regimental concerts or dramas "put over" by the troops themselves. They should be encouraged and attended by officers as they comprise something created by the men themselves, and are therefore of greater human interest than the imported article. The latter is of value periodically, especially such shows as "magic" (*nazar band* or *jadhu*) which are beyond the capacity of troops to produce.

Pay. We are all interested in our pay—quite rightly so. We are depressed when the F.C.M.A. slices off an unexpected large sum; we are elated when he forgets to deduct that which in our heart of hearts, we know he is entitled to. We have, however, an uneasy feeling that the Sword of Damocles is still hanging by a hair, only to fall heavily when we are off our guard.

If we take such interest in our pay and the things it will buy, surely our men do likewise, probably even more so, as their pay is corresponding less. Let us therefore see that they get their rightful dues and help them to remit home family allotments and to save.

Leave and Homes. We officers appreciate our leave and have our homes constantly in our minds. We are anxious when things go wrong and desire, if possible, to get leave, perhaps only for a few days, to go and assist in putting them right. If a wedding takes place, we naturally want to be there. Our men have the same human feelings—why shouldn't they? Let us realise this when the next application for urgent leave comes up, and take a human and understanding view of it, before hastily deciding that the man is merely trying to avoid some arduous training or task.

Durbars. The days are past when men were discouraged from daring to air their complaints. Through long years of democracy and freedom, we have learnt that it is far more dangerous to force men to "bottle up" their feelings than to air them—"to get them off their chests." Hence the "tub-thumping" in Hyde Park and the periodical processions and speeches in Trafalgar Square in front of Nelson's Column.

Durbars should be held monthly in all units and proper minutes written up in a Durbar Book so that all necessary action can be taken. They are valuable in discovering complaints before they become grievances. If run properly and constructive suggestions are encouraged, the men will feel that they are a real part of the unit and that their suggestions in the running of it or being sought. The old adage that two heads are better than one is not only being observed, but that feeling of importance deep down in the hearts of all of us is being satisfied.

Punishments. "The object of punishment is to prevent further crime not only from the point of view of the offender, but also of the whole sub-unit or unit. Sometimes it is necessary to be cruel to be kind. Leniency over punishment tends to encourage crime and therefore defeats its own object. Over harsh punishment on the other hand, merely make men 'Bolshy' and therefore also encourages crime. It is only the happy medium that prevents it.

"The soldier demands justice above anything else.....The first principle of punishment, therefore, is that every offender shall be convinced that he is in the wrong. If this is not done it produces at once a man with a grievance." (*Man Management of British Troops in Peace*). Let us, therefore, before dealing out 28 days R.I., go carefully into all the facts, both for and against. No trouble can be too great when trying a case to determine what is right and what is wrong. Dispense justice, avoid favouritism, and resentment will never rankle afterwards in a man's mind.

Promotion. "Promotion must be strictly by merit. No attempt whatever must be made to work to any fixed proportion of the classes enlisted in the unit." (*Man Management of all Class Units*). Selection for promotion is the responsibility of the commanding officer. Let us be strictly impartial and watch and assist the "coming" young N.C. Os. in their preparation for higher responsibilities. Don't let us neglect this important side of man management by leaving it to our V.C.Os. Their advice is not always impartial. It should be asked but not necessarily taken before an appreciation of all the factors has been made.

Saluting. Good saluting, and especially when carried on outside the unit, is generally accepted as showing that the standard and morale of the unit is good—that its man management is sound. A discontented unit will be slovenly in saluting if indeed it salutes at all.

Saluting is not a sign of servility. It is a sign of greeting between two warriors, each looking the other frankly and fearlessly in the eyes, as equal to equal. The junior salutes first in the same way as a young man would raise his hat first to an older man. This does not imply inferiority but merely respect for age and experience.

Thus officers must at all times ensure that saluting is meticulously carried out and is smart; that the men know the reason for saluting and in no way feel it to be a servile act; and that they themselves not only set the example by smartly and courteously saluting officers senior to them, but always make a point of returning salutes equally punctiliously and correctly. When your men sub-consciously smile as they salute you, you have accomplished something great which the officer round the corner has not.

CONCLUSIONS.

Man management and leadership consists then of human qualities, of a sympathetic understanding of those who are being led, and of a knowledge of character and of the passion and feelings which influence men's conduct. A leader is he who has the ability to express his ideas, to assume leadership, and to arouse enthusiasm among men. He must set a personal example and thereby gain the confidence and respect of his men.

From time immemorial, leadership has fundamentally been based on these qualities. Man has always been a creature of emotion, bristling with prejudices and motivated by pride and vanity. The passage of time has not rid him of these prejudices. Education has eliminated the surface brutality, and left him a more polished product of the twentieth century. Science has taught him to view things from a more penetrating angle and has quickened up his impulses. Basically, however, he is still the same complex human machine.

The principles of leadership, like strategy, never change. It is only the methods; the tactics whereby the commander's plan is carried out, which must of course conform to the living age. Man management demands a deep knowledge of these basic principles, and of the means to be employed in carrying out the plan, *i.e.*, in achieving our object.

The greatest asset that we have today is the mutual trust and respect that exists between officers, V.C.Os and men, and the consideration that each shows for the other. Let us not lose it. Let us see to it that we hold on to this golden asset. It will not be retained by sitting in offices. Man management means action.

Let us remember the words of Wellington, during the Peninsular campaign against the French, when he wrote: "If I attempted to answer the mass of futile correspondence that surrounds me, I should be debarred from all serious business of campaigning.....I shall see no officer under my command is debarred, by attending to the futile drivelling of mere quill driving, from attending to his first duty—which is, and always has been; so to train the private men under his command that they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field."

CONTROL OF REINFORCEMENTS

"FORWARD."

MANY regimental officers, possibly wrongly, will agree that aspects of administration most in need of improvement in the last war were the supply of reinforcements and—bound up with it—movement. An article in the *Royal United Service Institution Journal* drew attention to the advantages of moving reinforcements by air. If it were possible to move reinforcements direct from regimental centres to a point close to the unit for which they are destined—say, to a divisional reinforcement camp—then much of the exasperating delays at transshipment points and the kidnapping permanently or temporarily of reinforcements on the L. of C. could be avoided. This would save quantities of manpower, and reinforcements would arrive fitter physically and mentally. Returning aircraft could bring casualties who would be treated near to their centres where their welfare would receive attention and where they could rejoin their regiment without further exasperating delays.

This paper considers chiefly another reform which should become possible with improved communications: the control of reinforcements by regimental centres. During the last war, very considerable staffs were concerned with the control of reinforcements. These all required statistics and had to maintain records. Rightly or wrongly, many regimental officers think that they failed. The contention of this paper is that all this manpower should be collected at the regimental centre, and that subject to the allotment of priorities by General Headquarters, executive control should be by the regimental centre commander.

At first sight this may seem an appalling idea. How could a force commander allow control over the personnel of his force to be exercised by an officer far away and not even under this command? Let us first consider the object of the force commander. It is to maintain his units up to establishment in personnel at all times and for this purpose he likes to collect the biggest reserve he can obtain. If this reserve is not big enough to meet all calls, then he likes to be able to say which needs shall be met first.

As far as maintaining units up to strength, the regimental commander's object is precisely the same as the force commander's. The units dependent on him are very much his concern, and it can be certain that provided he has the men he will use them to keep his units up to strength. Should the supply run short, the centre commander is not himself in a position to apportion what is available. This is the function of the staff. If they tell him the object to be achieved, he can do his best to achieve it using far more expert knowledge than a staff officer.

There are, of course, two aspects to be watched. First, the centre commander will be liable, if he can, to retain a considerable number of reinforcements to do his own chores for him; the staff must watch this and prevent him as indeed they would have to do under any system. Secondly, it will be less easy for a force commander to collect a considerable supply of reinforcements to use for his chores or to form unauthorised units. This would be a disadvantage from the force commander's point of view, but would be an advantage from the point of view of the proper control and use of man-power.

Let us now consider the method by which a force commander kept his units up to strength during the last war, or tried to do so. There will be a certain amount of conjecture in what follows because the actual system adopted was not clear to the writer. If injustice is done to the staffs it is done unwittingly and the writer apologises.

In order to control the distribution of reinforcements, force commanders required information about unit strengths. Units accordingly submitted a variety of reports and returns. These were presumably collated in some staff office where, subject to delays in the arrival of returns, charts or graphs or some similar arrangements showed the authorised and actual strength of units. Based on this information, the staff gave orders for the despatch of reinforcements to units from whatever reserves of personnel were under their control.

This process naturally involved a great deal of detailed work. It could not be done by any senior member of the staff, nor probably could any senior member of the staff devote the time to mastering the charts etc., in complete detail. It is presumed that the senior "A" staff officer indicated general priorities to the reinforcement section and left the detailed work to them. The control of reinforcements, consisting of tradesmen and specialists, cannot be easy for a staff officer not thoroughly familiar with the functions of trades and specialists or the intricacies of class composition. Mistakes are bound to occur. Examples from experience are admittedly sometimes unfair, but may give an indication of what is liable to happen. As an example, reinforcement sections have demanded bricklayers for engineer units while at the same time reporting an unplaceable surplus of masons.

The work of collating strength returns takes time. It is very considerable, and there is a danger that the object may be obscured in a mass of detail so that in fact the work is wasted. A cause for this suspicion in the writer's mind is that throughout the war he submitted a number of strength reports and returns without, as far as he knows, ever getting any reinforcements as a result of them. It seemed to him that whenever the powers decided to furnish him with reinforcements, it was the result of entirely separate representations and they then asked for a simple statement of what was required.

It seemed possible that the strength returns were not in fact read and digested by anyone important enough to order action on them. This is perhaps not surprising when one considers the repelling aspect of one of these forms. It seems that the designer tried to think of how much information could possibly be crammed into them. A similar form is no doubt required by statistical sections (though even then it should not be necessary to enter the sanctioned establishment which is a thing that all statistical sections ought to know already) but for anyone who has to take action what is needed is a simple statement of the men required. It may be thought that this would be asking too much of the average demander, who will ask for extra men over and above his establishment, if he thinks his demands are not going to be checked. This objection would be valid if one could be certain that entitlements were checked under the present system.

The writer's contention is that checking the mass of forms received is such a complicated business that it is likely to be delegated to a junior officer or clerk, to become a matter of routine, and possibly in the pressure of work to be neglected partially or entirely. To support him in this suspicion is the writer's success in retaining until disbandment a number of those rare but useful men, mess servants, well in excess of his sanctioned establishment. A regimental

centre commander, at his wit's end to provide his units with followers, is most unlikely to let anyone get away with this type of kidnapping once he is given control.

Let us see how the proposed system might work in practice. We will assume a regimental centre maintaining a number of units with a force in the field beyond the borders of India, garrison units also outside India, and the usual garrison units in India. G.H.Q. in India would lay down guiding principles for the maintenance of these units. They might say, for example, that the overseas force must at all times have in the theatre the full war establishments plus twenty per cent as first priority. Second priority might be the maintenance of all garrison units to establishment in specialists and to establishment less twenty per cent for others. Third priority might be the maintenance of garrison units overseas and on the frontier to full establishment. Fourth priority might be the provision of a further ten per cent to the field force; and so on. This is all that G.H.Q. need to do. The regimental centre commander has to maintain charts or graphs or card indexes to enable him to do his work. The necessary copies of extracts can easily be sent to G.H.Q. so that they can watch the situation in detail if they want to.

The regimental centre commander must have an accurate picture of the day-to-day position of all the units for which he is responsible. Units must accordingly send reports and returns direct to him. The daily strength report will hardly concern him. But the weekly strength return will, and this should be got to him as soon as possible.

If reinforcements are regularly supplied by air then the delivery of these returns will be much simplified. But in any case, an efficient postal service using air mail should ensure action in a regimental centre as quickly as in a reinforcement section at the base, where the return might arrive in the office sooner, only to spend hours or days in an overburdened clerk's or officer's tray. These strength reports will be kept under constant check at regimental centres as a result of the unit's position disclosed by casualty reports. This information, under the system in the late war, came by means of Part II Orders from Second Echelon, and arrived months rather than days after the event, thus being useless for any purpose other than recording in individual documents.

Strength reports would continue to be submitted to formation commanders. Formation commanders would thus be in possession of up-to-date information on the general strength of units which is sufficient for their purposes. It should enable them to see when units are getting dangerously below strength, and they can then draw regimental centre commanders' attention to this and also, if necessary, that of the H.Q. controlling priorities. The regimental centre commander would in effect perform the functions of a staff officer to each force commander. He would be in a position to tell a force commander how many of his men were in which units, how many sick in hospital, how many on the various X lists, and how many awaiting despatch against the quota allotted by G.H.Q.

With wireless and air communications, it should matter little that the regimental centre commander is several thousand miles away instead of being a few score of miles away at Second Echelon. What might matter is that the regimental centre commander will not be directly under command and the force commander cannot sack him. But as has been stated above, the regimental centre commander is likely to be far more interested in keeping units of his corps up to full strength and efficient than a staff officer who may be of some other arm ;

and from the point of view of the Army as a whole, there is the added advantage that the regimental commander is likely to be reluctant to assist the misuse of men for unauthorised purposes.

The regimental centres would, of course, need extra staff for all this work. But in the first place, much of the work of watching unit strengths has to be done in any case and in the second place, the regimental centre is dealing with men about whom it knows. It can give proper importance to specialists and tradesmen, and can consider class composition seniorities and recruiting districts. Regimental centres should therefore be able to do the work as specialists and not only do it better, but also with less men than the organisations which attempted to do the work in the late war.

Second Echelon and its various advanced echelons and reinforcement sections could be done away with altogether; except perhaps that certain functions in connection with personnel supplied from outside India, or with no record offices in India such as British personnel in the last war, might still require the existence of a part of Second Echelon or some similar office.

PHOTOGRAPHS.

The photographs on the following pages are reproductions of paintings made by official war artists during the Second World War. They portray some of the different types of soldiers who went to make up that magnificent fighting force—the Indian Army. No captions are needed.

They will revive old memories of men we knew, fought and worked with during the war years, and remind us of the comradeship of brothers-in-arms that was; the comradeship that must be maintained wherever we are serving today.

We hope to be able to print more of these photographs in future issues of the *Journal*. We are indebted to Captains Sheldon, Metcalfe and Dugdale, the war artists concerned, and to the Director, Historical Section, Simla, for allowing us to reproduce them here. (*Ed., U. S. I. Journal.*)









THE OLD SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE

BRIGADIER H. BULLOCK, C.I.E., O.B.E., F.R. HIST. S.

THE profession of military adventurer in India was open to Europeans as soon as the country itself was open to them. From the chronicles of the early travellers and missionaries we know that there were hundreds of foreign soldiers in Mogul employ in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but the palmy days of adventure came later, from about 1750 to the end of the century. That period was one of continual conflict and often of anarchy, and all the while of British expansion. Every one of the armies which included troops drilled and led by European free-lances fell sooner or later before British arms or policy; and the turn of the century also marks the decline and fall of French dominion in India.

The main background to the story is provided by the great armies of the Mahrattas. Principal of these was the group under the control of the Maharaja Scindia, whose first mercenary commanders were Muslims known as *gardis* (gardees). It was not long before these were supplemented and largely replaced by European leaders, chosen more or less indiscriminately and regardless of nationality or ability. Amongst the potentates who employed such officers before the year 1800 were the Maharajas Scindia and Holker, and the Peshwa; the Rana of Gohad and the Nawab Wazir of Oudh; and the Emperor at Delhi. In fact every chieftain of ambition in Northern India had his European officers and artillerymen.

Private armies were formed which were willing to serve the highest bidder or were even used to establish independent principalities. Amongst these were the troops of the Irishman George Thomas, the Breton René Madec, and the Eurasian Hyder Young-Hearsey. The Indian consort of the notorious adventurer Sombre succeeded not only to a small kingdom but also to an army with which to hold it, and kept both her legacies till her death in 1836. But army after army melted away before the British advances. The Nizam of Hyderabad's French force was peacefully extinguished in 1798, by the Marquess Wellesley's *coup d'état*. The Mahratta armies were dispersed in 1803, as much perhaps through Scindia's mistake in employing leaders who were to desert him in his hour of need, as through the military genius of Arthur Wellesley and Lord Lake.

The Begum Sombre's army was disbanded by the British on her death, though her heirs rescued its equipment many years later through a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. That the matter was settled by such a tribunal shows how the old days of the rule of the sword had gone forever. The last armies of Scindia were disbanded in 1844 after the shortest campaign in history, to be followed within a short space of time by the formidable Sikh regions further to the northward. Last came the Oudh battalions, broken upon the British annexation in 1856, though they were but a travesty of the fine brigades which had gone before them.

By 1805 the profession of military adventurer, except in the Punjab, was extinguished, though a few openings remained until the Mutiny. Excellent as the effect of the disappearance of the mercenary brigades was on the tranquillity

of Hindustan, one cannot but regret the straits into which some of the disbanded soldiers of fortune were forced. We catch glimpses of their pathetic eagerness to continue as soldiers, either in temporary employment under the East India Company, or in shadow-armies such as the Begum Sombre's or the emasculated forces of Oudh or of conquered Scindia.

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It is popularly supposed that most of the soldiers of fortune in India were hard-living and hard-fighting swashbucklers, of discreditable antecedents and of alcoholic if not piratical propensities. The lives of such men as Walter Reinhard, Sombre and George Thomas certainly lend colour to this view, which is nevertheless an extreme one and unjust. It should be remembered that the military adventurers probably numbered four or five thousand in all; and writers in the past have, for reasons which are understandable, often selected from their ranks only the more striking of these as subjects for their pens. But it is unfair to judge the free-lances as a whole by the twenty or thirty of them whose careers have been written up in picturesque fashion.

There can be little doubt that many of the free-lances were well-conducted and well-educated men. Remarkably so, considering the precarious nature of their profession, for "trailing a pike" across Upper India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries cannot have been by any means conducive to a settled manner of living. Many of the free-lances were respectable married men possessing considerable landed property; and if their wives were not always chosen from their own race, it is hard to blame them for that. Often cadets of good English, Scots or Irish families, there is ample evidence that soldiers of fortune contracted alliances under formal Christian or Islamic rites with Indian ladies of noble or even royal birth, with whom they lived happily and by whom they had children who distinguished themselves in their turn.

Another characteristic of the soldiers of fortune is their elusiveness: so at least it seems to those who try to recapture some details of their careers from the shadows which have closed around them. A free-lance makes his brief appearance on the stage of history. His deeds or misdeeds, but rarely a solitary word, written or spoken are recorded; and the resulting sum total of our knowledge is that a Captain So-and-so, of uncertain antecedents and unascertained fate, played his small part in the drama of the Great Anarchy in the days of Shah Alam and George III. Sometimes the inquiry is made more difficult by the existence of two or more allusions to a free-lance of the same name, which may or may not relate to the same person.

In establishing identity, too, rank has little evidential value. Though in the more highly organised of the mercenary armies, such as Scindia's when commanded by the French Generals de Boigne and Perron, the ranks of the officers were usually regulated on European lines, there was nothing to prevent a junior officer from styling himself Colonel or General when he retired. In the smaller and more independent of the forces trained and led by the soldiers of fortune, the matter of rank was not governed by any formal rules.

Even proper names were changed or assumed, though such a course was for obvious reasons more often adopted by the deserters from the East India Company's or other forces, who formed a large proportion of the free-lance artillerymen, than by the relatively respectable British subjects who usually had the status of officers in the Mahratta or Oudh service. As a general rule, a

member of what he may term the "regular officer class" then, embarking on a free-lance career only changed his name if he had been dismissed, in circumstances affecting his character, from the King's or Company's service. Even so, in some instances an officer continued to use his real name.

Why did a man become an adventurer? Either from choice or from necessity; but the factors which induced the various free-lances to become such were singularly diverse. Some were acting under the orders of their superiors, and came to India as emissaries of their own governments. In this category fall many of the Frenchmen who arrived during the early years of the First Republic, as well as a number of their compatriots who entered Ranjit Singh's service in the Punjab between 1820 and 1845. Of the latter, several were regular French officers with records of distinguished service during the Napoleonic Wars. Thrown out of employment in 1814-15 they were despatched further afield after a spell of half-pay. One at least, after fighting against the British on the Sutlej, fought side by side with them as allies in the Crimea only a few years later.

Strictly speaking, perhaps, this class should not be regarded as adventurers at all; but there is much difficulty in deciding exactly who were secret emissaries and agents and who were really—not merely ostensibly—serving for personal ends alone. And here one must remember that certain of the genuinely independent free-lances were not above accepting an occasional commission to play the part of secret agent, from motives sometimes patriotic and sometimes mercenary.

Of the category who embarked quite voluntarily on a life of military adventure, the genuine unadulterated free-lance comes first: the man who was a pure fortune-seeker, who deliberately set out on a military career in the nominal or actual service of one of the Indian potentates in the hope that he would quickly and, barring accidents, inevitably find his way to a fortune, and who was prepared to accept the hardships and risks contingent on such service.

Others amongst the voluntary category included those who had come to India with the promise or hope of some more humdrum employment; which having failed them or proved uncongenial, they turned instead to the profession of arms. Others came overland to Hindustan by way of the Persian, Turkish or Egyptian service, attracted perhaps by travellers' tales of the fortunes which had been taken back to Europe by successful commanders such as de Boigne, Michael Filose and Avitabile.

Deserters of one sort or another filled many places in the free-lance ranks. From the British, French and Portuguese sea and land forces, and from merchantmen, flying the flag of every nation, many thousands of deserters must have made their way inland between 1650 and 1850 and turned their hands to serving a gun for the Mahratta, the Mogul or the Sikh. The European artilleryman was an established institution even in Akbar's day.

Most of the deserters, then and later, were of the lowest class, and did not hesitate even at treason, for British subjects amongst them fought against their own countrymen at Assaye, Bharatpur and in the Sikh wars. But there were a few outstanding exceptions like Colonel John Holmes of the Sikh service, who had deserted as a trumpeter from the Bengal Horse Artillery, and Masson the traveller and archaeologist.

Officers who had thrown up their commissions in the King's or Company's service through indebtedness, or who had been cashiered or otherwise disgraced, were not so numerous in the free-lance brigades as is sometimes supposed. There

were one or two of no conspicuous ability in Ranjit Singh's armies, and a few more served Scindia during the brilliant decade 1793-1802, when the Deccan Invincibles dominated half a continent. The only able leader amongst them was Colonel Robert Sutherland, a cashiered officer from a famous Highland regiment.

Other factors which went to swell the ranks of the adventurers were the French Revolution, and the demobilisation of most European armies in 1815-18, both of which sent many officers and soldiers in search of new fields to fight in. Not a few of them found their way to the East, and it thus came about, for instance, that the Russell Cavalry in the Nizam's service was commanded by a half-pay lieutenant of the Royal Navy, J. A. Moore who subsequently became a director of John Company. He is one of the few authentic specimens of the genus "Horse Marine".

A still more considerable factor was the official bar against the employment in the Company's armies of persons of mixed blood. In 1795 all persons not of European parentage on both sides were disqualified from service in the army save as drummers, fifers, bandsmen and farriers. But a partial unwritten prohibition had been in force for some years previously, and the effect was to drive away many eligible lads into the armies of the Indian powers.

The most prominent of these was Colonel James Skinner, C.B., founder of the famous regiment of Skinner's Horse; but others equally gallant are today forgotten. It is certain that the restriction on the employment of men of mixed parentage did the Company no good in the long run; and indeed, soon after the outbreak of war in 1803, it was modified to the extent of granting "local" or non-regular commissions to them—a fairly satisfactory compromise though it did not give them full status.

These are some of the reasons why men entered upon a career of military adventure in Hindustan. Who the men themselves were is a long and obscure story in which there are many gaps and more doubts. Amongst them were representatives—not always legitimate—of European and Eastern royal families; of an English ducal house; and of the nobility and aristocracy of many countries. Of the parentage of others nothing whatever is known, whilst many were undoubtedly of the humblest origin. But whatever their antecedents this much is certain, that they numbered amongst them many gallant and able men who do not deserve to be forgotten.

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The memorials of the soldiers of fortune are many. They are scattered over the length and breadth of India. Among the towns which the free-lances used as their bases were Agra, Delhi, Gwalior, Poona, Hyderabad and at a later period, Sardhana and Ferozepore. At each of these centres there may still be found traces of their stay. The connection of James Skinner with St. James's Church, inside the Kashmir Gate at Delhi, is well known; though the story that the old cavalryman also built a mosque and a temple at the Mogul capital is perhaps apocryphal.

At Agra, the old Roman Catholic cathedral contains a tablet proclaiming that it was enlarged by the munificence of Dominus Walter Reinhard, in whom we recognise the notorious Sombre. On the borders of Nana's Peth in Poona city, lies the Church of the Conception with the Indo-Portuguese burial-ground hard by, occupying land which was granted by the Peshwa in 1792, at the

request of his Christian officer Major Francisco Caetano Pinto, for his Goan artillerymen and musicians to build a chapel. The original edifice was demolished many years ago when the present church was erected; but the area though diminished by encroachment is still the centre of the Portuguese community in Poona.

Gwalior has two private chapels in which lie the remains of many members of two free-lance families, the Filoses and the Alexanders, whilst in the fortress of Narwar in the same State is a ruined chapel around which are the graves of forgotten European and Armenian gunners who served the Mahratta and the Mogul more than a century ago. The Roman Catholic church at Bhopal was built in the early seventies through the agency of one of the Indian Bourbons, and at far-off Patna, the now disused cathedral received much support from a little colony of military adventurers who had retired there to spend their last years in peace. Most striking of all is the huge church at Sardhana, designed for the Begum Sombre by her Italian military officer Major Antonio Reghelini. For a brief space this was a cathedral and the Begum's chaplain was its bishop.

There are innumerable other relics of the military adventurers. Place names such as the French Gardens at Hyderabad and the French Tombs on the Shankarseth road at Poona, tell a tale of Napoleonic dreams of an Eastern empire. Lofty funeral monuments such as old John Hessian's at Agra—it is said to have cost six lakhs of rupees—or the Vicomte de Facieu's less pretentious grave in the civil cemetery at Ferozepore, point mutely to the departed glory of a life of military adventure in India.

In the peerages you will find mention of old Colonel Johan Friedrich Meiselbach of Raja Himmat Bahadur's service, one of whose many daughters married a Byron; and of the Gardners of Khasganj who still lay claim to an Irish barony. But you will find no word there of young Montagu who laid down his life in Scindia's service, or of Arnott the adventurer friend of William Hickey the diarist, for though their connections with the English nobility were close, their birth was not legitimate.

Two famous regiments, Skinner's Horse and Gardener's Horse, perpetuate the names of soldiers of fortune, as does Thackeray's "Major Gahagan" who forms a composite portrait of Skinner and Gardner. A third cavalry corps, de Boigne's own bodyguard which he made over to the English Company on his retirement, has long since disappeared. It was the finest regiment of its day.

Faltunganj market at Bareilly keeps green the memory of a French cavalry captain Fanthome who served more than one Indian prince; and Juliana Sarai, south of Delhi, is reputedly named after the Portuguese lady who was Mogul court physician. And the Martiniere schools at Calcutta and Lucknow bear splendid witness to the munificence of Major General Claud Martin, who served both John Company and the Nawab Wazir of Oudh.

RAILWAY IMPROVISATION IN ERITREA

D. M. HAMBLY*

QUICK construction of a new railway connecting the Sudan system with Eritrea, and bringing the Eritrean railway system into service again after the country had been captured were no mean tasks, but both were accomplished speedily and successfully. Here is the story of how the work was done.

From Massawa, the Red Sea port of Eritrea, a railway runs inland up to the capital, Asmara, whence it descends roughly in a westerly direction to Keren and Agordat. There was an extension still further west to Biscia, but this had been partially dismantled and was not in use. Some earthworks and abutments for bridges had been built in continuation of this through a gorge as far as Aicota, but much very heavy work remained to be done.

From Aicota there was a gap of some 70 miles *via* Tessenei to the Sudan railway at Kassala. From Tessenei to Massawa there was an excellent road, but for the 40 miles from Tessenei to Kassala there was nothing but desert.

In 1940 the Italians had occupied Kassala, and thus cut the main north-south line of the Sudan railways. Kassala was a town of some importance, and was a locomotive watering station with a small shed.

In 1941 the British and Indian armies attacked Kassala and advanced rapidly through Tessenei and Agordat, but were held up below Keren. The story of the battle of Keren and the capture of the town is well known, but after the failure of the first attack it was obvious that provision had to be made for a struggle, while the problems of "supply," which might extend into the rainy season which starts in June, had to be faced.

The supply route from railhead at Kassala had to cover the 40 miles of desert to Tessenei, and then across the river Gash to the end of the Italian all-weather road to Massawa. The desert route was perfectly feasible in the winter, as when one track across the desert became broken up the drivers merely made their own diversions, and for a few days had a comparatively dust-free route. In the rains, however, the use of motor transport would have been impossible. Extension of the Sudan railway to Tessenei was decided upon, and engineers of the railway were given the task. The country was not difficult. The survey party worked one day ahead of the earthwork parties, the grade for the next day's work being settled on the longitudinal section in the evening. The line was originally more or less a surface line, but was subsequently raised, the necessary earth being dumped in the track by caterpillar drag-line excavators. As soon as railhead at Tessenei was reached, supply trains commenced to run from the bases in the Sudan, thus saving the motor transport the run across the desert from Kassala.

*The author of this article was in charge of Army railway work in the Eritrean Campaign from March 1941 onwards.

The motor transport position in Eritrea at that time was so precarious that all efforts had to be made to conserve the vehicles and drivers. Practically no vehicle had a tyre or tube on its spare wheel, and none appeared to be available at the base. If a vehicle had an accident and was left beside the road during darkness, by the next morning it would be completely stripped by other drivers who were building up a private stock of spares. The Italian road below Keren had become corrugated owing to lack of maintenance, and stores from railhead were carried forward over it by South African motor transport companies, the drivers of which were "Cape Boys," and they did a magnificent job of work. But at the end of the campaign they were becoming exhausted and suffering from eye trouble. The need for railways to relieve road transport was therefore of great importance.

Tessenei was the first village inside Eritrea. It had a small Italian colony, all of whom of course fled before the Army arrived. It was on the banks of the river Gash, which for eight months of the year is a dry sandy *nullah*, but during the rains is a raging torrent. If the Army were to be still held up at Keren during the rains, it was essential to construct all-weather crossings of the river, so that supplies could go forward. The Italians, while they were at Kassala had built a reinforced concrete road bridge over the river and two irrigation canals, but before it could be used had had to retreat. They destroyed the main span, which was subsequently replaced by the Army with a steel span.

BRIDGING THE RIVER GASH

It was decided to build a railway bridge across the river, but in case this could not be completed before the floods, the railway was taken across the river on a low bank to a rail-served depot at Arisateh. This depot was stocked as far as possible as a reserve on the Keren side of the river, for the troops who might have been still fighting during the rains.

The bridge presented problems, for this was in the bad old days of 1941 when the British Army was woefully ill-equipped. To start with there were no girders. A search in Egypt disclosed some old 2'-0" square box girders that had been used by a contractor on a barrage construction line. Their condition was far from good, and they were far too shallow for the span, but they were taken and sent to Fort Sudan by sea.

For the piers there was very fortunately in Egypt sufficient of the Army type of steel trestling, but what to put the trestling on was another question! This was probably the first bridge in a theatre of war to use this new type of trestling. On both sides of the river were portions of earth banks, but whether they had been intended for a railway or a road was far from clear. However, an officer was one day scratching about in the river bed sand between these banks when he struck something hard. Further clearing revealed what was obviously the top of a concrete foundation.

- After a feverish search a series were found across the river bed, but alas, they were further apart than the length of the girders that had been procured. It was decided to erect the steel trestling on these foundations and place across the top of the piers so formed steel joists projecting on each side, sufficiently far to accommodate the girders. Whether the foundations had been made for a railway or a road bridge was never discovered. Neither was any information as to their depth obtained: we just hoped for the best. In one case the

concrete was very poor, as it was sodden with water. Time, however, was "of the essence of the contract" and chances had to be taken.

The bridge was erected by a section of a New Zealand railway construction company, while the approaches, involving rock cutting and connections to the line laid farther upstream across the river bed, were carried out by an Indian railway construction company. There were no abutments, but cribs were built for these. The girders were dragged from railhead to site on the chassis of an abandoned lorry—suffering from a disgraceful overload. They were lifted from the river bed into position by a drag line excavator (borrowed from the Sudan P.W.D.) used as a crane, the fierceness of whose brake was overcome by placing a differential pulley block between the hook and the girder.

There was no cross bracing, and certain rivets were missing. Angles were obtained, but there was nothing with which to drill holes—not that this mattered much as there was nothing to put in them after drilling. Welding seemed the only possibility, and fortunately a captured Italian welding set and a certain number of rods were obtained. Shortages of rods were made up by fencing wire.

Some additional stiffeners were desirable at the bearings, but all the angle iron had been used for bracings. Some broken car springs were retrieved from an M.T. scrap heap and welded on. Of skilled welders there were none, but a New Zealand blacksmith volunteered the information that he "knew a bit about it." He did excellent work.

The bridge was completed in style, as really good new bridge timbers were supplied. The steel trestles were liable to damage by palm trees ruskling down in the flood, so stone cut-waters were built upstream and the lower portion of the trestling filled with concrete. No masons being available, a Greek contractor from Kassala was brought into the party. His rates were quoted in piastres and cubic meters which, being transposed into cubic feet and rupees *via* pounds and shillings, proved to be enormous. There was, however, no alternative but to make this contribution to the relief of Greece, which was then being overrun.

The bridge was finished in May in very great heat, to which the New Zealanders were unaccustomed. Night work was tried, but as the men could not sleep during the heat of the day in their tents this had to be given up. The local brand of duststorm—the *haboob*—thicker and darker than anything India can produce—was another of the visitations. A virulent form of malaria laid very low a number of men.

EXTENSION TO AICOTA

To relieve motor transport still further it was decided to extend the line from the river Gash to Aicota, 25 miles nearer Keren. The survey was made quickly by a small section of a New Zealand railway survey company. As there was no information on rainfall, the estimation of the bridging required was a trifle rough and ready.

A large number of labour companies had been promised. Only one materialised, and parties were often removed from this for other work. A mob—no other word—of local "fuzzywuzzies" was recruited, but as they were of poor physique and knew nothing about earthwork their progress was slow. A second drag line from the Public Works Department did one length of earthwork, but the difficulty was to break up the large clods of earth that it dumped on the bank.

The construction of abutments for small bridges was undertaken by a section of an army troops company, none of whom, including their officer, had seen a bridge being built before. They very soon got down to the job, and their work was of a high standard, but their numbers were few. In the office controlling this work there was one clerk and one draughtsman, who before the war was an apprentice.

Several miles of earthwork and bridges had been completed when the Army captured Massawa, the port on the Red Sea, and the need for this railway no longer existing, work was stopped.

THE ERITREAN RAILWAY

The Eritrean railway, like most Italian colonial railways, is built to a gauge of 90 cms. and for the greater part of its length is a mountain railway with a ruling grade of 3 per cent. Water is scarce, especially in Asmara at the summit, and of poor quality. Steam locomotives are used, although diesel engines were ready in Italy when the war started. (These were found later in Benghazi). There were also some very fine railcars with a diesel engine each end, with which a passenger service had been run. There are no continuous brakes, brakemen travelling in cabooses on the wagons, applying or releasing handbrakes on whistle signals from the driver. The track was well maintained. Trains are worked on a train-despatch system from Asmara which is connected to each station. Orders to drivers are given verbally by station-masters. The drivers were Italian, and the system appeared to work well.

When the battle of Keren was in progress the railway from Agordat to a point just short of the fighting was available but, although wagons had been left behind, there were no locomotives except a boilerless relic—from which some enthusiasts tried to convert a road traction engine boiler, quite forgetting the steaming capacity required on a mountain railway.

Small diesel shunting engines were brought overland on tank transporters to Agordat, and worked light trains as far forward as Agat, where the grades were easy. From there a small quantity of supplies was taken on by a motor truck pulling a wagon. The motor ran on its own wheels along the formation, while for the return journey down hill, it ran up planks on to the now empty truck, which ran down by gravity.

Somebody also produced a scheme to make a locomotive by installing an aircraft engine and propeller (salvaged from a burnt-out aircraft) on an open truck; unfortunately there were tunnels.

When once Keren was captured it was only a matter of a few days until Asmara was occupied, complete with locomotives, workshops and stores, and it was then possible to start getting the railways into working order. The head of each department was an Italian, and on the whole they co-operated excellently, as did the lower grades of Italians and Eritreans. There had been a certain amount of damage from bombs, and also demolitions by the enemy.

At Asmara the shed had been hit and, although the damage was local, a boiler had been cut in half with the usual macaroni effect from the cut tubes. An ammunition train had been bombed and burnt out, and the remains were still alongside the track. At a few places culverts had been blown on the hillside (the Italian railway engineers were very annoyed with the Army for having done this!), and below Keren a number of rails had been removed for roofing

dug-outs, while others in the track had been rendered unserviceable by shell-fire. In many tunnels a rail had been removed, and one or two engines run in from each end followed by wagons of stones from the up direction, the whole later being liberally sown with mines.

The track up to Keren was restored by British railway troops. The day after Keren was occupied repairs were started by the Italians and Eritreans to the demolitions on a side cutting below Keren. They were assisted by a party of Sappers and Miners with a portable compressor and drills for the removal of large rocks on the track. The Italians always kept a reserve of rectangular, open-topped cages of wire, about 6'-0" x 4'-0" x 3'-0", made like a trangular for repairs to breaches. A number of these were brought to site and used to build up a retaining wall from the toe of the slip. As each course of cages was filled with boulders or rocks another course of cages, set slightly back, was laid on top of it. A strong retaining wall was thus very quickly constructed.

The tunnels were cleared by British railway troops, who walked delicately on top of the rails for fear of treading on undiscovered mines. Most of the engines were leaning on the side of the tunnel, and they were first jacked to an upright position when rails were inserted under the wheels and joined to the track that had not been removed. The engine was then dragged back to the nearest station. One day was usually sufficient to clear a tunnel with only two derailed engines.

Near Keren the telegraph wires, which did not follow the railway but went straight up hill and down dale cross-country, had been very badly damaged during the fighting, and it was a long time before the Royal Corps of Signals restored these.

The first call on the railway was to bring ammunition and supplies forward and to remove prisoners to the back areas. Three up and three down trains were run between Agordat and Asmara, and the service was on the whole satisfactory, chiefly owing to the exertion of a young British railway traffic officer at Keren. The running staff—the late enemy—had very long hours on the road but never grumbled. The Eritreans did strike; they said they were quite willing to work but they had had no food for two days, and were quite incapable of carrying on. Their grouse, a not unreasonable one, was rectified by arranging rations for them.

There was no communication between the three stations above Keren owing to the damage to the wires. The three down trains arrived at Keren during the night at hourly intervals, and instructions were issued that the first up train was not to leave before the last down train arrived. That none of the three up or three down trains ran into each other had to be left to chance, and a big chance it was with the tunnels and deep cuttings combined with sharp curves. The gods were kind and nothing happened. A great deal of urgently required ammunition and petrol was brought forward, and a number of prisoners, who were in such large numbers that they were an embarrassment in the forward areas, were sent to the base. The chance taken was well worth it.

One evening in the station-master's office at Asmara the control telephone rang and after a short conversation in Italian, bedlam broke loose in about four languages. The story was that an engine backing on to a truck just removed from a tunnel had missed the coupling; the truck with a British officer on it had run away and hit a train. A diesel car sent down to find out what really had happened, disclosed that the somewhat volatile Italians and Eritreans had grossly

exaggerated. A truck had run away, but it had no passenger and after rushing through two or three stations had stopped by itself on a stretch of up-grade.

The few letters that passed between the British and the Italian railway were, on the British part, in English. An interpreter translated them into Italian. The reply was in English and was translated but this time into French as the interpreter did not feel competent to write in English. The files were a peculiar mixture!

In Asmara, the railway stores were a sight for eyes that had become tired trying to build a bridge and railway with next to nothing. Unfortunately it was too late to make use of any but a few of the items available.

In the workshops, which had turned out among other things a large number of land-mines, there were standing two locomotives, which had been converted by the Italians from the 90 cm. gauge to the 3 feet 6 inches gauge of the Sudan railways. It was never clear whether these were intended to be taken to Port Sudan by sea or overland to Kassala when the Sudan was captured. Whatever the intention may have been it did not materialise. Any discussion about them not unnaturally caused embarrassment and was avoided.

Water in Asmara was very short, and a quantity was brought in tanks from stations down the line. As a last resort the local water company was telephoned and one or two tanks were sent by road and pumped into the high-service tank.

The electric current in Asmara was generated in Massawa, and the supply was kindly continued by the Italians the whole time they were in possession of the latter town, and but for this the railway and other problems would have been very much more difficult.

The line from Asmara to Massawa was very little damaged and it was brought into use after the port was opened. There was an excellent ropeway joining the two towns, and this was soon running again in charge of the Italians and carried a considerable tonnage. A suggestion to strap wounded men to stretchers and send them on the ropeway was not encouraged.

The port of Massawa, which has a foul climate, was full of sunken ships, although an attempt to place one so as to block the entrance to the harbour was not entirely successful. The rail connections to the wharves were very inadequate and were subsequently improved. It is possible that a considerable amount of cargo was moved from the docks by road in the large diesel lorries with trailers, of which there were a great number in the country.

A few weeks after the capture of the whole of Eritrea, a British officer was sent to Asmara as General Manager of the railway, which then came under the general control of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration.

COSTLY INEFFICIENCY

"MILLSTONE"

A VARIETY of reasons prompt this article, but the three more important ones will suffice. The first, that every reasonable step possible should be taken to ease the administrative burden that is about to fall on the shoulders of the officers of the completely nationalised Armies of the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan.

The 500 or so lieutenant-colonels of the two Armies will have less than nine years' service. It is not their fault that they, and indeed the comparative handful of their seniors, will have had too little experience of the broader aspects of higher administration. We need not argue either the fact or the necessity. The fact of the lack of adequate experience of administration is plain. The necessity for easing the strain by lightening the burden is equally obvious.

The second reason is that independence and partition jointly throw an even more grievous strain than in the past on the totality of the country's financial resources, and as a result of the competition for funds, money for the two Armies will be tight. Embassies, imported food for the people, uplift programmes covering education, agriculture and industrialisation, to name only a few, will draw heavily on what used to be the combined revenues of this land.

Per se, partition will make the two Armies more expensive; two lots of overheads and two efforts to secure a balance of arms and services. Every anna of the Army budgets of the two Dominions must be made to give its full value if, in terms of defence, the best insurance is to be forthcoming. Money that makes no sufficient contribution to that insurance must be cut most ruthlessly.

The third reason touches on the morale and contentment of the men. To the civilian, Army clichés concerning morale and contentment are somewhat of a mystery. He is apt to believe that the Army officer drags this factor into his arguments when all else fails; a retreat to his last line of defence where his breastwork is built up of jargon, *jadu* and obtruse but probably empty technicality.

But for the Army officer who knows his trade, the absence or presence of morale and contentment means that the machine in his hand is either of base metal or that it is of the finest steel. Add discipline to those two ingredients and the steel is a finely tempered weapon whose edge will not turn when it strikes.

To come to the point, neither India nor Pakistan will be able to afford the massive red tape, the high expense and the inefficiency of their respective Military Accountant General's Departments. Let it be clearly understood that this somewhat severe indictment constitutes no animadversion on the many able individuals of those organisations. It is solely related to the doubtful necessity for such extensive machinery and for the procedures and methods that such machinery must follow. The three points of criticism will be taken in their reverse order.

There can be few causes more potent for the rise of discontent and the lowering of morale than inaccuracy in pay disbursed and in delay in the settlement of pensions. How few, from the lowest sweeper to the senior general, find

their monthly pay accounts correct? The position in which Army personnel of all grades today find themselves is that they dread the moment when, each month, their eye traverses the account of what the pay authority has decided they are entitled to receive. At least life is not monotonous! Crippling deductions in one month are followed by Rip Van Winkle periods inducing the belief that the storm has been weathered; that the bleak wind has blown out; but only to find a repetition sooner or later.

It is inevitable that after a war the ghosts of long forgotten debits should rise again but no one would mind if such debits always bore relationship to past events. It is the doubtful deductions that cause the trouble because little short of a full-time occupation, involving the production of documentary proof that has almost disappeared beyond human ken, can alone set invalid deductions to rights and only then after months of interminable correspondence.

Whether or not the foregoing is an understatement or is overdrawn, the material point in respect of contentment and morale is not what the facts of the case might be, but what the personnel concerned believe them to be. They only see the result. Pose the appropriate question to any three or four of the highest or the lowest and the result will surprise most people.

But although the position concerning pay is highly disconcerting, it is infinitely worse in respect of pensions and with special reference to the rank and file. Although the dependents of many men who died years ago still wait for the benefits that Government contracted to pay when those men undertook their service, the outstanding aggregate of pension claims yet to be settled is so large as to constitute a reproach to any administration. These are facts. And if anyone seeks to question the effects of this on the contentment and morale of our men serving in the ranks, let him pause to consider the position of a young widow who has to wait perhaps two or three years before her pension is admitted.

In this country, what can she do for her own support and that of any children she may have? She may be lucky in that she may become a drudge in a family of relatives. If this opportunity is not available, then many are forced to obtain the money for their sustenance through immorality. With such a picture before the fighting man what can be his thoughts?

In these hazardous days the soldier lives a life of almost unending danger. He cannot say, now that so-called peace has returned: "This cannot happen to me." It very well might. And he must ask himself: "What of my widow and my children?"

The second point of criticism arises from the heavy cost of these Departments of the Military Accountant General's. The readers of this article will probably have some idea of the numbers of infantry battalions now available to India and Pakistan. They may well be shocked to know that the cost of the unified Military Accountant General's Department before partition equals the equivalent of some 21 battalions of infantry. Put in another way, the cost of the "Military Accounts Offices" for the financial year 1947/48 is Rs. 5 crores 10 lakhs or Rs. 510 lakhs. This amount is nearly 50% more than all the money required in the same period for all military hospitals and all the doctors etc. The sum in this case is Rs. 3 crores 77 lakhs or Rs. 377 lakhs.

Soon, the Defence Budgets for the future years of the two Dominion Armies will be in the process of compilation. For the reasons that have been stated there will be the heaviest possible pressure to reduce defence expenditure.

The military authorities on whom this task will fall may well ask themselves how can they afford to spend such relatively massive sums on an item that makes no direct contribution to the defence of the country.

Lastly, there is the fact that the officers of the nationalised Armies of the future should not be overburdened with administrative intricacies that can, by suitable arrangement, be avoided. Give them a few years in which to gain their feet in the administrative field but let some effort be made against their being overwhelmed with avoidable burdens which absorb the time and energy which they should devote to the main purpose for which they exist, *i.e.*, the training and well-being of their men.

In its simplest expression, which runs the danger of an accusation of oversimplification, there are three main processes to be completed as between those in the Army who require money and the Military Accountant General's Department that provides it. The first stage is that the request for money must be properly framed, in accordance with the governing sanctions, and accompanied by whatever vouchers or other documentary evidence is necessary to support the claim for money.

The second stage is that some authority duly authorised and empowered for the purpose, must satisfy itself that the claim is valid and thereafter issue a cheque or other negotiable instrument for the money. The third stage is the writing up of the essential accounts. All the pieces of paper which constitute the claims that have been accepted and paid must be gathered together in one place so that a running account of the total expenditure can be kept.

Now there are many ways of doing this. One way (and Heaven forbid the thought that the writer advocates it!) is that the company commander on behalf of his men and his officers would prepare the necessary claims; that the commanding officer would examine the claims and issue the necessary cheques and lastly, that the commanding officer would send all his pay claims to a small central office whose sole task would be to keep the central account for the Army. Thus at one stroke of the pen the whole of the Military Accountant General's Department has been abolished!

But we must admit that the Treasury is entitled to a little more prudent management than such delightful simplicity would provide. It does, however, approximate to the pre-war German system under which the signature of a military officer of the requisite grade on any claim, automatically converted that claim into a cheque capable of being cashed at any bank or treasury. The brake on corruption was that if a series of claims so signed by an officer were found to be in any way suspicious, then there ensued no tedious examinations, enquiries and courts-martial. The officer was simultaneously relieved of his commission and conscripted into the ranks.

Under the German system, all claims so paid by banks and treasuries found their way to a central office in Berlin where the central accounts were written up. The result was that the German equivalent of the M.A.G.'s Department cost the German Army Budget the equivalent of a mere company of infantry; an interesting comparison with the cost of 21 battalions of infantry referred to earlier.

But something approaching that simplicity is desirable if the present high expenditure for inefficient service is to be corrected. The source of all evil

under the present organisation is the constitution of a massive organisation completely separated from the Army in every possible way. It is civilian and not military. It lives apart from the Defence Forces. Contacts of any kind scarcely exist. The result is inevitable.

A babel of cross talk, which is rarely verbal and almost exclusively on paper, between two foreign bodies neither of which are seized with the view of the other or indeed of any understanding of the other's viewpoint. The one knows nothing of the mind and thoughts of the other. All is questioned, all has to be proved and reproved again. Ignorant of the ways of military life, the narrowest meaning of all regulations is applied. There is no room for a broader view of their spirit and intention.

What is a suitable answer that will match economy with efficiency; that will give the Treasury security whilst permitting a reasonable reading of regulations, and will relate the claims of today with their discharge in days or weeks and not months or years?

The first principle to be followed is to bring the preparation of claims, their auditing and their sanction back into the Army where all can be checked and be verified in the place where the proof, both written and physical, is to be found. We must rid ourselves of those vast alien offices that require, usually at hundreds of miles distance, all to be substantiated, authenticated and proved all over again. This means that we require the compiler and auditor of claims somewhere in the military machine.

The thought of the older pre-war officer must automatically turn to the halcyon days when we had the Unit Accountant. This "foreigner" from the M.A.G. was our very great friend indeed. At source, the Army not merely learnt what it could not have but what it could have. The whole process of making effective claims was set aright. The cheque always came back for the amount claimed and without cuts, queries and delays.

That is what any reform must secure: expert and non-partisan claims compilation at the point of origin. That is the essential principle to be followed if any or all of the three points of criticism are to be met.

Assuming that the claiming for money has been put on a sound basis in such a manner, the next point is the expeditious issue of the money. For this, a few highly centralised alien offices of gigantic dimensions are quite unnecessary. That part of the organisation can be in the form of "attached officers" of small size at area and command H.Qs.

Lastly, there is the compilation of the centralised accounts which receives information of all payments made, and so compiles the running account of expenditure against Budget provision. The need here is a relatively small office based on mechanical accounting.

The foregoing seeks to do no more than indicate principles. If the gigantic bodies now constituting the two M.A.G.'s Departments were remodelled to conform to the general arrangements that have been indicated, perhaps expenditure on their account—expenditure that adds nothing to but subtracts from the defence of the country—could be cut down to perhaps 25% of what it is today; whilst much excellent personnel could be transferred from unnecessary labour to all those nation building activities for which India and Pakistan are crying aloud. That is an additional benefit beyond meeting the three points of criticism on which this article is founded.

But there is a last and further benefit which is perhaps the most important of all. From the aspect of building the strongest defence (which is by no means synonymous with large Defence Forces) it is very important that all training and all duties of military officers should be directed towards cultivating in them a well developed and balanced initiative, a readiness to accept responsibility and the mind and will to act.

In the financial matters that have been discussed, the practical result of the existing systems, whatever the theoretical intention may be, is that the officer is not to be trusted and his financial judgment and conscience must be kept for him. It operates to debar Government from receiving the whole-hearted co-operation, based on a sense of responsibility, which it has a right to expect, and would readily be forthcoming if some greater measure of trust were placed on military officers.

At present, theory and practice are in dire opposition. It is this that concerns the argument because it is this situation that, throughout the careers of military officers, sets to work an influence, deadly to their efficiency as defenders of their country, that saps the qualities that should be nourished and sustained.

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The Secretary, The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan,
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On receipt of this order, please pay to Lloyds Bank, Ltd., Simla for The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan, the sum of Rs. 20 (twenty) being Entrance Fee and my Subscription for 1948 and the sum of Rs. 10 on every succeeding January 1, until further notice.

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AN ICEBERG OFF BOMBAY

BRIGADIER ROSS HOWMAN, C.I.E., O.B.E.

“MY love, how *can* it be true, as this newspaper says, that soon, messages despatched from Bombay may reach London, thousands of miles away, at the same hour of the clock?”

Even allowing for the difference in local time which made such a feat possible, there was reason for feminine amazement at such Press statements. The year was 1870, when the idea of speedy transit between India and England in any shape or form was still distinctly a novel one.

True, steamships were plying and the Suez Canal had just opened, but nearly in the same decade a First Lord had defended the despatch of troops to India by sail because of the unreliability of steam. True, too, that London and Karachi had recently been connected by a land telegraph, but for a variety of reasons this had hardly established a reputation for speed.

Between Karachi and the Persian Gulf, where the Government of India was in control, the line was very reasonably efficient. Thereafter there was a choice of the Turkish and Russian routes, followed by the hazards of crossing the turbulent Balkan and Danubian States. The operators in these lands, too, were inflicted, more than ordinarily, with the curse of the Tower of Babel. On occasion they effected such startling changes in the text of Press messages that one enterprising, if pained, editor printed samples as puzzles for his readers to solve. On other occasions messages simply disappeared. There is, for example, reason to believe that the telegram containing the news of the death of Lord Derby, which was despatched from London on 23rd October 1869, has yet to reach India.

The commercial houses in India and England suffered most of all. The first message telegraphed to India when the line was opened in 1865 reported the fall of Richmond and a consequent sharp drop in the price of cotton. Having thrown this bomb into the Bombay cotton pool, the line promptly broke down. The next major shock to the nerves of India's businessmen came in 1866, when a laconic message announced: "Financial panic in London." Brokers and merchants were given a week to think over this one before the next instalment arrived. In view of such episodes it is not surprising to read that the Indian journals published a daily bulletin on the condition of the telegraph, exactly as if it were a distinguished invalid whose precarious condition caused the liveliest interest to the community.

Something, said many people, had to be done, and as it happened there was some one willing and anxious to do it, namely the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company, fresh from its triumphs with the Atlantic Cable. But the investing public proved coy, and as cable laying is an expensive business the Company "deemed it desirable to invoke the countenance and material support of the Government of India." The proposal put to the Secretary of State was that, with the assistance of Government, the Board should construct a cable from Bombay to Suez "protected by the depth of the ocean from destruction and injury either by accident or war." Unfortunately for them, as it proved,

the Board also stressed that their cable would "obviate the necessity for transmitting messages by land line through desolate or semi-barbarous countries.... and the consequent delays."

The gist of the reply they received was that while the first argument was well put, and conceded, the second figuratively stank in the financial nostrils of the Governments who had put up the capital for the land line. In other words these Governments wanted their rake-off, and the Secretary of State was certainly not going to subsidise a competitor for the money.

Undeterred by this rebuff the Board launched a subsidiary, the Anglo-Indian Telegraph Company Ltd., and signed a provisional, but curiously exact, contract for "manufacturing and laying 3654 nautical miles of cable." They then "respectfully begged" the Treasury to "move the Admiralty to obtain as expeditiously as possible accurate deep sea soundings and temperatures across the Indian Ocean." Since the Government of India had quoted H.M.'s Government as the chief dissentient to the cable proposal, it seems odd that both the Treasury and Admiralty should have "moved" with considerable celerity. But this they did, for the latter promptly despatched a frigate to take deep sea soundings from Bombay to Aden.

Despite this encouraging gesture the investing public still felt that somewhere there must be a catch, and money came in slowly. The Company therefore discharged their second barrel at the Secretary of State. This was an attractive offer which, amongst other advantages, purported to save the Government of India the considerable sum of over a million and a quarter pounds sterling. It was now the turn of the Secretary of State to look for the catch, and he presumably found it. His courteous but chilly refusal was hardly tempered by the cautious concession that "The Indian Government is, however,.... prepared to send a portion of its messages by the new route provided the line is efficiently worked and the tariff moderate."

After further and equally abortive financial skirmishing a powerful memorial was launched at the Secretary of State urging him to treat the construction of the cable as a matter of high, imperial importance. The first signature on this remarkable document was that of the Lord Mayor of London. There followed those of the Managing Directors of several score banks, insurance, railway, shipping and commercial firms, many of whose names are still household words today. A number of M.P.'s and several influential Indian gentlemen (one was Hormadji Prestonji) also signed the memorial.

Nothing happened, and a strong reaction set in. Some dozen London businessmen personally subscribed £400,000 and, the necessary public support following, launched a new association known as the British-Indian Telegraph Company. Events then moved fast, and in a remarkably short time the famous cable ship, GREAT EASTERN, was chartered, loaded, and ready to sail for Bombay.

At a banquet given to celebrate this event the Company promoters, forgivably, if somewhat illogically, rejoiced that the cable would be laid "free from the trammels inseparable from Government support." The frankness of the spokesmen for the guests from the Lords and Commons was, nevertheless, somewhat remarkable. An Hon. Member remarked that though the inception of the idea lay in a report by the House of Common's Committee "it was a happy thing that Parliament had nothing to do, directly, with the enterprise." The noble lord who followed stated with still more devastating candour that he

"dared say that when individual enterprise had done its best and been successful, the Government may step in and take over your sea telegraph." In this year of grace comment would be superfluous.

The cable ship, the GREAT EASTERN, was in her day as famous as the QUEEN MARY is now—more so indeed for she was a giantess born long before her time. Of 22,500 tons builder's measure, and nearly 700 feet long, her apparent size was enhanced by six towering masts, four prominent funnels, and two huge paddles "each bigger than the circus ring at Astleys", which she carried in addition to a screw.

As her name implied she was built for the Eastern trade, being specially designed to ply between England and Colombo, whence smaller "feeders" were to shuttle between Indian, Far Eastern and Pacific ports. Unfortunately for these plans, Marc Brunel, her designer, fearing for the narrowness of the Thames at her Deptford building yard, insisted that his ship be launched broadside on. She went aground. Ruined by this catastrophe the "Great Ship Company" was forced to sell to new owners who sent her to the North Atlantic. It was not therefore until 6th November 1869, eleven years after being launched, that the GREAT EASTERN first sailed to the East.

Her destination was Bombay. In her holds, besides 6,000 tons of deep sea cable, were 10,000 tons of export and fuel coal, which with other oddments made up a 21,000 ton freight. The venture, ship and cargo, amounted to two millions sterling, and there were anxious hearts in the City of London when the giant vessel was last sighted from England buffeting into a strong head wind in heavy seas. These anxieties were steadily to grow, for the GREAT EASTERN missed the homeward bound mail from Capetown by a day, and it was not till after the New Year that the joyful news of her safe arrival there reached London.

The GREAT EASTERN eventually anchored off Bombay on 27th January 1870 "looking like a huge iceberg dwarfing by comparison the handiwork of man." Since, before sailing, her outline had been compared with that of "a dark embattled city" this metaphorphis calls for some explanation. It was, in fact, due to a coat of whitewash liberally applied from stem to stern to reduce the temperature in her tanks "which threatened the mixture of gutta percha, India rubber and other gums" used in the construction of the cable. We are told there was an immediate drop of eight degrees.

All India, or so the Press said, had been on the *qui vive* for the GREAT EASTERN's arrival, and her Captain, who had 8,000 tons of coal to get aboard, imposed a two-rupee "entrance fee" in the hope that this would appreciably limit the enthusiasm of would-be sight-seers. He was disappointed, for a cable official writes that "from an early hour the ship, though lying two miles offshore, was beset by Parsees and Hindoos until, soon, the strangers in European costume were in a large minority. The snowy robes and peculiar head dresses of the Parsees were to be seen on all sides—on the paddle boxes, the bridge, the deck, down in the saloon, outside the tanks containing the cable, at the door of the testing house (a sacred spot) and, clustered round the enormous red buoys were the bright costume and intelligent faces of Hindoos and Mohammadens."

A wildly enthusiastic Parsee visitor considerably startled two comfortably upholstered ship's officers by rushing up to them with the remark that "until you came the biggest thing we saw in Bombay was the Bates Family from Liverpool." They only recovered when, pointing downwards, he added scornfully: "See! there she is alongside the GREAT EASTERN looking like a sampan."

The curiosity of the ladies ashore was whetted by the accounts of their menfolk, and the Captain, bowing to the inevitable, gallantly set aside a day when "a large party of Parsee and Hindoo ladies and children visited the great ship, making decks and saloon bright with colour." Amongst other visitors was the "Mahratta Chief and Bahee Sahab of Jumkhundee", and his wife, who "astonished the electricians by her intelligent comprehension of their mysteries."

The visit of the Governor, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, and his household was less successful, for the GREAT EASTERN was coaling and "an impish wind blew clouds of fine black dust directly over the ship's deck, so that to sit down on a chair was to carry a facsimile impression in black. The distinguished party indeed returned to the Governor's yacht piebald." It was indeed "all most unfortunate!"

Meanwhile, the technicalities of connecting up the shore end of the cable went on apace. The three-mile gap between the GREAT EASTERN and the shore was first bridged by one of her smaller consorts, the CHILTERN, which, with some navigational risk (she was 1,304 tons and drew 18 ft. of water) steamed in until she was "in six fathoms of water, with Government House and Malabar Point about a quarter of a mile distant on the north-east." There she anchored and transferred the cable to a barge which proceeded slowly towards the landing, dropping the heavy cable on its way. It was quite an aquatic pageant.

"First the Government steam tug, gaily dressed with flags, towing the all important barge which, with its sloping awning, looked exactly like a small Noah's Ark. In close attendance came the steam launch ELECTRIC, boats full of cable hands and an official gig pulled by active, quick-eyed, clean-shirted Chinamen with the Master-Attendant of Bombay Harbour in solitary and imposing dignity in the stern."

As the water shoaled the launch took over the tow from the tug, the boats from the launch and, finally "from all sides of the barge men dropped into the water, ranged themselves on either side of the cable, battled through the surf, and dragged the end triumphantly up the beach" following a trench already cut to the cable testing hut. The mile of land line to the Telegraph Office had previously been laid, and for some reason largely by night. The idea of being paid for "burying a perfectly good rope three feet underground" accentuated by the evident importance attached to their task had amused and excited the coolies. They found an outlet in song.

One can detect a certain malicious pleasure in a cable official's observation: "I am afraid that the military gentlemen who were camping on the ground through which our trench was cut enjoyed a thoroughly bad night. I had to resist appeals from the A.D.C. of General Sir Augustus Spencer every time his chief's slumbers were rudely disturbed—poor chap, he *was* harassed." The A.D.C. even more than Sir Augustus, one presumes.

The CHILTERN buoyed the seaward end of her cable, where it swung awaiting the completion of GREAT EASTERN's coaling. To celebrate this step forward one hundred and fifty Bombay notables were invited to luncheon on the GREAT EASTERN. Judging by the accounts carried by the *Times of India* and *Bombay Gazette* this event was chiefly remarkable for the multiplicity of the toasts and the exceeding length and prosiness of the speeches which accompanied them.

The candid remarks of the P. & O. agent (*in vino veritas?*) are, however, worthy of record. Proposing the toast of the Captain and Officers of the GREAT EASTERN, he said: "It gives me great pleasure to propose the health of these officers, from the fact that the GREAT EASTERN was built for the purpose of connecting England with India by conveying large numbers of passengers. This would have been a serious blow to the P. & O. Company. In her present task I think she is much better employed."

However verbose the speakers, the luncheon, nevertheless, appears to have been an unquestionable success. At 5 p.m. (we read) when the tugs came alongside to take the guests home "many were missing, perhaps still exploring the engine rooms, her famous tunnel, her cavernous depths." And perhaps not!

On 14th February the cable was ceremoniously sliced in the presence of the Governor. The GREAT EASTERN weighed anchor and sailed West on her course for Aden. As the Indian coastline dropped astern in the dusk a message sent over the cable to Bombay informed the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, of the successful commencement of the enterprise.

While responsibility weighed heavily upon the ship's officers and cable engineers an observer found "the calm regularity with which the paying out goes on, the absence of all stir or fuss" most impressive. At breakfast on 16th February, however, the sound of "rapid drumming upon metal was heard and all rushed from the table and upon deck pell-mell." There, however, everything was found in order. The alarming noises were eventually traced to "a late-rising gentleman, the jets from whose shower-bath were beating upon the metal deck above!"

The voyage continued quietly uneventful, though there were anxious moments as each successive cable tank emptied and a change had to be made to that next astern. On 27th February the GREAT EASTERN anchored off Aden, ungratefully described as "looking like a great cinder." After a rousing guest night with the Royal Fusiliers, then in garrison, this opinion was however revised and the handsome declaration made that "the American who said if he held property both in Hell and in Aden, he should part with his Aden holding, and live in the other for choice, was guilty of a coarse exaggeration."

At Aden, nevertheless, good fortune deserted the expedition. The cable fouled and sank in heavy weather and had to be laboriously searched for on the ocean bed with grapnels. Recovered and spliced to the shore end it fouled again, with the spectacular result (as gravely recorded by the electrician in the cable hut ashore) that "at 8.05 a.m. (Greenwich) the cable suddenly disappeared through aperture and has not been seen since." Recovery and repair operations were not assisted by the sharks who were "assiduous in their attentions, eyeing the white-fleshed strangers with hungry curiosity and seemingly ready to act with sportsmanlike precision in the event of a slip or fall."

After these trials and tribulations it was with relief that, on test, the line to India, 1,818 cable miles away, proved to be electrically perfect. By a curious coincidence, the first news flash to pass over the cable from Bombay was of a serious collision between the P. & O. steamer BOMBAY and an American corvette.

On 6th March a gun announced that the land terminal to Suez had been spliced, and soon Aden, again in disfavour and "really not a bad station—to leave" was fading astern. Only a few hundred miles of cable now remained in the GREAT EASTERN's tanks, and the second night out, lying off "a dark ember of an island, known as the Hill of Birds, faintly illuminated by the rising moon" her cable was cut and buoyed. A lesser ship, more fitted for the then tortuous and ill-charted passage of the Red Sea, completed the task, and the GREAT EASTERN sailed West again.

"Thus was the dream of Brunel, her maker, brought to pass. He had sought to bring East and West closer together by swiftly conveying passengers and freight between them in unparalleled quantities. Fate has intervened, but in the end relented. For his Great Ship had become the instrument of annihilating time and space between the continents through the magic of the deep sea cable."

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council of the Institution has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1948:

"ARE OFFICERS' MESSES SUITABLE FOR INDIAN CONDITIONS?"

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers. They should be typewritten (double spacing), submitted in triplicate, and be received by the Secretary, The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan, Simla, on or before June 30th 1948.

In order that the anonymity of each candidate should be preserved, a motto should be written at the top of each entry. A sealed envelope, bearing on the outside the words of the motto, and containing inside the name and address of the author of the essay, must accompany each entry.

Entries should not exceed fifteen pages (approximately 8,000 words) of the size and style of the *Journal*, and should not be less than 4,000 words.

Three Judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500 either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1948 issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*.

Copyright of all essays submitted will be reserved by the Council of The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan.

MISCELLANY

POINTS OF VIEW

I have never had a policy. I have simply tried to do what seemed best each day, as each day came.

—*Abraham Lincoln.*

The whole secret of life is to be interested in one thing profoundly and in a thousand things well.

—*Hugh Walpole.*

Readers are of two kinds—the reader who carefully goes through a book, and the reader who as carefully lets the book go through him.

—*Douglas Jerrold.*

Tact is the knack of making a point without making an enemy.

—*Howard W. Newton.*

I have never let my schooling interfere with my education.

—*Mark Twain.*

A large number of people seem to be conscious of existence only when they are making a noise.

—*Schopenhauer.*

Offhand, we don't remember a time when there were so many international organisations and so little international organisation.

—*"St. Louis Post-Despatch."*

Never in the field of human endeavour has so much history found so little space to edify so many.

—*A. T. Pitman.*

DESIGN FOR LIVING

If there is righteousness in the heart there will be beauty in the character. If there be beauty in the character, there will be harmony in the home. If there is harmony in the home, there will be order in the nation. When there is order in the nation, there will be peace in the world.

—*Chinese proverb quoted in the "Sunshine Magazine."*

Be unselfish. That is the first and final commandment for those who would be useful, and happy in their usefulness. If you think of yourself only, you cannot develop because you are choking the source of development, which is spiritual expansion through thought for others.

—*Dr. Charles W. Eliot.*

People squander in envy and jealousy enough vital energy to make them perfectly charming and lovable if it were properly directed. You should remember that though another may have more money, beauty, brains than you; yet when it comes to the rarer spiritual values such as charity, self-sacrifice, honour, nobility of heart, you have an equal chance with everyone to be the most beloved and honoured of people. One of the sanest, surest and most generous joys of life comes from being happy over the good fortune of others. Envy is what inclines us to be more ready to speak evil of the virtuous than of the wicked. A jealous person is one who debases himself in the vain and ignoble effort to discredit others.

—*Archibald Rutledge.*

SYSTEMS

I know of no system that can be better than the people who work it; the New Jerusalem will depend more on the quality of the neighbours than of the architecture. Belief in systems is usually a result of half-education. The completely ignorant man has no sense of the value of fact. The educated man realizes the value of fact, but also has a sense of its limitations. It is the half-educated man, discovering facts for the first time, who is dazzled by their brilliant possibilities and leaps out of his bath shouting, "Eureka! Collect all the facts, systematize, and there is the answer to everything!" And it seems to be nobody's job to explain that all the available figures are not all the facts, and that since *all* the facts on any subject can never be collected, he must still use his brains and his judgment.

—*Nigel Balchin.*

CONJECTURE

Erasmus Darwin has commonly been conceded the honour of being the first to conceive the idea of an aeroplane. "There seems to be no probable method of flying conveniently, but by the power of steam," he wrote in prose after James Watt had invented his steam engine, though he added that "there might be some other explosive material which another half-century may discover." In verse he thus stated his conjecture:

Soon shall thine arm, unconquer'd steam, afar
 Drag the small barge, or drive the rapid car.
 Or on wide-waving wings expanded bear
 The flying chariot through the fields of air.
 Fair crews, triumphant, leaning from above,
 Shall wave their fluttering 'kerchiefs as they move;
 Or warrior bands alarm the gaping crowd,
 And armies shrink beneath the shadowy cloud.

—"Nottinghamshire Guardian."

THE LIGHTER SIDE

It is forbidden, negligently or carelessly to remove any tree, seat or monument.

—*Notice in a Birmingham park*

European residents in Karachi have, I hear, made informal representations to the Sind Government against the proposal to forbid the import of liquor. The leader of the delegation expressed his case thus: "You import two things from Scotland—engineers and whisky, and you'll never get one without the other."

—*Peterborough in the "Daily Telegraph."*

A long-winded lawyer had been talking for so long that the magistrate eventually made no attempt to conceal a yawn. With some sarcasm, the lawyer said: "I sincerely trust that I am not unduly trespassing on the time of this court?" "There is some difference," came the reply, "between trespassing on time and encroaching on eternity."

—"Man of the World."

TAIL PIECE

Letters to "The Times".

Sir,—It is widely known that, while growing progressively shabbier and hungrier, we are marching towards a planned Utopia. But no one can march very far—or confidently—if he cannot rely on his trousers staying up. It is one of the limitations on human aspiration which science has yet to remove that man can go no faster than his own trousers. Four times in the past year of hope I have been forced to buy a new pair of braces, and after each occasion the braces have broken irretrievably within three months. I have tried them plastic and I have tried them unplastic. Can Sir Stafford Cripps, on whom all our hopes are now fixed, tell me what to do?

Yours faithfully,

19th December 1947.

Arthur Bryant.

Sir,—As we enter a New Year in the alarm and uncertainty induced by Dr. Bryant's jeremiad, it may hearten your readers to hear of one somewhat remarkable example of British steadfastness. My grandfather, who died in 1910, had a pair of braces which my father subsequently wore for most of 32 years. I, in turn, have worn them since my last pair sank in mid-Atlantic in 1942. I am wearing them today; and I shall march into 1948 with complete confidence.

Your obedient servant,

31st December 1947.

John Hadfield.

SETTLING IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

BRIGADIER L. B. BURROWS, O.B.E.

IN JANUARY 1947, my wife and I arrived in Africa from India with the intention of exploring Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa for a suitable place in which to settle. Why we never got further on this exploration than Southern Rhodesia will not, perhaps, be obvious from what follows.

It is sufficient to say that without a car, and at the time of the Royal Visit, travel in South Africa was such a difficult undertaking we felt it better to be satisfied with what we could find for certain in Southern Rhodesia. It is undoubtedly in many ways a country attractive for those who have spent long years in India; and as what we were lucky enough to find fulfilled the majority of our immediate wants, we decided to make the country our home, at least for the time being, without searching further afield in an unsettled world at very considerable expense.

Mr. Punch's advice to those about to be married was, if I am not mistaken, "Don't". The same might be said of settling in Southern Rhodesia at the present time. Very few would-be Benedicks have been deterred by this advice because of the probable difficulties of wedlock, and perhaps the intending settler will be no more inclined to heed it. But it is as well to realise that for the next year or so the newcomer to Southern Rhodesia will encounter very many difficulties and some lack of the comfortable conditions of living which previously prevailed.

He will, however, find no lack of friendliness or of warmth of welcome from the essentially British community of the Colony, which has always been famous for the cordiality of its hospitality and the geniality of its people. Heretofore, life was easy in Southern Rhodesia and the process of adapting it to the existing conditions and difficulties is necessarily a far from easy task. It must not be forgotten that the rigours of war dwelt lightly on the Colony, which enjoyed a period of prosperity and great activity connected with the Empire Air Training Scheme. Real hardships were not experienced and now that some are occurring they are not any the less irksome to endure.

It might be good advice to say that the intending settler should defer his coming for a year or two until conditions are more normal and easier for the newcomer. But for many in India today deferment of retirement is not feasible and, with all its difficulties, life in Southern Rhodesia is undoubtedly much less arduous than in England and probably compares favourably with other Colonies. Moreover, the late-comer forfeits opportunities, which are open at present, of acquiring attractive land in good localities in a country which is confidently anticipated to be on the threshold of considerable development and prosperity.

At the same time the opportunity of the voyage from India to see Kenya, and Tanganyika, which can be done by breaking journey at Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, might be worth taking before deciding definitely where to settle. By all accounts many of the same difficulties seem to exist in those countries also. But possibly the general conditions of life there, and the types of houses and properties obtainable, might appeal to those retiring from India as more suitable to their accustomed way of life than those in Southern Rhodesia.

The object of these notes, which have been written somewhat hurriedly, is to give the intending settler from India some idea of the conditions prevailing in Southern Rhodesia at the present time. It is not, therefore, desirable that they should be delayed for elaboration if they are to be of any use for the purpose for which intended. If they succeed in helping even a few readers in making their arrangements to leave India, they will have attained the writer's object in compiling them.

* * * * *

The accommodation situation is acute all over the Colony and especially in Salisbury. Emigrants from the United Kingdom are arriving monthly in hundreds. If they are recruits for the Government Service, they are accommodated in the former R.A.F. station at Cranborne, about three miles outside Salisbury. Conditions here are cramped and rough and ready. It is somewhere to live temporarily, but somewhat uncomfortable.

Hotels are full and will not usually accept a booking for longer than a fortnight. Boarding-houses are similarly occupied by longer term residents. There are waiting lists for most boarding-houses, but these are not always adhered to and cases are known of those seeking accommodation being accepted on personal application, because it happened that an unforeseen vacancy had just occurred. Salisbury householders are willing to take in paying guests to relieve the situation, but naturally they are anxious to choose their tenants and personal contact is essential. Hostels are being organised in Salisbury, but these will be very congested and uncomfortable.

The Settlers' Association cannot undertake to find accommodation for settlers as it has not the staff and organisation. Its small club room affords, however, opportunities for settlers to meet residents and establish contacts through which accommodation might be found. The notice-board can be used to advertise settlers' wants, but the Association can accept no responsibility for results. It is occasionally possible to get a furnished house, but these are rarely advertised and intending lessors usually lease to friends or through friend.

We looked for a furnished house for six weeks, during which time we found two possible ones. In one case, we were not selected from a queue of applicants as there was a more deserving one with children. In the other, there were too many conditions and restrictions to suit us. It is usual to be required to provide silver, cutlery and linen when taking a furnished house.

The last recourse is to camp. Most towns have good camping sites with water, and fuel and latrines provided. In Salisbury huts or *rondavels* (round huts) of poles, brushwood, clay plaster and thatch are being run up at the camping site. Such accommodation is definitely roughing it and while tolerable in the dry weather, will not be so in the rainy season which, if there is no drought, lasts from the middle of October to the end of March.

There is a Housing Board in Salisbury, which attempts to grapple with the problem. It should be realised, however, that official aid naturally tends to grant priority to Government employees and settlers who have their living to earn and must reside within reach of their work.

The only advice one can offer is, therefore, that intending settlers should secure accommodation in a hotel on arrival for as long as may be and then trust to luck. But the situation is not likely to improve and great difficulty and frequent moves must be accepted as inevitable.

It must be realised that the Colony does not cater for retired people and that most of the residents are workers. It is only 50 years since the Colony was founded and there is not yet a large number of retired people. The original houses were shacks and the bungalows which replaced them are now old-fashioned and frequently dilapidated. In pre-war days, the building of new houses had never caught up with demand. A limitation of building during the war has increased the shortage. There is, therefore, a serious and general lack of suburban houses.

In the country there are only the farm houses. It is easier now to purchase 5,000 acres with a farmhouse in the country than 5 acres with a modern residence near a town. However, houses come into the market from time to time in deceased estates or on account of removals, but they are snapped up at once. Usually sales are by auction. Prices are controlled by a Government Control Board but although steps are being taken to tighten up the control, evasions by means of privately arranged premia, inclusion of furniture at exorbitant prices and other dodges, have been frequent.

Most of the houses in Salisbury are either bungalows with iron roofs of about five main rooms, or modern villas of a somewhat unsuitable type for a country with a hot sun. Controlled prices of a five or six roomed house, fairly new and in good condition standing in say, two acres of land in the municipal area are seldom less than £4,000 to £5,000. Electric light and municipal water are general, but indoor water-borne sanitation is by no means so.

I bought a cottage, because I could not find any other way to live, and consider myself lucky to have secured it at £3,500 including 30 acres of land about 13 miles from Salisbury outside the municipal area. I had to wire the cottage but the electric connection was included in the purchase price. A private and adequate domestic water supply existed but I had to instal a water-borne sanitary system, kitchen sink and wash hand-basin. The cottage consists of two *rondavels* as bedrooms joined by a 20 ft. lounge, a hall, dressing room, kitchen and another connected *rondavel* as a dining room. It is built of brick with cement floors and a sound timber and asbestos roof over all. I estimate the property cost, with alterations, £4,000 and it is by no means spacious.

Building is only allowed by permit unless the cost is less than £100. Within the municipal area, one is obliged to employ an architect and European builders. Costs are high. I do not think a house of five main rooms could be built in Salisbury for less than £5,000. Materials are in short supply; especially piping, conduit for electric wiring, sanitary fittings, timber and roofing. Brick-making cannot yet keep pace with demand.

Outside the municipal area one can build with native artisans, but a permit is still required, and for individuals, it is more difficult to obtain materials than for a contractor to do so. I am trying to build a storeroom and garage. After searching in vain for three months, I have secured a native brickmaker, but now I cannot get sufficient coal to fire the kiln. I cannot obtain enough brick-moulds and am short of tools. This is typical of the difficulties encountered in building under one's own arrangements. The cost of buying bricks from a factory and transporting them would be approximately five times as much as making them with native labour on one's own land.

Land is obtainable at controlled and not unreasonable prices and there are many delightful sites in the vicinity of Salisbury, comprising plots of 5, 10,

or 20 acres. Electric current is or will be available, though water supply would probably necessitate a borehole. Many people have bought plots and built on them a small two-roomed building, intended ultimately to be a garage and storeroom. In these they live, waiting for the day when building is easier.

A neighbour of ours, a retired Government employee, who is building a house himself with native labour, has been living in this manner for 12 months. He hopes to occupy one or two rooms in his laboriously built house in a few weeks time. This is a typical example of the time required under present conditions to build a house. Moreover the individual concerned in this case has been 30 years in Southern Rhodesia, is an engineer, and knows his way about. Hence, he is much better placed to accomplish his object than a new settler would be.

However, a new-comer who intends definitely to settle would probably be well advised to secure a plot, while the choice is wide, and defer building until the situation improves. This is not likely to be for another two years by when it is hoped that the supply of materials may catch up with the demand, and the railway system be capable of delivering the goods; its present inability to do so being one of the contributory causes of existing difficulties.

One can, of course, go right out into the country and perhaps buy a small farm at no greater cost than a suburban residence in Salisbury. But unless the settler intends to farm, even in a small way, he would find singularly little to occupy his time, and his wife a remarkably difficult housekeeping problem. There are few country clubs, farms are very large, 10,000 acres being not uncommon, and the farming community widely separated.

Marandellas, for example, is a favourite and pleasant district. But neighbours are usually four or five miles apart, often as much as forty miles off a main road. Electric current is not available except if a private generating set is installed, and water supply obtainable from a well or dam. Marandellas "Town", marked large on the map, consists of a railway station, hotel, store, motor service station, small club, police station, church, and perhaps half-a-dozen small bungalows.

A car is an essential. Motor-bus services are totally inadequate and it is impossible to get about the country without a car. It is equally difficult to get about the city of Salisbury, where the municipal bus service is limited and infrequent and taxis expensive.

Until a few months ago new cars could only be purchased by permit. These were very difficult to obtain and the in-flow of new cars very limited. Justification had to be proved to obtain a permit. In my case, it was not until I had purchased my property that I obtained a permit for a new car because I could not occupy my house without one. This control has now been lifted, but the supply of new cars is quite insufficient to meet demand and all dealers have long waiting lists of old customers. Hence new-comers do not stand much chance except for 10 h.p. cars. These are quite unsuitable for country use and £475 is a lot of money to spend on a car of limited usefulness. It is likely to be a year or so before the position improves much.

Outside municipal areas, roads are still mostly wheel-track strips of tarmac. A programme of road construction is in progress but it will be years before country roads improve. Off the strips the roads are mostly earth-tracks and very rough at that. American cars are the most useful, and the cheapest are about £600.

Second-hand cars are a gamble with the dice loaded against the purchaser. Most used cars are worn out having been run, and run pretty hard, for at least eight years. Occasionally a lucky purchaser may find one in fair condition. Prices are controlled. Settlers are advised to bring cars if they have them. The customs duty on entry is 4% on British cars, 20% on Canadian, and 25% on cars of foreign manufacture at present value as assessed by the customs.

Both new and second-hand furniture can be purchased. The latter is not usually very attractive. Good new furniture is expensive, *e.g.*, £150 to £250 for dining room suites. £125 to £300 for bedroom suites. Some of the new furniture is ultra-modern and shoddy, but nice stuff is procurable and it is possible to find cabinet-makers to undertake making one's requirements—at a price.

Carpets, linoleum, etc., are obtainable, though somewhat expensive especially if cutting, fitting and joining are necessary. Glass, china, kitchen utensils, curtain materials and fittings are obtainable in gradually increasing quantities. Shops are quite good, but one has to arrive early to get a choice of articles.

The cost of living is high, but where in the world is this not the case? Imported articles are expensive owing to customs duties and transportation costs. But the final price to the purchaser of household articles, furniture, etc., is not any higher than in the United Kingdom after the purchase tax has been paid. Clothes are more expensive.

There is no income-tax on pensions and income derived from a source outside the Colony, so the pensioner-settler has his pension intact to live on. I asked an old pre-war Indian Army pensioner if he considered it possible to live comfortably on £1,000 a year (a figure mentioned by one enquirer) and he replied "easily".

My experience for the first six months of my residence in the country, half of which was spent in hotels or staying with friends, was that the cost of living, without a car, for the two of us averaged £66 per mensem. This included amusements, drinks and travelling. I anticipate, however, it being possible to live reasonably comfortably on a pension of approximately £800 per annum.

Food is not cheap but meat, vegetables and bread are obtainable in liberal quantities. Groceries are not unreasonable in price; some items are comparatively costly, whilst others are definitely cheap. Butter is rationed at $\frac{1}{4}$ lb per person per week. Sugar is no longer rationed but is available only in limited quantities. Cheese is similarly restricted. Bacon and ham are only procurable every other month, as all available supplies are shipped to the United Kingdom in alternate months.

Chemists' supplies, patent medicines, etc., are very expensive. Toilet soap is only available in limited quantities and soap flakes, etc., are frequently out of stock. Household soap is usually available.

Servants' wages are low compared with India, but their work is definitely inferior. Trained cooks are rare and the *memsahib* will have either to undertake the cooking herself or train a boy. The native house servant or garden boy only works satisfactorily when the "boss" stands over him. He is also incredibly stupid, foolish and childish.

The intending settler from India usually disembarks at Beira in Portuguese East Africa. The nearest town in Rhodesia is Umtali. It is well worth while making this attractive little place the first stop on arrival. There is a good hotel in Beira if it is not convenient or possible to take the evening train which leaves about 7 p.m. and arrives in Umtali early the following morning. At Umtali the settler is advised to stay at the Cecil Hotel, generally accepted as the best hotel in the Colony, or at Brown's or the Royal, that is if any of the three will accept a booking. It would be wise to write beforehand and make a provisional booking, confirming actual dates by cable from Bombay or Mombasa.

From Umtali it is easy to visit the Vumba (20 miles) where one can stay at either the Vumba Hotel or Leopard Rock Hotel, both commanding magnificent views over the mountains on the Portuguese border. The country here is not unlike Assam or the Western Ghats. The Black Mountain Inn (60 miles from Umtali) is another possible resort while exploring accommodation possibilities elsewhere by correspondence. There is also Inyanga, a popular hot weather resort about 90 miles from Umtali in the hills at an altitude of 7,000 feet. There is trout fishing here and one or two hotels. All these places can be reached from Umtali by motor-bus.

It is possible to motor from Beira to Umtali without difficulty, though the road has bad patches and petrol in Portuguese territory is very expensive. From Umtali, or one of the foregoing places, the new-comer can proceed to Salisbury by train in about ten hours either by day or night, or by car in about four hours. In Salisbury the principal hotels are Meikle's, the Grand and the Windsor.

Settlers' effects are admitted free of duty although a declaration is required. The customs officials are most helpful and reasonable to deal with. Baggage is booked from Beira to destination in Southern Rhodesia in bond so that there is no difficulty with the Portuguese authorities. On reaching destination it has to be cleared by an agent.

The congestion at the port of Beira is at present intense and a delay of several weeks in clearing heavy baggage must be expected. Not only is the number of berths for ships in the port small, but the Southern Rhodesian railways are short of rolling-stock and are unable to cope with the quantities of materials arriving at Beira by sea.

In Salisbury there are several cinemas. Dances are held at the leading hotels. There is an amateur repertory dramatic club, a music club and numerous associations and societies. Libraries are very poor. There is a large sports club providing all games, but its membership is full and new members are not accepted at present. There are one or two other small tennis clubs, but they are mostly full.

The Royal Salisbury Golf Club will only accept new mid-week members, who are restricted to play in the mornings only. There is another golf club, where the course is said to be good, but socially it would not appeal to the officer pensioner. The Salisbury Club is closed to new members for an indefinite period until premises have been enlarged. In Umtali the situation is probably not so acute. There is a club, two golf courses and tennis clubs. There is one cinema but the amenities of the town are little developed as yet.

Nothing has been said of Bulawayo, the second city of the Colony, and a thriving commercial centre. It is not a place where a retired individual would seek to live and it is not compared with the higher altitudes. It is worth a visit but as it is in the most distant part of the Colony from the probable port of arrival from India, the new-comer can seek information in regard to it after arrival.

There is not much scope for retired persons obtaining part-time or light employment with a view to augmenting pension or occupation. At present the Government, being short of experienced civil servants, does employ a certain number of pensioners in clerical or administrative capacities.

Settling, especially if it involves building a house and developing a garden, is a full-time job. It is possible to grow vegetables and flowers for market, if one has the water and the labour. This is generally the most fruitful way of augmenting one's income, even if it only pays its way and keeps one's own house supplied. Poultry and pig-keeping on anything more than a small scale becomes an undertaking involving hard work and risks.

Girls can find employment in secretarial and clerical capacities fairly easily. Boys would require a trade or profession, though commercial openings are to be found. The Colony is expected to develop on a big scale and high hopes of its future prosperity are entertained.

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VISUAL TRAINING

CAPTAIN E. W. KELLY

SINCE the cinematograph was invented 50 years ago, the film has become one of the principal means of satisfying the hunger of the human mind for knowledge and entertainment. It caters for the educated and the illiterate; for the highbrow and lowbrow; and for those of all classes in the remote regions of the earth.

Film is the modern medium for spreading knowledge; it can teach subjects beyond the scope of the lecturer. Through animated diagrams and sketches it can explain in one showing what the lecturer has been trying to convey in many lessons; it can illustrate a subject better and more vividly than any other medium. Movement, growth, or the development of a process can be shown. Film can convey a great deal of information in a short time and make a lasting impression; it is particularly useful with dull and backward people who learn from visual education much quicker than from verbal and written instruction.

The Service Departments in the United Kingdom, realising the importance of films for training, educational, record and public relations purposes, began using them extensively after the outbreak of the last war. Between 1940 and 1945, approximately 500,000 feet of finished film per year were produced, dealing with a wide range of subjects. At the outset, the Army made films of the straightforward instructional type, covering most of the subjects in the basic training of every recruit. Later, films were made depicting tactics, gunnery and target identification, camouflage, recognition of enemy weapons and aircraft, security, hygiene, health and many other subjects.

At the beginning of the war, the Directorate of Military Training (D.M.T.) was solely responsible for determining what films should be made, but the only means available for showing them were public cinemas and a few old Army projectors. So the Directorate of Army Kinematography (D.A.K.) was set up to provide the necessary organisation to furnish films and projection facilities. D.A.K. was responsible for making all films required by the different Directorates for use within the Army for military training, education, welfare and morale. D.M.T. decided what training films were to be made, and the Adjutant General's Branch, the educational and welfare films. A section of D.A.K., known as the Army Kinematograph Service (A.K.S.), undertook the distribution and exhibition of all films made for these purposes.

Each Army Command had a special section with film libraries, repair and servicing personnel, and mobile projectors. Each section consisted of 10 mobile projectors (usually three 35 mm. and seven 16 mm.) with a library, and repair and servicing personnel at its headquarters. A mobile projection unit showed training films during the day and usually entertainment films in the evening. In 1945, A.K.S. was operating 900 mobile projectors and 300 static projectors in training schools.

In 1944, the distribution system spread overseas. More than 400 mobile projectors were despatched to the Armies in Europe. Many of us, who came out East, will remember with pleasure the films shown on board troopships. For India Command and S.E.A.C., a separate organisation, called the Combined Kinema Service (C.K.S.) was set up, duplicating the Army organisation in Britain, with bases at Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta.

Before being transferred to the A.K.S. Production Company in Wembley Park, London, I was in charge of visual training *i.e.*, slides, filmstrips and films, at an O.C.T.U. in Lincolnshire and there the usefulness of training films was brought home to me vividly when A.K.S. distributed their first technicolour training film entitled "Camouflage (Air View)." This film arrived at the beginning of a new course. It was shown to the cadets with such success that the chief instructor was able to cut out the majority of his lectures on the subject. The cadets of the preceding course had had to sit through numerous lectures whilst their luckier successors learned the important basic principles of camouflage in four comfortable film shows.

In an artillery school in England the training period, with the help of films specially produced for this branch of the Army, was reduced by over four months. Aircraft recognition films were of the utmost importance to anti-aircraft training schools; while one of the most widely shown Army training films was "The 16 Daily Tasks", a film illustrating the maintenance and care of motor transport.

After a few months in the editing department of A.K.S. in Wembley Park, I volunteered for India and joined C.K.S. in Kolivada, Bombay. The films produced by C.K.S. for the Indian Army were most successful. For the ordinary sepoy, suddenly transplanted from his remote village into a world of which he had seldom heard, the moving picture was a stimulant to his training. His mind automatically registered what his eyes saw and his ears heard; there was no need to endeavour to plod through pamphlets and instructional books. He just sat back comfortably and watched—and learned.

Animated sketches and diagrams helped him. He was able to see and understand how the crankshaft of a car or the breach block of a gun works. With the standstill device of the 16 mm. projector, a close-up of any part of the mechanism could be shown on the screen for any length of time while the instructor explained it until even the densest of the recruits knew what it was all about.


When I arrived in India, the war was over, and C.K.S. was preparing the production of resettlement films for the Indian Army, the intention being to interest I. O. Rs, awaiting demobilisation in the resettlement centres, in learning some trade or village craft which would enable them to raise their standard of living when they returned to civil life.

The script department under Major S. T. Berkeley-Hill, had the correct idea about the structure of such films—simplicity. These films were not meant for the educated but for the simple and uncomplicated soldier. They were meant for men who had left their homes voluntarily to fight for their country and for a better world for themselves and their families. They were meant for men, who, for the first time in their lives, had seen a new world and who, to a great extent, had broadened their outlook and had picked up new ideas about better living and modern progress.



SCENES FROM RESETTLEMENT FILMS
(Reproduced by courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla)





SCENES FROM RESETTLEMENT FILMS
(Reproduced by courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla)



These films were to give the men a lead, a sort of helping hand, by showing them what could be done to improve the lives of themselves and their families. At the same time they were to recall the servicemen's discipline, health, drill; the appreciation of tidiness and cleanliness, of healthy recreation and, above all, of the Army spirit of toleration and respect for others. The former sepoy can and should be the pioneer of a new era in his country. Self-help and co-operation and the breaking down of old prejudices against certain types of work which offered an honest living, was the theme of these films. On the other hand, they were made to remind the man to be patient with the folk at home, not to swagger about, not to ridicule the old ways—to put his own house in order first and thus set an example to the local community.

The C.K.S. produced such resettlement films as:—"Anti-Soil Erosion", "Modern Implements", "Poultry Farming", "Rabbits", "Animal Husbandry", "Handloom Weaving", "Bee Keeping" and "Basket Making". "Modern Implements", for example, opened with a farmer ploughing his land with the age-old wooden plough, showing the hard work man and beast have to perform, the shallow furrow, and the resultant meagre harvest. Then another farmer was shown using a modern plough. The animals pull without strain, the furrow is deep and the harvest rich. In "Poultry Farming", the film shows a few scraggy chickens, picking whatever "food" they can find among the dirt and filth, and the minute eggs they lay. Then follows, in contrast, a demobilised sepoy who took a course in poultry farming at the resettlement centre. He has a clean chicken run; he feeds his poultry properly and his reward is a big basket full of large eggs which he sells at the market for a good price.

As can be seen from the titles and the "stories", our resettlement films were solely concerned with the backbone of India—her village life. They presumed no deep knowledge on the part of the sepoy. They began with facts already known to him and led him easily by simple stages to something better. Each film had the same lesson: "Train yourself in some trade or village craft and you will earn more money, and by earning more money, you will be able to raise your standard of living".

Early in 1947, C.K.S. was closed down. This was a pity, for the value of training, educational and documentary films is indisputable. No country can do without them. This is particularly so with India and Pakistan. Their Armed Forces have to be built up almost from scratch. Their young officers and men have to be trained in personal leadership, technical knowledge and other aspects of their professional careers. What better medium is there than the film? The scope is unlimited.

THE EPIC OF A DOG

LIEUT.-COLONEL C. C. R. MURPHY

THE WORD "epic" is perhaps a little overworked; but it will scarcely be found misapplied here, though the story be a simple one and the hero only a dog. The scene is Afghanistan, and the period almost a lifetime ago. Great Britain and Afghanistan were again at war. The charred ruins of the ill-fated Residency at Kabul, where the entire British Mission had recently been massacred, still lay under snow. But now spring was at hand; already the movement of troops had begun, and early one morning the regiment that had buried Napoleon in St. Helena set out from railhead in Baluchistan for the turbulent city of Kandahar.

Accompanying this gallant band of Berkshire men was a little dog. Bobby—for that was the name of this creature of destiny—was born in Malta, and had followed the fortunes of the 66th Foot from his earliest days. Neither breeding nor long descent was his; he was just a little rough-haired terrier, with liver-coloured ears, who had won his way into the hearts of the soldiers. That was all; but what nature had withheld as regards pedigree, fate was lavishly to bestow in the shape of honour and distinction. For surely no more celebrated dog ever slept by a guard-room fire.

Kandahar was reached without incident, but the city was not to be their home for long. Soon, five companies and Bobby were on the march again, this time with a brigade destined for the Helmand, in Western Afghanistan, to prevent the large Afghan force under the notorious Ayub Khan from crossing the river and swooping down on Kandahar. On arrival, however, the river was found to be too low to be any obstacle to the advance of an army, being fordable almost anywhere, and so after a brief sojourn on the banks of those far-off waters the brigade began their return march to Kandahar. Bobby was off again. Suddenly information was received from spies that Ayub Khan was heading for Ghazni by way of the little village of Maiwand. Accordingly the brigade was ordered by its intrepid commander to move at dawn, and after an exhausting night of packing and loading, set out in that direction in high hopes of intercepting him.

It was towards the close of a flaming July. The hot weather was raging with diabolical fury, and the scorched landscape danced and shimmered in the fierce heat. The troops had been marching for some time, and the sun was already high in the heavens, when suddenly the sound of guns broke in upon them. Presently, through the dust-haze, masses of Afghan infantry could be seen debouching from the hills, while hordes of fanatical horsemen came galloping across the plain. The battle of Maiwand had begun.

The tale of the disaster that followed is now a matter of history, and need not be repeated here: let it suffice to say that after hours of desperate fighting the British force, outnumbered by six to one, was gradually overwhelmed. The last stand of the day was made by a party of the 66th, who took up a position

in a garden. These men, surrounded, standing back to back, selling their lives as dearly as possible, and with Bobby still barking at the Afghans, fought on till all were killed—an episode portrayed by Frank Feller in a picture entitled "The Last Eleven at Maiwand", hung in the Royal Academy. In that painting, which drew crowds of people to London from all parts of the country, Bobby is seen in the centre of the foreground. Already wounded, he was the sole survivor of the last stand.

After the battle came the terrible retreat to Kandahar. Over the wide expanse of desert were to be seen men in twos and threes; camels that had slipped their loads; sick men, almost naked, astride donkeys, mules, camels and ponies; native stretcher-bearers who had thrown down their *dhoolies* and left the wounded to their fate. All the guns and carriages were crowded with wounded, suffering through pain and thirst the tortures of the damned. Horses with ugly wounds went limping along, and fainting men—their tongues swollen with thirst—were struggling on and on in the hope of finding water. After a long search in the dead of night a muddy well was found, and some of the wounded men were able to wet their parched lips. Thus, with every man's hand against them, the broken column plodded hopelessly along.

Villagers from all sides crept up to the low, mud walls, and many a stalwart fellow who had striven against the trials of the day and the horrors of the night fell a victim to the *jezail*.* At last they reached the Arghandab river, where men and animals tarried long to slake their thirst. A few hours later, after thirty-three hours of marching and fighting, the worn-out remnants of the brigade straggled into Kandahar. Amidst the toils and hardships of the retreat, the survivors had more than they could do to attend to the needs of the wounded. Doubtless, few, if any, had been able to spare even a thought for Bobby. What had happened to him after he had been wounded, no one knew.

Ayub Khan's army soon appeared before Kandahar, which was immediately invested, the siege lasting until the end of August when the city was relieved by Roberts' column. On the following day the forces of Ayub Khan, which had sustained very heavy casualties at Maiwand, were completely routed, and shortly afterwards, to the amazement and delight of the men, Bobby rejoined the regiment. Bedraggled, thick with dust, his coat still matted with blood from his wound, the little terrier had somehow or other made his way across the forty or fifty miles of almost waterless desert that lay between the battlefield and the beleagured city. He had been a prisoner of war with Ayub Khan for five weeks, but after the battle of the 1st September had presumably fallen in with some British soldiers and then gone into Kandahar to look for his master.

Bobby marched back to India with the regiment, embarked with them at Bombay in H.M.S. MALABAR, and landed at Portsmouth in February 1881. The regiment then proceeded to Parkhurst, where it was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, and later by Her Majesty Queen Victoria. Soon afterwards Bobby, wearing a gorgeous red coat with a crown and chevrons edged with sham pearls, was taken over to Osborne by a subaltern, who had been severely wounded at Maiwand, and shown to the Queen. Her Majesty listened with rapt attention to the story of his adventures, being greatly touched by the account of his wandering through the streets of Kandahar looking for his master. She then asked that his coat might be taken off so that

*Diary of the late Major-General Sir John Slade.

she could see for herself the place where he was wounded. This was plainly visible: for the bullet, which had only just missed his spine, had gouged a long furrow down his back, and although the wound had healed completely the hair never grew there again, and his back always looked as though it had been seared by a red-hot poker.

At the special request of the Queen, Bobby was then made to sit on a table and be photographed. When that was over, she presented him with the Afghan medal, tying it to his collar with a ribbon of green and red fashioned into an ample bow. After this unique ceremony she gave him an enamelled ornament that looked like a heraldic ensign and was probably the badge of some extinct order. The men always spoke of it as "*Bakshish* from Her Majesty". Within a few weeks, however, both the medal and the badge were stolen from his collar in the street.

Her Majesty always spoke of Maiwand as an honourable fight in which the greater glory rested with the vanquished. To the end of her days, the conduct of the little British force remained with her an abiding source of pride and satisfaction. She never lost her interest in the dog, nor failed to bestow on the regiment an occasional mark of her favour. Now and again she would send them some venison; but no gift of hers was ever unaccompanied by a message for Bobby. Next to her own collie, he was her especial favourite.

After being taken up by royalty, Bobby became ludicrously superior and exclusive, refusing to mix with the common untravelled dogs of the town. One fell autumn morning, however, when out route-marching with the regiment, he was run over and killed by a cab. An ugly scene followed. Some of the men, breaking ranks, rushed at the drunken cabman and tried to club him with the butts of their rifles, and the wretched man's life was only saved by the instant intervention of the officer commanding the company to which Bobby belonged. The dog's skin was stuffed, and now fills a handsome glass case in the depot barracks of the Royal Berkshire Regiment, where it stands as a great example of faithfulness and courage that was neither human nor divine.

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MILITARY BRIDGING IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

MAJOR W. T. REEVE, R.E.

IN the October 1944 issue of the *U. S. I. Journal* there appeared a short article on the use of military bridging for civil purposes. Owing to the need for secrecy then obtaining a good many relevant items of information had to be omitted and, although the suggestions made in the 1944 article still hold, the following supplementary information may prove helpful to those within whose province comes the responsibility for maintenance of communications.

The introduction of that remarkable and outstanding piece of equipment, the Bailey bridge, has virtually rendered obsolete all other patterns of military heavy road bridging, and there is no doubt that large quantities of these obsolete or obsolescent patterns will be available for civil use. To the uninstructed this would appear to infer that an inferior article is going to be fobbed off by the Army to civilian users. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The word "obsolete" means no more than that the store is obsolete for military purposes. For civilian uses the store rendered obsolete may be superior to its successor, and in the case of heavy road bridging this is certainly true. The Bailey bridge is not necessarily the best bridge for non-military purposes and some of its shortcomings deserve remark.

Sir Donald Bailey designed the equipment with the intention of producing the best military bridge possible. Now, a military bridge needs to be quickly erected and dismantled; it needs to be of parts easily man-handled; it needs to be one capable of carrying heavy point-loads, and its components must be such that from them can be constructed a wide range of bridges of varying load classes and varying spans. To achieve such a result certain disadvantages must be accepted. The Bailey bridge has a road surface that, being of timber, wears rapidly; being pin-jointed, there is considerable articulation of the roadway, and frequent inspection and maintenance of the joints is necessary; it is very much more expensive than other bridging; and parts damaged or lost would be difficult to improvise or obtain from local sources of supply.

Other types of bridging, obsolescent so far as the Army is concerned, are much more suitable for civil use. The two main types are the Hamilton and the Inglis bridges and both deserve consideration. The Hamilton is the more suitable for civilian use but the Inglis, being pin-jointed like the Bailey bridge, is more easily erected, and dismantled, and so would be suitable as a stand-by bridge or reserve to be kept to meet very sudden emergencies such as the disruption of road communications owing to flood or other cause. The Inglis bridge could be quickly erected, and could be dismantled and returned to store when the permanent structure it replaced had been either repaired or renewed. The Bailey bridge would be equally suitable for such emergency use but is considerably more expensive.

The Callendar-Hamilton Unit Construction Bridge, commonly known as the Hamilton Bridge, was designed by G. D. White-Parsons, A.M. Inst. C.E. and A.M. Hamilton, A.M. Inst. C.E., in response to an invitation extended by

the War Office to a number of leading bridge designers asking them to submit designs for a heavy road bridge suitable for military use. The design was first developed in Iraq and the bridge sites were located in mountainous country where mules constituted the only method of transport. The bridge therefore had to have parts capable of being man-handled, had to be easy to erect under all conditions, and yet had to be capable of carrying heavy loads over spans greater than 100 ft. Another factor that affected the development of the original design was that in Iraq at the time only unskilled tribal labour was available, and therefore only the simplest of gear could be employed. It is to be noted that similar conditions might well obtain in certain parts of India, Pakistan and Burma where the opening up of communications is contemplated.

The Hamilton bridge is a through bridge (*i.e.* its roadway is supported between its main girders as distinct from a deck bridge in which the roadway rests upon the main girders) and is of the Warren girder type. The individual members of the trusses are themselves composite in structure. The basic part used in the construction of a truss is a ten feet length of $6'' \times 6'' \times \frac{3}{4}''$ angle iron.

A truss can be designed for every required span of which the working strength is just enough, and no more, than that required to carry the standard load. This is possible owing to the fact that any given diagonal or part of a chord in a truss may consist of from one to four of these angles, as may be shown by calculation to be necessary.

These angles weigh only 140 lb. each and are the most numerous of the heavy parts. Of the still heavier parts the heaviest, the long cross-bearer, weighs only 455 lb. Only commercial sections of mild steel are used and therefore it is simple to repair or renew parts from local resources.

The specification to which Hamilton bridges were designed is that they must be capable of supporting over all spans from 40 feet to 140 feet, 12 units of British Standard loading for highway bridges, that is, capable of carrying all loads unrestricted as to spacing up to and including a loaded ten-ton lorry.

The roadway is a half-inch short of ten feet between wheel-guides and consists of steel cross-bearers supporting timber road-bearers and a decking of timber chesses. The road-bearers, in military practice, are of $5'' \times 10''$ timber and the chesses of $4'' \times 10''$ timber. In civil practice, where a permanent or semi-permanent structure is in contemplation, this timber roadway, which wears very quickly, can be replaced by steel troughing and metalling or by reinforced concrete, provided that the substitute roadway weighs no more than 0.335 tons per lineal foot of bridge. This is possible since in the Hamilton bridge, which is bolted and not pin-jointed, there is virtually no articulation and very little sag. Indeed, the sag over a 140 feet span is only $4\frac{1}{2}''$ under load. Both the Bailey and the Inglis bridges articulate considerably under load and sag to a greater extent.

Although Hamilton spans up to 200 feet can be constructed it is most economical to use in spans ranging from 40 feet to 140 feet in multiples of 10 feet. Generally speaking, it may be taken as a rough guide that the longer the span the higher the price per lineal foot and the greater the weight per lineal foot, since the longer spans have to be strong enough to support their own dead weight.

The Inglis bridge was designed by Professor Inglis, adviser on bridging to the Royal Engineers, and was designed specifically as a military bridge. It was first used in the war of 1914-18 in France, Palestine and Italy and continued to be used, with various modifications and improvements incorporated from

time to time, until the introduction of the Bailey bridge. It is easily man-handled and transported, quickly erected and launched, rapidly dismantled and is capable of supporting loads up to and including Churchill tanks. By strengthening the transoms with trusses even greater loads can be carried.

The bridge is of the through type and is made up of Warren girders consisting of twelve feet steel tubes of $4\frac{1}{2}$ " outside diameter connected in equilateral triangles, the resultant girder being approximately 10' 9" deep and having parallel horizontal top and bottom chords. The tubes are joined by a patent joint, a junction box into which projects a tongue from the end of the tube, the whole being fastened by a pin.

The roadway consists of R.S.J. cross-bearers or transoms which support 8" x 4" steel road-bearers and timber chesses 3" thick. These chesses can be replaced in civil practice by steel troughing filled with timber or metalling or by steel decking. The roadway is eleven feet wide. By doubling or tripling the girders, bridges of a variety of spans up to 192 feet can be constructed but the use of long spans will, of course, increase the cost per foot run of bridge.

Some idea of the difference in cost between the various types of bridge may be obtained from the following figures. They represent the cost of material only, not erection charges, etc., of three bridges each of the same span and load classification :

Bailey Bridge	Rs. 46,742.
Inglis Bridge	Rs. 32,676.
Hamilton Bridge	Rs. 25,050.

In addition to the bridges named, limited quantities of other types may occasionally be available. Deck bridges such as the box girder bridges, stock span bridges and variations of these two types will be suitable only over comparatively short spans and for limited load classes, and are unlikely to have any advantages over the ordinary R.S.J spans of civil practice.

So far as railway bridging is concerned there is little difference, generally speaking, between military and civil practice, and surplus railway bridging can be utilised by railway engineers without any modification.

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"THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SOLDIER."

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR PHILIP NEAME, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.

(Illustrated). (Harrap, 15/-)

There must be few autobiographies with so much to recommend them as this. Not only does the author's life cover to an important degree the two Great Wars, but his ability and the distinction he achieved in the first war (V.C., D.S.O. and a brevet Lieut.-Colonel) brought him to a position of high responsibility in the British military command at the outbreak of the second. As a result he is able to lift the veil on many vital aspects of the initial Allied strategy in 1939-40. Some idea of our weaknesses at that time has been made clear. In this book, we obtain first-hand evidence of the shortcomings of the Allied forces in equipment, in unified command and in fighting policy.

Before the storm burst in May 1940, the author had been transferred to the Western Desert where (Indian soldiers will be interested to note) he commanded the famous 4th Indian Division, and was the first to train and place it on a mobile basis. His appreciation of Indian troops and his affection for them (born of long service with Sappers and Miners and on the staff in India between the two Great Wars) is a marked feature of this part of the book.

The author's account of events subsequent to General O'Connor's Western Desert campaign, which resulted in the first capture of Cyrenaica in 1941, is exceedingly interesting. As the world knows, our army in Cyrenaica was denuded in February 1941 to go to the aid of Greece which was threatened by overwhelming German forces. The move failed to save Greece, lost us Cyrenaica and Libya and but for the Australians' defence of Tobruk must have lost us Egypt also.

The British Government excused the disaster by saying that not to respond to the Greek appeal for help was unthinkable. Lord Wavell, the Supreme Commander in the Mid-East theatre, admitted that the enemy's ability to strike back early from Tripoli had been under-estimated. General Neame was, the commander left to face Rommel's onslaught of two German armoured divisions (with a strength of 600 armoured fighting vehicles) and four Italian divisions. He had less than one useful regiment's strength of armour, an infantry division that could deploy but a brigade group of all arms, and the famous 3rd Indian Motor Brigade of about 1,000 Indian cavalymen armed only with machine guns and rifles—a wholly inadequate force with which to stem Rommel's advance.

The disclosures in this book leave little doubt that the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade's sacrificial stand at Mechili gained the vital breathing space for Tobruk to be manned and Egypt to be saved. As the author points out, had Tobruk fallen to Rommel in 1941, as it did in 1942, he would have been provided with a forward sea base for an advance on Egypt while our forces in Mid-East were still involved in Greece and our resources undeveloped. The result can hardly be doubted.

Apart from such authentic disclosures of strategy at the critical moments of the early years of Great War II, the book is also an absorbing human record of colourful anecdote and reminiscence. The author was taken prisoner during the operations in Cyrenaica. "His account of the British Generals' War Prison at the Castello di Vancigliatta and the escape of six inmates at their fifth attempt is exciting reading indeed. Of this part of the book one can only quote as another example of truth being stranger than fiction.

During his service between the wars, General Neame was an expert and keen *shikari*, and the chapters describing his expeditions after big game, whether chamois in Europe, *markhor* in Baltistan or tiger in the jungles of India, are both instructive and interesting. Methods and weapons are discussed and the story is told in detail of how the author was charged and mauled by a man-eating tigress and was lucky to escape with his life.

The book is written in an eminently readable literary style. It is well illustrated and should make a wide appeal not only to the soldier sportsman but to the general public of the British Commonwealth that respects and honours achievement and self-sacrifice.

W. E. H. C.

GRANDFATHER LONGLEGS

"THE LIFE AND GALLANT DEATH OF MAJOR H. P. SEAGRIM,

G.C., D.S.O., M.B.E."

IAN MORRISON. (*Illustrated*). (Faber and Faber, 12/6.)

This is a clear and comprehensive account of the circumstances under which Major H.P. Seagrim, G.C., D.S.O., M.B.E., remained in the Karen hills after the evacuation of Burma in 1942, and of the guerilla operations which he conducted there against the Japanese. It also tells of the tragic deaths of Major Nimmo, D.S.O., and Captain Eric McCrindle, who flew in to join Major Seagrim but who like him, fell victims to the ruthless and efficient methods of the *Kempetai* system.

Without being in any way a remarkable literary work, this account of Seagrim's life and death brings out all the main points which the historian and biographer need to note: Seagrim's intense devotion to the Karens and their reciprocal love for him; his intense absorption in Christianity and the consequent strict adherence to principle which caused him to surrender himself to the Japanese in order to spare the Karens further suffering; and from a military standpoint, Seagrim's own farsightedness and the premature nature of the attempts to succour him.

The immense dividends paid by his activities when Imperial forces returned to Burma are also clearly brought out. It is interesting to speculate, though this is a point not touched on in the book, that perhaps Seagrim rendered the Allied cause a greater service through his virtual martyrdom than he would have done by staying alive and personally organising the ultimate rising of the Karens against their oppressors.

In general, this book is naturally of the greatest interest to those who came from and also took part in the operations in Burma, but it will also interest the general reader without specialised knowledge of that troubled land. Seagrim's life brings out two lessons of permanent and universal interest. The immense power and scope of achievement of absolute sincerity and devotion in an individual, and the fact that even in these days of depreciation and liquidation of the British Empire, there still remain Englishmen capable not only of inspiring devotion and loyalty but also of directing such affection purely towards the interests of the peoples concerned.

W. E. H. C.

PRISONER AT LARGE

"THE STORY OF FIVE ESCAPES." IAN REID. (*Gollancz*, 12/6.)

The title hardly makes clear that the author was himself the hero of five successful consecutive escapes from the hands of the Germans in Italy during 1943 and 1944 in Great War II. It was only exceptional ill-fortune that led always to his recapture, and prevented him from getting away altogether from enemy-held territory and rejoining the British 8th Army that was advancing through Italy.

The story is probably the most sensational of the many records of adventure encountered by the numerous British prisoners of war who managed to escape from Italian prisons or prison camps at the time when the Italian armistice was declared in 1943. Numerous bands of them were wandering through Italy at this time, hiding from the Germans and working their way South towards the Allied armies. Perhaps the most notable feature of Ian Reid's story, apart from his thrilling adventures, is the picture of the peasant classes of Italy and their unfailing sympathy, cheerfulness and courtesy towards British war prisoners—even to the danger of their own lives.

Nowhere among these simple folk did the author find pro-Fascist or pro-Nazi feeling, and it was only when approaching upper class chateaux or the property of wealthy Italians that the author found those types that worked for Hitler and Mussolini and brought ruin on Italy.

The book is written in simple conversational style somewhat in the manner of a diary. It has no great literary merit, nor does it throw any light on military problems of the Italian campaign. As a study of the technique of escaping from enemy hands, the book gives food for thought and discussion, but the author does not embark on commentary in this direction or attempt to point out any but the simplest conclusions.

The final chapters are of interest as indicating the problems and dangers which faced Allied prisoners of war in German camps as the invading British and American armies advanced into Germany in 1945.

W. E. H. C.

DEFEAT IN THE WEST*

MILTON SHULMAN.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR IAN JACOB, K.B.E., C.B.

(Illustrated). (Secker and Warburg, 15/-.)

Major Milton Shulman, a pre-war Canadian lawyer, presents a gripping story of the defeat of the German Wehrmacht in the West. It is a fascinating account of the collapse of the Third Reich; of the reactions of its leaders to the avalanche of the Allied invasion armies; of Hitler's obstinacy and the servility of his General Staff; of the confusion, bungling and debacle that followed as the tide of the Allied invasion rolled on; and of the final break-down of the German war-machine.

Several writers before now have written and wrangled about World War II. They have produced admirable accounts of campaigns and battles, of tactics and strategy, of defeats and diplomacy, of victories and blunders, of personal ambitions and private quarrels. But all this has been written from the Allied point of view.

Major Shulman has initiated a refreshing departure from this line of presentation. He has constructed the picture as it appeared during the war from the "other side of the fence." *Defeat in the West* might have been written by a well-informed, honest German privileged to have an over-all view of the German Wehrmacht, as it came to grips with the Allied invasion force, and as it reeled and staggered under the hammer-blows, and rallied and rolled back and finally disintegrated. From the time of the Allied landing in Normandy to the last hour of Hitler's forlorn stand in the bunker beneath the Chancellory at Berlin, the book remains consistently the German side of the picture.

The author is particularly fitted to the task of producing such a work. Educated at Toronto, he practised at the Canadian Bar before the war. On its outbreak, he volunteered for service and received a commission in the Canadian Armoured Corps. He then went to England as an intelligence officer and later took part in the planning of the Normandy landings. Subsequently, he worked as a specialist on the German Order of Battle in the West. After the surrender, he was given the task of interviewing senior German officers who had fought in Germany and France.

In these various capacities, he had access to and studied thousands of captured German documents ranging from the orders of the German Supreme Command, and records of telephone conversations between Hitler's Generals, to the German Intelligence Reports; to formation diaries, soldiers' diaries and letters written home from the field. From this material, he has woven a chronological, factual story of the defeat of the Reich, as it was seen, felt and experienced by soldiers, officers and the people of Germany.

The book begins with a brief outline history of German militarism from Versailles to Stalingrad and an examination of the weaknesses of the Wehrmacht which led to its downfall. It then proceeds to give an account of the fighting in the West from the invasion of Normandy to the surrender at Rheims. Normandy, Mortain, Falaise, Paris, Seine, the coastal fortresses, the Siegfried Line, Ardennes and Berlin are reviewed in rapid succession. The whole account is enlivened by a portrayal of the actions and reactions of Hitler and generals like Rundstedt, Dietrich, Student, Blumentritt, Halder, Jodl and several more.

*This book was mentioned briefly in the October issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*.



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
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The book will help the reader to revise many of his war-time notions formed under the stress of Allied and enemy propaganda. For instance, the author "debunks" the German Fifth Column, and shows that Hitler did not necessarily bank on a *blitzkrieg* to win his war. He also shows that the German Intelligence Service, with its misguiding information, was perhaps more responsible for averting the invasion of Britain than any other single factor.

Defeat in the West will make profitable reading for the layman as well as the specialist. It will provide them with answers to many of the war-time conundrums and make them look at the war from a new angle.

P. C. B.

BEHIND BAMBOO

ROHAN RIVETT. (*Illustrated*). (*Angus and Robertson, 12/6.*)

Faced with the difficulties that are post-war, we are fast forgetting the conflict of recent years. Our interest in the most direct of legacies from World War II has rapidly declined. It is necessary for our own clear thinking to be reminded on occasion of the order that was.

The trial of war criminals was a legacy which focussed the attention of all—at the start. We had heard of German and Japanese atrocities during the war years, but we had heard similar stories in a previous struggle, and we made due allowance for some degree of propaganda. As hostilities ceased, however, full accounts of the horrors perpetrated by the enemy came in fast and thick. We were horrified at what we heard. There were more stories and more and yet more, and we grew accustomed, almost immune to them.

Behind Bamboo reminds us of the misery of thousands of prisoners of war in Japanese hands; of the years of deprivations, of the subtle and unsubtle forms of hurt; of the almost complete lack of food and shelter in tropical jungles, of cholera and dysentery, of beatings, torturings, cold-blooded (and often, slow) murders; of the utter hell that was life. It does not make nice reading, this. It makes one glad to be what one is, thankful for the small mercies of life, and fear another war.

This book is, in the main, of the Death Railway. It is from the pen of the News Editor of the Malayan Broadcasting Corporation, Singapore, in early 1941. We read of his escape from the Island, of his capture in Java, and subsequent incarceration there. He is shipped to build the infamous railway line, and slave labourer he remains until the Allied victory, when even then, the prisoners of war are to be slaughtered *en masse*. Prisoner he is lucky still to be, for many thousands of his fellows have perished, indirectly or directly murdered due to the treatment meted out to them.

The chronicle is one of the misdeeds of the Japanese, of the terrible suffering and steadfastness of the men in their hands. We are given an insight into the working of the crazed Japanese mind. We feel the torture and pain; we laugh at the humour in misery; we yearn for release—and sometimes for death.

Behind Bamboo is a grim and admirable book, one of the finest to come out of the war. Its realism brings home the horrors of P. W. life with the sadist Japanese; our debt to the prisoners; the grandness and pettyness of humanity, and the big and little things in life. Rohan Rivett brings one down to earth with a bump, and one is much the wiser and better for the experience.

P. E. C.



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REVIEWS IN BRIEF

"THE DANZIG DILEMMA." JOHN BROWN MASON.

(Stanford University Press, California, Rs. 15/15.)

This account considers all aspects of the "Danzig Dilemma"—the clash of two of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points; the right of national self-determination and the right of access to the sea in an area where Teuton and Pole have faced and fought each other for centuries.

An especially interesting feature is the frontispiece, reproducing a captured letter from the Nazi Gauleiter of Danzig telling of the Fuhrer's awarding of the Golden Party Badge of Honour to worthy citizens of Danzig.

"MODERN AIR TRANSPORT." F. S. STUART AND H. C. BIARD.

(Illustrated). (John Long, 18/-.)

The authors worked for three years to collate and bring right up to date this account of the performance and prospects of modern air transport. Biard has had a hand in developing, and Stuart in critical writing about air progress in the past fifteen years, and each speaks from experience and knowledge.

This is a useful book for all those to whom immediate air development will have any direct or indirect importance, and to many others who wish to be authoritatively informed on a phase which will profoundly affect the future of civil air lines.

"CHRONOLOGY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR."

(Royal Institute of International Affairs, 15/-.)

A consolidated edition of a chronology which, after an initial issue covering the period September 1938 to March 1941, was published in quarterly parts throughout the war. The passage of time has made possible a reassessment of the relative importance of the events recorded in the original issue, and some details have been omitted, particularly in entries dealing with military operations.

It has been possible to include information which for security reasons was withheld during the war, and to give the actual dates of many events which for the same reason had previously to be recorded under the dates on which they were announced. The type has been entirely reset, and various improvements in presentation have been made.

"THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AND U.S.A.A.F."

AIR-COMMODORE L.E.O. CHARLTON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(Illustrated). (Hutchinson, 21/-.)

"THE ROYAL NAVY AND ALLIES."


BY COMMANDER KENNETH EDWARDS, R.N.

(Illustrated). (Hutchinson, 21/-.)

Both these volumes cover the period October 1944 to September 1945, and are the fifth and last of the respective histories in text and pictures. Each volume contains more than 300 illustrations, the majority of which are excellent. Art paper is used throughout.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A LIFE MEMBER

*Brigadier-General Sir Standish Crawford, Bart., C.B.,
C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., Dalry, Ayrshire.*

In August of last year I received the July issue of the *U. S. I. Journal*, rather better got up than formerly. It contained a long list of new members chiefly Indians which augurs well for the continuance of the Institution.

Since then I have received no October issue. The non-receipt of a military journal may seem to matter little to an old officer of 75, many years retired. But I do retain a lively interest in an Institution which during these twenty years of retirement has maintained so kindly an interest in me by sending me the *Journal*.

Although of the British Service (The Gordon Highlanders), many years of close association with the Indian Army in peace and war, as well as when I was a political officer in Persia, makes me still very interested in the Indian Army. To the end of my service I was able to address an Indian battalion on parade fluently and without difficulty.

As India has changed so rapidly since last summer, I should be grateful for a brief line, if not too much trouble, as to how the future of the United Service Institution of India stands.

(We are grateful to General Crawford for his letter. He should by now have received the October issue of the *Journal* in which the future of the Institution was referred to briefly. More details are given in this issue.—*Ed. U. S. I. Journal.*)

INDIAN STATES FORCES


Captain L. L. Malik, 4th Bn. The Dogra Regiment, Roorkee.

As a result of the changed status of India and the consequent accession of Indian States to the Union, the Indian States Forces should be given equal status with the Indian Army whether they are inside or outside their States. Most of the States Forces units are already required to attain the standard of the Indian Army and quite a number of them did very well in the last war, in which they took part in active operations.

Although we have the department of the Military Adviser-in-Chief to the States Forces to ensure a uniform standard of training etc., I feel that there should be more direct contact (*milap*). In many States the Indian Army is considered to be the force of an outside power and *vice versa*.

Opportunities should be provided for units to live together. For example, an Indian Army unit could be stationed in Jaipur and a unit of that State could

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be posted to a cantonment in India. The pay and allowances of the States Forces should be brought up to the Indian Army scale, at least when they are in the Union.

This would be a forerunner of better and more cordial relations between the States' people and the people of the Indian Union.

OLD FOLLOWERS

*Major-Qmr. C. Cutting, M.B.E., 1st Bn. Royal Fusiliers,
B.A.O.R. 24.*

I am particularly interested in the old Followers who have served the British Army in India for so many years. Now that we are withdrawing British troops from India and Pakistan, I feel that the old Follower will have a very lean time as on account of his age he will be unable to obtain any further employment and his meagre pension will be insufficient to keep him. My idea is for a fund to be raised to be called the "Indian Army Followers Benevolent Fund". I feel that if this had the backing of some influential senior officer or officers, and if the appeal had a wide circulation, there would be a ready and generous response from the many thousands of British officers who have known of the valuable service these old Followers have given to units.

The difficulty as I see it is—who will undertake the collection of the subscriptions and the administration of the fund? It obviously must be done by somebody who is remaining in India or Pakistan. I presume that the District Soldier's Boards are winding up as otherwise they would appear to be the best organisations to administer the fund.

What I have in mind is that the old and needy ex-Follower could receive a grant from the fund, either monthly, quarterly, or annually, and he would see that we British had not forgotten him.


I served in India for a number of years and I still hear regularly every month from one of my old Followers who has served with the British forces since the Tibet Expedition of 1904. It is for such as he that I feel so sorry. The ex-Sepoy and others of the Army are not too badly provided for but the ex-Follower receives very poor recompense for his long and valued services.

SOCIETY OF COLLECTORS OF MILITARY RELICS?

Mr. Hurmuz Kaus, Hyderabad, Deccan.

I read with much interest Colonel Hayaud Din's letter regarding the proposed Medal Collectors' Society in the October issue of our *Journal*. There is already a Society for collectors of coins and medals in India. This is the Numismatic Society of India with its headquarters at the Prince of Wales Museum in Bombay, and its editor at the Hindu University at Benares. But this Society is much too engrossed in the study of coins, and I don't think much attention was ever paid to the study of medals, particularly military ones.

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If Colonel Hayaud Din is keen on forming a Medal Collectors' Society then I am at his heels. Medal collectors who have seen the medal collection at the Victoria and Albert Museum, Victoria Gardens, Bombay, know what importance is attached to military relics in civil museums. Military relics are a subject by themselves, and military collections and museums should be something away and apart from civil collections and museums.

May I be allowed to enlarge upon Colonel Hayaud Din's excellent idea, a Society of Medal Collectors? Why not have a Society of Collectors of Military Relics? Military history is an obscure subject in India. Why not collect badges, buttons, shoulder-titles, belt-buckles, medals etc? The field of collection is wide, the scope of the study is wider, and much spade work remains to be done.

If Colonel Hayaud Din approves of my idea I am at his service. Such a Society can save military relics from going to the scrap-dump or the melting-pot, or bring them to light from oblivion in civil museums.

In conclusion, I request our Editor to put my name as Number 1 in the register of those willing to join if a Medal Collectors' Society is formed. I wish Colonel Hayaud Din every success in his undertakings.


EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Colonel N. Eustace, D.S.O., 6th Gurkha Rifles, Dehra Dun.

I would like to mention how very greatly I have appreciated the facilities afforded by the Institution. In particular the excellent library and arrangements for borrowing books by post; the first class reading-room in Simla which I used regularly for five seasons when at A.H.Q. ; and the *Journal*, especially in recent years. I am sure that officers will continue to find the same benefit and pleasure in the Institution as in past years. I should like to wish the Institution all good fortune in the future and a long continuance of those admirable facilities afforded to members.

Captain S. S. Sandhu, M.T.S.S.D., Kirkee, Poona.

I wish the U.S.I. and its Editor the very best of everything in this New Year. I will make every possible endeavour to increase the membership of our *Journal* which contains information of such importance and interest to all members of the Armed Forces, that it should be read by every officer.



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THE SECRETARY'S NOTES

Now that the disturbances have passed the work of the Institution is returning to normal, and it will be our endeavour in the future to publish the *Journal* nearer the publication date.

In "Matters of Moment" we have referred to the special Council meeting at which it was confirmed that the Institution and *Journal* would continue to function as a joint Institution embracing India and Pakistan. At that meeting, which was presided over by Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles, it was felt that, with the departure of so many British officers, it was desirable that a new President should be elected, and Lieutenant-General K. M. Cariappa was unanimously elected to that office. Captain H. M. S. Choudri, R.P.N., and Air-Commodore S. Mukerjee, R.I.A.F., were elected as new Vice-Presidents. Other members were co-opted to the Council, the names of whom you will find in an earlier part of this issue.

The change in our title will be of interest to all present and past members. After more than seventy years as "The United Service Institution of India" we will henceforth be known as "The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan". We hope, therefore, that all members whether in India, Pakistan or in any other country, will feel that this is *their* Institution, and that they may avail themselves of the facilities which the Institution has to offer.

Gold Medal Essay Competition

Since our last issue the officers invited to act as Judges in selecting the best entry in the 1946/7 Gold Medal Essay Competition have announced their decision. The subject was "Man Management". They selected the paper submitted by Colonel C. W. Morton, as the best and have recommended that he be awarded the Gold Medal and Rs. 200. The runner-up was Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mason and the Judges have recommended that he be awarded a cash prize of Rs. 150.

Fifteen members submitted entries, all of which were of a high standard and showed a considerable grasp of the subject. The Judges, who were Air-Commodore N. K. Janjua, R.P.A.F., Commander H.G.P. Taylor, R.N., and Brigadier S.P.P. Thorat, deserve the warm thanks of the Institution for the trouble they took in arriving at their decision.

Colonel Morton's paper is published in this issue and it is hoped to publish the runner-up's entry in the April issue of the *Journal*. The subject for the 1947-48 competition is "Are Officers' Messes Suitable for Indian Conditions?". Entries must reach the Secretary by June 30th 1948.

Honours to Members



Among those on whom His Majesty the King recently conferred honours were the following members of the Institution:

G.C.S.I.—H.E. Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Nye, G.C.I.E., K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., Governor of Madras and H. E. Sir Frederick Burrows, G.C.I.E., late Governor of Bengal.

K.C.S.I.—Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles, K.C.B., and Lieut.-General T.O. Thompson, C.B., C.B.E., K.H.P.

C.S.I.—Major-General J.B. MacDonald, D.S.O., O.B.E., Lieut.-Colonel G. L. Mallam, C.I.E., Bar-at-Law, I.P.S. and Major-General F. M. Moore, C.I.E. G.C.I.E.—Sir Hugh Dow, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.

K.C.I.E.—W. Christie, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., M.C. ; A.D. Flux Dundas, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., and Lieut.-General D. D. Gracey, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.



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Knighthood.—Major-General G. de la P. Beresford, C.B., M.C.; F.H. du Heaume, Esq., C.I.E., O.B.E., and Hugh Weightman, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E.

C.B.—Major-General J. S. Ballentine, C.I.E.; Major-General W.D.A. Lentaigne, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major-General R. I. Jones, C.B.E.; Major-General F. H. Skinner, C.I.E., O.B.E. and Major-General H. H. Stable, C.I.E.

C.B.E.—Brigadier R. D. Cameron, O.B.E., M.C., M.B.; A.E. Foot, Esq., and Brigadier J. J. L. MacKirdy.

O.B.E.—Brigadier W.E.H. Condon; Lieut.-Colonel C.O'B. Daunt, M.C.; Brigadier F.R.L. Goadby, M.B.E.; Brigadier R. S. Johnson; Major-General V.N. Parameswaran Pillai; Brigadier W.E.H. Talbot and Brigadier A. J. M. Wilton.

M.B.E.—Lieut.-Colonel P. C. Keayes-Byrne; Brigadier N.J.B. Stuart and Major A. J. Wilson, M.C.

New Members

We are glad to be able to announce that, despite unsettled conditions, the following new members have joined the Institution since October 14th:

AGA, Major A.C., R.I.E.

AGARWALA, Captain S.D., R.I.A.S.C.

BALRAM SINGH, Lieut., I.A.O.C.

BEDI, Captain S.P.S., Indian Signals.

BHAGWAT, Major K.H., Indian Signals.

CHANAN SINGH BRAR, Captain, C.I.M.P.

DURRANI, Major M.A.K., Guides Cavalry, F.F.

*FERRIS, Major D.W., Indian Grenadiers.

HENDRICKS, Lieut.-Colonel N.E., I.E.M.E.

KARAM SINGH, Captain, Central India Horse (I.A.C.).

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The Journal of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan

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MAHATMA GANDHI

2nd October 1869—30th January 1948

This old and rarely published photograph of Gandhiji was taken in 1906 when he raised an Indian Ambulance Corps during the Zulu Rebellion. This was the second time that he had brought help and succour to wounded soldiers. During the Boer War he mustered an Ambulance Corps of 1,100 which included some 400 Indians. The rank and file received the pay of stretcher bearers but the leaders worked in an honorary capacity. Gandhiji's men, on occasions, marched 25 miles a day carrying the wounded on stretchers. When in charge of one of the stretcher parties, Gandhiji himself carried General Woodgate from the field, where he lay dying, to a base hospital.

(The photograph by courtesy of Gandhi Sangraha, Ahmedabad)

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NEWS AND VIEWS

After nearly 200 years.

On the 26th February 1948, the 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch embarked on the Empire Hallidale at Karachi. Two days later the 1st Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry slow-marched through the Gateway of India and on to the Empress of Australia. The British Army had left these shores after a stay of almost 200 years.

The first regiment of the British Army to serve in India, as distinct from troops of the East India Company, was the 1st Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment, which disembarked at Madras in 1775. The regiment still bears the motto "*Primus in Indis*." Almost immediately it marched on Calcutta, which had been captured by Suraj-ud-Dowleh, who was finally vanquished by Clive at Plassey. Other regiments soon made an early journey round the Cape, and it is perhaps true to say that nearly every unit of the British Army has since served in the Indian peninsula.

The history of the British Army in India, which the many battle honours of the regiments represent, is interwoven with the deeds of the Indian companies of the East India Company's army, from which evolved the armies of the Dominions of India and of Pakistan. Together they fought the French, the Princes who seized power after the collapse of the Moghul Empire, and the invading tribesmen from frontier territories. Only during the Mutiny was this comradeship, which in two world wars bore fruit on nearly every battlefield, temporarily and partly suspended.

The British Army leaves an indelible mark on the face of this sub-continent. The martial skill and experience, tradition, and sense of duty painfully learnt and evolved during 193 years of service are now equally shared by the two Dominion armies. Today these new armies are carrying on as before. Orders are still given in English; tactics and organisation remain unaltered; bagpipes, tartans and regimental marches have been passed on; and old English airs still enliven the barrack square.

During the later part of its service here the British Army was mainly concerned with the maintenance of law and order. In this role the British soldier was seen at his best. His ready sense of humour made him an admirable man to intervene in communal rioting, and with only the aid of a prodding rifle butt to quieten aroused passions.

That India has left its mark on the British Army there is also no room for doubt. Its vocabulary contains many Hindustani words, or, at least, words which the British soldier believes to be Hindustani. Much of its equipment and tactical theories were tested on the North-West Frontier.

Breaking up of a regiment

It has been a privilege to see and be given leave to make use of a letter by a Muslim officer of a famous Indian regiment. It was written after the date on which India and Pakistan became separate Dominions and may be described as a Muslim officer's farewell to his British comrades.

He says: "It is with immense pride and satisfaction that British officers, now saying farewell, are able to hand over to their Indian comrades, for future safe keeping, a regiment which in achievement, history, and tradition ranks second to none in the annals of the Indian Army. May such achievement and tradition be our guides in the years to come. With the division of the country came the division of the army, and with it the division of the regiment. The regret felt among British and Indian officers, past and present at the prospect of the breaking up of this magnificent regiment is inspired by its heroic achievements both on the Indian frontier and in the two great world conflicts.

"No one can easily forget the gallant deeds of those British officers. . . None can see unmoved the passing of the British officers who have shared with their comrades some of the bitterest of disasters and the most resounding triumphs. Thanks to the leadership of British officers, the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan saw the regiment at the height of its fame....."

He appeals to Indian officers to uphold the regimental tradition, and ends thus: "May the valour and devotion of those of whom we think today be an ever-present inspiration to all of us who have to face the manifold problems of the future. The memories of those who have lived amongst us as gentlemen and friends, to preserve the democratic way of life, will grow stronger as the years pass."

Indian Armed Forces Exhibition and Tattoo

Over five lakhs of people visited the Armed Forces Exhibition which was held from 31st March to 6th April and over 45,000 saw the Tattoo between 1st and 6th April. The Prime Minister of India sent the following message :—

"India's Army is an army of the people, pledged to the disciplined service of India and her people. We are lovers of peace and wish to encourage the arts of peace, so as to raise the standards of our people and make our motherland strong and prosperous. But peace and independence can only be preserved if we are strong enough to do so and gain the respect of others. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Therefore we must have a model army capable of comparison with any other in its discipline, efficiency and devotion to duty. It must think of India as a whole and not of sectarian or provincial differences. It must not pay heed to any aspect of communalism. Every soldier of India must always remember that he has the honour of India in his keeping. The Army has set a high standard and by that high standard he will be judged."

The Defence Minister, in his message, said: "On the occasion of the Exhibition and Tattoo I greet officers and men of India's Armed Services. Through the months since the attainment of our freedom the Armed Services have been called upon to perform many exacting tasks. The pride and gratitude of the people of India are ample testimony to the magnificent way in which the Armed Services have carried out their duties. I am glad that an Exhibition and Tattoo have been arranged because they afford an opportunity to the public to get a glimpse of the manifold activities of our Armed Services. More and stiffer difficulties lie before us, but with discipline, loyalty to our country, selfless devotion and inner strength we can and will surmount all obstacles."

Pakistan Military Academy

"I was very much impressed with what I saw. The institution has been established on sound foundations and a steady supply of efficient officers for the Pakistan Army assured," said the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, after a detailed inspection of the Pakistan Military Academy.

Formed barely two months after partition, despite handicaps, the Academy is now firmly established. The first course started on 26th January 1948 with an intake of 207 cadets including 60 cadets who were transferred to Pakistan from the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. 39 cadets, university graduates, will be trained for one year and the rest will be commissioned after two years' training. 16 cadets who possess degrees in science will be sent to the United Kingdom in October to be trained as electrical and mechanical engineers.

15th Anniversary of the R.I.A.F.

The Royal Indian Air Force celebrated its fifteenth anniversary with an impressive parade at which the Chief of the Air Staff and Air Vice-Marshall Commanding took the salute. In his brief address he recalled with pride the humble beginnings of the R.I.A.F. in 1933 and reviewed the progress the following years witnessed. He said that the achievements that had filled the story of their growth were remarkable. The Second World War saw a tremendous expansion in India's young Air Force. It had distinguished itself in the strenuous battles on the Burma front and crowned itself with glory. New responsibilities had fallen on their shoulders with the advent of freedom, the Air Vice-Marshall said. Free India looked to her armed forces for the defence of her freedom and honour. He was sure that the R.I.A.F. would live up to the great trust the nation had reposed in them. Critical days were ahead of the country and he was confident that the R.I.A.F. would give a good account of itself.

"Piffer" Week at Abbottabad

The first post-war "Piffer" Week was a historic event which brought about a reunion of several "Piffers." The Punjab Irregular Frontier Force, predecessor of the present Frontier Force Group, came into existence nearly a hundred years ago and was finally abolished in 1922 as a result of the reconstitution of the Punjab Frontier Force. Soon after the First Sikh War, the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force was entrusted with the task of administering the north-western districts of the then Punjab Province.

The units which formed this force were four regiments of artillery, three of cavalry and three of infantry. Today, with the exception of two artillery units and one infantry regiment—the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles—which went to the Indian Union on the partition of India, the remaining units are still in Pakistan. They are the Guides Cavalry, the P.A.V.O. Cavalry, two regiments of the Royal Pakistan Artillery, the Frontier Force Regiment and the Frontier Force Rifles. It is understood that an invitation was sent to the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, as a gesture of old comradeship, to take part in the celebrations which were held in a most friendly atmosphere in the Regimental Centre of the Frontier Force Regiment.

The Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army was present on the last day when the beating of Retreat by ten massed pipe bands marked the end of the festivities. There was a "*bara khana*" and several sporting events which brought the "Piffers" closer together. It will be recalled that prior to World War II, the "Piffer" Week was invariably held at Kohat.

Begetter of an age

That cold December day in 1903, a gusty north wind was blowing across the sand dunes of North Carolina's coast. The wind blew sand into the eyes of Wilbur and Orville Wright as they moved their awkward flying machine out of its shed at Kitty Hawk. Orville stretched himself flat on his stomach on the lower wing between the two chain-driven propellers. The twelve-horsepower engine coughed, spat and began to clatter. With Wilbur running alongside holding one wing, the plane swayed down its wooden launching rail and rose unsteadily into the air. For twelve seconds it lurched slowly forward like an uncertain box kite, dipping and bobbing a few feet above the ground, then settled back on to the cold sand.

Three more flights were made that day, the brothers taking turns at the controls. The longest was 59 seconds, for a distance of 852 feet. Then the wind picked up the plane, rolled it over and wrecked it. But the Wright brothers, bicycle mechanics of Dayton, had proved that man could conquer the air.

Wilbur died of typhoid fever in 1912. In February 1948 at the age of 76, Orville suffered a heart attack. Late one night, in a hospital in Dayton, death came to Orville Wright, begetter of an age.

* * * * *

The Journal

The Editor would be very pleased to hear from readers their opinions of the January and April 1948 issues of the *Journal*. Suggestions and constructive criticisms all are grist to the mill. More articles etc., from Indian and Pakistani officers are wanted and with our present record membership there must be much potential writing talent available. So send in your contributions which should, if possible, be typed and in duplicate. A glance through this issue will indicate the length and type of suitable material required.

MAN MANAGEMENT*

LIEUT.-COLONEL W.G. MASON

ANOTHER way of expressing one of the facets of leadership, the term "Man Management" was coined during the last war by the Services. By no means a new consideration—the welfare of mankind has existed since the beginning of things—its understanding has advanced throughout the ages with the progress of evolution. Man management in the Services has a deeper meaning, a wider scope and a more profound importance than in commercial life. A deeper meaning because its application is more personal; a wider scope because the man is separated from his home and family; and a more profound importance because on it depends success in battle.

In civilian life, management, the term more generally used because it is then applicable to both sexes, does not usually extend beyond the factory or business house outside which indeed, it is not required, as the individuals are then controlled in their ordinary ways and standards of living by the common laws and practices of the land. In this way management among the civilian community is not personal or continuous to the same degree as in the Services. Not that it is suggested, for one moment, that there is no personal touch in management in commerce; it is well known that any management which fails to consider the individual is itself a failure.

Commercial management has, however, an economic ring about it, mostly controlled, as it is, by Acts of Parliament, and Trade Union rules, and guided by cold scientific research which aims at producing the greatest economic effort from man or a combination of man and machine; whereas, in the Services, although management is also governed by law and rules in the Navy, Army and Air Force Acts and King's Regulations respectively, the success of their enforcement depends much more on personalities and the confidence between man and officer than in their impersonal representation.

The scope for man management in the Services covers a very wide field. With few exceptions in peace and none in battle the serviceman lives apart from his own home and family and becomes a member of another and much larger family—the Service family—which temporarily embraces his whole life. In this life, as opposed to conditions in commercial life, man management is continuously present, not only in the ship, the barracks or the aircraft during times of peace but also, at the zenith of its importance, in the supreme test of battle. In battle, the importance of man management becomes paramount; here all the threads are joined together in a knot, the like of which is not to be found outside the Services, and in which is bound the confidence and trust between men which is essential to success.

Man, with instincts which are developed as a child and progressively increased by training grows up with, amongst others, a sense of justice, duty to country and other men, comradeship and *esprit de corps*, responsibility to family and a sense of fear. In many, these senses are more acute than in

* This essay was awarded the second prize for 1947, in the annual Gold Medal competition conducted by The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan.

others, in some they may not exist. But in the normal development of these senses man has been guided by a leader. Among those who have led him have been his parents; his teachers, both academic and spiritual; his managers in business and his captains in sport. This whole process has taken place in the secluded environment of his family, school and work.

When man joins the Services his environment and conditions are abruptly changed and he again looks to a leader for the means to adjust these senses which have developed in him, so that he can maintain his poise and morale which are essentials to the stability of his mind. Man management in the Services then, continues to be a question of leadership and its purpose is to enable the serviceman to give his best at all times. It has a mental and a physical side and its application may be divided into training for battle, the period of battle and readjustment after battle.

* * * * *

The preparation for the battle period begins the day the man joins the Services. He must be made to realise from the outset that he is joining a family in which he has a place with an object. His feelings will not be unlike those he had when he first went to school or employment, and so his confidence will be gained from the beginning if his reception is better, if possible, than his previous experiences. At the outset of his training the virtues of discipline, saluting, turnout and fitness must be explained to him. He must be told about his pay, the postal, leave and recreational facilities. He must be taught about leadership, his relations with his officers and non-commissioned officers and how to remedy a considered injustice. Later in his training he must be hardened, the conditions of battle brought to his understanding, the evacuation of casualties explained and practised, and he must never be bored.

The essential to the success of this teaching and the establishment of a solid foundation of man management lies, throughout, in the relationship between officer and man. It is vital that each step taken is fully explained in a manner which will enable the man to understand the purpose of Service rules and regulations, and that his welfare and that of his dependants is given full consideration. It is only in this way, that such a team spirit will be inculcated which will result in solid trust and comradeship between all ranks, which is the psychical object of man management.

Discipline, the first requisite of man management if properly understood and impartially applied will, above all, do more for morale than anything else. Success in its teaching will only be achieved if it is understood that it is rigid for all and that indiscipline in leaders is a greater offence than in those led, and that the former should expect greater punishment in proportion to the latter. It is therefore necessary for officers to set themselves a higher standard of discipline than that which they expect from their men. In this manner confidence will grow between officer and man and this is the basis of sound discipline.

Saluting should be instilled as an act of friendly greeting to which the man has been accustomed as a civilian and not one of servility. Here again it is upon the officer that successful relationship between him and the man rests. He must never fail to return a salute and much will depend on his manner and example when in the presence of the men. On parade, saluting is formal in character and has little relation to that away from parade. When away from the moral support of others, some men are shy about saluting and the officer can do much by

encouraging a man to greet him, even to the extent of saluting first if the man shows hesitation. Such action will make a great impression on the man and most probably he will not hesitate on another occasion, and an officer should be able to judge whether the man's action is one of hesitancy or indiscipline and act accordingly. On the other hand, the officer who himself is diffident about being saluted, and is inclined to look the other way to avoid seeing a salute, is doing irreparable damage to the man whose confidence he has broken and also jeopardises his own status as a leader.

Turnout has a great affect on morale and the best fighting units have always been those who were the best turned out, whether it be in the shining polish of ships, rifles and equipment, or aeroplanes, and the smartness of personal clothing of peace or in their dull cleanliness of war. The question needs to be tackled on both the score of pride in person and pride in unit. Much harm can be done and much time and labour wasted in unnecessary artistry. Good turnout should be restricted to personal cleanliness, the correct fitting and wearing of clothes and equipment, and the cleaning of that which is not meant to be dirty, in equipment and vehicles. Smart appearance is an aid to self-respect and this is what the man wants.

Fitness, another essential to morale has two aspects; the physical fitness derived from good food, good exercise, and good living, and that maintained by the avoidance of disease. Training must include instruction on the danger of overcrowding and the diseases which may be obtained from dirt, food, water or insects. No man loses his morale or confidence in his leaders more quickly than the one who has taken a pride in his physical fitness and finds himself unable to fulfil his function as a fighter because he has been incapacitated by a preventable disease against which he has not been given the means to resist.

Pay is often a source of mental worry affecting the fighter's efficiency, and his leaders must know all about it, so that they can explain its correctness or have it put right if it is wrong. Officers must know what their men's entitlements are and how to get them credited to them. Their knowledge of administration has got to be perfect and they must constantly check that family allowances are getting to the families, by questioning the men. The men will welcome such inquiries made in the correct manner and their appreciation will further cement the friendship between officer and man which is so essential to man management and the best fighting results.

Postal facilities is another of the big factors in morale. Arrangements must be made as early as possible in advance of a move involving a change of address so that, with due regard to secrecy, correspondents may be informed and there is no break in the delivery or despatch of mail. Every effort made to provide simple, quick delivery and despatch of parcels, money and letters will do much to save men mental strain about their families and friends. Arrangements must also be made centrally for the supply of newspapers and the issue of news by broadsheet if no other means are available.

With regard to the welfare of relations, the facilities of the Services' organisations should be employed to the full and their scope fully explained, so that their assistance may be obtained when necessary. But, here again, in good man management the unit's own assistance should be sought first by the man and given when possible. The man should be encouraged to obtain his leader's advice and it must be the duty of all officers to assist personally in the removal of this

worry from their men and only resort to outside help when the question is beyond them. Even then they must follow it to its close, if mutual trust is not to be broken.

Leave in this preparation for battle period presents no difficulty if officers and men can go to their homes, but when this is not possible, the most thorough administration is required. The first criterion about leave is that it should be the same for both officer and man. No officer has the right to longer leave than his men and if there is any doubt about availability of leave, no preferences should be made. When distance, or other factors, preclude leave being taken at home, leave camps are essential. The site should be carefully chosen with regard to climate and recreational facilities. For those who prefer it excursions and walks should be planned. The camp must have the minimum restrictions absolutely essential. To be beneficial to the mind, leave camps need an air of freedom about them. There must be no parades. If a man would like to take some sandwiches with him and go off for the day he should be able to do so. There must be no dress rules, excepting those to prevent misuse of the King's uniform.

Organised recreation should be run by the men with the assistance of officers, and the programmes arranged to suit all tastes and be given attractive and wide publicity. Recreation should be partially organised and partially individual choice. Organised recreation must be competitive and led by the officers, thereby adding another link to the team spirit. It must be available to all and of all standards. The provision of good equipment and its maintenance is essential. Recreational facilities are not, of course, restricted to leave camps; their availability in barracks, in ships and camps are also essential and they should not only be planned to meet outdoor and indoor requirements of groups of men but also of individuals.

Every opportunity should be given to the man to show his capabilities of leadership. Not all can be leaders and the man will be the first to recognise this. But somewhen the time will come for all who have the powers of leadership to employ them. What is important is to give all who show the power, the opportunity to exercise it. This can be easily arranged by making exercise casualties in training. In this way understudies will be ready to take their places in war when the occasion arises and be morally fit to do so.

Relations between officers and men must be good. Not only must the man be taught how to approach his officer if he considers he has been wronged or is in some difficulty, but the officer must get to know his men thoroughly. He must mix with them off parade and learn about them and their families. Very often some worry which is hindering a man's training can be put right in this way. A very good system is for an officer to allot some period of the day in which any of his men can come and speak to him in private and in confidence, and commanding officers should have a similar rule, not only in respect of their men, but also their officers. There is no loss of dignity in such a procedure provided there is no familiarity, and the good that such interest brings will be amply repaid in the added confidence the men will have in their leaders.

Hardening should be a gradual process throughout training. Here again the leader's example is of paramount importance. He must set a high standard of toughness for himself which will gain the admiration of his men and urge them to assimilate. Not only does toughness in battle demand the ability to withstand great physical strain but it also requires the power to recoup quickly in uncomfortable conditions. Not that the standard of comfort should be deliberately

low : on the other hand it should be made as high as possible and every improvisation to this end must always be given consideration by the leader. Above all, there must not be a higher standard of comfort for the officer than the man. Maintaining this equality the training should become progressively harder and include practice in the ability to sleep for short periods at will. Gradual advance in these respects will show men what they can do and give them confidence in their powers of endurance and self-discipline.

The conditions of battle, the unknown, will cause a strain on the nerves which may impair the fighter's efficiency. This can be minimised in training by the use of powerful non-lethal explosives and getting the man accustomed to the noise of war. Similarly, familiarity to being shot over and shot at is obtainable by controlled battle exercises. Such training will go far to prepare the nerves for the real thing and not only add strength to morale but give the man confidence in his own weapons and those of the supporting arms.

The evacuation of casualties explained and practised before battle will also add to the man's mental strength. So long as he knows that he and his comrades will receive all possible attention and care if wounded, and that if killed, all reverence will be paid, and that in either case his relatives will be sympathetically informed, one more possible distraction from his power of giving his best fighting ability will have been removed.

Finally, throughout all his training the man must never be bored. If he is bored it means that the training is empty to him; he does not take the trouble to understand its meaning, and does not believe in it. Training must, therefore, always be alive. Too much time cannot be devoted to the study of the man and the example given him. With his confidence not only will he be well-trained but he will realise it, and know that he is a better man than the enemy. That knowledge will make him mentally fit for battle.

* * * * *

During battle the most important principle of man management is to give the man the best opportunity to prove he is better trained than the enemy. To achieve this the first essential is to bring him into battle fresh. Long continued movement breaks down men and should be avoided. Little, and often, rest is a good thing; men should lie flat on the ground to rest, then the whole body is relaxed. Extraordinary exertions such as forced marches are to be avoided and should only be carried out when imperative and the objective cannot be obtained in any other way; for this hardship on men is often more painful and damaging to the spirit than the dangers of battle itself.

It may not always be possible to bring the man to battle fully rested, but every effort must be made to give him some rest before he is called upon to make his great effort. During this period he should have some food and hot sweet tea, and, if there is time, an opportunity to sleep as he has been trained. If it is not necessary to bring him into the main battle direct, and this should be avoided, then the second essential is to continue his battle inoculation by a further gradual process. This can usually be achieved by employing him initially on simple patrol actions, later made more difficult as regards endurance.

The third essential during the battle is good administration. Ammunition must never be wanting; every opportunity must be taken to send food and hot tea forward; casualties must be well cared for and there should be a rest area in which not only reliefs may rest during prolonged actions but, also, near which any stragglers may be brought and given the opportunity of recovery that rest, food,

drink and a smoke bring. Discipline, however, is as essential now as it always has been, and both fire discipline in the forward area and general battle discipline, the object of all discipline, in both forward and back areas must be rigidly enforced.

The fourth essential is the example of the leaders. Frequent movement by officers among the men will be beneficial. Such visits must not be perfunctory but of sufficient duration to give information as to the course of the battle and what is happening to other parts of the unit: this is not only essential to the success of the action but such example, under fire, will do much for morale.

* * * * *

After the battle sleep is the first requirement, then a general restoring of the battle damage done. The cleansing of arms and accoutrements, the importance of which the man has been taught, should be given first priority after sleep; later the cleanliness of person and clothing and the issue of clean clothes where necessary. This is the time to have the man's mail ready and a tot of rum issued. This is the time for the leaders to get round their men, share their experiences, tell them what happened in the battle, console here and there, and be on the look out for injuries which have been forgotten in the heat of battle but need attention. Now is the time to hold a short service in memory of the dead; to write to next-of-kins and to visit the wounded in hospital; and now is the time to deal with honours and awards.

After all these first things have been done comes the time to prepare for the next battle, to restore poise and morale by physical and mental recreation. Should some fault in training have been noticed during the action it should now be remedied before the memory of it fades.

* * * * *

Some of the ways in which good and bad man management can affect the mental and physical fitness of the serviceman have been described. They are those of major importance which will, in principle, cover the many situations which occur. The whole essence of good man management is good leadership. When a man joins the Services he is entering a new world. His moral and spiritual quality will be tested under new conditions and especially, at first, by loneliness—the loneliness of new surroundings, a strange town or perhaps a foreign country. What he most needs are friendship and encouragement as well as recreational activities for body, mind and spirit. These can only be given him by his leader but, in their giving, his leader must avoid familiarity or else discipline, the very root of successful man management, will be destroyed. For this reason the virtue of discipline must be explained to the man from the beginning, and it will be maintained without effort, if there is confidence between man and leader.

The way to this confidence is through the leader's character and efficiency. He must, above all, be just at all times. He must set a high standard for himself and know his profession thoroughly. He must always place the welfare of his country first, the welfare of his men before that of his own and he must never fail to give assistance or encouragement where it is due. If he is always thinking of his men and appreciating their point of view then nothing can prevent him carrying out his task to the best of his ability, and he will perform the functions of man management automatically.

Much of man management is concerned with administration. The question of discipline, pay, leave, mail, recreation, food, clothing, honours and awards, are examples. The leader must be a good administrator if he is to be a successful manager of the serviceman. Every time there is ignorance or slackness in dealing with administration one thing or another is bound to occur which will be the cause of discontent and loss of morale, and which will weaken confidence between man and leader.

Service manuals lay down that a commander's appointment involves complete responsibility for the training and leadership of fighting troops, and for the efficiency and maintenance of these troops. Good man management is an essential attribute to the successful achievement of this assignment and the officer who thereby, succeeds in obtaining the confidence of his men, will have earned the trust put in him by his superiors and with his men will reap the reward in the final test of battle.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council of the Institution has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1948:

"Are Officers' Messes Suitable for Indian Conditions?"

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers. They should be typewritten (double spacing), submitted in triplicate and be received by the Secretary, The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan, The Mall, Simla, on or before 30th July 1948.

In order that the anonymity of each candidate should be preserved, a motto should be written at the top of each entry. A sealed envelope, bearing on the outside the words of the motto, and containing inside the name and address of the author of the essay, must accompany each entry.

Entries should not exceed fifteen pages (approximately 8,000 words) of the size and style of the *Journal*, and should not be less than 4,000 words.

Three Judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500 either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the 1st November 1948 issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*.

Copyright of all essays submitted will be reserved by the Council of The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan.

THE HISTORICAL SECTION

"EXPERENTIA DOCET"

THE *Journal* dated January 1946 printed an article on the inauguration of the Indian Historical Section. The task of this body is to write the history of the Indian forces and the Indian war effort in the Second World War, and to organise and maintain the Indian war diaries and records, with photographs and films.

When the above article was written, the Section had been at work barely six months, and had not filled its establishment, but it was getting to grips with the vast problem of research and narration that its task involved. So much, however, has happened since then, and eyes and minds have recently become so concentrated on developments within the Indian continent, that the achievements of the years from 1939 to 1946 have tended to become obscured. Nor is this true of India alone, or peculiar to the post-war period of World War II. A war of such a catastrophic nature, leaving behind devastation and disruption on such vast tracts of the earth's surface, cannot fail to leave a legacy of problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation that absorb current attention to the exclusion of all else. It was so in a lesser degree after the First World War and the result (only now realised) was national ignorance of the war lessons themselves, and universal deafness to the signs and portents that heralded the Second World War.

It is probably true, therefore, that not only the Indian Historical Section but those that are at work on the histories of all the belligerents in World War II are, at the present time, out of the limelight and hidden from notice by the more pressing problems of the moment. Public attention will only be ready to take an interest in "the truth about the war" when some semblance of real peace and stability, both in economic and political relations, returns. Occasionally official disclosures in relation to the war are made, if they have either current news value (as in the case of the Nuremberg trials) or if political capital can be made out of them (as in the case of the Russo-German negotiations of 1939-40), or if some public personage and his reputation are involved (as in the case of General Smuts and General Klopper in regard to the loss of Tobruk in 1942). But these are mere flashes of history and not likely to give the events concerned more than a distorted prominence, as the latter have been presented out of their proper setting.

It is, nevertheless, the historical bodies concerned who produce the documents and data for these occasional early glimpses of war history, and this comprises a separate sphere of activity extraneous to the normal research into and solution of the vast jigsaw of war narratives on which historical sections are engaged. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Indian Historical Section prepared the military case for India's delegates at the U.N.O., both for election to the Security Council and for the settlement in regard to the Italian colonies.

A less spectacular, but no less vital incidental role in relation to current administration that falls to the custodians and compilers of war records, is the provision of information to verify or refute pension claims. The extent of the aid thus given to the Pensions Branch in dealing with cases of family distress is incalculable. Any soldier with a pension claim for an injury etc., or the family of a dead soldier claiming a pension needs to have their claim substantiated. A well organised historical section with its war diaries well indexed and in order is in a position to save its Government lakhs on fraudulent claims alone. The ability to confirm, by circumstantial evidence a genuine claim is no less important.

Apart from these considerations, however, many will be wondering what the position of the Indian Historical Section is under the present conditions of a partitioned India, and how its programme (as outlined in the article of January 1946) will develop under the new regime.

The Joint Defence Council have decided to retain the Historical Section in being under its own aegis as a neutral body serving the needs of both Dominions. The only alternative was to drop the war history, and reduce the Section to a care and maintenance basis with a restricted mandate to maintain and preserve the war records. The decision is a wise one. Apart from the folly of dropping a work half-way to completion, India and Pakistan can only rely on the lessons of World War II for the training of their forces, and the education not only of their officers but of their civil population as well. The greatest and most widely applicable lesson of the late war was that modern war is no longer confined to the fighting forces of a belligerent. The whole population are in it and it is total in every sense of the word. Who then can question the wisdom of retaining a body of research specialists whose labours, if at present obscured by postwar political and economic preoccupations, may at any time prove of vital importance to the safety of the two Dominions?

In one respect, however, the Historical Section has suffered a serious setback as a result of recent events. A considerable number of its most experienced historians have left and replacements for them have to be found with equal knowledge and experience of the campaigns and war effort of the years 1939-46. The difficulty of this is not easy to appreciate. The disruption in the Section was unavoidable once the position in India of (a) British officers and (b) Pakistanis became clear. The former were given a summary three months' notice and though the offer to withdraw this in the case of British officer historians in the Section was later made, it came too late and many found it impossible to change their plans. In the case of the latter, conditions in Simla rapidly became impossible, and all Muslim personnel of the Section had to be evacuated under escort. Nor were officers of the Indian Dominion unaffected. Partition and the nationalisation of the Indian Army made it imperative for regulars to return to executive work if their future prospects were not to be sacrificed, and offers of permanent civil employment to temporary officers could not be disregarded. However, a small nucleus of the original staff of officers together with the large majority of ministerial staff are to remain with the Section and these will form an essential link with the new editors and narrators.

Two large and important subsections have been added to the Historical Section since the article of January 1946 was written:—

- (a) The Medical Subsection.
- (b) The Film and Photo Subsection.

The Medical Subsection was, in fact, in existence before the Historical Section itself was started. It was then a section of the G.H.Q. Medical Directorate known as D.M.S. 3, and had been engaged in studying the medical side of the war history in Eastern theatres since 1944. The importance of this is obvious to anyone who either served in an Eastern theatre or has merely read the despatches relating to one. Not only are the records and lessons, whether of medical expansion and organisation, of clinical problems, of the medical aspects of campaigns themselves, or of individual and special subjects like hygiene, malaria etc., of major importance to humanity, but the Indian Historical Section is the only Commonwealth body whose medical team are studying these problems in regard to Eastern theatres.

A conference of Dominion and U.S.A. Medical War Historians was held in Ottawa in September 1947. The head of the Medical Subsection of the Indian Historical Section attended, and found himself the only authority on these theatres, and the work of his medical historians was rated as of unique importance.

The Film and Photo Subsection joined the Historical Section from the Public Relations Directorate on the latter's demise at the end of 1946. They brought with them several million feet of war films, and many thousands of photographs taken in the field. The task in respect of this mass of historical material is again distinctive and presents many difficulties. In the first place, the cameramen who produced the pictures were not given a mandate for subjects of historical or instructional value for the future. Their object was to find material of current news or propaganda value—a very different thing. Moreover, any pictures they produced were rigidly scrutinised at the time from a security point of view and all clues to units, personalities or equipment appearing in them, rigidly deleted.

The Historical Section, therefore, is faced with the dual problem of recognition of detail, and selection of what is of value from an instructional or historical point of view. Superimposed on this are the tasks of preservation of films, and their conversion to 16 mm. (the size of the equipment provided to units). In this respect, the Section is well equipped. It is not often in India that climate favours any particular form of activity, but where films and their storage is concerned the experts have pronounced the climate of Simla ideal. The only enemy to be defeated is damp, and this has not proved difficult. The Historical Section has its own projection theatre and fourteen film vaults capable of storing some 15 million feet of film. The use of concrete has rendered the vaults damp-proof, and precautions against fire include a gallery with fans for removing the inflammable gases that films exude.

The Medical Subsection and the Film and Photo Subsection of the Historical Section are believed to form a distinctive feature not so far found in other war historical bodies. In England the research and preparation of narratives is delegated to three separate historical bodies who work individually under the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry respectively. The medical war history has its own war historians under separate medical aegis. None of the above has the organisation or equipment incorporated to deal with the pictorial side of the war history, whether still or movie.

The advantages of an integrated organisation dealing with the narratives of not only sea, land and air forces, but with medical and pictorial records at

the same time are obvious. In some respects they are already bearing fruit, for the Historical Section has been able to support the historical data it has already been called on to furnish, with photographic illustrations; and documentary films prepared from those taken in the field are under production as illustrations to training and instruction.

I remarked, at the commencement of this article, that the Historical Section is to work as a neutral body serving the needs of both India and Pakistan. The partition of India has left many problems of division and allocation to be solved. These have been reflected in the difficulties experienced by the Historical Section during the latter months of 1947. The desire of each Dominion to have its own services in all respects cannot fail to be understood. The Indian Forces, however, fought as a whole and their diaries cannot be separated. To attempt to duplicate them all would be a stupendous task and its cost would be out of all proportion to the value obtained.

The first volume of the Indian War History is a popular volume written by the celebrated author and historian Mr. Compton Mackenzie. He spent from October 1946 to July 1947 touring India and the battlefields where Indian troops fought, meeting and discussing with the Commanders of Indian formations the points of interest and controversy arising out of the part India played in the crucial years of World War II. From August to December 1947 he studied the narratives of the Historical Section and obtained what data he required. His book, *Indian Epic*, when it appears, cannot fail to be among the most important works dealing with the Second World War. Based as it is on official and authentic information, it will be in a different category from many works by war correspondents and authors who saw some but not all of the stage, and whose work is therefore a mixture of fact and fiction, story and sensation.

Before leaving India, Mr. Compton Mackenzie lectured to an Indian audience at the Kali Bari Hall, Simla. His concluding words were to the following effect: "As one who keeps in touch with public opinion in Great Britain at the highest level, I would tell you that the person who did more towards Indian independence than anyone else was the Indian sepoy and fighting man in the late war. It was his gallantry, devotion and sacrifice as a volunteer, when for years the forces of evil seemed certain to triumph, that caught the imagination of the British public and secured its sympathy towards India's aspirations."

These words cannot be overemphasised. Let nothing stand in the way of the completion of the record of India's achievement in World War II, and let that record remain always a link between the two Dominions and the rest of the Commonwealth.

PLACE OF THE SKULLS

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. DE L. WALTERS

I GROANED inwardly when I heard there was to be a holiday in three days time, and I cursed the local inhabitants for having so many festivals during this period of the year. It was mid-May in Bengal, and as we were on a job out in the wilds, there was no means of alleviating the heat and damp. Consequently we were never dry for an instant, day or night.

I was in a bad mood when I ran into Wilfred and imparted the news.

"But that's grand," he remarked, "now I shall be able to have a lie-in and afterwards write reams about life in the jungle to Susan and to all those other gorgeous creatures I've been owing letters to for so long."

"Come off it," I said. "You may enjoy lying on a sodden sheet with globules of sweat chasing each other across your manly chest whilst the bullfrogs croak and the brain-fever birds sing you a lullaby, but that's not my kettle of fish."

Wilfred grimaced. "Put like that it doesn't sound too inviting, Mr. Pessimist. What's hatching in that oversize football you wear on your shoulders?"

"Now if you're going to be insulting," I started, when he wagged his fingers to show that he had scored a rise. "Oh! alright then," I went on, "yes, I've got an idea. I was talking to old Bannerjee the other day. He seems to be a big-wig amongst the villages in his home area some thirty odd miles or so from here, and says he can put us on to shooting a *mugger*. Don't look so disbelieving, for he has actually seen it with his own eyes. Also apparently there are plenty of pig in the jungle round about. I suggest we go out in Annabella and try our luck, and take Vincent along, too, if he'll come."

Annabella, it must be explained, was Wilfred's ramshackle old car.

Wilfred continued to look rather incredulous. "I thought the only *mugger* existed down in the Sunderbans," he said. "However, I'm quite game. Poor Susan will have to wait for her letter, but I'll send her a dressing case and a pair of shoes when I have shot the beast."

So at the ghastly hour of 4.30 on the Wednesday morning we were duly woken up by Vincent. We supervised the loading-up of Wilfred's car by the aid of hurricane lamps, which gave out fitful gleams through the surrounding mass of insect life. Our armoury consisted of three shot-guns, a sniper's rifle and a Mauser, together with various knives and daggers; tinned food and cans of water were placed in the back. We had a final check-up to make quite sure that nothing had been forgotten, and then retired under a neighbouring banyan tree for an impromptu breakfast.

Half an hour later we piled into Annabella, with Wilfred at the wheel, and after a few coughs and snorts she was galvanised into life. The arrangement was for us to meet Bannerjee at an old temple about twenty-two miles out. The road was nothing more than a glorified track used by bullock-carts and full of pot-holes, and as Wilfred was notoriously blind and Annabella's lights kept on flickering and dying on us, we were all in a "scrambled" condition before we had gone very far.

Every time the lights died out, Wilfred would stop, reverse himself in the seat, and lie on his back with his head under the dash-board, whilst a flow of invective would pervade the interior of the car and make us feel hotter than ever.

After about five miles of this I tapped Wilfred on the shoulder and said: "What about letting either Vincent or I have a go now?"

Wilfred drew up with a jerk. "All right, if you chaps feel you can do better you're welcome. Come on Vincent, I'll swap over with you." He was obviously annoyed at my insinuation against his driving and always hated to admit his blindness. However, the journey became much more comfortable; we did at least avoid the worst of the pot-holes.

It was intensely dark. For most of the way the track wound in and out amongst dense vegetation and overhanging trees. Occasionally we passed through small villages and caught a glimpse of the mud walls and thatched roofs of the houses. We would often see jackals at the side of the track, and once some large animal flashed across in front.

After what seemed hours of jolting, when every bone in my body was aching and perspiration was pouring down in cascades, I was glad to see a hurricane *batti* being swung backwards and forwards at the side of the track in the distance. We soon drew up alongside the light, and a big moon-shaped face grinning from ear to ear poked itself through the window.

"I'm glad to see the *sahibs* so nice and early," Bannerjee remarked facetiously. "We will now have plenty of time to get to the tank just as the sun comes."

He had brought with him a *shikari* and a few other helpers. This entailed a major repacking operation and numerous bodies piled into the car until the door could shut no more. The remainder hung on where they could outside. The temperature rose rapidly inside to alarming heights and the smell of unwashed humanity was almost overpowering.

From this point our journey was very slow. Wilfred was worried about Annabella's springs, whilst every now and again one of the clingers-on was either swept off by a protruding bush or just shaken off. This produced so much laughter that an extremely noisy approach was made to the village that was to be our rendezvous.

Every man, woman, child, dog, and goat turned out *en masse* to greet us. The noise and babel was terrific and, as it was still only semi-light, confusion reigned supreme. In the end I managed to restore some sort of order, by climbing on to Annabella's roof, shouting and gesticulating. This produced a lull which enabled Bannerjee to drive the crowd clear of the car and allowed us to unpack the rifles and ammunition.

We were duly presented to the village head-man and an eulogistic speech was made on either side. We promised to return by mid-day and partake of his hospitality. He then retired about ten yards with some of the village notables—squatted down on his hunkers and sucked away at a hubble-bubble pipe made from a papaya nut which was produced for him. Meantime, the rest of the village, clothed and unclothed and of either sex and all ages, gathered in a goggling group in his rear.

According to Bannerjee the tank (pool) was quite close, so we decided to load our rifles there and then, which caused much speculation amongst the spectators. We must have appeared a motley crew. We each wore floppy-brimmed hats with flat crowns—mine had been emerald green—and khaki shorts and shirts. I carried my ammunition in special deep breast pockets;

Wilfred carried his in a bandolier that had been salvaged by his grandfather from some unfortunate Boer in the previous century; and Vincent had his in his trouser pockets.

Eventually we were ready, and the cavalcade set out, led by the *shikari* and Bannerjee, then the three of us and finally, well behind, the rest of the village. By now it was quite light, and a reddish glow low down behind the trees announced that the sun would be up before long. It was all very beautiful, as every twig and leaf was wet with dew and gleamed like silver. The birds had woken up too, and were chattering away in the trees round about. I saw a couple of golden orioles flitting from branch to branch, whilst an old crow looked down sagely from above, and a blue jay gave vent to a harsh cry of fright as it fled to denser cover.

Wilfred turned round to me and murmured: "I think this is all hokey. *Muggers* don't exist in village tanks, especially in this part of India."

"You never know," Vincent replied. "Bannerjee seemed pretty sure about it."

We had now approached a high embankment covered with dense scrub, and I was quite sure the tank was on the far side. The *shikari* stopped and made some frantic gesticulations, on which the remainder of the villagers sat down and proceeded to "chew the cud."

We then held a short council of war.

"You will find that the bank slopes down to the water's edge on this side," Bannerjee explained, "while the far side is all reeds. The *mugger* always likes to lie on the bank and bask in the sun."

"In that case," I replied, "I suggest you, Wilfred, go round to the right, I will go twenty yards or so to the left, and Vincent, you stay here. We will crawl up into position, and if he is there open fire, taking time from Wilfred, who has farthest to go."

"That sounds all right," Vincent remarked, "but I'm not going to have any of these chaps in white *dhotis* accompanying me."

"I agree," I replied. "Bannerjee, will you explain and then we will be off."

I watched Wilfred creep off into the undergrowth, and then started off myself. When I got to a suitable place I crawled slowly up the bank until I could see over the top.

A most surprising sight greeted me. There was a large clear patch of water with tall reeds on the far side, just as Bannerjee had described it. But floating gracefully on it were hundreds of mallard, quite oblivious to our presence. It was a lovely sight, but I tore my eyes away and started to examine the banks with meticulous care. Soon I came to the conclusion that if there was a *mugger* anywhere about he was still somewhere at the bottom of the tank. After waiting a short while I saw that Wilfred was right down at the edge of the scrub on the inside of the tank. He saw me, gave the "wash-out" signal and then let out a piercing whistle.

The effect was magnificent, as with a whirring of wings the mallard took flight and circled round and round overhead. The surface of the water was all ruffled, and confusion reigned where only a minute or two before everything had been quiet and peaceful.

I made my way down into the tank and saw Vincent doing the same. As I reached Wilfred I saw that he was staring at something in the thick grass.

It was a human skull, and the sightless eyes seemed to be gazing up with a sort of reproachful look in them. Then I noticed that round about there were still more skulls, in fact the area was littered with them—I could count twenty from where I was standing.

"Good heavens," I exclaimed, "so this accounts for the *mugger*. This must be the village burial ground."

"Yes," Wilfred interjected, "you've got the idea. All the skulls here bear testimony to past funerals."

"I suppose when a bloke dies the corpse is placed on the bank to await the pleasure of His Highness of the Pool," I said. "I wonder why we are being encouraged to shoot him—I suppose there must be several of them."

"Well, we'll come back again this evening, I suggest," Wilfred remarked, "then we can try again. We at least know that he exists now. In the meantime, let's get our guns and see if we can get some of these duck. Vincent and I will go back and leave you here with the rifles."

So it turned out that the *mugger* shoot became a duck shoot. By the time they returned the mallard were back on the water again, and obviously hadn't been shot at for a considerable time. We duly took up our positions round the tank and then the fun began. At a given signal the *shikari* put them up, and the fun was fast and furious. The result was seven and a half brace, which was good going when taking into consideration the fact that we had to be careful not to shoot them so that they fell into the water—for obvious reasons!

As we made our way back to Annabella we met Bannerjee, who insisted that we should drive back to his village where, he assured us, we should get a chance at some pig. So after explaining to the head-man that we would be back in the evening, poor Annabella, weighed down with humanity, once more jerked and bumped an unhappy way over vile tracks until we came to a very clean-looking village tucked away in a jungle clearing.

We were immediately surrounded by the usual noisy mob and, introductions over, arrangements were made to organise a pig shoot. The first necessity was beaters—and a collection of individuals armed with an assortment of weapons was quickly gathered together. Most of them had spears which consisted of very rusty home-made spearheads driven into bamboo poles; but one man had a bow and arrow. We were very intrigued with this as it was made entirely from bamboo; even the bow-string was a thin piece of bamboo! The owner was a very old man with a matted beard who looked just like Rip Van Winkle.

Wilfred managed to make him understand that he would give him four annas if he could hit his hat from ten yards. This offer was readily accepted, and amidst great excitement we all retired to a nearby glade where Wilfred hung his hat on a branch, crown towards the archer. The old man inserted an arrow, bent it double, gave a terrific heave and Wilfred's hat was transfixed. It was amazing. Wilfred then asked if he would try further away and we paced out twenty-five yards. I thought it was most unfair, but without any hesitation he let fly and Wilfred's hat fluttered off the branch once more with a second hole in the crown. The old man, beaming and muttering, was solemnly presented with a silver rupee to the acclamations of the crowd.

After this we set forth on a fairly long trek through the jungle to the spot where the pig were known to route about. The sun was now well up, and it was steamy hot walking along. There was much of interest on the way. Myriads of butterflies of gorgeous hues were playing about in the sunny patches, and darting

in and out amongst the trees. Numerous "Flame of the Forest" trees were dotted about. Their bright scarlet flowers made a striking contrast against the emerald green of the surrounding vegetation and were the delight of swarms of small bees whose hum pervaded the stillness.

Most of the small shrubs and creepers seemed to be in bloom, and one white one in particular gave off the most sickly sweet perfume. There were coconut palms everywhere, and near villages we ran into banana trees with their long drooping leaves and bunches of fruit, still in the green stage, hanging from them. On two occasions we passed small *pipal* trees growing out of palms from eight to twelve feet above ground level—presumably the seed had been dropped by some bird and taken root.

When we were about half-way to our destination a villager appeared from a side-track, and there was an animated pow-wow between him, Bannerjee and our *shikari*. Eventually Bannerjee turned to us and said: "This man says that near here there is a panther which killed a cow last night. He says he knows where to find him. Would the *sahibs* like to try and beat for him."

"That sounds grand," I replied, "but I didn't know there were any panther in this neighbourhood."

"Oh yes, quite a lot," Bannerjee answered, "only they're very difficult to shoot as the country is so thick."

"I'm on, let's have a go," Wilfred interjected.

So it was arranged that we should try for the panther. We turned off down the side-track and followed our guide, the villager, and hadn't gone very far when he stopped and pointed to the ground. We gathered round, and there sure enough was a very familiar mark, which left no doubt about it being a panther.

A little further and we emerged from the trees on to the edge of a large tank. The beat was now arranged so that the panther would break clear into this tank area. Wilfred, Vincent and I took up positions about a hundred yards apart on the near edge of the jungle undergrowth so that the panther would break through us, and we would be shooting away from the beaters.

Whilst waiting for things to start, I leant up against a large mango tree and admired the profusion of mauve water-lilies that covered the whole surface of the tank. On the far edge a village fisherman had cleared a patch of water, and was busily engaged in trying to catch some variety of mud-fish by using a bamboo rod. He had an improvised float and was using a brand of *atta* as bait. I noticed that he squatted on the very edge and flicked the line in and out about once in every thirty seconds. It must have been very irritating for the fish, but I presumed he knew what he was doing. I gave him a hail and made him understand by gestures that he must clear off temporarily. Just then I felt a series of sharp bites, and discovered that my mango tree was just a crawling mass of bright yellow ants who quite naturally resented my presence. I had to whip off my shirt and shake it out while my language made the day seem even hotter.

Just then all the noises in Hell broke loose as the beat started. The beaters shouted, yelled, coughed, and beat and kicked the bushes, but nothing except a rather bewildered hare broke cover. They were all most disappointed, and the beat was repeated from two other directions before the panther was given best.

When we had collected together again Wilfred looked at his watch and said: "I make it about mid-day now. I vote we get back to the village and have some grub. It is a long trek. Afterwards we can decide what we want to do."

"I'm all for that," Vincent remarked. "Let's get cracking."

I shall never forget that trip back. It was infernally hot and our energies had flagged to such an extent that every time one put a foot forward it was like moving a ton weight. Except for a brief halt to admire some tree orchids we doggedly plodded on until hours later, so it seemed, the welcome sight of the village came into view, and we were duly escorted in by the entire population.

On the outskirts we were met by the head-man and a large number of green coconuts were dumped on the ground. The heads were chopped off with a machet and the milk was poured out into glasses produced by Wilfred from the interior of Annabella. I have never tasted such nectar—a soft, sweet taste that was most satisfying.

We were then bidden to the village chief's hut where, in some miraculous manner, chairs and a table had been produced. We sat round and the rest of the village congregated in the doorway and watched us eat the most enormous meal. We started with hard-boiled eggs, which were followed by curry and innumerable frills, then *luchi*, a kind of sweet and rather sodden pancake, and the whole meal was finished off with fish-balls and bananas. All this was washed down by more coconut milk.

Vincent pushed back his chair with a sigh. "I'm just too full and too tired to move for another twenty-four hours," he remarked.

"Well, I feel just like blowing up." I replied. "The last time I had such rich food was in the Spanish Restaurant near Piccadilly."

"Oh! shut up," Wilfred groaned, "I think we'll have to sit here for a long time to recover. Hallo, Bannerjee, what is it?"

"In an hour's time, *sahibs*, we will beat for pig close here—very little walking. Then in the evening we will see if the *mugger* is out of the pool."

After a certain amount of expostulation we eventually agreed, and so it came about that some time later we had taken up positions behind bushes in more open type of country not far from the village. The beat started with the usual hullabaloo, and the first excitement came almost at once when a hare skipped out between Wilfred and I. We both had a bang at it with our rifles and a very near miss was recorded. The most astonished hare in Christendom is probably at this moment reciting his adventure to numerous grandchildren.

Nothing much happened for some time, until the frenzied yells of the beaters told us that something was on the move. As the noise came closer, every muscle became taut, and I felt ready for anything. Then there was a crashing of undergrowth and a huge boar shot out almost on top of Wilfred. I just managed to get in a snap-shot as he was disappearing, and from the blood marks obviously scored a hit. Wilfred's language as he picked himself up would have shocked a sailor.

Vincent and I tore after the boar as hard as we could go, and got glimpses of him as he went across open spaces and dried up tanks. Eventually he turned at bay, and Vincent despatched him. My original shot had hit him in the back. When the villagers came up he was strung on to a pole and carried back in triumph. He was skinned on the spot. I have no idea of the villagers' religion; but they certainly had no scruples about accepting portions of carcass when it was cut up.

Bannerjee then announced that we ought to be on the move if we wanted to have a try for the *mugger*. So we all piled into Annabella once more and drove back to the first village. We left our late host beaming in the midst of the entire village, and clasping a brand new hubble-bubble pipe which Wilfred had thoughtfully brought out in anticipation of just such an interlude.

On arrival at our destination we were met by the *shikari*, who had preceded us and was obviously very excited. He had just come back from looking into the tank, and apparently a large *mugger* was basking contentedly on the bank.

We had a hurried council of war and agreed on the same positions and procedure as before.

"I suggest we draw lots as to who is to have first shot," I remarked.

"A splendid idea," Vincent said. "Then the other two can fire just to make sure, immediately afterwards."

"Yes," Wilfred replied, "but be ready to rush down and give him the *coup de grace*, as they are very slimy customers and he may flip himself into the pond and we'll lose him."

"Don't approach him too close," I cautioned, "as his main armoury is in his tail. One flip from that and you're in the water with a broken leg."

Wilfred now started to organise things and he called up Bannerjee and the *shikari*. "We won't have anyone coming up with us this time," he instructed. "No, not even you two. We're not going to take any risks of a disturbance or noise, so wait here until you hear us open fire and then come up. Is that clear?"

Both understood, and Bannerjee went off to explain to the villagers, while the *shikari* assisted us to get ready. I noticed that the sun was well down, and it was already getting very much cooler. We then tossed up for first shot and I won.

We were soon ready and set off on our respective routes. It was very slow going, as one had to be quite sure not to make the slightest sound and the approach to the lip of the tank, until one could see in, had to be done gradually. Eventually I was able to peer over the top and a grand sight met my gaze. A huge *mugger* was lying on the bank, broadside on, apparently oblivious to everything. He presented a perfect shot from my position. I slowly pushed my rifle forward inch by inch until the butt was in my shoulder, and I was just taking aim when there was a crashing of undergrowth nearby, a childish shout, and the jangling of a bell.

With an incredibly quick movement the *mugger* was gone, just as three shots rang out almost simultaneously and the echos came back to us mockingly as the ripples on the surface of the pool grew larger. Then a bullock, trailing a broken cord, came lumbering down the bank followed by a very frightened small boy. The bell round the animal's neck seemed to jangle derisively, while I could swear that the eyeless socket of a nearby skull winked at me. Of course, it was only the effect produced by a shadow from an overhanging branch.

I still think to this day that the numerous spirits of the pool which were represented by that *mugger* saw to it that he was safe for ever. I learnt afterwards that many others have tried for him without success, which accounts for the villagers' acquiescence when one arrives to shoot their holy *mugger*. They know full well that he's safe, and after all it gives the *sahibs* some fun.

However, I was glad we didn't go back empty-handed as we had the mallard and the pig. We were all dead beat, and Vincent summed up our sentiments in two words when he remarked: "Some day!"

AID TO FORSAKEN MILLIONS

“ INDIAN ARMY OBSERVER ”

OVER 8,500,000 refugees crossed the Indo-Pakistan border in both directions up to December 1947. Of these, nearly 4,500,000 consisted of non-Muslims who were brought over to India from the West Punjab, N-W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan. Organised movement on a large scale was completed by the Military Evacuation Organisation in the first week of December, a week earlier than the date fixed. Clearance of small pockets and rescue of abducted women and forcibly converted persons are still in progress. During the same period over 4,000,000 Muslims were moved to Pakistan from the East Punjab and Delhi, the Government of India contributing a much larger number of troops, trains and other facilities than Pakistan for the purpose.

From 1st September 1947, the Indian Army took over the duties of evacuating non-Muslims from the West Punjab and the Pakistan Army became similarly responsible in the East Punjab. A Military Evacuation Organisation was set up under a Major-General with troops and transport at his disposal. Pakistan's resources in military personnel and transport being limited, the main burden of evacuating not only non-Muslim refugees east but also Muslim refugees west fell on the Indian Army. The Indian Army and the R.I.A.F. set up a fine record of achievement in the collection of refugees, Muslim as well as non-Muslim; moving them on foot and by road, rail and air; locating them in camps at destination; and in the transport of food and medical supplies. Officers and men were subjected to prolonged fatigue, to moral and physical strain, and frequently to a considerable measure of physical danger. The Indian Army raised civilian motor transport companies, loaned officers to the East Punjab Government for administrative work, provided equipment for camps, and offered assistance in numerous other ways.

Up to 31st October 1947, an independent organisation set up by the Royal Indian Navy at Lahore evacuated 830 non-Muslim personnel of the R.I.N. to the Indian Union. The R.I.N. intend to appoint a Welfare Officer attached to the Rehabilitation Committee at Jullundur to assist in the resettlement of naval families.

Foot columns provided the names of movement for the largest number of refugees. Fleeing from towns and villages close to the Indo-Pakistan border, non-Muslims began to enter India in large numbers in numerous small disorganised parties towards the end of August and early part of September. Later, when the Indian Army took charge, huge foot convoys, each 30,000 to 40,000 strong, embarked upon a 150-mile march from the fertile colonies of Lyallpur and Montgomery districts. In 42 days (18th September to 29th October), 24 non-Muslim foot columns 849,000 strong, with hundreds of bullock carts and heads of cattle crossed the border into India.

Movement of these columns raised problems of deep complexity. In some instances the Government of India had to drop cooked food as well

as foodgrains and sugar for starving people from R.I.A.F. aircraft which flew from Amritsar and Delhi to Jaranwala, Lyallpur, Churkhana, Dhabhansinghwal, Balloki Headworks and Bhai Pheru. Drugs, vaccines and doctors were sent. Field ambulance units were sent to Raiwind to inoculate refugees before they crossed the border. Often on the way the columns were attacked, resulting in heavy casualties. Women and children were abducted, and unauthorised search deprived the refugees of the few valuables they carried. The columns suffered at the hand of not only man but also nature. Exposure and devastating floods thinned their ranks. Nevertheless the determined caravans moved on.

REFUGEE TRAINS

Next to foot columns, trains carried the largest number of refugees. More than 670 trains moved over 2,500,000 refugees across the border. Of these about 1,500,000 were non-Muslims and about 950,000 Muslims. Refugee trains were also attacked by armed mobs in the East and the West Punjab, thus necessitating heavy military protection, introduction of stern measures against villages through which the trains passed, imposition of collective fines and curfew in the affected areas along the railway track. Thanks to these measures, attacks on refugee trains dwindled and disappeared. Each train was escorted by a detachment—sometimes a company, sometimes two platoons strong.

Over 427,000 non-Muslims and over 217,000 Muslim refugees were moved in motor transport under military escort, the Military Evacuation Organisation of India alone using 1,200 military and civilian vehicles for this purpose. Motor transport was used primarily for collecting people stranded in villages and other small pockets and also for bringing them to rail-heads. In one month alone 1,000,000 gallons of petrol were used in the East Punjab area, mostly by the Military Evacuation Organisation.

EVACUATION BY SEA AND AIR

Nearly 1,000 flights were made by Government-chartered aircraft to move refugees. The total number of passengers carried was nearly 18,500 on the outward and 30,000 on the inward journeys. Nearly 600,000 gallons of aviation spirit were used a month during the peak period.

Up to the middle of December, nearly 133,000 non-Muslims were cleared from Sind by steamer and country craft, their destinations being Bombay, Okha, Bedi, Navlakhi, Kundla and Cutch Mandvi.

FLOODS IN EAST PUNJAB

The Royal Indian Engineer Units were engaged in restoring communications which had been disrupted by the flooding of the Beas and Sutlej rivers towards the end of September 1947.

Roads in the Punjab had never before been subjected to such heavy cart traffic as in August and September, when the mass movement of refugees was in progress. One of the finest road networks in India was breached in many places and washed away in parts in one night by torrential rains..

The Officer Commanding R.I.E. units in this area, gave top priority to restoring the damage to the Grand Trunk Road, so that Jullundur and Amritsar, which had been cut off from the eastern districts both by road and rail, could be linked with Ambala again. Accordingly the 1st and the 4th Companies R.I.E. (both of Bengal Sappers and Miners) built Bailey bridges over the Bein River, five miles east of Jullundur Cantonment. In spite of many difficulties and with only one bulldozer to help build the approach roads, the work was done in five days and the bridge was opened on 9th October. This was the first time that Bailey bridges had been erected over gaps in the Grand Trunk Road and put to public use.

Filling the breaches on the Grand Trunk Road between Jullundur and the Beas River was an even bigger task. Here in the space of 16 miles, 15 large breaches had occurred together, and many small ones. The 32 Assault Field Company (Madras Sappers and Miners) was assigned the difficult task of restoring this sector. One bulldozer and one road roller were all the mechanical equipment that could be made available.

Using local sources for road metal, some army trucks and much sapper ingenuity and knowledge, this unit did good work and had the road open to traffic in six days. Where diversions were possible and necessary, they were made, and where large gaps on embankments had occurred, bridges were constructed. The railway bridge over the Bein, which was partly destroyed, was repaired by engineers of the East Punjab Railway and 101 Railway Construction Company, R.I.E. (Madras Sappers and Miners). Besides these tasks Indian Army engineers made wide and frequent surveys and kept open roads used by refugees.

REFUGEE ROUTES

In August and the early part of September, before the Military Evacuation Organisations of India and Pakistan were set up in order to control the movement of Muslim and non-Muslim refugees, Muslims immediately east of the new boundary and non-Muslims west of it crossed over on their own. Thus the areas east and west of the new boundary became clear of the minority populations.

When the Military Evacuation Organisations were set up they discussed arrangements for foot convoys and planned specified routes. These convoys sometimes contained as many as 70 or 80 thousand persons each, with their bullock carts, cattle, horses and belongings. The problem of moving such convoys was, therefore, extremely difficult especially in view of the communal tension in those areas.

Non-Muslim foot convoys from Montgomery and Multan districts came past the Sulemanki Headworks into Ferozepore in September and October. Non-Muslims from Lyallpur, Jaranwalla, Sheikhpura and adjacent areas used a road which crossed Balloki Headworks, where there was a bottleneck and convoys were detained for hours or even days. After crossing the Headworks, the convoys passed through Bhai Pheru and Raiwind and moved thence to Amritsar or through Chunian to Ferozepore,

Further north many non-Muslims from Lahore district crossed into Amritsar by the Grand Trunk Road or by any track or path that they could find. Still further north many non-Muslims from the Pakistan portion of Gurdaspur district and west of it crossed into the Indian portion of Gurdaspur district through Batala, Dera Baba Nanak and Jassar.

All these foot convoys were protected by Indian and Pakistan troops according to the agreement reached between the representatives of the two Dominions at a conference. Indian troops provided close escort and Pakistan troops wide escort to non-Muslim refugees while they were in Pakistan territory.

The largest number of Muslim refugees to move west took the Grand Trunk Road from Jullundur to Amritsar and thence to Lahore. For a while the military authorities found it difficult to take the Muslim refugees through Amritsar city where reports of attacks on convoys in the West Punjab roused the fury of the local population who refused to allow Muslims to go through the city. The troops made a diversion north of Amritsar in order to send these caravans through but the diversion became unserviceable after rains. For a while all convoys were diverted along the road running along the bank of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, but this road could not take heavy traffic and broke down. Thereafter, when tempers cooled down in Amritsar city, all the Muslim caravans were routed through the city along the Grand Trunk Road to the frontier post at Wagha where Pakistan authorities took charge of them and sent them on to Lahore.

Muslim refugees from Gurdaspur district took the same route as non-Muslims to cross the border, namely through Dera Baba Nanak and Batala. Care was taken to see that one-way traffic was maintained. From Ludhiana and Jullundur districts large columns of Muslim refugees were routed through Jagraon, Moga, Ferozepore and Sulemanki Headworks. Muslim convoys from the southern districts of the East Punjab such as Rohtak, Hissar and Gurgaon took the route which ran through Hissar, Sirsa, Dalwali and Fazilka.

All Muslim refugees moving on foot from the Indian Union into the West Punjab were escorted by Indian troops, on foot and in lorries, and sometimes when these columns had to pass through areas where great tension prevailed Armoured Corps units escorted them. Although, according to the agreement, Pakistan troops were supposed to provide close escort to the Muslim refugees while they were in Indian Union territory, most of the escort were Indian owing to the fact that the Pakistan Army was unable to send an adequate number of troops.

In the third week of September, major attacks on foot convoys took place on both sides of the border, but after that such attacks dwindled in number and decreased in intensity and the end of October saw speedy and safe movement of refugees. In October, Muslim and non-Muslim refugees often took the same route and crossed each other without any untoward incident.

In the same month, however, the unprecedented floods in the Punjab rendered most of the routes taken by the refugees unserviceable for over a week. Bridges were washed away and strips of road also disappeared under water. Many refugees died of exposure and many were carried away by the floods. All foot movements were at a standstill during this period but the army and civil engineers worked hard on the roads and got them going again within a week.

REFUGEE CAMPS

Fifty-six camps were set up to accommodate refugees and over 40,000 tents placed at the disposal of the various provinces for the same purpose. The largest of these camps was at Kurukshetra which was organised in October to billet non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan. The army was called upon to organise this camp and this meant the employment of 1,200 men. This camp had a capacity of about 2,50,000 and was divided into separate "towns" of 50,000 each. It had a hospital of its own and contained up-to-date arrangements for vaccination and inoculation. Steps were also being taken to electrify the camp. At its peak period 20 major Indian Army units were employed.


MEDICAL AID

The army's medical services were fully used for the benefit of the refugees. Mass inoculations and vaccinations were carried out and ambulance cars accompanied the foot convoys. 1,300 beds were made available for refugees in Combined Military Hospitals in Jullundur, Ambala and Delhi. Medical officers were detailed for refugee work in various stations in the East Punjab and Medical Inspection Rooms were established in refugee camps. Penicillin, sulpha drugs, D.D.T., surgical instruments and equipment, field dressings, etc., amounting to about 250 tons, were made available to treat refugee casualties. A contingent of two veterinary officers with two complete veterinary sections and a number of farriers were sent to Jullundur for shoeing and rendering medical aid to animals arriving from Pakistan with the refugees.

SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT



The army supplied 30,000 tents to the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation. Certain accommodation stores such as camp kettles, hurricane lanterns, entrenching tools, and cooking utensils were also made available by the army for use in Kurukshetra camp. A small supply of blankets was also made to the Bihar Government. In several different stations the army placed at the disposal of the various Provincial Governments and the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation accommodation sufficient to house at least 2,00,000 civilians.

Six transport companies and supervisory staff to raise five civilian transport companies were provided by the army for the movement of refugees. Over one million gallons of petrol, oil and lubricants were used up in a month by the Military Evacuation Organisation. Aviation spirit for refugee work during the peak period reached about 600,000 gallons a month.



THE UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Until 1910 the business of the Institution was conducted from offices in G.H.Q., Simla. In 1909, land was leased from the United Service Club and work was commenced on the building shown in our photograph. It was completed the following year. In July 1947, the freehold of the land was purchased from the Club. Well situated on the Mall, near the Combermere Bridge, the building contains the library and office on the ground floor, and a spacious reading and writing room on the first floor.



THE PRESIDENT VISITS THE UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTION
 During his recent one-day visit to Simla, General Cariappa inspected the Institution's building on the Mall. He is seen here, accompanied by the Secretary and Editor, entering (left) and leaving (right) the building.

AIRCREW OF TOMORROW

CHARLES GARDNER*

DURING the war the Royal Air Force training "octopus" spread its tentacles over a large part of the earth's more civilised surface. There were, I remember, reputedly delightful places in the Union of South Africa, Canada, Bermuda, India and California to which the lucky aircrew-cadet might hope to be posted, and where, in the fullness of very pleasant time, he would be taught his trade. "The Empire Training Scheme" it was called, or officially, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Through it Britain herself was able to shed the load of most non-operational flying and so strip for action, while in safe remoteness, far from Hitler's bombs, powerful reinforcements were being trained.

"AIR COLLEGES"

But now, in less drastic conditions, the R.A.F. has set up a new training scheme which is called the "All Through" training scheme.

Having spent a day inspecting the new system, I think I would prefer to rename it. "All Through" is a somewhat meaningless title to the general public and it gives no clear idea of the scope of the plan. Calling it the "Air College" scheme would give a better idea of what it is all about—because, in fact, it really amounts to the setting up of a number of such colleges to replace many of the mushroom growths of the war.

Overseas training, incidentally, is still to be carried on in a part of the Commonwealth—Southern Rhodesia. What the R.A.F. has done is to rationalise its home-based system of aircrew training to meet present needs out of a slender budget and, at the same time, attract young men to enlist, either on a short service or career basis with possibilities of promotion and commissions.

When the war finished, the R.A.F. found itself with a heavy surplus of aircrew of all sorts, and during 1946 and 1947 the main job was to reduce the swollen ranks by demobilisation, while retaining a hard core of regulars round which to reform a compact, well-trained and well-equipped force. It also had to devise a means of replacing the pre-war short service commission, since short service officers not only provided, at any one time, the majority of the serving pilots but a substantial part of the active reserve as well.

The new "All Through" scheme is a carefully planned answer to this post-war problem.

YOUNG BLOOD

By the end of last year most of the surplus non-regular aircrew had been demobilised and there was a need for young blood in all aircrew categories. The estimated requirement of pilots alone was 100 a month for the whole of 1948, and to deal with this intake three "Air Colleges" have now been established: Feltwell in East Anglia, South Cerney in Gloucestershire, and Ternhill in Shropshire. There are similar colleges for navigators, and later the scheme will embrace signallers and gunners.

*B. B. C. Air Correspondent.

A young man in his late teens who joins the R.A.F. as a pilot-cadet still goes to an Initial Training School, where he spends six months on ground studies, discipline, and learning the theory of flight and the mathematics of navigation. From his I.T.S. he now goes to one of the three "Colleges" where he stays until he has won his wings a year later.

The old and wasteful system of sending him to one airfield to learn to fly elementary trainers, to another to learn to fly modern planes, and to a third to learn the practical tactics of air warfare, is now discarded. Instead, all this training is sensibly concentrated in one place and under one set of instructors, who remain with their pupils from their first flight to the final passing-out parade.

CONTINUITY

One of the things I disliked most about my own R.A.F. training was being uprooted so often and sent to new places, to fly with new companions under new instructors. There was no sense of continuity and stability. The "Air College" scheme now alters all that. The young man enters it from his I.T.S. with his fellow classmates, some of whom will probably serve alongside him for most of his first tour of duty. They are all aircrew-cadets and all have an equal chance to get commissions, for the days of direct entry officers are over and no commissions are given at all except through the ranks or through University Air Squadrons and the R.A.F. College, Cranwell.

At Feltwell, the new entrant is allocated to a flight in which he remains for his entire stay at the school. Each flight has a senior and a junior term, the senior being engaged on advanced tactical work, while the juniors are being taught their first take-offs and landings. At the moment the equipment is Tiger Moths for elementary training, and Harvards for the rest. The instructors work with both flights to give continuity of teaching.

For 16 weeks the cadet devotes himself to learning to fly. The second 16-week period introduces the pupil to the faster Harvard monoplanes, and to the intricacies of retractable under-carriages, flaps and blind flying panels. The third 16 weeks is the applied flying period, and in it formation flying, night flying across country, bad weather navigation and the use of modern aids are taught. At the end of it all the cadet, who has at least 200 hours in his log book, is posted to an operational training unit where he converts to the type of plane he will fly in the service, after which he goes to a squadron—usually in the command of the pupil's own choice.

HIGHER STANDARD

The standard of training is higher than it was in war-time. For instance there is much more emphasis on all-weather flying, on the use of blind approach aids and controlled descent through clouds. There is more night flying and more accent on cross-country work, both by day and by night. Moth flying is more accurate than ever it was in my own elementary training days.

On a recent visit to Feltwell I asked if I could go for a ride with one of the pupils. The one chosen to drive me was a young man who had only seven hours solo in his book, and who had never been away from his own airfield before. He was a cheery youngster who showed no dismay at being asked to take a stranger on quite a difficult cross-country test on a far from ideal day.

He worked out his courses and his timings with great accuracy, and he held a bucketing Tiger Moth on to her proper heading with a smooth skill which would have been praiseworthy in a pilot with ten times his experience. He checked his pin-points on the map and, from time-to-time, gave me a lucid account of what we were doing, and why. He reached his destination without the slightest trouble, turned, and set course back. When our home airfield came into sight, he landed like a veteran, in tricky gusty conditions.

GOOD START

I was so impressed that I suspected I had been given the star pupil to ride with. But I hadn't. Several other lads had quite a few more hours flying experience than my pilot, who was reckoned to be just a fair average, and was chosen for that reason.

There is an old saying that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Having ridden with one of the juniors, and having watched the seniors fly their Harvards in tight formation and then perform excellent individual aerobatics, I can say with certainty that the new R.A.F. training scheme is producing the "goods."

And what do the lads themselves think?

Said one: "I am making the R.A.F. my career, and I'm enjoying it."

Said another: "When I finish with the R.A.F., I want to go into civil flying—and I reckon this will give me as good a start as any."

I reckon it will.

"Bird-proof" windscreen

One of the few things which chill the heart of the air pilot with apprehension is the sight of a flying bird—for such have been known to crash through the windscreen with disastrous results. The new giant 120-seater Brabazon, now being built at Bristol, is to be fitted with a protection against such accidents, which, in 1945, are said to have cost the Royal Air Force £120,000 (Rs. 15,97,225). Peregrine falcons are, in fact, now being used to rid airfields in Britain of flocks of birds.

The Brabazon's windscreen is to be made of several layers of different types of glass and a three-quarter inch perspex panel, with a small airgap for demisting by the circulation of hot air.

So tough will the windscreen be that a bird flying into it just after take-off would crack the glass, but would not crash through into the control cabin.

A special apparatus which hurls high-speed missiles at glass panels has helped to solve this problem. Exact replicas of the Brabazon panelled cockpit screen have been subjected to tests and proved "bird-proof" in conditions equaling climb after take off—the time when the danger of collision with birds is most likely.

At higher altitudes on the Atlantic routes over which the Brabazon will operate, the danger is considered almost non-existent.

INDIAN SURVEYORS IN PAIFORCE*

"SURFIELD"

THE Allied Forces in Persia and Iraq during World War II were singularly unsuccessful in catching and holding the limelight. It is true they had their moments, but these were brief. Rashid Ali's rebellion in Iraq in the early summer of 1941 caught the headlines for a few days; so too did the brief Syrian campaign a month or so later in which columns from Iraq assisted. The Persian campaign in August 1941 promised to be exciting but was all over in a brief four days, and thereafter the doings of the military forces known at different times as British Troops Iraq, Tenth Army and Paiforce, lapsed into obscurity in view of more spectacular happenings elsewhere.

Many of the activities of an army in war-time turn out to be wasted effort, but one activity at least of the forces in Persia and Iraq was an exception, and will remain as a lasting contribution to the development of the areas in which it took place. This was the work of the Survey Service and in this the Indian surveyor played a singularly honourable and important part.

In the late summer of 1941 the General Officer Commanding the forces in Persia and Iraq was faced with a serious problem. He had to prepare for the possibility of an Axis drive through Turkey and Iraq aimed at splitting the Allied forces in the Middle East from those based on India; and his trouble was that the greater part of the deserts over which operations would take place were quite unmapped.

Survey troops and map reproduction personnel were rushed from India, which was the only source of supply of surveyors with the special experience of the small scale topographical survey work that would be required. These were practically entirely personnel of the Survey of India, who were hastily formed into military units and sent overseas to Iraq where the bulk of them arrived by November.

The headquarters of the Survey Service was established in Baghdad, alongside Force H.Q., and here map reproduction and printing equipment together with drawing and air survey sections were installed, while every available ground surveyor was put on to field work. By the beginning of December 1941, surveyors equipped with mechanical transport were spread out and hard at work over the whole area of Northern Iraq as far west as the Syrian frontier and beyond. The deserts of Iraq are largely composed of mud which when dried provides a hard surface suitable for motoring. Each surveyor had a couple of vehicles and carried enough food and water to keep him self-contained for a month.

DIFFICULT TASK

The military plans of the force commander necessitated the revision of the maps of the whole of Iraq north of the latitude of Baghdad many of which were little more than blank paper, and their publication and distribution to the troops by February. The task was almost impossibly large but with extreme efforts and given luck in the weather it was just within the bounds of possibility.

*Reproduced by courtesy of *The Statesman*.

About mid-December however the weather seemed to be on the side of the Axis powers and one of the coldest winters ever recorded in Iraq and Persia set in. In Baghdad the temperature fell to 13° below freezing point and was accompanied by a bitter wind. Those working on map reproduction had often to work all night with no more than a tent as protection. On one or two occasions work had to stop as the hands of the printers became so numb with cold that they could not operate their machines. In Northern Iraq, in the Mosul area, temperatures below zero were recorded accompanied by snow; and Madrassi lorry drivers who had never seen snow before had to drive in arctic conditions and several cases of frost bite were recorded.

The deserts of Iraq when wet produce a particularly glutinous and slippery type of mud which renders movement by wheeled vehicles quite impossible, and during the snow and thaw surveyors were immobilised where they happened to be and had to hope that the desert would dry enough to enable them to reach supplies before their food was exhausted. An indication of the severity of the weather was afforded when in the vicinity of the Jabal-Sinjar hills the desert was found littered with dead gazelle, killed by the cold.

Casualties to mechanical transport were enormous as in spite of every precaution a large number of cylinder blocks became frozen and cracked. Numerous expedients had to be employed to get damaged vehicles back to repair shops, and probably one of the most ingenious of these was by an Iraqi interpreter who repaired the cracked cylinder block of his surveyor's lorry with a mixture of plaster of Paris and albumen from a raw egg. This repair held for some weeks and enabled the lorry to continue in use.

SURVEY EXTENDED

In spite of these difficulties of weather the surveyors managed to keep up a very large output of work, but there was a great feeling of relief when in January the General Staff gave a postponement of the completion date owing to an improvement in the military situation in Russia. This gave an opportunity for surveys which had been skimped to be revised more carefully and also for them to be extended further south to cover the area between Baghdad and Basra.

The results of these desert surveys were interesting. In the previous maps huge areas had been shown completely blank and were assumed to be practically featureless desert. In actual fact they turned out to contain numerous features including extensive salt swamps, many of which would have been very effective military barriers. The few features shown on the old maps were often many miles out of position.

The climate of Iraq is extreme and only a few weeks separate the season of great cold from the succeeding one of extreme heat. By February the deserts were warming up and the work had moved further south. During March and April heat and haze combined with dust storms were becoming trying and surveyors who a few weeks before would have given much for a little warmth, found the heat becoming almost insupportable.

Little has been said of the personnel left in Baghdad for production of printed maps from the surveys sent in by field personnel. Although not of so spectacular a character their work was in many ways equally outstanding. Maps were produced in improvised accommodation under adverse conditions in a time which would, by peace-time standards, have been considered quite impossible.

For example, the surveys covering the area of one full $\frac{1}{4}$ inch to a mile map sheet (about 4,000 square miles) were received in Baghdad and within 17 days the map had been completely fair drawn and reproduced and 10,000 copies had been printed. This work under peace-time conditions would not have been completed under six months or more.

BRUSH WITH ARABS

The programme described above represented hard and continuous work for all involved. There was little actual danger but much extreme discomfort. Occasional incidents did however enliven the proceedings. On one occasion a surveyor at work at a low eminence in the desert noticed a group of tribesmen approaching him from the distance. He was busy at his work and paid no particular attention to them. On looking up from his planetable some minutes later he was disconcerted and alarmed to see that they were much closer, were armed with rifles, and had spread out in open order and apparently were engaged in stalking him. He at once took up his instruments and beat a hasty retreat to his lorry which was standing nearby and reached it at the same time as a straggling volley of shots. Fortunately the lorry started immediately and he was soon out of danger.

At length the programme was finished about the end of March; and surveyors were glad to move from the torrid deserts of Iraq to the uplands of Western Persia, where an even more strenuous and equally important programme of work awaited them.

* * * * *

AMONG THE PERSIAN HILLS

Western Persia is a plateau some four thousand feet above sea level. It consists of rugged ranges of mountains up to about 14,000 feet in height, with wide valleys and rolling plains between. The country is semi-arid and with a hot dry summer, provides no special difficulties for a well-equipped invading force, although the mountains and passes give scope for many strong defensive positions.

The military surveyor must always look ahead—often ahead of the planners on the General Staff. When survey troops were rushed to Iraq in the autumn of 1941, those controlling the Survey Service realised that though Persia was not immediately envisaged as the scene of important operations, it might soon be so. Surveys cannot be undertaken at a moment's notice; before they are begun the positions and heights of numerous points must be fixed by a process known as triangulations. This is a long and highly skilled task and involves the making of numerous observation stations, generally on hilltops, from which the country can be commanded.

It was essential that the surveys in Persia and Iraq should be in agreement and the only bases from which a system of triangulation in Persia could be carried out were in Iraq. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1941, an Indian captain of Engineers was entrusted with the vitally important task of carrying triangulation from bases near Khaniqin on the borders of Iraq, up through the mountain passes and across western Persia as far as Hamadan.

This work, if satisfactorily completed, would provide numerous bases in Persia from which it might be extended rapidly both north and south, in the spring, to form the basis of planetable and air surveys. Failure either to complete the task in time or to maintain a high enough standard of accuracy would have jeopardised the whole future programme of surveys in Persia, and was unthinkable, but the task at the best of times would have been formidable.

The winter of 1941-42 in Iraq and Persia was one of the coldest on record and the epic struggle which ensued between the observer and the weather was followed in Survey Headquarters in Baghdad with a mixture of admiration and anxiety. By the end of December he had reached the Persian plateau carrying his observations up astride the Pay-i-Taq Pass. His stations were on the tops of hills at heights of 8000 feet and over and here the full force of the weather struck him. Temperatures of -20°F were encountered together with blizzards and high winds.

The party shivered in their tiny tents pitched high on the hillsides and at times nearly buried in snow, or ploughed their way up to the hilltops on clear days through deep snow under arctic conditions.

WORK COMPLETED

Those at headquarters were daily expecting to hear that the enterprise had had to be abandoned, but still it kept on. By the end of January the work had reached the vicinity of Kermanshah, and two months later with improving weather conditions had achieved its objective near Hamadan—a triumph of perseverance and endurance.

It is interesting to note that later, when this work was connected at another point with the Iraq triangulation, it was found that the whole chain extending over a length of more than 500 miles had only accumulated an error of 40 metres, and about half of this may be attributed to the latter series. This accuracy under normal conditions would have been creditable.

In April 1942, all available surveyors were rushed to Persia and once again they were working against time. The whole of the western part of the country from the junction with the Russian zone, about the southern end of Lake Urmia, as far south as the passes through the Zagros range into the oilfield area in the south-west, and as far east as Teheran, had to be surveyed and the maps had to be in the hands of the troops by the end of August. In addition large-scale maps were required of numerous defensive positions.

Once again the task seemed almost impossible but on this occasion the natural elements were favourable. Western Persia with its high barren hills and wide valleys and general lack of vegetation is almost an ideal country for the skilled planetable surveyor, and Indian surveyors, many of them trained on the hills of the North-West Frontier, found themselves in their element.

Persian Kurdistan provided a special problem. The area was of great strategic importance and it was essential that it should be surveyed. The Kurds were, however, in rebellion against the Persian Government, though friendly towards the Allies. Any attempt to enter their country from the Persian side was likely to be viewed with great suspicion by the tribesmen.

Permission was obtained to send surveyors into Persian Kurdistan from Iraq. It would have been quite impracticable to provide any sort of adequate

protection for all the small survey detachments scattered throughout the country, so the success of the operation depended on the ability of the surveyors to establish and maintain friendly relations with the Kurdish tribes.

The Persian Government in Teheran was interested that the tribes in rebellion should not receive Allied encouragement, so to assure them of our good faith it was agreed that civil Persian observers should accompany the survey parties into Kurdistan. At the last minute through some misunderstanding a Persian military officer was ordered to accompany the first survey detachment commanded by an Indian lieutenant. After they had waited a day at the rendezvous the Persian officer did not turn up, so the survey party, moved over the border into Kurdistan.

SURROUNDED BY KURDS

That night its camp was surrounded by an armed party of many hundreds of Kurds who demanded to know who were in the party and what they were doing. On learning they were Indian military personnel their attitude became friendly and there was no further trouble. It was fortunate for the Persian officer and probably for the whole party that he did not keep his appointment to accompany the surveyors.

The Kurds were very zealous Muslims and many of the Indian surveyors who had to work in their country were non-Muslims, and the Survey authorities at first felt some anxiety that they might have difficulty with the tribesmen. A visiting senior officer soon learnt that these fears were groundless. In conversation with a surveyor and his squad he asked whether there had been trouble. "Well, at first," was the reply, "the Kurds seemed to be rather aloof as we were Hindus, so we all adopted Muslim names, and now they are most friendly."

INVASION DANGER REMOVED

As the summer wore on and surveys still continued to come in at a prodigious rate those in the Survey Directorate at Force Headquarters felt the strain relax. Once again the Indian surveyor had risen to the occasion, and the army's demands for maps would be met in time.

The original programme was extended as the military situation on the Russian front promised a postponement of the threat to Persia; and finally when the Russians held fast at Stalingrad and it became apparent that the winter snows in the Caucasus had removed the danger of invasion at least until the following spring. It then became possible to call in for a well-earned rest surveyors who had in many cases been working practically without a day off for over twelve months in extremes of heat and cold.

The development of air survey will in future decrease the importance of the role of the Indian planetable surveyor: and it may be that Persia-Iraq provided the last extensive programme of purely ground surveys. But if his sun has set, at least the setting was brilliant, and fully accorded with the tradition established during over a hundred years, amid Himalayan snows, tropical jungles, and the cultivated plains of India.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

BRIGADIER J.G. ELLIOT, C.I.E.

GOVERNMENT servants have earned for themselves an unenviable reputation for their rendering of the King's English, and it is to be feared that most service officers would have some difficulty in proving a claim to be exempted from the class to which they naturally belong. The cause is not far to seek, being no more than that a restricted field of interests virtually encourages the writer to restrict himself to the phrases and expressions, often pseudo-technical, that are current at the time. If we were to carry the matter a step further, and invite an impartial critic to review the paper-work passing through a military headquarters, and award to the various categories—reports, letters, appreciations, briefs—an order of merit, it is to be feared that the annual batch of confidential reports would be placed distressingly near the bottom.

It is inevitable that such a low standard must detract from the usefulness of the reports; and, considering the vital purpose for which they are required, there would be cause for uneasiness if the matter went no further; but it does. There can be few officers who would place their hands on their hearts and declare that the confidential reports rendered on them through their service have told the whole story; and, if pressed further, they would probably admit that it has been the shortcomings which were left out or under-emphasised. In the generous catalogue of the good officer's strong points they appear out of place, and when recorded of the mediocre they must in all charitableness be written down.

The first thing to do, if we are to produce any constructive proposals to improve the standard of confidential reports, is to try to diagnose this fell paralysis which strikes the commanding officer's pen when he sits down with the year's confidential report forms on the table before him. His feelings can perhaps be summarised as follows. He is perfectly prepared, at the time of the offence, to deal with any officer guilty of inefficiency, idleness or indiscipline; but it is quite another matter to sit down in cold blood and record in writing matters which have been forgiven and forgotten by both sides. Such a procedure not only seems unfair, but may even provoke a request to interview the brigade commander, or worse still, an appeal to the Army Council. The fact that he knows that confidential reports are kept for permanent record probably increase his reluctance.

A further deterrent to absolute candour, which certainly existed before the war was that, even though the individual accepted his report without protest, higher authority, presumably in the interests of the officer, was in the habit of coming back for elucidation of any remark which could in any way be construed as adverse. On balance therefore, the commanding officer decided to be non-committal, provoking neither the reproachful looks of his subordinates nor the unwelcome curiosity of his superiors. It was the writer's fortune to be a brigade major in 1934, when the special reports were called for that formed the basis on which officers were either retained in the army, or transferred to the Special Unemployed List. These reports were written no more than two or three months after the routine annual reports, and it was therefore inevitable

that any discrepancies between the two should attract attention. There were in fact considerable discrepancies and it was the writer's conviction that the special report gave a much fairer indication of an officer's worth. In one battalion the difference was actually so marked as to be almost laughable; the annual reports had been formal and uninspired, the special reports were full, illuminating and eminently fair.

It is relevant therefore to examine the particular conditions that governed the rendering of the special reports, and to see if they are in any way related to the factors which have been postulated as responsible for the commanding officer's attitude towards this annual duty. These conditions were that the report was to be used solely for the information of the selection board responsible for the preparation of the final lists, and would thereafter be destroyed; that the report was not shown to the officer concerned; and that a special form was used in which a large number of specific questions had to be answered. Apart from these particular differences, which will be seen to have a distinct bearing on what has been said above, commanding officers undoubtedly felt that the formidable restrictions hedging the preparation of annual reports would largely be waived, and that they would not have their opinions referred back to them for further elucidation of any critical remarks they had seen fit to make.

* * * * *

It is the object of this article to suggest how commanding officers can be persuaded, by fair means or foul, to present a more accurate picture of their subordinates in their confidential reports; and such references as are made to what goes on in the Military Secretary's Branch when the reports are received are confined to matters which have a direct bearing on this object. The confidential report is required for two purposes, which though they may be very closely allied are nevertheless quite separate. It may be used as a guide in selecting the most suitable officer to fill an appointment, and in this role its use is informatory; and it may be used to decide whether an officer is fit for promotion, or whether his service career should be terminated, in which case it is the basis of executive action.

The essential attributes of a confidential report are that it must be impartial, comprehensive, up to date, and must provide its information in a readily intelligible form. The most recent report on any individual should fulfil the last two demands, but will be much less satisfactory on the first two. As regards comprehensiveness, it will seldom happen that even in the course of a complete year a commanding officer can speak with authority on all the attributes of all the officers on whom he has to report; and a report by one person on another can never be truly impartial, for the simple fact that it must be coloured by the personal relations existing between the two. The complete dossier of reports on an individual from the day he enters the service should be good for comprehensiveness and impartiality, but can hardly be said to be in a readily intelligible form, since a careful analysis will be necessary to resolve the differences of opinion that must inevitably exist.

One is forced to the conclusion, therefore, that the Military Secretary should maintain (and for all the writer knows to the contrary he may well do so) what may be termed a secondary report, compiled by his own staff, and representing the distilled essence of the primary reports submitted annually. It should be sufficient if this secondary report was rewritten every fourth year, or whenever an officer was approaching a milestone in his career. If in the year

before the secondary report fell due, a preliminary review was made, it should be possible to single out certain attributes which had to date been inadequately covered; and if these points were sent by the Military Secretary direct to reporting officers, with the request that they should receive particular attention, a bond of purpose would be created between two of the three parties most concerned in the standard of reporting.

The third party is, of course, the officer reported on. If the primary report was used only as the basis of the secondary report compiled by the Military Secretary, then as each secondary report was completed the connected primaries could be destroyed. It is suggested that the knowledge that their work would not remain on record for all time would be a factor that would encourage initiating officers to write more freely.

The next point for consideration is the form of the report. It can be said at once that it should be in two parts, corresponding to the informatory and executive requirements that have been discussed above. To deal with the latter first, the prime essential is that the recommendation as to fitness or otherwise for promotion should be definite, and unqualified by such saving clauses as "in due course". The recommendation should not therefore be called for until two years before promotion, when there should be no room for doubt in the matter. A possible refinement is the insertion of a warning clause, for use one year before the ordinary recommendation falls due, if the officer's prospects are such that he is heading for trouble. The report might then read as follows:—

1. If this officer is due for promotion to———
before 31st March 19 (two years ahead) then complete either A or B:—
 - A. I consider him in every way fit for promotion to the rank of ———(No qualification whatsoever may be made to this recommendation).
 - B. I do NOT consider him fit for promotion because (here indicate, very briefly, your reasons).
2. If this officer is due for promotion to———before 31st March 19 (three years ahead), and if you foresee that in his next report when called upon to answer question 1 above there is a probability that you will NOT be able to recommend him for promotion, you may at your discretion complete the following:—
 - C. Unless during the next twelve months this officer shows material improvement in (here indicate his shortcomings) I doubt whether he can be recommended as fit for promotion.

It is contended that once this essential recommendation has been clarified, there is room for very much increased candour in the other part of the report. If the recommendation (Part II) is adverse then Part I will naturally reflect that opinion; if the recommendation is favourable, or does not fall due to be completed, then Part I can be read as fair comment on the officer's shortcomings (and who is free of them?) but not amounting to an expression of opinion debarring him from further advancement.

It remains to deal with the officer, usually in the early years of his service who, for such causes as gross inefficiency or debt, which do not fall to be dealt with by court-martial, must be called on to resign his commission. Such proceedings come more into the field of discipline, and should be kept entirely separate from the annual confidential report. His shortcomings may, depending

upon their nature, call for comment in his confidential report, but when his commanding officer considers that matters have reached the stage where the officer is no longer fit for retention, the form of report and the procedure to be followed should be designed for the special purpose they have to serve.

Opinions as to the best layout for Part I vary enormously, ranging from the blank space, in which the author is invited to record his general impressions, to the elaborate list of questions against which the reporting officer places a cross in the appropriate square to indicate "good," "average," or "bad." A further refinement allows for three sub-divisions of each category. As can be imagined the former does not produce very satisfactory results, and reports tend to be vague, banal, and far from comprehensive. The extent to which the report should go to the other extreme is dependent largely upon the method adopted in the Military Secretary's office for classifying and recording the information.

It is said that the tracing of a girl's profile, regarded as a wave form and analysed into the sum of a number of sine curves, can then be expressed as a mathematical equation. Whatever may be said for the scientific accuracy of this method, it is fairly certain that most lonely soldiers still prefer the more conventional pin-up girl. In other words, a rigidly categorised assessment of an officer's characteristics and aptitudes must still be supplemented by a word picture that conveys some idea of what he is like as a human being.

Appointments in the army fall into three main categories, command, staff and instructional; and, since one of the main objects of the confidential report is to direct the selection of officers to the best advantage, both of themselves and of the service, it would be logical to sub-divide the first part of the report under these three headings. Under each would be grouped the characteristics contributing to success in that particular field and against them the appropriate gradings would have to be entered; the picture being completed by a brief summary of the officer's suitability for that sort of employment. There would still remain certain characteristics of a general nature affecting an officer's performance in any walk of life, and these should be dealt with in a general section.

Prominent among such characteristics are two, intelligence and industry, which were used by the German Army in classifying its officers. The clever and industrious were regarded as pearls of great price, and were taken for appointments on the great General Staff. The clever and idle made good commanders in the senior ranks. Even the stupid and idle were not without value as junior commanders; but the stupid and industrious were regarded as a serious danger, to be kept at all costs from posts of any importance.

For some reason we regard an accusation of idleness almost as damaging as a charge of moral turpitude or intemperance. But idleness is a quality which should influence a number of postings, and it is time that we revised our attitude towards a very human weakness, of which all except a very few are guilty in a greater or lesser degree. As an example, an "idle" brigade commander should certainly not be given an idle brigade-major, and the reverse is probably just as true. Again, the standard of intelligence varies enormously, so why not acknowledge the fact and make use of it? It is generally true that the less intelligent officers should be posted to appointments where their work is defined for them, and where they are not required to initiate action and direct the activities of others.

Before leaving the form of the report, a most essential item is provision for an expression of opinion on the intrinsic accuracy of each report, to be recorded

by the reporting officer immediately superior to him who initiates it. At the time of the Special Unemployed List reports commanding officers, though probably few of them knew it, were graded as to the leniency or otherwise of their standards. It was a wise precaution: for one, who was one of the most kind-hearted of men, obviously could not bring himself to be a party to the arbitrary termination of the military career of any of his officers. In consequence, all his geese were swans. An indication of an initiating officer's general tendency does not, however, provide for individual cases, since while the general run of reports may be unexceptionable, two or three may be biased, one way or the other, by personal likes and dislikes. The brigade commander, or officer at equivalent level should therefore be required to amplify his traditional "I concur" by recording his opinion, in an appropriate square, as to whether the report is too favourable, fair, or too severe.

Finally comes the question as to whether the officer should, or should not, be shown his report. There is very little doubt that, if the rule by which every officer must initial his report in token of having seen it were waived, commanding officers would feel encouraged to report very much more freely. Such an improvement is so desirable that it is worth examining very critically the justification for the rule, particularly as it is not enforced in either the navy or the air force. Primarily, it is designed to protect the officer from the prejudiced and even unscrupulous superior who, secure in the knowledge that his victim is in no position to challenge his report, might be tempted to perpetrate remarks for which there is little or no justification. A secondary reason is that it is important that every officer should periodically be told what his good and bad points are.

It is just as necessary to bring the man who is over-pleased with himself down to earth, as it is to encourage the over-sensitive, who may be brooding under the impression that some peccadillo has wrecked his military career for ever. The point is: can these two ends be satisfied otherwise than by actually showing the officer his report? If the initiating officer was required to certify that the substance of his report had been communicated verbally to the officer reported on, the latter of the two objects would be achieved; and the former, the protection of the interests of the officer, would be secured except against the unscrupulous superior who made a too liberal interpretation of the word "substance." It would, however, be very easy to include certain additional safeguards.

The first should be that any report culminating in an adverse recommendation for promotion must be seen and initialed by the officer reported on. The second that when a report revealed really serious shortcomings in conduct or qualifications, the brigade commander should satisfy himself by personal interview that the officer had been properly acquainted with the terms of the report, with power at his discretion to order that it should be shown to him. It should also be open to any officer to appeal to his brigade commander for permission to see his report if he felt that the version communicated to him verbally indicated any injustice. It would be for the brigade commander, after a personal interview, to grant or refuse the request.

* * * * *

To sum up. It has been contended that what restricts the commanding officer's freedom of expression is his reluctance to place on permanent record opinions which he fears may have a lasting and adverse affect on an officer's

career. A reluctance which is intensified by the possibility that either the officer, or superior authority, may challenge his remarks because they too are unnecessarily apprehensive as to the significance that will be attached to them. The remedies that are proposed attempt to make a distinction between what is categorically adverse, with a direct bearing on an officer's career, and what should be a free and unfettered expression of opinion; to remove the uneasy feeling that an unfavourable remark may remain on record throughout an officer's service; and to reduce the possibility of reports being queried, subject to the necessary safeguards that will allow an officer to challenge what may vitally affect his future. In addition, the form of the report should be such that it will compel answers to certain key questions, which will be arranged so as to simplify the use of the report for selection purposes by the Military Secretary.

What may or may not be said or done in the rendering of confidential reports is after all, very much a question of what we are used to; and if the adoption of the proposed reforms led to an era of greater candour, everyone would very soon accept such candour as perfectly normal and cease to worry about it. There is one last point. This paper envisages both the initiating officer and his immediate superior adopting a far more personal approach when dealing with their subordinates on matters affecting confidential reports. It is an attitude which should be encouraged, for this report is the most human document the army handles, and deserves something better than the impersonal treatment it received before the war.

THE UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

To

Date.....

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GENERAL MACARTHUR

LIEUT.-COLONEL RAJENDRA SINGH.

MACARTHUR'S name has become a legend. His military achievements and administration of Japan have become classic. For those interested in military history and learning something about administration of an occupied country, it is a natural urge to meet a person who has moulded the course of historical events. The quality of hero worship is latent in all human beings and is to be exploited in the disciplining of any nation.

On 30th October 1947, when I was buying my air ticket at the N.W.A. (North West Airlines) office in the Maranuchi building, I was surprised when the receptionist, handing the telephone receiver to me, said: "For you Colonel Singh." To the usual "Hello" the person at the other side said, in a soft voice: "Colonel Bunker speaking. The General wants to see you tomorrow at 11 a.m."

My passage on the morrow was cancelled and a priority passage by Pan American arranged for the day after. That evening I spent making mental notes of the points about which I was keen to know the General's opinion and spending the last of my occupation dollars on the latest American film.

The offices of the Supreme Commander are located in the eight-storeyed Dai-Iche building on the Imperial Plaza overlooking the palace where Emperor Hirohito sleeps disillusioned, guarded by the sentries of the Allied powers. S.C.A.P. building dominates all those left standing in Tokyo like the personality of MacArthur which today has no equal in that part of the world. It may be just a chance or a coincidence that the General occupies a room on the top floor from where he looks down on the Imperial Palace and can see the "Old Glory" floating in the air over the American Embassy where he lives.

I had been to S.C.A.P. many times on official business on behalf of General Robertson but this time, when I met the guide at the entrance, I was a little nervous. The expectancy of a meeting with a great personality created a mental fervour which lasted till I walked into the office of the A.D.C.

Colonel Bunker has a very charming personality, the appearance of Charles Boyer and the disarming smile of Maurice Chevalier. He has the tact and manners of a well-groomed lawyer and a lawyer he was by profession, till called up for service and selected by the General as his aide. Bunker got his degree from Oxford and this background has helped him a great deal in dealing with the British and other political and military leaders. He is a perfect A.D.C.

As the General was busy with his Chief of Staff I had a few minutes with Colonel Bunker, who knows India fairly well, having been there during the war. He, like most of the Americans I met in Japan, was very interested in the communal upheaval in the Punjab and the future foreign policy of free India. From the Americans I wanted to know the reasons behind the virulent criticism of India in the American Press. Colonel Bunker provided an answer when he said: "We expect better behaviour from a civilised country and cannot criticise one about whom we know nothing."

The bell rang and I heard the General saying: "Tell Colonel Singh I shall not be ten minutes. Buyer has taken longer than I expected." I was expecting to be ushered in in the correct military fashion but before I could enter the room and salute, the General came forward, gave me a pat on the back and in the act almost embraced me. He shook me by the hand and placing me on a low sofa pulled a straight chair from the corner and sat down saying: "Well, it is just luck that I caught you before you slipped away. Colonel Bunker saw the write up in the *Stars and Stripes*." That provided the clue.

I was expecting to meet a medium-sized, well-built, greying General but to my utter astonishment he was tall, proportionate and looked more like General Clarke than the MacArthur of *Life*. He looked exceptionally young.

Just as I had gathered my thoughts to "shoot" my queries the General leant forward and said: "Please tell your troops how proud I am of having commanded them in Japan. They have won great fame on the battlefields and here they have won the heart of the Japanese people." That reminded me of the time when the Indian troops were moving to Japan and it was feared that they would not be able to stand the cold or hit it off well with the Japanese. Those fears were groundless. Wherever the Indian troops have been they have endeared themselves to the people. By their soldierly qualities, inherent politeness and generosity, they always steal a march over others. In Japan they had arrived as conquerors but showed no arrogance. The Japanese appreciated this gesture and if the popularity of a force is to be judged by the number of applications for matrimony, the Indians left quite a large number of broken hearts behind! These friendships were a token of understanding that had arisen between the masses of the two nations on which a lasting friendship can be built, and was not, as some critics may like to point out, due to exploitation of the economic situation which is slowly strangling the Japanese nation.

"The Indian troops have left the best record," said the General. Without going into details we can proudly state that no Indian soldier committed any serious crime against the Japanese and the percentage of V.D., which is a barometer of self-control and military discipline, was the lowest as compared with other contingents, and as low as in India itself.

The Japanese masses, inbred with propaganda, showed some apprehension in the beginning but it did not take long for reality to be known. Soon the Japanese welcomed the Indians as their own. On 15th August 1947, the population celebrated Independence Day and were genuinely happy. In India, they see their future hopes and in the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, their salvation. Non-violence *en masse* will be practised by the Japanese nation if the necessity arises. When the time arrived to depart, they came in thousands, some crying, others bowing in affection and wished us: "*Soya Nara*."

"You would be surprised to know that I have received many letters from the Japanese people and officials to retain Indian troops in Japan. I tried my best but your Government had made up its mind otherwise."

"India needs them badly," I said.

"I appreciate this but it would have been a greater asset in the long run if a token Indian force was retained in Japan. India is an Asiatic country and being directly concerned, must play her part. It is now too late to change the decision but now tell me if you have benefited by your stay in Japan."

The answer could not but be in the affirmative. During the short stay of the Indian Contingent in Japan the troops had learnt to work with those of other nationalities and it is surprising how well they got on despite language difficulties. Nothing is better than personal experience of persons and places. For a soldier to know and learn the attributes of comrades from other countries is a lesson in itself. The troops developed a wider outlook and a willingness to learn things which they could take back to their own country.

"The troops were very keen to meet you. I wish you could visit the Contingent once."

"I have left that to General Eichelberger. I am now the political head though I am sorry to miss the command of troops." Colonel Bunker told me that the General had left Tokyo only once since he landed in Japan. He makes rare appearances on military occasions and leads a busy life fighting with files in the Dai-Iche.

The General keeps an extraordinary routine. He arrives at his office at about 11 a.m., has a late lunch, returns at about 4 p.m. and stays until late at night except when he has to attend official dinners for V.I.Ps (very important persons). "This routine is to suit conditions," said Colonel Bunker. "The papers from the Chief of Staff do not start coming in till 11 a.m. and the General never leaves till his tray is empty."

I had a quick glance round the room to look at the various things with which the General surrounds himself. They were all simple. I was looking at the pictures on the wall to determine his aesthetic tastes, when the General said: "I know you do not smoke. The Sikhs don't. I have been to the Punjab and once I trekked the Kipling road from Delhi to the Khyber. I had a Punjabi orderly, the best I ever had. He was full of stories."

The General has visited India twice. The first time during Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty and the second when Kitchener was Commander-in-Chief. On the first occasion, when he submitted a military report on India, he nearly got the "sack." "I got back that report from the military archives the other day and everything has happened as I had appreciated except one—I never dreamt that India would be divided. It is one by nature. The division is highly dangerous and the position of both countries will become indefensible unless they have combined defence. Some people have vague ideas about military strategy. Geography still plays a very important part. I am sure you know something about your history. What has been the basic reason for the defeat of India whenever it was invaded from outside?"

"I should say the pacifist attitude and peaceful intentions of the people."

"I quite agree. Too much idealism has been the cause of an unrealistic foreign policy which has been the contributory cause of defeat. I was referring to the geographical factors."

I listened attentively.

"The strength and weakness of India lies in its geography. It is like a fort. Once the bastion is broken and the enemy gains a foothold you are defeated from within. Whenever the enemy has succeeded in making a firm base on the soil of India itself, India has always been defeated. Whenever the enemy was met at the doors, he has always been turned back."

As the General talked the pageant of Indian history passed through my mind. I saw the hordes of Alexander turning back after receiving a good knock from Porus. The invasions of the Huns and Mohamed Ghor and the conquest of India by the British, all illustrating that India's freedom will always be in jeopardy if any enemy exists within the natural barriers of the Himalayas and the sea. Pakistan and India to survive must have common defence and take full advantage of the Himalayan barrier.

The General likes India and has a very great regard for the Indian leaders. He expressed his belief that under their able guidance, India would become a great country.

It was past one o'clock when I invited the General to visit India for the third time and he agreed to do so soon after his work in Japan is finished.

TINNED MILK

A True Story

One day I sat by the cookhouse door
With my Subedar and his pals on the floor
Chatting and joking under a tree
While the company storeman plied us with tea.

The latter, a Jat, tall, lugubrious, thin,
Had just finished pouring out milk from a tin,
And I chaffed him, saying, I couldn't believe
(Knowing what storekeepers often achieve)
With a figure like his so sadly deficient
Of fat, that he could be really efficient!

As he sucked his teeth, he thus-wise replied,
"I don't stuff myself like the young boys outside.
"Besides, in our rations the things I miss most
"Are the ghi and the milk that my village can boast."

"But, surely, the things you are getting," I cried
"Are the very best food that the world can provide.
"The flour for your bread; the ghi its cooked in;
"And the milk you've just poured out of that tin?"

"Kckluck(*)!" he replied, "I don't want to seem rude,
"But I never drink that 'LAKRI KA DUDH!' "

W. L. A.

*The chick with the side of the tongue made by the typical Jat country man.

INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA

LIEUTENANT E.J. MARTIN*

NUMEROUS works and articles, both official and otherwise, have appeared dealing with badges of the Indian Army, but as far as I know, no record has been published of the insignia worn by the Indian States Forces. The following is a list of the badges worn at present by the Forces of the different States, together with a few notes on some badges now obsolete. In a number of cases the name of the State without addition is worn on the shoulder, but I have not thought it necessary to mention these. The usual format for the brass shoulder-title is a shallow curve, the ends being higher than the middle. The metal shoulder-title is however now obsolescent, a woven title of "slip-on" type taking its place almost universally.

Alwar. The badge of the Alwar State Forces is a brass coat of arms of European type, the overall dimensions being 1 in. by 1 in. The escutcheon is circular, and bears the device of a tower within an ornamental border. The supporters are animals, the dexter (that on the left of the observer) being horned, the sinister (to the observer's right) having no horns. Behind the escutcheon is a pair of flags, in saltire (*i.e.* crossed diagonally), and above these flags is the ceremonial head-dress of His Highness the Maharaja. Below the coat of arms is a scroll bearing an inscription. (Plate I and IV).

At one time the name of the State alone was worn as a shoulder-title in white metal by the lancers, and in brass by the infantry. In the Royal United Service Museum, London, there was at one time a specimen of the shoulder-title in white-metal, bearing in three lines, the designation: "Alwar/Mangal/Lancers".

Buttons of various types are in use. The Alwar Mangal Lancers wear a brass button inscribed round the edge with the name of the regiment. In the centre is the head-dress described as being worn above the coat of arms. A small button of white metal is used by the Alwar Partab Paltan. This also bears the name of the unit round the edge, but the device is the coat of arms as for the badge. The Imperial Service Lancers formerly wore a button bearing two *katars* crossed, points downwards, behind which appears an object which is perhaps a ceremonial umbrella. A brass button bearing the coat of arms and the word "Alwar", or plain brass or white-metal buttons, are worn by other units.

Bahawalpur. Official information concerning the badges of the forces of this State unfortunately is not available. Officers apparently wear a representation of a bird as a badge on the head-dress. The Bahawalpur Mounted Rifles and Bahawalpur Camel Corps, which at one time formed part of the State Forces, wore shoulder-titles of cast brass, with the names of these units. The Camel Corps raised for Imperial Service bore these two words in addition. (Plate III).

Benares. The 1st. Benares (Prabu Narain's Own) Battalion wears a brass shoulder-title: "1/Benares." The buttons, also of brass, bear a device consisting of two fishes surrounding a globe, with a trident. Round the edge is the inscription: "1st. Benares (P.N.O.) Infantry." (Plates III and IV).

*A letter from the author appears under "Correspondence." *Editor, U.S.I. Journal.*

Bharatpur. The cap-badge of the Bharatpur Jaswant Household Infantry is in brass, and consists of crossed rifles, below which is a scroll worded "Bharatpur State." Superimposed upon the upper half of the rifles is a horse's head above another scroll bearing the initials "J.H.I." The present shoulder-title, also cast in brass, is of ornamental design, and bears in three lines the inscription: "J.H./Infantry/Bharatpur." Formerly the name of the State alone was worn. The buttons bear a monogram of the three letters "J.H.I." (Plates I, III and IV).

Bhavnagar. The coat of arms of Bhavnagar State is an eagle displayed. In the dexter canton is a lion, statant guardant. Above the escutcheon is a helmet of European pattern, the crest being a sailing-vessel. The supporters are horned animals. This coat of arms, superimposed upon a pair of crossed lances, and with the word "Bhavnagar" below, is used as a badge by the Bhavnagar Lancers. Another type of badge consists of the coat of arms alone, beneath which is a scroll worded "Bhavnagar State Lancers." A badge of identical format, but with one word of the inscription changed, is used by the Bhavnagar State Infantry. The shoulder-title for the latter unit is the letters "B.S.I." $\frac{5}{8}$ -in. high. Buttons bear the coat of arms, those of the larger size only having in addition the words "Bhavnagar State Forces" round the edge. Another type of button bears the eagle only, superimposed upon crossed rifles. Above is a small representation of a field gun, and below, the name of the State. (Plates I, III and IV).

Bhopal. A unit formerly raised in this State was the Bhopal Victoria Lancers. Its badge consisted of crossed lances, with the letters "C.I." at the point of intersection. The unit's designation appeared on three scrolls below these initials, above which was the Imperial crown. The design of this crown was changed slightly after the accession of King Edward VII in 1902. (Plate I).

Bikaner. The cap-badge worn by all units of the Bikaner Army is of cast metal, black finished and is a representation of the State's coat of arms, barry of seven (*i.e.* divided into seven equal horizontal strips), three small birds being superimposed upon the bars, two above, one below; a helmet of European pattern with mantling, appears above the shield, and the crest is a tree. Tigers are used as supporters. The universal button also bears this coat of arms. Officers of the Ganga Risala (Camel Corps) wear silver camels as collar-badges. Similar badges in brass were worn by other ranks. (Plates I, II and IV).

Chamba. The coat of arms of Chamba State is worn as a cap-badge and appears on the buttons of the State Forces. In the centre of the shield is a square enclosing a bird—perhaps an eagle. Above the shield is a helmet, the crest being the sun in splendour. On either side of the helmet, and below the shield, appears ornamental scrollwork, but there is no motto or other inscription. (Plates I and IV).

Faridkot. All units of the Faridkot State Forces (with the exception of the Sappers and Miners) wear the name of the State in brass upon the shoulder. The units are differentiated by strips of coloured cloth or ribbon behind these titles, as follows:—

H. Q. State Forces	..	} Ribbon, half gold, half green.
His Highness's Bodyguard	..	
Infantry	..	Red cloth
Garrison Company	..	} Green cloth.
State Band	..	

The Sappers and Miners use a title of the "slip-on" type, with the letters "S.M." above the name of the State, all woven in black. The Imperial Service

Sappers wore a brass title as above described, with the letters "I.S.S." added above. The universal button bears the coat of arms of the State, with its antelope supporters and demi-lion crest. Above the coat of arms are the words "Faridkot State." (Plate IV).

Gwalior. I have been unable to obtain any up-to-date information regarding the badges of the Forces of this State. At one time a cast badge was worn by the 3rd. Battalion Infantry, comprising the State's coat of arms with crest and supporters. Below was a scroll bearing the name of the State, and above this scroll, the figure "3". (Plate I).

Hyderabad. I have not been able to obtain official information concerning the badges of the Nizam's Forces. The following details were, in the main, gleaned from the Hyderabad State Forces contingent in the Victory Parade in London in 1946.

The 1st. Nizam's Own Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers wear a badge with the numeral "I" superimposed upon a pair of crossed lances. Upon two scrolls at the bottom is the designation "Hyderabad I. S. Lancers."

The button worn by the Nizam's Horse Artillery bears a field-gun in the centre. Above are the words "H. H. Nizams" and below, "Artillery."

A badge used by the 1st. Battalion Hyderabad Infantry is circular and of brass. Around the edge are the words "H. H. The Nizam's Infantry," and in the centre, a crescent with the figure "1" above. Surmounting the circle is a five-pointed star. Two of the few metal shoulder-titles still in use are worn by the 1st. and 2nd. Battalions Hyderabad Infantry. They bear the initials "H.I.", preceded by the appropriate numeral, in one straight line. The button of the 1st Infantry bears the inscription (in three lines) "1st Regt./H. H./Nizam" above which is an Arabic numeral "1." That of the 3rd. Regiment bears a double circle surrounded by a laurel wreath, and bearing the title "H. H. The Nizam's Regt. Infantry." Within the circle is the numeral "3", and above, the head-dress of H. H. The Nizam. (Plates I and IV).

Idar. The *pagri* badge of Idar Sir Pratap Infantry is particularly imposing, measuring $2\frac{1}{4}$ -in. high by $1\frac{3}{4}$ -in. extreme width. The device is a hawk (*cheel*) facing to the dexter side within a wreath of laurel. Above, the name of the State appears upon a tablet, above which again is the rising sun. Upon a scroll at the base of the badge are the words "Sir Pratap Infantry." A similar device is borne upon the buttons. A brass shoulder-title was in use bearing the letters "I.S.P.I." (Plates I and IV).

Indore. The arms of the State consist of a *khanda* (broad-sword) and lance, in saltire over a field of poppy and wheat, between a sacred bull (*nandi*) and a horse, both rampant. Above, as a crest, is the sun in splendour beneath a *chhatra* (royal umbrella). A reproduction of these arms is worn above a scroll worded "Maharajah Holkar" on both cap and collar. (Plate I).

Jaipur. Rajendra Hazari Guards. The badge, in brass, is an eagle, which is also worn as the device upon the buttons.

Jaipur Guards. The sun in splendour is depicted in formalised fashion as an eight-pointed star. The badge is bronze-finished, the buttons brass.

Kachhawa Horse. The badge an elongated eight-pointed star, is worn in white-metal. In the centre is a horse's head behind which may be seen a rank of other horses. Surrounding the central device is a gilt band bearing an inscription. A similar star is worn upon the buttons, which also bear the name of the unit.

1st Jaipur Infantry. The badge is of white-metal. Within the arms of a crescent is the numeral "1", behind which are flames. Below, on a scroll, "Jaipur Infantry." Three types of button are now, or have been, used. The first bears an eight-pointed star with a device in the centre, and above and below are the words "Jaipur Infantry." In the smaller sized button the star is replaced by the numeral "1." The third pattern button bears a portcullis, without other device or inscription.

2nd. Jaipur Infantry. The badge is silver, and consists of an elephant's head, affronté, within an ornamental circular border. Below are two *katars* points uppermost, and a scroll with the name of the State. Between the *katars* and the scroll is the numeral "2". The buttons bear the portcullis, as for the 1st. Infantry.

Jaipur Transport Corps, or "Pony Company." The badge is a shield bearing a fortress upon a rock. Upon a chief, an inscription. Below the shield is a tripartite scroll worded "Jaipur Transport Corps," and above is a crown. The device upon the button is the sun in splendour, formalised into a star of twelve points. Below are the initials: "J.S.T.C."

All these badges are of Indian manufacture. Specimens of a collar-badge, of English make, the design of which is a fortress upon a rock, above which is a rising sun; and below a scroll bearing the word "Jaipur" are found, but I have not been able to confirm that these are used by the Jaipur Forces. Plates II and IV).

Jodhpur. I have been unable to obtain any information from the State concerning the badges of its Forces, but I believe that a shoulder-title oval in shape, and bearing the words "Jodhpur Lancers" is worn by the Jodhpur Sardar Rissala, and one curved up at both ends, and inscribed "Jodhpur Infantry" by the Jodhpur Sardar Infantry. All ranks of the Sardar Rissala wore, on the right upper arm of the white *kurta* (blouse) a brass eagle, with a scroll below bearing the word "Marwar". This badge was about 2½ inches in height. (Plates II and III).

Junagadh. The badge of the Junagadh Lancers is crossed lances, with the monogram "S. L." at the point of intersection. Above is a star and crescent, below upon a scroll, the name of the State. The same design appears upon the buttons. (Plates I and IV)

Kashmir. No information has been forthcoming regarding the State Forces of Jammu and Kashmir. The following shoulder-titles, however, have been, or are now, worn by different units:—

"Kashmir Lancers" in two lines in the form of an oval.

"1/J.&K." and "3/J.&K." (in two lines) and "2.J.&K." (in one line) by infantry units.

"1/K.M.B." and "2/K.M.B." (in two lines) by mountain batteries. (Plate III).

Khairpur. A Camel Transport Unit at one time existed in this State, the Mounted Rifle escort to which bore the letter "M. R." above the name of the State in brass upon the shoulder. (Plate III).

Kotah. A silver badge in the form of a coat of arms is worn by the Kotah State Forces. The supporters are dragons, the crest a Hindu deity, and an inscription appears upon a scroll below. (Plate I).

Malerkotla. Details of the badges of Malerkotla State Forces have not been forthcoming from the State itself. I believe, however, that the Malerkotla Lancers wore a badge consisting simply of crossed lances with the name of the unit upon two tablets superimposed upon the lances. The Malerkotla I. S.

Sappers bore this designation upon the shoulders in the form of an oval title. The button worn by the State Forces bears the coat of arms of the State with antelope supporters and a five-pointed star as a crest. The words "Malerkotla State" appear above. The collar-badge of the Sappers and Miners is a brass grenade. (Plates I, III and IV).

Mewar. Mewar Lancers. The device upon the buttons is a sun in splendour (with nine rays) upon crossed lances. The name of the unit upon a scroll below. The shoulder-title is of the "slip-on" variety, and bears the name of the unit in two lines.

Mewar Bhupal Infantry. The buttons bear crossed *katars*, a sun in splendour (eight rays) above. Below upon a scroll, "Bhupal Infantry." The shoulder-title is of brass, and comprises the sun in splendour (nine rays) above the words "Bhupal Infantry."

Mewar Sajjan Infantry. The buttons have crossed knives above the sun in splendour (ten rays) and below upon a scroll "Sajjan Infantry." The shoulder-title is of cast brass bearing the letters "M.S.L." above which is the sun in splendour (ten rays) (Plates III and IV).

Mudhol. The shoulder-title of the Mudhol Sujjan Sinha Infantry bears the designation in full—the name of the State being in the centre, and supporting the rising sun. The remainder of the unit's designation is in the form of a half-circle. (Plate III).

Mysore. The badge of Mysore is a double-headed eagle, and this is worn by some units in white metal without addition. Printed in gold upon a two-inch red square, it is used also as a formation sign.

The Mysore Lancers wear the eagle in brass, superimposed upon crossed lances, and with the name of the regiment upon a scroll at the foot. A similar badge was formerly worn by the Imperial Service Lancers with the script letters "I. S. L." added upon the breast of the eagle. The button is of white-metal, and within a circle inscribed "Mysore Lancers" bears the eagle upon crossed lances with a crown above. The name of the regiment was formerly worn as a brass shoulder-title.

The 1st. Battalion Mysore Infantry wears as a badge a laurel wreath enclosing a garter bearing the words "Mysore Infantry" within which is the numeral "1." Above is the double-headed eagle. This, together with the other infantry battalions, wears a brass button, the device upon which is a circle inscribed "Mysore Infantry" enclosing the eagle. Brass shoulder-titles were formerly worn with the numeral "I", "II or III" above the name of the State. (Plates II, III and IV).

Nabha. The badge of the Nabha Akal Infantry is a *chakr* upon which is superimposed a double-bladed *kirpan*. Below are two single-bladed *kirpans* crossed, and below these again is a scroll bearing the name of the Regiment.

Palanpur. The shoulder-title worn by the Palanpur Iqbal Infantry bears the name of the State, curved up at each end, within the curve being the script letters "I. I." The buttons are of white-metal, and bear a coat of arms with crest and supporters, between the words "Palanpur State." (Plates III and IV).

Patiala. 1st.(Rajindra) Lancers. The badge is of white-metal, and consists of crossed lances with the figure "I" at the point of intersection. Above the "I" is a crown, and below upon a scroll the word "Rajindra." The shoulder-

title, in brass, is the word "Rajindra." Formerly titles were worn in which the words "Patiala" (curved downwards at ends), "Rajindra" (straight) and "Lancers" (curved up at ends) were superimposed upon crossed lances. The buttons bear crossed lances with a crown above. Below the lances is the numeral "1," and below this again, a scroll bearing the word "Rajindra."

2nd. Lancers. The shoulder-title is of brass, and reads "2.P.L." in characters $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. high. The former title bore the words "Patiala Lancers" as described above for 1st. Lancers, superimposed upon crossed lances. Above "Patiala" was the figure "2". The buttons bear crossed lances, with an Arabic figure "2" above; the name of the State appears on a scroll below.

1st. Infantry, Rajindra Sikhs. The *pagri* badge is the *chakr* either in white-metal enclosing the letters "R. S." in monogram form, or in black iron—incidentally the sole example of an iron badge known to the writer. A photograph of the Colonel of this Regiment taken during the war of 1914-1918, shows him wearing the *chakr* with the inscription within, in three lines "1. P./Rajindra/Sikhs". The shoulder-title is the numeral "1" above the name of the State, and is worn upon a crimson cloth patch (*takki anabi*). The buttons bear the monogram "R. S." enclosed in the *chakr*, superimposed on the upper part of which is a Royal crown. The name of the State appears upon the lower part of the *chakr*.

2nd. Yadavindra Infantry. The *chakr* is worn by this unit also. The white metal variety encloses a monogram composed of the letter "Y" and the figure "2" with a gilt crown mounted upon the upper rim. The black *chakr*, in this case of brass, black-finished, is engraved on the upper side with a crown, and below with the word "Yadavindra." A shoulder-title of standard type, i.e. with the figure "2" above the name of the State, was formerly worn, but the present pattern bears the figure "2" above "Yadavindra". This is worn upon a scarlet patch (*takki*). The buttons bear the monogram "2. Y" above a scroll with the word "Patiala". An earlier form of button bore the words "Patiala State" upon a garter enclosing the numeral "2".

3rd. Infantry. The shoulder-title is the name of the State, above which is the numeral "3". The two parts of the title are joined by ornamental scroll-work. The buttons are of similar design to those of the 1st. Infantry, but within the *chakr* are the figure and letter "3. P." intertwined.

4th. Infantry. The shoulder-title is of similar format to that of the 3rd. Infantry, and is worn upon a *takki*, divided horizontally into two equal parts, the upper being grey, and the lower crimson. The buttons bear the figure "4" within a garter inscribed "Patiala State".

Transport Company. The *pagri*-badge is the *chakr*, worn in brass, $1\frac{1}{8}$ -in. diameter, and enclosing the letters "M.T." or "A.T." for Motor Transport or Animal Transport. The shoulder-title is of the "slip-on" variety, and is woven with the letters "B.T.C.". Buttons bear the words "Patiala Transport" on a ring enclosing an ornamental flower of twelve petals. Those worn by the Motor Transport bear the letters "M. T." enclosed within a *chakr* inscribed with the name of the State. A fringe (*palla silki*) is worn at the side of the *pagri*. This is of drab silk with a 1-in. wide orange band.

Wireless Section. The shoulder-title bears the letter "W" above the name of the State, and is either of brass, or of the woven "slip-on" pattern.

Horse Artillery, Fort Guard. The shoulder-title, of the "slip-on" pattern, bears the initials "P. H. A." The design of the buttons is based upon that used by the Royal Artillery, and comprises a field-gun surmounted by a crown. Below the gun is the name of the State.

Mountain Battery. The "slip-on" title bears the abbreviation "M.T.N." above the name of the State. At the time of writing, no design has been approved for the buttons. (Plates II, III and IV).

Rampur. Rohilla Lancers. The cap-badge is of white metal, and bears the Imperial crown above crossed lances. A scroll below is inscribed "Rampur Rohilla Lancers".

1st. (Raza) Infantry. The cap-badge is of brass, and consists of two fishes, back to back, and standing upon their tails. Above is a crown, and below a scroll inscribed "1st. Rampur Infantry". As a background to this is worn a red-metal circle, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ -in. diameter.

2nd. (Murtaza) Infantry. The badge, also in brass, is a coat of arms, in which an escutcheon is supported by two tigers, each holding a lance with a pennon. Above the crest, and at the foot of the coat of arms, are plain scrolls. A shoulder-title was at one time worn consisting of the initials "R. I." in script letters about $\frac{5}{8}$ -in. high, above the name of the State in quarter-inch capitals curved up at the ends. Above "R. I." was the numeral "2".

The Imperial Service Infantry wore the letters "I. S. I." in monogram form, above a scroll bearing the name of the State. (Plates I and III).

Sirmoor. The Sirmoor Sappers and Miners formerly wore a shoulder-title inscribed "Sirmoor Sappers" in two lines, in the form of an oval. A rosette appeared at either end.

Suket. The badge of the Suket State Forces is a coat of arms, as follows: Quarterly, 1st. and 4th.: two swords in saltire. 2nd.: the sun in splendour; 3rd.: the crescent moon. Supporters: lions rampant guardant. Crest: Arising from an Eastern crown, a horse rampant. Upon a scroll below appear the words: "Suket State, Punjab". (Plate I).

Tehri-Garhwal. The universal cap-badge is an eagle in white-metal. Shoulder-titles in brass are worn to denote different arms, e.g. "T.G.S.F.", "T.G.N.I.", "T.G.S.M." (Sappers and Miners). "T.G.G.C." (Garrison Company). (Plates I and III).

Travancore. The badge of the State—a conch—is worn by the Travancore State Forces. (Plate I).

Tripura. The badge worn in the head-dress by the 1st. Tripura (Bir Bikram) Manikya Rifles is of white-metal, and consists of two broad-swords in saltire, above a tripartite scroll bearing an inscription. The collar-badge is a white-metal crescent, arising from the centre of which are three points in gilt. (I am not sure whether these are the three prongs of a trident, which they resemble, or a stylised representation of a flower). The shoulder-title bears the name of the State above which is the numeral "1". (Plates I and III).

INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA

1. Alwar.
2. Bhavnagar State Lancers.
3. Bhavnagar State Lancers (shoulder).
4. Bhavnagar State Infantry.
5. Bharatpur Jaswant Household Infantry.
6. Bhopal Victoria Lancers (pre-1902).
7. Bhopal Victoria Lancers (since 1902).
8. Bikaner.
9. Chamba.
10. Gwalior 3rd. Infantry (obsolete).
11. Hyderabad 1st. I.S. Lancers. (shoulder).
12. Idar.
13. Indore.
14. Junagadh Lancers.
15. Kotah.
16. Malerkotla Lancers (shoulder).
17. Rampur Rohilla Lancers.
18. Rampur 1st. (Raza) Infantry.
19. Rampur 2nd. (Murtaza) Infantry.
20. Suket.
21. Tehri-Garhwal.
22. Travancore.
23. Tripura.
24. Tripura (collar).



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
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
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
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
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
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INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA

1. Mysore 1st Infantry.
2. Mysore
3. Mysore Lancers (shoulder).
4. Mysore I. S. Lancers (shoulder).
5. Jaipur Rajendra Hazari Guards.
6. Jaipur Guards.
7. Jaipur Kachhawa Horse.
8. Jaipur 1st. Infantry.
9. Jaipur 2nd. Infantry.
10. Jaipur Transport Corps.
11. Jodhpur Sardar Rissala (arm).
12. Patiala 1st. Infantry.
13. Patiala 1st. Infantry.
14. Patiala 2nd. Yadavindra Infantry.
15. Patiala 2nd. Yadavindra Infantry.
16. Patiala 1st. (Rajindra) Lancers.
17. Patiala Transport Company.
18. Patiala Transport Company.
19. Bikaner Ganga Rissala, (collar).

PLATE II (BADGES)

INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA

1. Benares 1st. (Prabhu Narain's Own) Battalion.
2. Bhavnagar State Infantry.
3. Bahawalpur Mounted Rifles (obsolete).
4. Bahawalpur I.S. Camel Corps (obsolete).
5. Bharatpur Jaswant Household Infantry.
6. Jodhpur Sardar Risala.
7. Jodhpur Sardar Infantry.
8. Khairpur Mounted Rifles (obsolete).
9. Kashmir 2nd. Mountain Battery.
10. Malerkotla I.S. Sappers.
11. Mewar Bhupal Infantry.
12. Mewar Sajjan Infantry.
13. Mudhol Sajjan Sinha Infantry.
14. Mysore 2nd. Infantry.
15. Palampur Iqbal Infantry.
16. Tripura 1st. (Bir Bikram) Rifles.
17. Patiala 1st. Lancers (obsolete).
18. Patiala 1st. Lancers (present pattern).
19. Patiala 2nd. Lancers (present pattern).
20. Patiala 2nd. Lancers (obsolete).
21. Patiala 1st. Infantry.
22. Patiala 2nd. Yadavindra Infantry.
23. Patiala 3rd. Infantry.
24. Rampur I.S. Infantry.
25. Rampur 2nd. Infantry (obsolete).
26. Patiala Wireless Section.
27. Tehri-Garhwal State Forces.
28. Tehri-Garhwal Native Infantry.
29. Tehri-Garhwal Sappers and Miners.
30. Tehri-Garhwal Garrison Company.

PLATE III (SHOULDER-TITLES)



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
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INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA—PLATE IV (BUTTONS)

INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA

1. Alwar Mangal Lancers.
2. Alwar I. S. Lancers.
3. Alwar Partab Paltan.
4. Benares 1st. (P.N.O.) Infantry.
5. Bharatpur Jaswant Household Infantry.
6. Bhavnagar.
7. Bhavnagar.
8. Bikaner.
9. Chamba.
10. Faridkot.
11. Hyderabad 1st. Infantry.
12. Hyderabad 3rd. Infantry.
13. Hyderabad Artillery.
14. Idar.
15. Jaipur Rajendra Hazari Guards.
16. Jaipur Guards.
17. Jaipur Kachhawa Horse.
18. Jaipur 1st. Infantry.
19. Jaipur 1st. Infantry.
20. Jaipur 1st. and 2nd. Infantry.
21. Jaipur Transport Corps.
22. Junagadh Lancers.
23. Malerkotla.
24. Mewar Lancers.
25. Mewar Bhupal Infantry.
26. Mewar Sajjan Infantry.
27. Mysore Lancers.
28. Mysore Lancers.
29. Mysore Infantry.
30. Palanpur.
31. Patiala 1st. Rajendra Lancers.
32. Patiala 2nd. Lancers.
33. Patiala Horse Artillery.
34. Patiala 1st. Infantry.
35. Patiala 2nd. Infantry (obsolete).
36. Patiala 2nd. Infantry (present pattern).
37. Patiala 3rd. Infantry.
38. Patiala 4th. Infantry.
39. Patiala Transport Company (M.T.)
40. Patiala Transport Company (A.T.)

PLATE IV (BUTTONS)

LE ROUGEOT

LIEUT.-COLONEL C.C.R. MURPHY

ON THE day before the battle of Quatre Bras, as a great mass of French troops was marching through the heat and dust towards Charleroi, two horsemen rode by on the flank of the column. An old soldier glancing up at one of them suddenly exclaimed: "There goes *le rougeot*!" Immediately there was a loud buzz of conversation, while some of the old hands, unable to restrain themselves, broke into a cheer. It was Marshal Ney.

Michel Ney, whom Napoleon hailed as *le brave des braves*, was the son of a cooper, and was born at Saarlouis early in 1769, the birth-year of Napoleon, Wellington, and other famous figures in history. Saarlouis is situated in the borderland of France and Germany that has for so long been a battlefield. It has often changed hands, belonging first to one and then the other. The house where he was born is still standing.* It is a small, two-storeyed building, with three dormer windows in the tiled roof. Three steps lead up to the door that opens on to the street. A horse-shoe is fixed above the lintel, and over it between two windows of the upper storey is a marble tablet with the inscription:—

Ici est né

Le Maréchal Ney

The tablet was placed there in 1815 after the cession of the town to Prussia.

Ney enlisted in 1788, that is to say, the year before the outbreak of the French Revolution, and joined a cavalry regiment that on being renumbered became the 4th Hussars.† On account of his reddish hair his comrades nicknamed him *le rougeot*. Ney began his fighting career under Dumouriez in the war with Austria, his first great battle being Valmy, after which he was promoted sub-lieutenant. During the wars in Belgium and the Rhineland, Ney was present at Jemappes and later at Tirlemont, Gossoncourt and Neerwinden. In 1793, when Napoleon first came on the scene, he was made a lieutenant. He was then in his twenty-fifth year, so that up to date his promotion had been slow. Many an officer in the British Army has been a colonel at that age.

In the following year under Kléber, he was present at Fleurus, Mons, Louvain, the sieges of Maestricht and Mayence (where he was wounded) and many lesser actions. He was now a marked man; henceforth his rise was rapid and within ten years he was a Marshal of France. In 1797 he commanded the right wing of Hoche's army, and at Giessen was taken prisoner. After Mannheim, where he won great fame, he fought in the Swiss campaign of Massena. In 1800, he took part in Moreau's Danube campaign and was present at Hohenlinden, the poem about which, by Campbell, is known to every schoolboy in England.

After his marriage in 1802, he became an ardent admirer of Napoleon, who in May 1804 was chosen Emperor of France, and within a few weeks Ney was made a Marshal of France. After his great victory at Elchingen in 1805,

**The bravest of the brave* by A. Hilliard Atteridge.

†The 4th Hussars of the British Army claim an equally famous man—Winston Churchill.

he was created Duke of Elchingen. He then took part in the great battles of Jena and Friedland, and during the years 1808-11 figured in many a fight in the Peninsular War.

But strange to say, the episode with which his name will always be most gloriously associated was a colossal failure, namely the Retreat from Moscow. In that fateful year 1812 he accompanied Napoleon to Russia. He took part in the advance to Moscow, and though he did not enter the capital, from his camp on the high ground to the westward he was able to watch it burning. For his services at Borodino he was created Prince of the Moskowa, and after a series of exploits in the snow and ice he was the last man to recross the frontier.

In referring to Ney's deeds during the retreat, Lord Wolseley* relates that the passage of the Niemen was signalised by a feat of arms remarkable even amongst the many in Ney's career. Covering the retreat across the river with a mere handful of soldiers, sustained by his own splendid example, he found himself at last in Kovno with only thirty or forty men, and the bridge over the river in the possession of the enemy. Ney however, seizing a musket, led the attack in person, and with these few men cleared the bridge. "His daring courage," Lord Wolseley continues, "will be for ever the admiration of all peoples who still preserve any national sentiment for the self-sacrificing soldier who counts his life as dross in comparison with the upholding of his country's honour."

In 1813-14 he served in the Prussian and Austrian campaign and was present at Torgau, Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, Dennewitz, and Leipzig where he was again wounded. In the campaign in France in 1814 he saw much fighting, and by his daring raids at Etouvelles and other places, and his splendid defence of Arcis-sur-Aube, earned further renown. But it was all in vain. The French cause was lost.

In April 1814, Napoleon abdicated and withdrew to Elba, but at the end of a few months Europe was startled by the news that he had escaped and was back in France again. Ney, who had been spending the winter quietly in the country, was immediately summoned to Paris where he is said to have told Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon to the capital in an iron cage. He set out from Paris ostensibly to do so, but got no further than Lons-le-Saulnier. Here he was shown a copy of Napoleon's proclamation, and shortly afterwards he received a letter from Napoleon's Chief of Staff, with a note from Napoleon himself. This was followed by a proposed proclamation to Ney's troops, with the Marshal's title at the foot of it. Every hour brought fresh news of regiments deserting and of Napoleon's triumphal progress on his way to Paris. Ney had now to choose between marching against his old chief or marching against the government. He chose the latter.

All those who came into contact with Ney at Lons-le-Saulnier spoke of his wild talk and strange behaviour. Napoleon too, when he met him at Auxerre on March 18th, for the first time since his abdication, noticed the great change that had come over him and remarked before those present: "This fine fellow Ney is going mad!" In the end, Ney marched back to Paris with his troops, arriving there three days after the Emperor's return to the Tuileries.

Napoleon was not in a hurry to employ Ney again, but in the great struggle about to begin he could not do without him, and when they met between Charleroi and Gilly on June 15th Napoleon gave him the most important

**The Decline and Fall of Napoleon.*

command in his power to bestow, namely that of the army that was to attack Wellington.

Such was Ney's amazing record of active service, that began at Valmy and ended at Waterloo—the two last of Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*. It has not been possible in so brief a sketch as this to describe all the adventures that befell this extraordinary man. Let it suffice to say that probably never in history has anyone been through so many campaigns or so many great battles, or taken part in so much desperate fighting. Ever conspicuous, whether he was leading a victorious charge, or when wounded, cut off, defeated or taken prisoner, he was always the same.

On every occasion, and at every hour of the day or night, he always showed the same magnificent courage. Yet in spite of all his daring exploits he seldom came to grief. He would emerge from an attack bareheaded and begrimed, with his face blackened with powder, his clothes slashed and torn, and perhaps the mark of a ball that had grazed his coat or saddle; yet on very few occasions did his wounds force him to leave the field. At Waterloo, he had five horses shot under him, and that was not his first experience of the kind.

Although the Russian campaign had witnessed Ney's greatest glory, it was the tragedy that led to his undoing. By a series of miracles he had escaped bodily injury; but the strain of the retreat had destroyed the balance of his mind, producing a condition—then undiagnosed—with which the world in the war of a century later was to become so woefully familiar. At St. Helena, Napoleon said that Ney was a man who never had faith or honour about him—words uttered in the bitterness of exile after Ney had been shot as a traitor.

The truth is, however, that up to the time of the "caged lion" episode Napoleon had always trusted Ney. Faithlessness in so chivalrous a character as Ney's could not have been always lacking; but after the terrible retreat from Moscow, a change came over him and he was never the same man again. There seem to be no other way of accounting for his strange behaviour at Lons-le-Saulnier, and his inertness at Quatre Bras. *Inertness* in Ney! Save the mark! If this plea was actually made at the trial, it could not have been given the consideration it deserved.

In England, in the Georgian days, so prevalent was the crime of sheep-stealing that especially severe measures had to be introduced before it could be checked. In France, during the eleven-year break in the Bourbon rule, treachery was equally rife and called for corresponding action. The people, by turns Royalist, Republican and Imperialist, had grown accustomed to changing sides. Custom is second nature—and "how use doth breed a habit in a man."

Turn-coats jostled one another in the streets of Paris, but being just ordinary citizens were allowed to go free. With Ney however, the case was altogether different. He was an international figure whose name was a household word all over Europe, and his defection was more than France's wounded pride could stand.

Although Ney was guilty, his execution was the act, not of a great nation but of one divided against itself. His trial, and the judgment of the court, were alike unworthy of the French people, and the world at large was shocked that they should have singled out for punishment a man with Ney's almost incredible record. Yet such was their thirst for revenge that neither his own brilliant services nor the vast influence of the Duke of Wellington could save him from their fury. The end came with the tragedy of the Luxembourg Gardens when, on that December morning in 1815, he was brought before a firing-squad to meet his death with the calm dignity of a great soldier.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

LIEUT.-COLONEL N.V. BAL

IT HAS been stated that the most effective way for ex-servicemen to settle in civil life after demobilisation is through the medium of co-operative societies. Ex-servicemen, equipped as they are with a high sense of team spirit, discipline, organisation and leadership will not only benefit themselves and their neighbours when they return to their villages, but will also provide the basis for a large scale expansion of the movement.

It is proposed to consider in detail, how far this statement is true. For this purpose it will be necessary to understand clearly the genesis of the co-operative movement; its aims and objects, in so far as they are of interest to India; the potentialities of ex-servicemen as true co-operators, and the ways and means by which opportunities could be given to both ex-servicemen and civilians to benefit in the mutual task of making co-operation a success.

The birth of the co-operative movement, originally a western institution, which has been for over 50 years adapted to suit Indian requirements, is interesting. It was in 1844 that the first co-operative shop was opened by Robert Owen at Rochdale with the object of procuring for the workers a cheap and unadulterated supply of provisions at reasonable rates. By adopting strict business principles, and by honesty and a spirit of self-sacrifice, the shop did exceedingly well, and the lot of the local working classes was considerably improved.

The movement soon spread in England and to other countries, and developed in different forms to meet the varying requirements of the economic conditions of the people in each. In Germany, the movement has been mainly directed towards helping the farmers and the artisans. In Italy, small-scale industrial co-operative and building societies are the dominant feature. The whole of the dairy industry in Holland is organised on a co-operative basis. Most recently the Jewish community in Palestine has turned the desert sands into a land of shining crops and golden fruit.

The annals of Indian history are full with glorious accounts of the prosperous village communities, economically self-contained, proud of their local institutions and in spite of various caste distinctions, leading a happy and prosperous community life. The advent of British rule upset the economic balance in villages entirely. Instead of the whole village community pulling together, individual interests began to predominate over community interests. There was a race for obtaining positions of vantage in government services or building up individual fortunes, often at the expense of the rest of the members of the community. Agriculture, which still remains the predominant industry in India, suffered considerably as a result. Recurring famines, chronic poverty and indebtedness of the Indian peasant became the order of the day.

It was in these circumstances that the Government of India turned to the co-operative movement as a possible saviour of the agricultural community. In 1904, the Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed mainly for the purpose of facilitating the grant of cheap credit to the cultivators. Since 1904, a succession

of Acts have been passed to improve and enlarge the scope of the co-operative movement. The MacLagan Committee in 1914 reported that "the chief object of co-operation in India was to deal with the stagnation of the poorer classes, and more specially the agriculturists who contribute the bulk of the population". The Royal Commission on Agriculture in 1929 reported that "wherever agriculture is the predominant industry co-operation is commonly regarded as the natural basis for economic, social, and educational development and India is no exception....."

The spread of the co-operative movement in the villages is bound up closely with the problem of rural uplift and reconstruction. Although co-operation is an economic movement its methods and ideals make it essentially a moral movement. In 1921, Mr. F.L. Brayne embarked on a comprehensive scheme for rural reconstruction in the Gurgaon district and his plan has since served as a model for a number of similar experiments all over India. The scheme is not confined to merely starting co-operative societies but covers work for education, sanitation, medical relief, improvement of agriculture, female education and maternity welfare. The scheme further extends to the setting up of village *panchayats* in order to settle petty disputes both civil and criminal on the spot, and so save people considerable expenditure and loss of valuable time in fighting law suits.

The limitations of confining the movement to the credit societies alone are now well realised, and it is agreed by all that the co-operative movement for its success must extend its scope to cover all activities which contribute to the peasants' well-being. Apart from financing of agricultural credit, activities such as the marketing of agricultural produce, cattle welfare, dairy farming, and subsidiary industries such as spinning and weaving, the supply of consumer goods, manufacture of small tools and implements and oil-pressing, must also be undertaken. The success of the co-operative movement in India will depend primarily on the extent to which it helps in bringing all round improvement in the social and economic life of the rural population.

Seventy-five per cent of the men in the services come from rural areas and normally go back to their villages when they return to civil life. Thus the extent to which the co-operative movement can contribute towards the successful resettlement of ex-servicemen is self-evident. Are there any special attributes of ex-servicemen which make them particularly suitable agents for the spread of the co-operative movement? It has been stated that the various qualities developed while in service, self-confidence, self-respect, discipline and sense of responsibility, leadership etc., will be of great value to the co-operative movement. Besides these, the environment of common messes, living in dormitories, playing games together is conducive to the development of the spirit of co-operation, tolerance and comradeship.

There is, however, considerable difference between having the potentialities of a successful co-operator and applying these potentialities to civil life. The man in service, although working in a communal atmosphere, is living in surroundings totally different from those obtaining in the villages. Firstly, he has no common economic interest to pursue. He is trained to do a job set before him in co-operation with others, but the success or otherwise of completing this task has no direct bearing on his own economic or social betterment. Secondly, he does not work as a member of a family group wherein all the member of the family work together for the advancement of common family interests.

Thirdly, the very basis of co-operation namely, a felt material need towards the fulfilment of which all the energies of the co-operators are directed, is lacking. It will be obvious, therefore, that a considerable amount of training will have to be given to ex-servicemen before their potentialities as successful co-operators can be made use of in civil life.

During the last war servicemen received a considerable amount of practical training in co-operation. They travelled far and wide and visited countries farther advanced in modern institutions than India. They talked with the men from the countries they visited, and studied their way of life. I refer particularly to those who went to Italy, Greece and Palestine. These men saw with their own eyes the splendid fruits of co-operative effort and will demand opportunities for applying what they have seen on return to civil life. Service instructors have received training in co-operation in various institutions in Madras, the United Provinces and the Punjab as part of the pre-release training scheme. On completion of training they were posted to demobilisation centres to carry out considerable propaganda and publicity to thousands of military personnel. In addition, the benefits of co-operative effort in rural reconstruction, as advocated by Mr. F.L. Brayne, formed part of the men's normal education throughout their service. The training thus received while in service can, however, only be considered as introductory and insufficient to enable them to take their place as trained co-operators immediately on release.

Successful resettlement in civil life on a co-operative basis is a matter of immediate concern to released personnel. These men have been accustomed to standards of living very much higher than those obtaining in villages today, and they will find life hard unless they are assured of a vocation which will bring them an adequate monthly income. Only limited facilities are available for their absorption in suitable government posts, in industry or in agriculture as conducted today. The ex-serviceman generally has no capital to set himself up in new industries, often in competition with established concerns, while new and improved agricultural methods would also entail a considerable amount of expenditure which is beyond the capacity of the average ex-serviceman. Co-operation, therefore, affords the only means of obtaining even temporary relief in a matter which is one of life or death to them.

Happily for the ex-servicemen there is already a wide understanding of their problems among civilians. The report of the Co-operative Planning Committee, appointed by the Government of India in January 1945 "to draw a plan of co-operative development" has given a prominent place to "ex-servicemen and co-operative planning." This report states that "any plan of post-war development should take into account the extent to which it not only provides for the suitable resettlement of ex-service persons, but also the extent to which it can and should benefit from the training which such men and women have received.....every effort should be made to attract them into the co-operative fold in as great numbers as possible, either as members of existing societies, or to start new ones, or as staff for the expansion of the movement.."

The 6th All-India Co-operative Conference held in Lucknow in April 1946 passed a resolution dealing with demobilised soldiers and co-operation. The resolution *inter alia* states:....."this Conference resolves that adequate facilities be provided in all co-operative institutions to impart practical training in co-operation.....this Conference further recommends that the special capacities of service personnel should be fully and immediately harnessed by

the Central, Provincial and State Governments and co-operative institutions in the promotion of their post-war development plans which, in addition to ensuring maximum efficiency in out-turn, would also enable the man to secure increased return for his labour and tend to the general raising of the standard of living, so essential to the well-being of the country."

A number of provinces and states have already taken suitable steps to implement these recommendations. Ex-servicemen's co-operative societies have already been started to cater for a number of activities, *e.g.*, transport, weaving, furniture, labour contracts, metal works, better methods of farming, etc., in Madras, the Punjab and the United Provinces. This is not the appropriate place to give details of these societies except to record that they have increased rapidly both in their membership, share capital and the types of activity covered. A significant feature of these societies is the place given to the friends and relations of ex-servicemen.

It is realised on all sides that ex-servicemen cannot properly ask for special rights and privileges and that their place is alongside the civilian in the villages. The ex-serviceman is expected to bring his wide experience, special knowledge of conditions obtaining in other countries and his technical skill to the successful operation of these societies. Their success is mainly dependant on their capacity to inculcate similar ideas among the civilian population.

Airfield approach lighting

A new type of airfield approach lighting, claimed to be a considerable advance on any system previously devised in Britain or the United States, is to be installed at London airport before next winter.

The new system, intended for use in foggy weather at night, has been designed to meet the needs of pilots for a horizon to aim at when landing. It consists of bars of light placed horizontally across the approach area at intervals of 600 feet, with a central line of lights 100 feet apart, leading straight to the runway. As the pilot approaches the runway, the bars of light provide him with an artificially created horizon by which he can gauge the aircraft's altitude to the ground. The central lights guide him to the runway.

It is expected that by the use of this lighting, daylight landings will be possible when visibility is restricted to 200 yards and at night, with visibility down to 100 yards.

The system is now being tried out at the Royal Aircraft Establishment's airfield at Farnborough.

SECOND SIGHT

"VIATOR"

ON a rare occasion in the year of grace 1927, the South Waziristan Scouts pushed their patrols as far as the Wana plain and encamped for a few days near the site of the old Wana Fort, whence Major Russell and his detachment made such a gallant retirement in 1919.

It was early in the month of June that a mounted escort was sent to accompany the Political Agent from Sarwekai Post to Wana Fort where he wished to pay out the allowances to certain of the Wana Wazir tribes and also to hold a tribal meeting to hear their answer to Government on certain serious charges. The escort was in charge of a British subaltern of the South Waziristan Scouts who had with him some eighty mounted infantrymen. With the party was a Parsee medical officer who, in keenness for the advancement of his profession, had asked to be allowed to accompany the escort and give some free medical attention to the sick in the vicinity of Wana. Permission was easily granted, and the doctor though no great horseman, covered the distance from the post at Sarwekar to Wana with chevalier like courage.

The day after the arrival of the party it was evident that the locals were wise to the doctor's arrival. A medical inspection was therefore arranged in the old Wana Fort at which the British subaltern agreed to act as interpreter, for the Wana Wazirs speak a particularly unorthodox form of the Pushtu language.

By eleven o'clock the precincts of the fort were seething with Wazirs old and young, male and female. In the Orient free medicine has the same attraction as the offer of a free cinema show in Europe!

Guards and sentries were duly posted in the hope of infusing some sort of order amongst the gleeful patients. The doctor and the subaltern arrived and duly ensconced themselves behind a solid door in a courtyard apart. It was then announced that the sick might present themselves.

For two long hours the subaltern patiently translated the graphic accounts of almost every possible form of human affliction while the good doctor with wonderful resourcefulness was able to give either medicine or solace to each of the patients. In opening his Pandora's box he could not fail to reveal some twenty pairs of glasses laid in the bottom tray. Nothing escapes the watchful eye of a Wazir bent on acquiring something for nothing and the subaltern feared that a request for the services of an optician would soon be forthcoming.

The door was suddenly pushed open and a Wazir beldame of an advanced age and great ugliness walked up to the subaltern and pushing her finger almost in his eye shrieked: "I am so blind that I do not even see you." The subaltern answered her in Pushtu by an expression of condolence for her disability and informed the doctor of the sad malady. Already the wizened witch was eyeing the box containing the glasses with unfeigned eagerness. The subaltern bade her be seated on a stool and the doctor took out the chart with dots for eye testing. He uncovered five dots and asked the subaltern to tell her to say how many there were. Standing beside her, he heard her mutter: "Five there are." Then aloud she screamed: "Nine." The doctor then showed six dots and after a mental calculation, the witch produced the astounding

answer : " There are none.....none." With supreme patience the doctor then showed two dots. The witch in a final effort started using her fingers to count and after several seconds exclaimed : " Twelve.....twelve ; now you see how blind I am." The doctor made an enquiring gesture to the subaltern who taciturnly answered : " The old hag has remarkably good sight, but she won't go away without glasses now."

Time and the heat of the morning were weighty factors. The doctor picked out a pair of glasses and presented them to the beldame, while the subaltern told her they were worth many rupees and that she would never find such a precious article in the whole of the Wana plain. This speech had an exhilarating effect on the beldame and hiding the treasure in a rag tied to her dress she waltzed out of the courtyard with the sole comment : " O ho ! O ho ! O ho !"

Out of sight out of mind, and the doctor with the subaltern's aid then dealt with stomach aches, constipation, boils, toothache, carbuncles and all the other bodily complications to which prolonged residence on the Wana plain seems to give rise. At two o'clock they closed the "consulting room" and returned to the camp for a belated lunch and a siesta in their tents.

Evening brought the news that the inhabitants of the Wana plain were deeply grateful to the "donktor" for his ministrations but that there were many other patients to be seen the following morning. There was nothing to be done but recommence the "consultations."

The following morning a large and merry gathering was again assembled for treatment and the subaltern was hard pressed to remember in English the many and various parts of the anatomy referred to in Pushtu by all and sundry. Time wore on ; the heat, the dust, the dirt and the clamouring added no glamour to the proceedings. Even the kindly doctor was becoming a little short tempered and the subaltern was telling the many malingerers precisely what he thought of their time-wasting activities.

Suddenly the door of the inner courtyard was noisily opened, and the two were regaled by the unwelcome sight of the beldame of yesterday's fame dragging along by the hand a lady of equal age but of a far more pleasing countenance. The subaltern sensing more time-wasting, demanded an explanation of the beldame's unwarranted reappearance. " My sister," was the answer, " she is so blind that she is exceedingly blind, O ho ! O ho ! O ho ! " There was nothing to be done, and the same pantomime was enacted somewhat enlivened by the fact that when the doctor showed four dots to the beldame's sister, the latter was just about to call out *salore* which in Pushtu means four, when her relative gave her a violent dig in the ribs and muttered in a hoarse whisper : " Yo Yo (one.....one)". The terrified old woman complied and announced : " One dot, one."

Time was advancing, and hoping piously that the beldame was blessed with no further blind relatives, the doctor presented her sister with a pair of glasses. But the subaltern hoped for the last word with the beldame. " What have you done to the glasses we gave you yesterday; you aren't wearing them?" " I am," screamed the beldame. " You aren't," retorted the subaltern ungallantly. " I am," she shrieked, and undoing a piece of dirty sheepskin tied round her neck she revealed the precious glasses resting within. Then with a look of triumph she marched her joyful relative out of sight. " I think she is wearing them as a charm," said the subaltern. " Can you beat it," said the good doctor and burst into hearty peals of laughter.

NAVAL OFFICERS AS CAVALRY COLONELS

LIEUT.-COLONEL M.E.S. LAWS, O.B.E., M.C., R.A. (retd.)

THE appointment of Admiral Sir Walter Cowan as Honorary Colonel of the 18th King Edward VII's Own Cavalry is unique in that no other British naval officer has ever been selected for such an appointment in the Indian Army. There is, however, one nearly parallel case in the British Service, though it is necessary to go back over 150 years to find such an unusual association of a naval officer and a cavalry regiment.

In June 1795, a British naval squadron under Captain Sir John Borlase Warren was detailed to act as escort to a fleet of transports carrying a body of French royalist troops from Portsmouth to the French coast South of L' Orient. The troops had been raised in England on the authority of a special Act of Parliament and were part of the British Army, being paid, clothed, armed and equipped by Britain. They were subject to British military law, and the officers, who were all French like the rank and file, held British commissions signed by King George.

The expeditionary force consisted of an artillery corps of four companies called the French Emigrant Artillery; four infantry battalions (those of Comte de la Chatre, Marquis du Dresnay, Comte d'Hector and Comte d'Hervilly) and an engineer corps of officers (the French Emigrant Engineers). There was no cavalry unit, but three of the infantry battalions had "noble companies" composed of French officers serving in the ranks who were to be employed as leaders of the new units which it was intended to form in France. The Comte de Puisaye had been commissioned as a Lieutenant-General to command the expedition, while Comte d'Hervilly was in actual command of the troops. An enormous stock of arms, ammunition, clothing and accoutrements supplied by the British Government accompanied the expedition.

Sir John Warren had orders to convoy the transports to the French coast of Quiberon Bay and there to land the *émigré* troops and their stores. His further action was not very clearly indicated, though he was instructed to re-embark the force if requested to do so. It was, however, confidently expected by the British Government, no less than by the royalists themselves, that the whole of western France would at once rise in their favour as soon as the royalist standard was set up. At that time La Vendée and parts of Brittany were in open revolt, and the republicans were being hard pressed.

The French Republican Fleet made an attempt to intercept the transports, but was defeated and driven off by the British Channel Fleet. The royalists were thereupon landed near Quiberon peninsula against trifling opposition and Sir John Warren's crews proceeded to unload the stores on to the open beach. The *émigrés* then advanced to attack Fort Pentrievé which guarded the neck of the Quiberon peninsula. After a short bombardment by the British ships, the republicans surrendered and the royalists moved in to the peninsula which they decided to use as a base. To the British Navy fell the laborious task of shifting the piles of stores and equipment to the new base.

The next move was an attempt to break out of the peninsula and to storm the republican entrenched camp at St. Barbe. Much time was wasted in discussions and quarrels, and when eventually the attack was made, it was a complete failure, since the enemy had had plenty of time to entrench and was well aware of what was coming. The royalist troops were driven back to the peninsula, and had it not been for the prompt action of Sir John Warren, who sent his gun-vessels and launches to cover the retreat by gun-fire, it is doubtful whether the whole force would not have been driven into the sea in confusion. Meanwhile, the navy had also been busily engaged in landing small parties of *émigrés* at other points on the coast, in landing and mounting heavy guns for the defence of Quiberon, and in covering operations ashore by gun-fire.

There is no doubt that Sir John also exercised a very considerable influence on the French leaders, who were insanely jealous of each other. Though he could not himself speak their language, he seems to have obtained the confidence of them all, and he did not hesitate to give them all the assistance in his power and in some respects he considerably exceeded the strict letter of his instructions.

That the French leaders realised how much they owed to Sir John was shown by a suggestion made to the British Government by Comte de Puisaye in an official despatch of 18th July 1795. He declared that having obtained some horses, he had started to form a light cavalry regiment and asked that it might be named "*Les Hussards de Warren*" as being "the only means of according to Sir John Warren a tribute to his great talents; his indefatigable zeal and the great interest he has shown in the cause we serve; and to perpetuate his name, which will remain so honoured by all good Frenchmen". The Horse Guards approved the application and the unit was thus accepted for the British Service under the same conditions as the other *émigré* corps.

Meanwhile the formation of Warren's Hussars had already begun; the rank and file being supplied by selecting volunteers from the *émigré* infantry battalions, and the officers coming from the "noble companies" in which were many ex-cavalry officers and cadets. The limiting factor to the formation of the regiment was the lack of horses, but within a few days over 60 men had been mounted and formed into two troops. The unit provided patrols along the neck of the peninsula to give warning of any offensive move by the enemy.

The night of 21st July was very dark and stormy. Under cover of heavy driving rain, a body of picked republican troops guided by a deserter scrambled over the rocks along the shore, and having thus avoided the patrols, surprised and rushed the fort. Being quickly reinforced, the storming party swept on into the Quiberon peninsula, and despite desperate resistance by the *émigrés* they obtained possession of almost the whole of the royalist position. The *émigrés*, who had only a few days before received a reinforcement of four very weak battalions from north Germany, made a final stand at the tip of the peninsula. There they were covered by the cross-fire of two British gun-vessels, which were magnificently handled despite the gale. Meanwhile, the ships' boats of the squadron rescued hundreds of the *émigrés*, until the remnant ashore surrendered to the republicans on a promise of quarter.

Sir John Warren thus found himself encumbered with some thousands of disorganised soldiers and terror stricken women and children. They were landed on the Isle d'Yeu off the French coast and the royalist troops were re-organised. Though two French *émigré* cavalry regiments had by then arrived from Germany, it was decided to disband Warren's Hussars, and the survivors

were drafted into the Comte de la Chatre's regiment, which continued to serve in the British Army till it was reduced in 1802 at the Peace of Amiens. The *émigrés* were eventually taken back to England in December 1795.

It should be realised that all French royalist regiments were named after distinguished French general officers and that the naming of "*Les Hussards le Warren*" after a British naval officer was indeed a very great compliment. In addition it must be remembered that the colonel who gave his name to a French regiment was also its proprietary colonel, who in fact owned the unit and derived considerable personal financial advantages from his office.

The fact that there were many senior French officers serving in subordinate positions with Comte de Puisy's army made the selection of Sir John Warren as the proprietary colonel of the first newly-formed unit—and a cavalry regiment at that—an even more remarkable event, for there was naturally keen competition to obtain such appointments. Moreover, that such an honour should be accorded to an Englishman, speaks well for the generous spirit of those Frenchmen who overcame their traditional suspicion of "*perfidie Albion*" which was a notorious characteristic of our neighbours across the Channel of those days.

A greater tribute to the personality of Sir John Warren it would indeed be difficult to imagine, and it was probably due to the fact that the regiment had such a short life that this unique honour has not been given the prominence it deserves.

Commodore Nott

The Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh, and high ranking officers of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force attended a special memorial service for the late Commodore M.H. St. L. Nott, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.N., conducted on 8th April at the Free Church, New Delhi. Reverend S.N. Carpenter led the service.

* It will be recalled that Commodore Nott, who had rendered valuable service in the Royal Indian Navy, was killed on 27th March 1948 in the I.N.A. Viking Aircraft crash near Corsica.

- The Governor-General was represented at the service by Colonel D.H. Currie and others present included Rear-Admiral Hall, Chief of the Naval Staff and Flag Officer Commanding, R.I.N., Air Vice Marshal Mukerjee, Chief of the Air Staff, Lieut.-General Russell and Major-General S.M. Shrinagesh.

THE GAS TURBINE

DAVID FERGUSON

THE use of gas turbines as the power plants of jet-propelled aircraft is now widely known, but few are aware of the developments which are taking place in other fields of gas turbine applications in the United Kingdom.

The gas turbine is the only known type of prime mover which has applications over the whole range of power generation, from high-speed aircraft to electric power stations, and in the near future this new type of engine can be expected to be at work in locomotives, ships and power stations as well as in industrial processes.

As a result of Britain's war-time policy, work on the gas turbine was concentrated on the development of the turbo-jet engine for aircraft where the advantages to be gained in aircraft performance were immediate and obvious. The wisdom of this policy is shown by the fact that at the end of World War II, Britain, alone among the Allies, had gas turbine jet-propelled fighter aircraft in operation on the Western Front.

British jet engines are now accepted as being supreme in the world, and the air forces which use or are being equipped with either Rolls-Royce or De Havilland engines include those of the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentine, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland and Turkey.

British industry, however, was quick to realise the advantages to be obtained by the application to industrial usage of its newly-won technical prowess in the gas turbine field, and at the end of World War II, began work on the application of this new prime mover to peaceful purposes. Now, the engineering staffs of industry, together with research workers in Government establishments, have reached the stage where many definite projects are being built and will shortly be seen in operation.

THE WHY AND HOW

The main centre for research on this new type of power plant is the National Gas Turbine Establishment at Whetstone, Leicestershire, and Pyestock, Hampshire, where all aspects of the gas turbine are studied. Subjects under investigation include the basic problems of airflow, combustion, behaviour of materials at high temperature, compressor and turbine design, stresses in working components including vibration effects, and methods of manufacture.

The manufacturing department makes experimental components of new design for test purposes, and the results of these fundamental investigations are continually being passed on to industry and applied to the improvement of the breed. The Establishment also undertakes the technical assessment of new industrial designs and the testing of components and complete engines of the firms.

The Establishment grew from the fusion of Air Commodore Whittle's team of engineers at Power Jets Limited, with the gas turbine branch of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, but as much of its work is now devoted to industrial applications as to aero engines. Recent developments include, for example, an improved axial flow compressor and a combustion chamber having a pressure loss less than half that of previous designs; both of these developments are applicable to gas turbines in general.

The aim of the work is always first to obtain an understanding of fundamental principles by means of research work and then to apply this understanding to the design of components of the engines; in other words, to find out "why" before deciding "how."

WIDELY APPLICABLE

It is the policy of the United Kingdom Government to patent and exploit inventions of commercial importance made in its research establishments, and to this end Power Jets (Research and Development) Limited is a wholly Government-owned Company responsible for holding and exploiting in the national interest, patents resulting from Government research and development in the gas turbine field.

The Company possesses about 1,700 British and foreign patents based on some 250 inventions covering the early work of Air Commodore Whittle and his associates and later activities of Power Jets (Research and Development) Limited and the National Gas Turbine Establishment. Although the majority of the inventions arose from work directed towards the problem of the aircraft gas turbine, their application is not so limited, most of them being equally applicable to industrial engines.

The Company has recently held two courses at a school at Lutterworth, Leicestershire, England, attended by representatives of about a dozen foreign countries, during which lectures were given on all aspects of gas turbine technology and representatives of British industrial concerns gave talks on special aspects of the problem. Similar courses are also given at the school for British engineers of the aircraft industry and from marine, railway and power station concerns.

ALL-ROUND SUPERIORITY

In addition to the National Gas Turbine Establishment, research into marine applications of the gas turbine is carried out in an experimental station on Tyneside, in the north of England, under the Parsons and Marine Engineering Turbine Research and Development Association (PAMETRADA), which has been set up by a number of shipbuilding and marine engineering firms engaged in the manufacture of turbine engines. The work is supported by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and both firms and the Admiralty advise on the programme to be carried out. The Association has equipment for the testing of both components and complete engines, and is actively engaged on the solution of various problems including that of transmission.

The gas turbine has particular advantages both actual and potential in each field of application. For example in the locomotive field, its advantages over the steam engine lie in its higher efficiency, cleanliness, independence from water and less maintenance. By comparison with the Diesel locomotive it should be cheaper in first cost and considerably less size and weight, thus effecting a great

saving in locomotive size and thereby power. In addition the gas turbine in future, should be able to burn either heavy oil or powdered coal and, therefore, has a further potential advantage over the Diesel.

British Railways are alive to these possibilities and last year, the former Great Western Railway ordered from Metropolitan-Vickers a 2,500 h.p. gas turbine locomotive. It is expected that this engine will be on trial in the near future when running experience will be built up, and there is little doubt that the next few years will see a growing use of the gas turbine on the recently nationalised British Railways.

MARINE GAS TURBINES

In the marine field the gas turbine again scores by its low weight and volume, compared with other forms of prime mover and it should offer higher efficiency than steam plants combined with cheapness of first cost. By comparison with steam plants its reliability should be high when elimination of the latter is considered. Engine room staff will be correspondingly reduced.

A number of projects for marine purposes are being developed by British firms, and an augury for their success is that the first marine craft in the world to be powered by a propeller-driving gas turbine was taken to sea by the Royal Navy in mid-summer 1947 and preliminary trials have been completed satisfactorily. The gas turbine used was developed by Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co., Ltd., from the Beryl aircraft engine and has been installed in H.M. Motor Gun Boat 2,009, a triple-screw craft built by Messrs. Camper and Nicholson. The engine drives the centre shaft and takes the place of one of the normal complement of three 1,250 h.p. reciprocating engines.

The basis of the engine is an aircraft jet propulsion engine which consists of an axial flow compressor supplying air to an annular combustion chamber where Diesel fuel is burnt, followed by a two-stage turbine which drives the compressor. In this case the exhaust gases from the turbine, which normally constitute the jet, are further expanded through a four-stage turbine which is coupled to the propeller shaft through gearing. The exhaust from this turbine then escapes to the air through a funnel. The propeller shaft power output is about 2,500 h.p.

This is, of course, essentially an experimental installation, but valuable experience is being obtained which may well bring about a considerable change in the performance of small fighting ships, and, in any case will prove invaluable to later designs of light marine gas turbines. As a next step Britain's Admiralty has ordered larger gas turbine machinery from Rolls-Royce Limited, for installation in a vessel of the escort type, and a unit is also being built by the English Electric Company for a Royal Naval frigate.

ELECTRICAL GENERATORS

In the field of electricity generation, the Central Electricity Board have already ordered from Metropolitan Vickers a 15,000 KW gas turbine generator to be installed at the Trafford Power Station of the Stretford and District Electricity Board. The plant should have an efficiency at least as high as, and probably rather higher than, the most efficient steam turbine plant in existence (26 per cent.) and will probably be used for peak load duties where the gas

turbine shows to the best advantage by reason of its low capital cost, small volume, quick starting, and other favourable characteristics.

A wide use of gas turbines can be envisaged in this field. In the generation of base load power, the gas turbine should be able in future to offer considerably higher efficiency than the best steam plant, probably rising eventually to over 30 per cent., but its use in this field will depend principally on its ability to burn cheap fuels such as boiler oil or powdered coal. Experiments to this end are now proceeding. When this is possible its low cost and small size combined with high efficiency will make it an attractive power unit for all power stations.

Besides these three broad fields for the gas turbine, there are a host of other possible uses, including in particular the provision of compressed air for industrial processes where large quantities of hot gases are available at the outlet from the process to drive the turbine. Such processes include among others, blast furnaces, fuel cracking and underground gasification of coal, and it is probable that many uses may be found for the gas turbine in such industries in the future.

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LOOKING FOR A JOB

A.H. ERO

YOU learn a lot when picking your new civilian job these days. I did. But things are much easier than after the last war. First the Ministry of Labour is not so much concerned in compelling you to labour as in labouring itself, to find your heart's desire. Then the ex-officer is told—I almost said “warned”—that there are to be no more drones. No more drones! You're telling him! Was it our fault that we once thought ourselves lucky to get a job peddling vacuum cleaners?

Well, those days are gone. The ex-serviceman has acquired qualities of leadership which make him invaluable to industry. That is “official.” It made me feel much happier when I went to have (or should I say “give”?) my first interview. Another encouraging report which, if not official, came from authoritative sources was that there were more jobs going for ex-officers than there are applicants to fill them. Ah me! Happy days are here again.

But in order to benefit by my experiences, you must know how you compare with me as an applicant. Age—young to be out with a pension. Military record—not so startling as to attract Press notice but not undistinguished: Status—field rank. But many of you will have better military records. References—unimpeachable. Not many ex-servicemen will have as strong recommendations for civilian work from leading industrialists.

I found three methods of seeking a job. The first was answering advertisements. This was, at first, a most attractive hobby. By the time I had written half a dozen I had acquired a literary skill which convinced me that other candidates would not stand a chance. I never realised before how admirable were my qualities. I was struck by the astounding way in which I was so particularly fitted for this particular job.

Lesson No. 1. The acquiring of this literary skill is evidently necessary—but unfortunately all other applicants equally realise this.

I have been composing these masterpieces for six months. A wait of two months was usually necessary before they were even considered. A further couple of months had gone by before I had realised that I was not even going to get a negative reply. Another birthday passed, I regretfully added another year to my age in my next application. Some advertisers were considerate and told me the sad fate soon. In some cases my spirits soared when I heard that I was selected out of hundreds for the short list. But this did not mean that it was in the bag. This fascinating hobby, I soon found, palls and seems to have little future. Of course, one applicant must be lucky. So is the Irish Sweep winner.

I next switched to direct introduction to a world-known firm noted for its support to ex-servicemen. I was introduced by acquaintances who merely

knew my work. I did not use "influential relations or friends." That would be most immoral. Besides I haven't got any. The reception was very different to the silence which followed my answers to advertisements. I was given a large leather chair, a cigarette, coffee, honour and an attentive ear. Of course, I was told, no positive offer could be made till my qualifications could be judged. I was asked to explain them and answered searching questions. "Yes," I was told, "you are just the kind of man we want."

This is *Lesson No. 2*—a lesson which will become clearer later on. They would let me know, they said, after the next staff conference. I had rung the bell!

Receiving no reply for some time and being afraid to send a reminder I next approached the Appointments Officer, Ministry of Labour. A queue, endless forms and a dingy office in which I would be treated not as an individual but as one of a mass, was what I expected. If this account does nothing else, let it correct that false belief.

An appointment, at my convenience, was arranged, and I was received in privacy with an even greater courtesy and honour than by the private firm. Service to me was the keynote. After recording my qualifications, I made application for a certain post. Here again I rang the bell, for I was informed that I was unusually well qualified for it and just the kind of man they wanted. I was dumb enough not to recognise *Lesson 2* again, even when they informed me that they would recommend me for a post of higher status than that for which I had applied. It took six months to receive the decisions—a tiny printed form with one word filled in in ink "unsuccessful", a similar reply having been received from the private firm a little earlier.

Lesson No. 2 in short is—be grateful for courtesy and when someone tells you you're just the kind of man they want, be equally courteous but don't expect anything. Just go and look for another job.

Let this not, however, give the impression that the Ministry of Labour or civilian firms are not sincere. The delay was necessary in my interests. Their one aim is unquestionably to secure me a job and they are still trying—but they are not magicians. It's up to me to be fit for the square hole on offer—not to expect a hole of my dimensions to be manufactured.

And there are other avenues to explore, other voluntary organisations which are most helpful, so it is not a case for despair but, by heck, wishful thinking won't hand you your bread on a platter. Which reminds me—I've given up looking for jam—bread will suffice. In short, if £600 to £800 is your expectation, cut it in half. Salaries are not going to be high.

That's all. When you leave the Service you'll find the country grateful and courteous, but don't think you can sit back and do nothing. The country has no use for drones. That gives you a laugh anyway!

And, by the way, if any reader has kept the recipe for getting a job as a live (well, nearly) peddler of vacuum cleaners just pass it along. Or tips on how to induce Editors to accept unpalatable articles.

* * * * *

This article was written some months ago and has lain in a drawer ever since. Reason—I was too busy doing my new job! Yes, the Ministry of Labour was as good as its word and put me up for three jobs, all at nearly double the salary of the post for which I asked them to recommend me. I went for interview, and in ten minutes it was in the bag.

There is a moral to this story—which is true—but I'm not quite sure what it is.

REVIEWS**IT MIGHT HAPPEN AGAIN**

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET LORD CHATFIELD, P.C., G.C.B., O.M., ETC.

Illustrated. Heinemann, 18/-

• If World War I—the war to end wars—ended on a note of easy optimism that it could never happen again, World War II has left the nations of the world with less assurance.

This second volume* of Lord Chatfield's autobiography was written in 1940, with the exception of the final chapter which has been added as a post-war commentary with the significant heading which is also the title of the book. He deals mainly with the period in between the two world wars, when the spirit of pacifism and disarmament pervaded Britain. Germany was defeated and the German Fleet was at the bottom of Scapa Flow. There was no danger of aggression from any quarter for years to come. The Services fought a losing battle with the Treasury. The Navy was considered an expensive encumbrance, and the armament firms as the cause of war. The result was that the Second World War caught the nation again unprepared and once again justified the accusation of the traditional unreadiness of Britain for an emergency.

The author speaks with first-hand knowledge and experience of an era in which he held high administrative appointments at the Admiralty, including that of the highest post open to a sailor. Those were days of conferences. Between 1921 and 1936, successive naval conferences tried to effect reductions in the navies of the great powers both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Washington Conference in 1921 agreed on a ten-year holiday in capital ship construction, although it failed to abolish the submarine. It also terminated the Anglo-Japanese alliance thereby seriously weakening Britain's position in the Pacific.

As a logical extension of the agreed ten-year holiday in capital ship construction, the British Cabinet assumed there would be no great war for another ten years. So the "Ten-Year Rule" began in 1923 and was renewed each year, the Services being on "ten years' notice" for war.

At the Geneva Conference in 1927, the U.S.A. demanded parity with Britain in the number of cruisers. For the U.S. this was mainly a matter of prestige. They were the richest nation, so why should they not have the biggest navy? But they had no overseas commitments and did not want to spend money on more cruisers, which meant that Britain would have to reduce her own cruiser strength. It was parity at a level to be dictated at Washington and not in London. This Britain refused.

However, in the London Naval Treaty of 1930, Britain surrendered parity in cruisers and destroyers at a level suitable to the U.S. Navy. The replacement of the ancient dreadnoughts was postponed for another five years. It was not

*The first volume of Lord Chatfield's autobiography *The Navy and Defence* was reviewed in the *U.S.I. Journal* of July 1943.

till the London Naval Conference of 1935—the year also of the Abyssinian crisis—that quantitative limitation (ratio) was abolished, Japan disagreeing and withdrawing from the Conference.

But still Britain could not *commence* to restore her naval strength until the end of 1936, as the two treaties of Washington and London were not due to expire until then. The author was present at all these conferences except that in London in 1930, when he was in the Mediterranean as C.-in-C.

Returning to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in 1933 he remained until 1938. Due to his exertions and the changes in the international situation, the Cabinet was made to realise the danger of any further neglect of the fighting services. He was chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The report of this subcommittee in 1933 was so strong that it led to the removal of the dangerous "Ten Year Rule." It awoke a feeling of uneasiness in the Cabinet which set up a Defence Requirements Committee to examine the defence position in the country. This was followed in the autumn of 1934 by a second Defence Requirements Committee which was told to report on the full measures needed to increase the country's defences in all three Services *without regard to financial considerations*.

Even when money was forthcoming to rebuild the Fleet, there was a campaign in the Press against replacing the old capital ships. Irresponsible experts aired the view that bombers were more economical than battleships. The responsible advisers had no means of refuting such criticisms. The author took up the challenge by demanding a capital ship enquiry by the Cabinet. The Capital Ship Committee after hearing the evidence on both sides decided unanimously in favour of capital ships. The author incidentally had the rare opportunity of trouncing his opponents, the pseudo experts, who had been invited to give evidence before this committee.

To prevent the public being misled by uninformed propaganda the author refers to, although he does not necessarily advocate, the United States' system in which a responsible Chief of Staff appears before a responsible parliamentary navy committee to which he can state his views based on up-to-date knowledge. He can be cross-examined and thus convince his hearers and through them, the public.

When the author (raised to the peerage in 1937) left the Admiralty in August 1938, a vast programme of naval construction was under way. The difficulty now was to get the armament firms geared up to match production with sanctioned expenditure. The effects of the policy of the earlier peace years were now being felt. Not only had the Service been prevented from replacing obsolete material, but the war industries had been starved and driven out of existence, and even the great dockyards were considerably reduced.

Towards the end of October 1938, Lord Chatfield was sent out to India as chairman of a committee set up by the Committee of Imperial Defence to report on the defence problems in this country. After a three months' tour and examination of witnesses, the Chatfield Committee completed its findings by the end of January 1939. The report submitted by this committee envisaged a minimum period of five years for the expansion of India's Armed Services and the development of the productive capacity of her war industries. This programme was upset by the outbreak of World War II eight months later, but the Committee's report was of great help in enabling the country to face the problems thus created.

On his return to England in February 1939, the author was taken into Chamberlain's Cabinet as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. This post he was holding at the outbreak of war when he also became a member of the War Cabinet. He resigned in April 1940 to enable the reshuffling of the Cabinet, when Mr. Winston Churchill took his place.

Lord Chatfield in the House of Lords has continued his efforts to warn Britain of her defence requirements. He regards defence expenditure as insurance money for the safety and security of the nation. This insurance money must be a first charge on the budget as it is in family life. There should be a national (or imperial) defence council, and so free defence from party politics.

Defence and foreign policy, as is well known, are interrelated. Foreign policy must be regulated by the nation's armed strength, but it is not equally true that defence will depend on foreign policy alone. Foreign relations can change very rapidly, but armed strength can be built up only over a number of years. The pacific spirit after the First World War, and Britain's military unpreparedness for the Second, illustrate this clearly. Defence strength while it is *relative* to that of potential enemies, must also have a certain *absolute* minimum for the nation's own peculiar defence problems.

What of the future? The use of force will be the ultimate action even for a United Nations Organisation. Has the atomic bomb rendered obsolete the Navy, Army and the Air Force as we know them today?

"Even if world approval was given to use the atomic bomb against an aggressor, there would be a natural hesitancy to use it; lesser means of coercion, rather than to utterly destroy him, would come first; such as placing armies on his frontiers, air attacks on his industrial capacity by ordinary bombs, or blockade. Normal armed forces will still be required. We cannot yet 'scrap the lot', we must retain all weapons other nations have. The main danger in atomic bombs lies, not so much in their use in war—though that thought is terrible enough—as in the temptation of an aggressor to use them to surprise and utterly overwhelm his victims, by a knock-out blow".

The author has had experiences given to few which make him keenly alive to the difficulties and dangers which beset the democratic defence machine. Is there a cure, he asks?

"At the moment, the nation seems determined not to allow the same mistakes to be made again, or to go through the same hair-raising risks it has experienced in these last five or six years. But public memory is ever short and we must bear in mind that human beings pass away; personalities that have had the painful experiences, and perhaps learnt the consequent lessons, may no longer exist, or be in a position to guide the nation on a better future course. So one feels that the old errors may recur only too easily in similar circumstances".

Altogether an outstanding book, written by a sailor who has occupied the highest position in the greatest navy in the world. A book which all naval officers should read, and all officers in the Defence Services will do well to read.

K. V. C.

PATRICK GEDDES IN INDIA

EDITED BY JAQUELINE TYRWHITT, A.I.L.A., A.M.T.P.I.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY LEWIS MUMFORD

Illustrated. Lund Humphries, 10/-

If ever dry-as-dust official reports from the pigeon-holes of government archives yielded very revealing and pleasant reading matter, it is to be found in *Patrick Geddes in India*. This little book ushers in a far-reaching revolution in the technique of town and city planning.

Professor Sir Patrick Geddes, an original thinker and fearless pioneer, was the founder of a new school of thought in the art and science of town planning. In 1915 he was invited to India to advise the Government of Madras on some schemes of public improvement. From 1915 to 1919 Geddes stayed in India, surveying its towns and villages for the various provincial governments, local bodies and rulers of Indian States. During this period he produced reports on eighteen Indian cities and other connected problems.

Extracts from these reports have been published for the first time in *Patrick Geddes in India*. They have been so arranged as to give a sense of self-sufficiency and continuity to the reading. The book reveals a master who lived much ahead of his time and struggled, with all the earnestness of a noble soul, to wean the officialdom in India from the orthodox and destructive method of town planning in favour of his new method, the humanistic method.

There were two schools of thought, Geddes said. The first only considered the immediate effect. "Here a street as fine as may be, there a monument as impressive as the funds will allow. There again an avenue or garden as magnificent as the space permits." This school was wont to be preoccupied with the big things, the palace or the chief civic building. When the slums were taken in hand, it was too often only to sweep the place to make room for the conventional wide streets, resulting in displacement of groups of families who moved out to create worse congestion elsewhere. This school coerced people into places against their interests and wishes and solved one problem to create another.

The second school of thought on the other hand always started with what Geddes called a diagnostic survey. It sought to co-ordinate town planning with its environment. It took account of the historical context in which the town had grown and improved the town without altering the context. It did not believe in ruthlessly driving a gridiron of wide streets through a congested area, but it adopted the method of conservative surgery. This did not involve very much cutting and slashing but improved the town by pruning and trimming here and there—not for making the town look magnificent but for making it seem beautiful and idyllic. This method, he demonstrated, was less expensive to the tax-payer, and more productive of wealth and comfort values for the people. It did not need the support of huge financial schemes. Straight-as-the-ruler streets were not necessary if good communications could be secured by removing a few structures here and there and turning a labyrinth of lanes into a more or less straight road.

According to Geddes, the town planner could so model the environment of the individual as to bring the former into harmony with the latter's beliefs, aspirations and cultural outlook. Thus the town planner could stimulate the intellectual growth of the citizen like a good educationist. He can even break down social prejudices like untouchability. Geddes has actually outlined a wonderful scheme for utilising the sweepings to manure the garden-patches of the town, thus turning the sweepers into sweeper-gardeners, owning their own garden-plots.

Patrick Geddes in India contains a wealth of suggestions for the modern town-planner. It is amazing what a lot could be done for the towns and villages of India by following these suggestions instead of waiting for big financial schemes to be floated first. What Geddes has suggested for Indian towns and cities is being carried into effect in Europe and America today. India cannot afford to ignore his great teachings at the present stage of her development.

Town planners, government officials, municipal councillors, sanitarians and social reformers; sailors, soldiers and airmen; students and citizens, male and female alike, will find *Patrick Geddes in India* easy to understand and delightfully instructive to read.

P. C. B.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KING GEORGE V'S OWN BENGAL SAPPERS AND MINERS GROUP, R.I.E.

AUGUST 1939—JULY 1946

LIEUTENANT G. PEARSON

Contemporary military analysis of the U.S.A. came to the conclusion that one great lesson of the American Pacific campaign against the Japanese was the importance in modern land war of engineering and engineer organisation. There is little doubt that the British Commonwealth historians will endorse this view; but if there are doubters, let them read this little book which sets down in simple but readable English the story in Great War II of the achievements of one of the three great engineer corps of the Indian Army.

The advance of the 4th, 8th and 10th Indian Divisions up the east coast of Italy was an epic of which the world as yet has heard comparatively little. Apart from the dour and relentless fighting defence of the finest troops of the German Army, these divisions had to contend with endless mines, rivers and mountain road problems. Success depended on the sappers.

Similar problems faced the 14th Army and 15th Corps in Burma, with the added and even more vital problem of airfield construction. Advancing forces depended almost totally on air supply (land communications once Burma was penetrated were almost negligible). The air could not function without rapidly constructed or repaired forward airfields; and airfields rendered unserviceable by retreating Japs or our own bombing could not be used until the sappers had dealt with them.

The story of the Bengal Sappers and Miners in the Burma campaign includes also that of the construction of the Chindwin bridge. This engineering triumph comprised the largest Bailey bridge ever constructed (1,150 feet) up to that time. It was given the name of "Grub Bridge," though the reason for this somewhat uninspiring title is not given in the record.

It will be seen that some idea of the tasks, their difficulties, and the debt the fighting forces eternally owe in modern war to the engineers can be gathered from this book. Perhaps the most pertinent and somewhat humorous remark to illustrate the unending variety of calls on the sappers' energies and resources is the suggestion made anonymously that for the Indian Sappers and Miners, the motto "sub cheez" should be added to the R.E. motto of "ubique".

The proverbial humour of the British Commonwealth's fighting man is also to be seen elsewhere here and there in the volume as when a weary sapper who had to service his bulldozer after day and night long work on airfield construction, observed the habits of the R.A.F. and made the pithy remark: "*Ye log kuch nahin maintenance karta.*"!

The book includes of course when relevant, records of numerous and varied acts of gallantry and devotion. In this connection, the prelude tells dramatically of the first medals for bravery ever given to the Indian Army, which was exactly a hundred years before the outbreak of World War II—i.e. in Afghanistan in the late summer of 1839. This award was won by a subedar and twelve sappers of the Bengal Sappers and Miners who as a volunteer party, blew up the gates of Ghazni.

The presentation of the book (obviously printed and produced in the Bengal Sappers and Miners' centre at Roorkee) is admirable for these days of post-war printing difficulties. The compilers "note" promises later a fuller and more accurately informed history. When this appears doubtless a finished presentation will include more detailed and comprehensive maps. Nevertheless, those at the end of this volume are adequate for its purposes at this stage. Those of us who have tried to follow numerous "popular war books" full of geographical names and descriptions but in which no map appears, are grateful for the inclusion of the sketches contained in this book.

Lieutenant G. Pearson the author, is to be congratulated on his work.

W. E. H. C.

THE ESSENTIALS OF MILITARY KNOWLEDGE

MAJOR D.K. PALIT

Gale and Polden, 10/6

This is the first book that we have seen, written by an Indian officer serving in the army, that analyses military problems and attempts to exemplify them from the history of past battles and campaigns. As such the book surely deserves the warmest welcome particularly at a time like the present when Indians are taking control of their own armed forces and both the new Dominions are establishing their own military educational institutions. The book has been appreciatively perused by Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck who has written a foreword.

It is in four parts. The first two parts survey the evolution of military strategy and tactics from the earliest times of which there is any military record. The campaigns analysed, however, are almost entirely taken from European military history. The book would benefit if an analysis were also included from a tactical point of view of battles of the past that have been fought in India. Apart from those fought between Indian rulers and European invaders such as the Portuguese, French and British, such actions as the last Battle of Panipat merit study and comparison with contemporary actions in Europe.

The third part analyses the principles of war, discussing the heads under which various authors and official publications have attempted in the past to elucidate them. Here the author adheres to the eight principles originally enunciated in Field Service Regulations after World War I. Previous to this no official textbook had ventured to deal with principles of war as such. The author, however, does not embark on a discussion of the somewhat thorny problem that arose when a later volume of Field Service Regulations omitted one of the previously laid down eight principles and retained only seven. The discarded principle was "maintenance of the objective", and the change of thought implied was widely discussed at the time—the columns of the *U.S.I. Journal* being largely used in the process.

In the fourth part of the book a description is given of the German campaign in Poland in 1939, with a commentary on the operations. This is a very interesting and instructive account of the first demonstration of a full scale *blitzkrieg*, as planned and prepared with German thoroughness and care. It shows up the hopelessness of the defensive role in modern war when a properly co-ordinated attack by greatly superior forces supported by full scale air bombardment is launched upon an unprepared country. The moral is clear though the author does not emphasise it very pointedly in his concluding remarks. No country can afford to be militarily unprepared for modern war and on professional soldier can afford to neglect to study the lessons of World War II.

The truth of the campaign in Poland in 1939 was hidden from public eyes because it exposed the disgraceful weakness and shortcomings of the Allied leaders at that time. This, the first factual account of that campaign should serve to direct attention to the dangers of unpreparedness, and to stimulate thought and consideration of what the effect of the still more efficient and powerful destructive armaments of the present day will be in the next war—particularly on a country that may not be ready for them.

Major Palit's book is well written in readable style and deserves the attention of every officer in the Armies of India and Pakistan.

W. E. H. C.

MISSING FROM THE RECORD

COLONEL DICK MALONE, O.B.E.

Collins (Canada), \$3.00

Colonel Malone has given us a very helpful work. The former chief of Canadian Public Relations draws on his own experiences during the war years in Europe and Asia to paint in some of the detail inevitably missing from any official or even popular history.

In his army capacity the author had much personal contact with leading Allied actors in the drama, and with the difficulties presenting themselves amongst the Allies. As a Canuck, and representing the Dominion, Malone deals with people and events rather naturally from the Canadian viewpoint, but far from making the narrative biased and uninteresting, it makes it a refreshing change to read this point of view.

There are four threads to the book: the present C.I.G.S., Canadian overseas conscription, press and censorship, and Allied differences. The motif dealt with first and at some length is that of Field Marshall Montgomery. We have all of us heard of the whimsies and wonders anent Monty, but most of it has been factless fable, or, at best, garbled truth. The writer has had the advantage of working closely with Montgomery, and can give us of his idiosyncrasies and works. And they make excellent reading. His delight at leg-pulling, his winking out of incompetence, his Biblical allusions, his superb grasp of detail, all the phases of his war commands of which we have heard tell, are all admirably illustrated by examples from one who was with him day by day.

Those of us who are not *au fait* with the state of affairs in wartime Canada will learn with no little interest of the issue that so nearly brought down Mr. Mackenzie King's Government. Whilst the English-speaking provinces were in favour of men being conscripted for overseas service, the French provinces (and in particular, Quebec, whence came a great deal of the Prime Minister's support) were not. Colonel Malone shows how this issue resulted in all three Service ministers leaving the Government, and how Mr. King managed to retain power.

The author's particular field receives here his expert attention. The immense importance of the Press in war, its effect on the general public, its difficulties with the rules of censorship (more often than not, seemingly unwarranted), and the fight to get news, are all dealt with in admirable fashion. Malone himself started the European news-centre at the Scribe Hotel in Paris.

Australian difficulties in dealing with MacArthur's staff while trying to get news back to Australia is one of the censorship stories. There were many other Allied differences of opinion—all of them, fortunately for Allied arms, of a minor nature. The writer closes his impressions with details of some of these differences, of the "school-tie" British, the boastful Yanks, of the Canadian colonials.

The war record is much the fuller for Colonel Malone's colouring (although some half-a-dozen printer's errors in the edition will annoy most of us!). As a "Guide to Montgomery" alone it is worth-while the reading.

P. E. C.

THEY CAME TO SPY

STANLEY FIRMIN

Illustrated. Hutchinson, 16/-

That perennial favourite, spy literature, is back with us again in some spate. That will be in the years immediately after a war—and why not? How many of us are not intrigued by tales of that strange and wonderful profession that is the spy's? We have here a factual account of espionage, which being factual, adds to the lustre. Spys and their attempts on fortress England is the theme.

It is from the pen of a man in a particularly favourable position to give us this story. Stanley Firmin, of the *Daily Telegraph*, was correspondent accredited to Scotland Yard. We learn of things secret to us until now, of the battles within battles, of the tribute due to those wonderful people of the secret services.

The book is to be commended. It is interesting indeed thrilling from cover to cover, albeit one chafes at the lengthy procession of hopeful spies being executed, and wishes one at least of the more gentlemanly and sportsmanlike variety would escape courageously back to the Fatherland, if only to write his own story and thrill us more.

All of the many tales would take excellent fictionisation in printed or even film form. Authors and script writers are recommended to read Mr. Firmin's book. There's only one disappointment about *They Came to Spy*: there's not enough of it.

P. E. C.

THE WAR—SIXTH YEAR

EDGAR MCINNIS

With maps. Oxford University Press (Canada), \$ 2.50

Another volume—the sixth and last—of another progressive history of World War II. Professor McInnis has, however, not written “just another” popular history: he writes as objectively and fairly as any historian penning contemporary events can. What is more, he writes interestingly. *The War—Sixth Year* takes us from the British Canadian attack on the Scheldt, the American advance on Aachen, the resumption of the Russian offensive on Hungary, the capture of Tiddim and the landing on Leyte, to the Japanese surrender.

Excellent maps of the campaigns accompany the text, and the value of the book as a reference is further enhanced by the inclusion of documentary appendices, chronological tables and an index.

P. E. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

"WHAT IS THE REAL VALUE OF L.R.P.?"

*Major-General W.D.A. Lentaigne, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.,
Staff College, Wellington (The Nilgiris).*

I have just read the article "What is the real value of L.R.P.?" by "Experientia Docet" in the October issue of the *Journal*. I realise that it was written in 1944-45 when the fog of war was still thick. This fog added to "Experientia Docet's" worm's eye view has led to many errors in the account of the operations and to a failure perhaps to adduce the right lessons.

To speak of the Wingate operations as "controlled guerilla operations" and to infer that they were a new technique in warfare is hardly correct. Guerillas are poorly organised, ill-disciplined patriots whose arms and equipment leave much to be desired. Special Force was composed predominantly of regular battalions and their arms and equipment were of the highest order available at the time of their operations. Jeb Stewart in the American Civil War employed the same technique. So did Lawrence in Arabia. True Wingate employed Dakotas in place of horses and camels, but he merely used modern weapons and equipment and did not produce a new type of warfare "right out of the hat".

The author's memory is somewhat inaccurate. "Pyats" (his spelling) and flame-throwers were not used in the 1943 operations. He is right in stating that these operations were an experiment, but it is of interest to note that the lessons demonstrated were learnt by those master mimics the Japs as well as or better than by ourselves, and in the various interrogation reports now available it is clear that the 1944 Jap offensive on Imphal was only considered feasible after the realisation that soldiers (be they Jap or Allied) could expand the time and space factor of existence without an L. of C. in the jungle.

The author is none too clear in regard to the plan for the 1944 operations or how these developed. There was never any intention, except in Wingate's mind, that 4 Corps should assume the offensive in that spring. Lack of transport to maintain itself much further east than the Assam-Burma frontier was an over-riding factor. Again, if as stated "some time would be given for our operations to take effect after which a direct attack on a broad front would be launched by our troops on the Indo-Burma border", this would have meant that D-Day for the corps offensive could not have been fixed for much before 1st April—barely six weeks before the opening of the monsoon and therefore a most unlikely date to begin offensive operations. The truth is that Wingate by his personality forced higher authority to commit Special Force to the area Indaw-Katha in spite of every indication that the Jap was planning an offensive on our 4 Corps front. Intelligence had failed to "put across" the magnitude of this operation or its probable thrust lines.

It is manifestly absurd to suggest, as has "Experientia Docet", that the Jap reaction to the landings in his rear was to launch his offensive on Imphal. This offensive, confirmed by interrogation, was long-planned to begin on the

date it did. In fact some commanders have expressed disappointment that the Wingate landings at Broadway and Chowringhee did not stop the Jap offensive, although here again it is difficult to see how this could have happened bearing in mind the Japanese military mentality of sticking slavishly to plan and the enormous distance of these landings behind his start line on which he had dumped all his estimated requirements of men and material to maintain him till 4 Corps' main supply depots were overrun.

Wingate's personal plan, as given to his staff and subordinate commanders, was to dominate an area of 40 miles radius round Indaw. Before the fly-in he told them that the force would operate in two waves of three brigades each, each wave being in action for two or three months. It would be followed up by one or more airborne divisions which would land on the Jap-made Indaw air-strip; would consolidate this area during the monsoon; and would be the spear-head of the grand southward advance in October. In actual fact he was never promised these airborne divisions, which in any event did not exist in the theatre at the time. Nor was the Indaw west air-strip surfaced, cambered or drained and it would have been useless once the monsoon broke. This flaw in the plan could have been avoided if air photo interpretation had been resorted to before the fly-in. It was not until 27th April that I got definite confirmation by ground reconnaissance that the strip was in fact useless for monsoon operations. In the directive issued to him by 14th Army, his first task was to assist the southward advance of General Stilwell. Wingate subordinated this task to the conception given above.

When I assumed command of the force on 31st March, a week after Wingate's death our attack on Indaw, planned and ordered by Wingate, was in progress. Two brigades were already "operating against the road L. of C. running through Pinlebu and Bannauk"; and the West Africans were from the outset, under Wingate's orders, "split up and used in bits and pieces for odd jobs". All this was no new plan as suggested by "Experientia Docet". It was done under Wingate's orders.

The author is incorrect in stating that we were under the command of 33 Corps. That formation was moved hurriedly from the Poona area where it had been engaged in training for amphibious operations well after the opening of the Japanese offensive against Imphal which in turn developed after the fly-in of Special Force. In fact Special Force was until 17th May directly under General Slim at 14th Army Headquarters and no other formation. From that date it owed allegiance to General Slim through General Stilwell, in his capacity of commanding the forces of N.C.A., who made this a condition for his agreement to the "real" new plan.

This "real" new plan was first propounded to General Slim by me on 10th April and to General Stilwell on the 16th, but the latter's agreement was only finally accorded after my second visit to his H.Q. on 1st May when General Slim accompanied me, and "Vinegar Joe" agreed to the plan subject to the force being under his command.

As I have already stated the role given to the force as far back as February by General Slim was primarily to assist General Stilwell, and as the author states himself "if we were really out to help Stilwell we would have done far better to go much further north". The new plan was in essence exactly what the author suggests should have been done in the first instance. The apparent delay in "getting wise" was due to General Stilwell's intransigence, but in fact the new

plan was in operation long before mid-May. Orders for the regrouping of brigades further north were issued on 27th April, and not after mid-May as stated by the author. The difficulty apart from getting the plan accepted was that tired men had to be moved on foot over extremely bad going during pre-monsoon storms and could not use the Dakotas that had flown them so easily to the wrong place in the first instance.

I would here like to stress that all concerned realised that the troops were tired. Wingate's two waves of three brigades each never materialised; he committed three brigades in February and early March; broke up a fourth (the West Africans) at the outset to garrison the strongholds; and finally committed a fifth brigade in under three weeks after the first Broadway landing. This last brigade actually completed its fly-in to "Aberdeen" stronghold on 12th April after long delays due to shortage of aircraft. This left only one brigade in reserve for the second wave on the date I took over, and at my first meeting with General Slim on 31st March, I was told that they were essential to stabilise the main front when no other reinforcements for the hard-pressed 4 Corps were immediately available. With the newborn Jap offensive in full blast it would have been conforming to the enemy's plans to withdraw those L.R.P. brigades already committed at the expiry of their two or three months' operations, quite apart from the fact that this would have resulted in General Stilwell's offensive being still-born. Even if they had been withdrawn after three months' operations this would have been early in June some fourteen days after the monsoon had broken in earnest when our stronghold strips were definitely "out" for Dakotas and the only way to withdraw them would have been to march them over the long dreary tracks to the north through Stilwell's lines. General Slim quite rightly pointed out to me that it was an error of Wingate's to promise withdrawal from operations after a fixed period and, again rightly insisted that the force must continue in the field and carry out its role of helping General Stilwell.

The statement that "for political reasons we were told it was desirable to keep British troops fighting in Burma" is a canard that could only have originated round the bivouac fire. The troops were kept in the field to ensure Stilwell's success, and to pin down all available Japanese reinforcements who, if they had been left unemployed, might well have turned the scale on the main front in the Imphal area with results that it is hard to assess. No other reason was ever given by me or my staff to the troops for their continuance in the field. It is worthy of note that General Stilwell kept his American L.R.P. brigade—Merill's Marauders—in the field as long as ours. True they had several rest periods and their battle casualties were negligible, nevertheless their sickness wastage rate was far in excess of ours.

The possible breakdown of light-plane evacuation of casualties after the advent of the monsoon was foreseen. This was an added reason for the move northwards, since it allowed land and water evacuation routes round the Jap flanks to Stilwell's L. of C. It is a slur on the U.S. Army Air Force categorically to state that the system broke down. In fact over 400 casualties were cleared by light plane from 77 Brigade at Mogaung alone well after the monsoon broke, and many more were evacuated from the other brigades to the west of or in the Railway Valley. The breakdown was only partial and was chiefly due to the almost complete lack of maintenance and administrative components in the Air Commando.

To supplement the light planes the proposal to evacuate casualties by flying boat to Indawgyi lake was raised with Air Marshal Baldwin on 7th May

some three weeks before the monsoon broke. Actually these flying boats (not sea planes as stated) cleared over 500 casualties, while the so-called "Chindit Navy", equipped largely with equipment brought in by these flying boats, evacuated a further 500 down the river from the lake to behind Stilwell's lines at Kamaing. Over a thousand men saved from death largely by the efforts of two flying boats can hardly be called "much vaunted and over publicised". If, as apparently the author considers, the Force should have remained in the "White City"-Indaw area, not one man could have been evacuated by air after the breaking of the monsoon, since the light planes could not do the round trip without fitting extra tanks, thereby leaving no room for patients, and Dakotas could not, once the monsoon broke, have landed on our stronghold strips.

Regarding casualties inflicted on the enemy by Special Force. The "White City" block and the actions in its neighbourhood killed under 1,500 not 2,000 as stated. This latter figure is within 100 of the total bag claimed by 77 Brigade, who in fact did very severe damage to the enemy's effective strength long after the "White City" block was evacuated. Actually 60% of the 5,000 odd Japs counted as killed by the Force were dealt with after the new plan to operate closer to General Stilwell was put into effect, and high ranking Japanese commanders and staff have stated that the heaviest casualties were inflicted at the "Blackpool" block where "one regiment of 53 Division was regrettably annihilated". In this action our troops actually only claimed to have killed 700. It is impossible to estimate the numbers of the enemy who died of disease and starvation as a result of Special Force's operations. On our side deaths in action, sickness and wounded totalled 1,034 and I would hate to conjecture what these figures would have been if the Force had persisted in dominating the Indaw area as planned by Wingate. This figure of 1,034 is under 4% of the total of men put in the field, so that the tales of "men dying at the rate of two a day and there were several suicides" and again "many more died on their feet while trying to struggle out in what were euphemistically known as 'sick convoys'" are perhaps overdrawn when viewed from the wider angle.

As to the lessons deduced by "Experientia Docet", he has I think missed the two most important. The first I would define as the employment of a L.R.P. force in an area where it can best effect the main battle. The "White City" operations killed 1,500 Japs. They would have killed as many if not more if the block had been located nearer to Stilwell's front. If the whole force had struck first at the area Mogaung-Kamaing instead of far to the south Stilwell would possibly have consolidated his objective (the line Mogaung-Myitkyina) in April rather than late in August. The wrecking of the Indaw area supply dumps etc., was largely carried out by air directed by L.R.P. columns. The air could equally well have been directed on to these targets by inconspicuous small parties each consisting of an officer, a wireless terminal and a dozen or so trained local inhabitants. It is certain that if the force had been deployed further north at the outset, the troops would have been saved much blood and sweat in getting to where they were really wanted. This fact is borne out by the success from the outset of Wingate's 23 Brigade deployed by General Slim early in April close in on the east flank of 33 Corps in the latter's advance through Kohima to join up with 4 Corps on the road to Imphal. The operations of the Chin Lushai Brigade against the Jap L. of C. on the Tiddim Road is another example of L.R.P. employed close in to the main fighting front.

The second main lesson to my mind is that the column organisation propounded by Wingate is unsound. Modern rocket-firing aircraft, or for that

matter modern precision bombing technique, or even small forces of 20 men or so air-dropped and air-supplied, can play havoc with an enemy L. of C. as was proved by the Tactical Air Force and the "Resistance" in Normandy immediately prior to D-Day, and again by Force 136 later on in the S.E.A.C. Campaign. As shown by the "White City" and "Blackpool" blocks and the attack and capture of Mogaung, if large numbers of men are put down to operate in rear of the enemy they must be prepared to fight hard and long. Arnheim is yet another example of this necessity of concentrated fighting power. Concentration and economy of force are violated if large numbers are split into penny packets of 400 odd men each. Too much time is wasted in "fading out" for safety before striking again. L.R.P. to justify its cost under all heads must, therefore, be ready to fight continuously against a strong build-up. To do so it must fight by brigades, or even by divisions. But a brigade is slow, unwieldy and vulnerable on hill jungle tracks with mule transport and overladen men. Therefore the column for movement when necessary, and the battalion and brigade for fighting, leaving sabotage and such like to the air and really small air-borne parties of equivalent strength to a platoon.

Of the lessons deduced by "Experientia Docet" I would like to comment on the first "that the bombers were too late—the enemy had gone.....a score of times". This was due to the distance columns were operating from the "G" Staff Office at Force H.Q. which received their message and again the distance from columns to the actual bomber airfields. These distances, at the outset over 200 miles, made wireless communication a slow process owing to atmospherics and "blinding" and while the weather over the target might have been excellent the odds were that it was unfit for flying at the airfield, or what is more likely over the mountains between airfield and target. This produces yet another argument for L.R.P. to be employed closer in to the main front. In the earlier operations of 1944 the Air Commando, through lack of maintenance facilities was quickly "all burnt up." Later when we were under General Stilwell's command the American northern sector air force was obsessed with the urge "to bomb hell outa Mitchener" as they pronounced "Myitkyina", while the monsoon piling up the cul-de-sac of the Hukwang Valley made it often impossible for the fighter bombers to fly through to Mogaung and the railway corridor, while at the same time the route to Myitkyina in the wider Irrawaddi Valley was clear of storm cloud build-up.

I in no way wish to detract from the reputations of two great men—Generals Stilwell and Wingate—who are since dead. But in the interests of historic accuracy I feel bound to correct the errors in "Experientia Docet's" article and in doing so have had to criticise some of the actions of these two officers.

Finally, I would stress that Special Force in 1944 was only what all good infantry should be—well-trained, well-led troops whose introduction to battle was an improvement on infiltration on foot, and now with the improvement of air-borne technique, largely out-dated.

"THE BROKEN RING IS AN UNBROKEN LINK"

Mr. Hurmuz Kaus, Hyderabad, Deccan.

I read with much interest Major F. G. Harden's article, "The Broken Ring is an Unbroken Link" in No. 329 of our *Journal*. In my letter regarding the colours and appointments of the Nizam's Army under French command in our *Journal* No. 327, I have referred, on page 365, to the type of buttons described and illustrated by Major Harden in his article. I was of the opinion that this type of button is found only in the peninsular portion of India, but Major Harden has proved that they are known even in the Punjab, which could hardly be called a field of French influence, like South India in those days. Since I was coming across several buttons of this type in Hyderabad, Madras and Bombay, I said in my letter referred to above that they may be of French origin as they come mostly from the field of French influence. I have several buttons of this type, in two sizes, all in brass, save one solitary specimen, which is in some soft base metal, which may be a specimen submitted to the authorities for approval. The design is definitely French; laurels and numbers which are found even in the present day, on the band of the peaked caps and on the collars of French military uniforms.

Before I proceed further, I would like to describe my collection of this type of button. They are as follows:—

I. Size, 0.90 inch diameter.

Metal, brass.

Shape, round-domed.

Makers, Smith, Kemp & Wright,
Birmingham.

Numbers known in my collection: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 15, 20,
21, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 36,
38, 40, 47 and 49.

II. Size, 0.75 inch diameter.

Metal, brass.

Shape, round-domed.

Number with maker known in my collection:—

No. 8, Hobson & Sons, Lexington Street.

III. Size, 0.70 inch diameter.

Metal, brass.

Shape, round slightly domed.

Numbers and makers known in my collection:—

Nos. 18 and 39, Smith & Kemp, Birmingham.

No. 40, Nutting, London.

IV. Size, 0.70 inch diameter.

Metal, soft base metal.

Shape, round-flat.

Number and maker known in my collection:—

No 42, Nutting, London.

(Total 24 buttons)

I have not come across a single pewter button of this type, and those that I have found are mostly in a good state of preservation, which accounts for the fact that they may have been in use for a short time only.

As Major Harden says, the French were the first European nation to raise, arm and train Indian sepoys into regular regiments. French influence was wiped out of India during the last decade of the 18th century, and the dream of an Indo-French Empire came to an end with the death of Tippu Sultan of Mysore their greatest supporter, at the Battle of Seringapattam in 1799. Major Harden's statement that the Honourable East India Company, the successors of the French in India, adopted the French system and copied their button design seems to be absolutely correct. The buttons of this type, described above, are, no doubt of French design, but were all made by British firms. Moreover the memento of the battle of Aliwal (1846), from the coat of a Sikh sepoy in the service of the Company, is another instance that supports Major Harden's statement.

Major Harden places the date of this type of button as between 1824 and 1850, but I am of the opinion that the Company adopted the French design much earlier, that is, immediately after the decline of the French influence in India. Hence I am inclined to place the date of these buttons in the first decade of the 19th century. My reason for this is that the Company had little or no time to prepare fresh designs for the appointments and accoutrements of their newly raised Indian regiments during a transitional period, and also the die-hard Indians may have attached some sentimental value to the French design, hence the Company, tolerant as usual in such matters, may have retained the French design in their own buttons.

Major Harden says that after 1850 or so, brass replaced pewter in the manufacture of buttons, but experience says otherwise. Probably pewter may have been used before brass in the manufacture of military buttons in England, but in India, either under the French or the English, brass was in use since the beginning. The badges and buttons of the European regiments of the Company raised during the late 18th century, and those of the East India Volunteers raised in England for service in India during the same period, are of brass. One small button in my collection, showing an ornamental "W", surmounted by a crown, belonging probably to a soldier of the time of William IV (1830—1837), is also of brass.

THE O.B.I.

*Lieut.-Colonel Balwant Singh, 2nd Bn. Sikh Light Infantry,
Poona.*

I had recently a case in the battalion where a Jemedar preferred to be Jemedar Adjutant to being appointed M.T. J.C.O. I was rather taken aback by the decision of the J.C.O. for I thought and still maintain that a M.T. J.C.O.'s job is more arduous and has greater demands on intelligence than a Jemedar Adjutant. This irrational decision of the J.C.O. at first perplexed me a lot as I could not attribute to his attitude any plausible explanation. Incidentally this J.C.O. is one of the most intelligent in the battalion and I was therefore made to realise that there must be some very sound reason for his refusing to accept the M.T. appointment and instead volunteering for Jemedar Adjutancy.

The root cause of this was that the J.C.O. looked far ahead and quite rightly too. He must have calculated that he was bound to serve long in the army in view of his greater efficiency and intelligence over others, and that a day would come when he would be pitted against J.C.O.'s of his calibre from all the other units of the Indian Army for winning the coveted O.B.I. which means the honorary rank of Lieutenant and some monetary gain. As most of us know, one of the items besides others for scoring points are the appointments of Jemedar Adjutant, Jemedar Quartermasters and Subedar-Major.

In my opinion it was justifiable in the pre-1939 army to make these appointments in an infantry battalion attractive so that the very best could only avail of them. But now with the change in the armament and equipment of the army it is desirable that the system of attracting the right people be also revised. It would not be wise to dub the intelligent soldiers selfish and unpatriotic if they do not show preference for a good job. The system should be changed so that it allows the best man to take up the best job.

In an infantry battalion, J.C.O.s holding the appointments of M.T.O., Signal Officer, Mortar Officer, Pioneer Platoon Commander, and in fact performing the duties of an officer should be considered equally important and greater dividends be allocated than when they are assistants to an officer. Their point allotment should be the same as the Jemedar Adjutant or the Q.M. Jemedar is entitled to at present. In view of the fact that the New Pay Code does not hold any monetary attractions to J.C.O.s performing officers' duties, the above system will help in attracting the right people for difficult jobs.

The object of my writing this letter is to bring this anomaly to the notice of the authorities and to the readers of the *U. S. I. Journal* so that the present state of things can be put right.

A THINKERS' GUILD

*Lieut.-Colonel Rajendra Singh, 1st Bn. The Indian Grenadiers,
c/o 56, A.P.O., New Delhi.*

Colonel Kapur in his most illuminating article "Importance of Radio Science" in the October 1947 issue of the *Journal*, has cried in desperation to us to make use of constructive ideas. Your *Journal* has given a great deal of encouragement to original thinking and constructive criticism. It seems to have fallen on deaf ears.

It is a great pity that no advantage is being taken of these ideas and suggestions which in many cases are considered outpourings of unbalanced minds. How stupid! If we have to advance and advance we must, we must get down to serious thinking and those who are not capable of doing so must help in giving practical shape to these schemes by their personal and executive backing. Thinkers and writers like Colonel Kapur, who feel bitterly at this delay, should not—I am sure will not—give up, because no immediate action is being taken. Success lies in scientific persistence.

To give more backing to these ideas and to force their acceptance, would it not be a good idea to start "A Thinkers' Guild," a society to encourage, collate and propagate original thought for the advancement of military-cum-scientific knowledge. I, personally, think it would be a good idea. This should become a powerful, national force to guide our future leaders. Young thinkers must have advice and encouragement and this "Guild" would provide them with opportunities and also help in the practical development of their ideas. In time to come it may receive official recognition and attain executive control.

This is not a far-fetched idea. Many institutions, which have now become national, were started as private concerns by enterprising individuals. So let us get down to it.

"INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA"

*Lieutenant E.J. Martin, Church Brampton, Northampton.**

I am only too conscious of my unsuitability to write on this subject, and my excuse for venturing into this field is simply that no one better qualified has hitherto done so.

Owing to inability to make contact with the military authorities of some States, I have been unable to give details of their insignia other than—in a few cases—those ascertainable by observation. If any reader can supply any further information concerning the insignia of the States Forces, preferably accompanied by sketches or—better still—specimens, and would communicate with me at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, this would be gratefully received and incorporated in a supplementary article with illustrations at a later date.

In conclusion I acknowledge the assistance I have received from many sources and in particular from the Military Adviser-in-Chief, Indian States Forces; the Military Advisers, Punjab States Forces, Southern India Circle and Sappers and Miners, I.S.F.; the Military Secretary, Benares State Forces; the Commandant, Chamba State Forces; the Officer Commanding Faridkot State Forces; the Commandant, Idar Sir Pratap Infantry; the Commandant, Mewar State Forces; the Officer Commanding Military Forces, Palanpur State; the Commandant, Tripura Infantry Training Unit; and officers commanding other States Forces; Lieut.-Colonel A. J. Curtis, M.B.E. (Indore State) and Major F. G. Harden, late the King's Regiment (Liverpool).

*The author's article appears in this issue. *Editor, U.S.I. Journal.*

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Major Mohd. Azim Khan, H.Q. 3rd Armoured Brigade, Risalpur.

I have been a member of this famous Institution for just over fifteen months and during this brief period have managed to enlist five members. I shall, however, persuade more of my friends to join. I am also prepared to give my willing co-operation in all matters relating to the advancement of our Institution. Wishing you every success in your noble task.

Brigadier A.B. Bartrop, O.B.E., M.C., Maiden, Dorset.

I would like to tender my thanks to the Institution for the excellent service I have received from it over the past 31 years.

Major B.B. Bhatnagar, H.Q. Eastern Command, Ranchi.

I will do my best to attract more members to this most useful Institution.

Harry Hobbs, Esq., M.B.E., V.D., Old Court House Street, Calcutta.

I have just received the eight back numbers that you sent me and I am full of regret for not having joined before as the reading matter is just what I like. If you have any earlier back numbers please send them to me V.P.P.

Lieut.-Colonel Ajit Singh, H.Q. East Punjab Area, Jullundur Cantt.

I assure you of my fullest co-operation to carry the U. S. I. to even greater heights than it has attained hitherto. I will ask all my brother officers at this H.Q. to join the Institution if they have not done so already.

Captain Sultan Mohd. Khan, R.P.E. Centre, Sialkot.

I will definitely try to make the Institution and *Journal* as popular as I can. The other day we received a copy in the Mess and quite a few people seemed to be very interested in its contents.

Major S.W.H. Jafery, 1/15 Punjab Regiment, Rawalpindi.

I congratulate you on your appointment as Secretary of the Institution and Editor of the *Journal*. Every endeavour will be made to enlist as much support to the Institution as possible.

Major-Qmr. C. Cutting, M.B.E., 1st Bn. Royal Fusiliers, B.A.O.R. 24.

I am very pleased to know that the *Journal* is to continue publication as it will enable those who are interested in India and Pakistan to keep in touch with military events there. Since I became a subscriber in 1942, I have always looked forward to receiving the *Journal* as have my friends, to whom I pass it on to read. The articles are very well written and very informative and instructive.

Major John A. Jamieson, M.B.E., R.E.M.E., Forest Hill, London, S.E. 23.

I have received the *Journal* regularly since returning to England and find it useful in maintaining a link with the many good friends I had the fortune to meet during my period of service in India. May I thank you again for paying so much attention to one so tardy.

Brigadier M. Usman, Comd. 50 Para. Brigade c/o 56 A.P.O., New Delhi.

I would be glad to be of any service to the *Journal* if you ever so desire.

THE SECRETARY'S NOTES

On the 22nd April, the President of the Institution, Lieutenant-General K. M. Cariappa, O.B.E., was able to pay a one-day visit to Simla. He came especially to meet the staff of the Institution and to inspect the U.S.I. building on the Mall, and was very interested in all he saw. Photographs taken during his visit appear in this issue.

Special Council Meeting

A Special Meeting of the Council will be held in New Delhi on the 8th June. Items on the agenda include consideration of the amended Rules and Byelaws of the Institution consequent upon the decision that the U. S. I. is to continue as a joint organisation embracing India and Pakistan ; and the question of moving the U. S. I. from Simla to Delhi. A report of the proceedings at the Meeting will appear in the July issue of the *Journal*.

New Members

We are very glad to announce that since the beginning of the year over 200 new members have joined the Institution and the total membership is now the highest in our long history. The following is a list of members who have joined since 19th January and up to the time this issue of the *Journal* went to press :

*ABDUR RAHIM KHAN, Lieut.-Colonel, Pakistan Diplomatic Service.

ALI RAZA KHAN, Major, Frontier Force Rifles.

AMBARDEKAR, Captain W.S., Indian Signals.

ANEY, H. E. Shri M.S., Governor of Bihar.

APPACHANA, Captain S.T., Mahratta Light Infantry.

APTE, Captain V.K., Indian Signals.

ATTAR SINGH AHALAWAT, Captain, Poona Horse.

AVASTHY, Captain B., Rajput Regiment.

BAGYARAJ, Captain J.R., R.I.A.S.C.

BAHRI, Captain O.P., Dogra Regiment.

BAJAJ, Captain V.P., R.I.A.

BAKSHI, Captain M.L., I.A.O.C.

BAFAT, Major V.G.

BARVE, Colonel C.L., I.A.

BASHIR NAWAZ KHAN, Major, Frontier Force Rifles.

BHADRAN, Esq., C.A.R., I.F.S.

BHAGWANT SINGH SODHI, Lieut., 4th Patiala Infantry.

BHAN, Major C., General Staff.

BHARAT SINGH, Captain, 2nd Punjab Regiment.

BHARUCHA, Major P.C., Kumaon Regiment.

BHASIN, Major K.D., Indian Signals.

*BHATIA, Brigadier S.N., I.A.

BHUPINDAR SINGH AHLUWALIA, 2/Lieut., R.I.A.

BIJI, Lieut.-Colonel R.S., I.A.O.C.

BILIMORIA, Lt.-Cdr. (S) M.R., R.I.N.
 BRAGANZA, Lieut.-Colonel A.H.A., R.I.A.S.C.
 *BRIJENDRA BAHADUR SINGH, Captain, I.A.O.C.

CARDOZA, Major E.R.I., 16 Punjab Regiment.
 *CHADHA, Major R.N., I.E.M.E.
 CHANNAN SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.
 CHAUHAN, Lieut.-Colonel H.S., 11 Gurkha Rifles.
 CHETIA, Major J., Assam Regiment.
 CHIMA, Lieut.-Colonel J.S., R.I.A.S.C.
 *CHOPRA, Major S.R.L., R.I.A.S.C.
 CHOWDHURY, Brigadier P.S., I.A.
 CHOWDRY, Colonel P.P., I.A.M.C.
 CRANENBURGH, Captain L.E., R.I.A.

DALAL, Major J.A.F., R.I.E.
 DARSHAN SINGH DHINSA, Lieut., Sikh Regiment.
 DATTA, Major D. N., Central India Horse.
 D'MELLO, Captain C.B., R.I.E.
 DRIGPAL SINGH, Major, 2nd Yadavindra Infantry.
 DUNNE, Major A.D. Murray, R.E.
 *DYER, Lieut.-Colonel A.J.R., M.B.E., R.I.A.S.C.

FOREGARD, Captain R., R.I.A.
 FRIER, Lieut.-Colonel R.N.D., M.C., Assam Regiment.
 FURTADO, Captain A.O.; Madras Regiment.

GHAI, Captain V.K., 11 Gurkha Rifles.
 *GIMI, Major D.P., Assam Regiment.
 GOUR, 2/Lieut. S.K., 11 Gurkha Rifles.
 GUPTA, Lieut.-Colonel Wishwanath P., I.A.M.C.
 GURBIR SINGH, Captain, Jat Regiment.
 GURCHARAN SINGH, Major, R.I.A.S.C.
 GURDEV SINGH SAHOTA, Captain.
 *GURDIAL SINGH, Captain, Indian Signals.

HAMID, Brigadier S. S., Pakistan Army.
 HANUMAN DAS, Captain, R.I.E.
 HARBANT SINGH, Major, R.I.A.S.C.
 HARDWARI LAL KAUSIL, Subedar, Indian Signals.
 HARMANDAR SINGH KAUCHHUR, Major, Assam Regiment.
 HAERNARAIN SINGH, Brigadier S., I.A.
 HARPARTAP SINGH, Captain, 7 Light Cavalry.
 *HARTAJ SINGH, Lieut.-Colonel, R.I.A.
 HASAN, Major Z., 15 Punjab Regiment.
 HASNAIN, Captain S. M., Royal Garhwal Rifles.

INDER SETHI, Captain.
 IQBAL SINGH, Captain, Indian Grenadiers.
 JAMAL ATHAR, Major, R.P.A.S.C.
 JASPAL, Captain M. S.
 JASWANT SINGH KANG, Captain, R.I.A.
 JAYAL, Captain N.D., R.I.E.
 JUNEJA, Captain S. L., Indian Signals.

- KADKOL, Major A.M., I.E.M.E.
 KAICKER, Colonel A.S., I.A.
 KAPUR, Major H.S., 5 Royal Gurkha Rifles (F.F.).
 *KARWAL, Major J.D., 1 Gurkha Rifles.
 KELLY, Major E.W., R.A.O.C.
 KENT, Lieut.-Colonel S.P.M., Rajputana Rifles.
 KHAIRA, Captain J.S., I.A.O.C.
 KHANNA, Captain R.P., R.I.A.S.C.
 KHURSHID ALI, Major, Frontier Force Rifles.
 KISHAN SINGH, Captain, 9 Gurkha Rifles.
 KOLAH, Major J.D., 2nd Punjab Regiment.
 KOHLI, Lieut.-Colonel R.S.S., Indian Grenadiers.
 KULDIP JIT SINGH CHHATWAL, Major, 5 Royal Gurkha Rifles (F.F.).
 KULRAJ SINGH SOIN, Captain, Rajput Regiment.
 KULKARNI, Captain R.G., 2 Air Liaison Section.
 MALIK, Major A.R.
 MALONI, Captain G.S., R.I.A.
 MASUD KARIM, Major, Frontier Force Rifles.
 MAYADAS, Captain J., Indian Signals.
 MEHTA, Major L. N.
 MILLS, Esq., William S. (ex. Border Regiment).
 MITRA, Lieut.-Colonel A. K., I.A.O.C.
 MOHINDAR SINGH PADDA, Lieut., Royal Deccan Horse.
 *NAGRA, Major G.C., 4 Gurkha Rifles.
 NAIDU, Captain C.R., Poona Horse.
 NAMBIAR, Major A.M.M., Royal Mahrattas.
 NARASIMHAN, Captain R., Indian Signals.
 *NARENDRA SAIN, Major, Jat Regiment.
 NAYUDU, Major E.J., R.I.A.S.C.
 NAZARETH, Captain J., Indian Grenadiers.
 NEGI, Major K.S., Royal Garhwal Rifles.
 NIJJAR, Captain B.S., Rajputana Rifles.
 OHRI, Captain S.P., Indian Signals.
 *PACHNANDA, Lieut.-Colonel K.D., R.I.A.S.C.
 PAVRI, Captain M.S., Indian Signals.
 PHILLIPOWSKY, Lieut. I.G., I.A.O.C.
 PRABHU, Captain B.R., Indian Grenadiers.
 PRADHAN, Captain C.B., Assam Regiment.
 PRAKASH, F/Lieut. D.N., R.I.A.F.
 PRITAM SINGH, Major, 2nd Punjab Regiment.
 PRITHI PAL SINGH, Lieut., 8 Gurkha Rifles.
 PRITHVI RAJ DHAWAN, 2/Lieut., I.E.M.E.
 PURI, 2/Lieut. P.R., R.I.E.
 QAZI, Captain S.H., R.P.A.S.C.
 *QURESHI, Major R.U.
 RAINA, Lieut.-Colonel B.L., I.A.M.C.
 RAJENDRASINGHI, Lieut.-General Shri Maharaj, D.S.O., I.A.
 RAJINDRA SINGH, Colonel, I.A.
 RAMUNNY, Squadron Leader M., R.I.A.F.

- RANDHAWA, Captain P.S., Indian Signals.
 RANJIT SINGH, Major Raj Kumar, Poona Horse.
 RANJIT SINGH CHANDEL, Captain, Dogra Regiment.
 RANJODH SINGH GREWAL, Lieut., 4th Patiala Infantry.
 RAO, Major B.G., I.A.E.C.
 RATHORE, Lieut. S.K., Mahratta Light Infantry.
 RODRIGUES, Brigadier E.A., M.B.E., D.S.O., India.
 ROY, Esq., T.K., Ordnance Officer Civilian.
 SAIFULLAH KHAN, Major, R.P.A.S.C.
 SALAM, Major M.A.
 *SANDHU, Lieut. G.H.S., R.I.N.V.R.
 SANT SINGH, Captain, I.A.E.C.
 *SARBANG SINGH, Captain, Mahar M.G. Regiment.
 SATPAL SINGH, Esq., Ordnance Officer Civilian (Narrator).
 SETHI, Captain Y. P.
 SHAH, Captain A. A., Frontier Force Rifles.
 *SHARMA, Lieut.-Colonel B.P., M.B.E., I.A.E.C.
 SHERIFF, Brigadier M.K., I. A.
 SHETE, Captain M.Y., Indian Grenadiers.
 SHYAM LALL SONI, Captain, Indian Signals.
 SHIAM LAL, Captain, I.T.F.
 SHINGAL, Major H.N., Royal Garhwal Rifles.
 *SIDHU, Major D.S., Jat Regiment.
 SHIVDEV SINGH KATARI, Captain, R.I.A.
 *SIHOTA, Captain H.S., R.I.A.
 SKUKLA, Lieut. S.D., R.I.A.S.C.
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THE UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan is the new title of a very old institution, The United Service Institution of India, which was established in 1871 with the object of the "furtherance of interest and knowledge in the art, science, and literature of the Defence Services." After August 1947, by unanimous agreement among representatives of both the new Dominions on the governing body, the Institution has continued to serve the interests of the officers of the Defence Services of both India and Pakistan.

The governing body of the Institution is the Council which is composed of ex-officio members representing the Governments of India and Pakistan, and elected members from the two Dominions who form the majority.

The activities of the Institution include :—

1. The publication of the quarterly U.S.I. Journal.
2. The maintenance of a reference and lending library principally of military interest.
3. The organisation of lectures at any station in India and Pakistan.
4. The custody of pictures, medals, trophies and relics presented to or purchased by the Institution.

Membership is open to all officers on payment of an entrance fee of Rs. 10 and an annual subscription of Rs. 10. Life Membership costs Rs. 160, which includes entrance fee.

Members receive the quarterly issues of the U.S.I. Journal free and post free to any part of the world. The Journal is of specialists interest to those who follow the military profession and contains original papers, prize essays, articles, and items of news of military interest. Articles, etc., from members are welcomed and, being a semi-official publication, officers have a forum here to air their views on matters of common concern, except of course, politics. Members in India and Pakistan may borrow books from the library of the Institution; books are sent post-free to members, the borrower paying for the return postage only.

Up to about three years ago the membership was composed almost entirely of British officers, but since 1945 many Indian officers have become members. During the past few months the response from both Indian and Pakistani officers, has been most gratifying and more than 400 officers from both Dominions have joined. It is the desire of the Council of the Institution that every officer in India and Pakistan should become a member of the U.S.I.

The Journal of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan

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
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(By courtesy of Captain E. W. Kelly)

THEIR EXCELLENCIES THE EARL AND COUNTESS MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

This photograph of the retiring Patron of the U.S.I. was taken on his last visit to Simla before relinquishment of the office of Governor-General of India.

The Journal of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan

Vol. LXXVIII.

JULY 1948

No 332

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

EDITORIAL NOTES

The Journal

Readers of the Journal will find in the Secretary's Notes the reasons for the late appearance of this issue. We have been trying to surmount difficulties with a temporarily depleted staff, all the while keeping steadily in view one main objective—that the standard of excellence of the Journal must be maintained. The Institution and the Journal have been run by British officers for the last seventy-seven years. With the change of status of India and Pakistan, this responsibility has now devolved on the nationals of this Sub-continent. The task is not to be lightly undertaken, for it is a great and worthy inheritance.

We have spoken of the standard of excellence of the Journal. For this we need contributions from those who have experiences to record, ideas to transmit, and the ability to write. Up to now we have depended almost entirely on British officers for good articles, short stories, news and other items of Service interest. In the nature of things it could not have been otherwise. Most senior officers were British for whom the language medium presented no difficulties. We are still indebted to them for several excellent articles in the current issue, and we hope to publish more in future issues.

Many of them have a warm place in their hearts for the Journal, which is their only link with the Fighting Services they have left, as a glance at our Extracts from Letters to the Editor will show. But with the passage of time their numbers are bound to get smaller.

We now need more contributions from Indian and Pakistani officers. We are confident that there must be many in the two Dominions who *can* write. Again a glance at the articles in this issue should convince one of this. The difficulty at present is that there are too few who care to write, to make the effort to put pen to paper and set down their ideas in simple, clear, prose. Those who have attempted this, however, will know the pleasure that is the reward of a good performance. Apart from such mental satisfaction, there is also the material gain to be derived, when articles which are accepted and published are paid for!

It may be urged that an officer's primary duty is to fight and administer. Those who get to the top, on the other hand, endeavour to do much more. We have a shining example in General Slim, famous Commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma, a former editor of this Journal and now appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Those who have come across his speeches and writings cannot have failed to be impressed by the sensitive and cultured mind they reveal.

We would also appeal to Naval and Air Force officers to take a greater share in contributing articles, etc., to the Journal. By so doing they would be making the Journal more representative of their own Services, and consequently of greater interest to themselves.

We have received a suggestion from one of our British subscribers, that we should have Navy Notes, Army Notes and Air Force Notes as in the R.U.S.I. Journal. We have no doubt this is an excellent suggestion,—we have been, in fact, thinking on such lines for some time—and would certainly welcome contributions under these heads from the three Services in India and Pakistan. We feel, that to begin with in any case, such notes will have to be confined to these two Dominions.

As regards other Commonwealth countries and the U.S.A., we would be glad to receive items of general interest from our readers in those countries. We are making a start in this issue with a New Zealand News Letter. In our next issue we hope to have an American News Letter as well.

Earl Mountbatten

Earl Mountbatten will have a place in history as the last Viceroy of India and the first Governor-General of the Indian

Dominion. In both capacities he had to work hard, more than hard, to work against time so to speak. To him the high office of Viceroy was no sinecure. He had been entrusted with a special mission which demanded great patience, tact, industry and above all great understanding. Strangely enough that mission was to hasten the end of his own Viceroyalty. This he did with such success that he became, almost automatically, the first Governor-General by popular choice of the Indian Union.

Historians of World War II will, of course, record his services to the Allied cause as the Director of Combined Operations and subsequently as the Supreme Allied Commander in South-East Asia.

After his brief spell in high office, Earl Mountbatten was a marked man for high diplomatic appointments abroad. But he has chosen to go back to sea. His naval career, we have no doubt, will ultimately lead to the highest appointment open to a sailor in the Royal Navy. If it does, Earl Mountbatten will be following the footsteps of his father who was First Sea Lord at the outbreak of World War I.

Our New Patron.

His Excellency Shri Rajagopalachari, the new Governor-General of India, has kindly agreed to be our Patron, thereby maintaining the long tradition of the Institution. We extend a warm welcome to our new Patron.

Qaid-E-Azam

With the late appearance of this issue of the Journal, we take the opportunity to record our deep sympathy with the grievous loss which Pakistan has sustained in the passing away of His Excellency Qaid-E-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor-General of the new Dominion. To the millions in Pakistan it is a personal loss. A remarkable career with remarkable achievements has thus come to an end. An outstanding personality has vanished from our midst. As lawyer, politician, popular leader, legislator, statesman and head of a State which he himself largely brought into being, Mr. Jinnah showed brilliance, tenacity, determination, and personal integrity which can be an inspiration to ordinary men of lesser fibre.

Pay Accounts

The regular and punctual disbursement of his pay and allowances is vital to the morale of the fighting man. It is doubtful, however, if there is any accounts department in any country which can claim to be

so efficient as to be free from complaints and criticisms in this respect. This is perhaps inevitably so at the end of a major war.

In our correspondence section we publish a commentary by a qualified contributor from Pakistan on the article on "Costly Inefficiency" which appeared in the January issue of the Journal. Our correspondent attempts to show the working of the Military Accounts Department in peace and war, and discusses the respective merits of the Peace System of Pay Accounts and the War System of Pay Accounts. The question as to whether the Services should be on the Peace System or War System of accounting has been settled in favour of the latter by the Governments of both the Dominions.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council of the Institution has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1949.

"In time of peace the task of a Unit Commander of any Armed Force to lead, train, keep up morale and command his unit is more difficult than in time of war, when there is usually a clear object before him and his men. What are the qualities required of a successful Unit Commander and how can we best ensure that our officers are trained in leadership in order that they may become both good commanders and good leaders?"

Entries are invited from all Commissioned Officers. They should be type written (double spacing), submitted in triplicate and be received by the Secretary. The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan, The Mall, Simla, on or before 30th June, 1949.

Entries will be strictly anonymous. Each essay must have a motto at the top, instead of the author's name, and must be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto outside, and with the name and address of the competitor inside.

Essays should not exceed fifteen pages (approximately 8,000 words) of the size and style of the Journal, and should not be less than 4,000 words. Should any authority be quoted in the essay, the title of the work referred to should be given.

Three judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500 either in addition to, or in substitution of the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1949 issue of the U.S.I. Journal.

Copyright of all essays submitted will be reserved by the Council of The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMMAND IN WAR*

MAJOR-GENERAL H.H. RICH, C.B.

THE difficulties of command in battle are summarised in Field Service Regulations Vol II, Sec. 11. Briefly these are:—danger and fatigue; unforeseen incidents; the enemy doing the unexpected; important messages going astray; and an imperfect knowledge of the situation. After this somewhat gloomy picture F.S.R. goes on to give certain points which will assist a commander to overcome these difficulties and to defeat the enemy. These are:—clear understanding and maintenance of the objective; surprise and distraction of the enemy; speed in action; concentration of all available means; offensive action; and constant thinking ahead.

Thus we see a leader has to make his decision under the most distracting circumstances and the first thing he has to do is to be absolutely certain of what his object is. Those who have read Foch's book, *The Principles of War*, will remember the incident when Verdy du Vernois arrived on the battle-field of Nachod. Foch writes:—

"In the presence of the difficulties which faced him, he looked into his own memory for an instance or a doctrine that would supply him with a line of conduct. Nothing inspired him. 'Let history and principles', he said, 'go to the devil. After all WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? And his mind instantaneously recovered its balance'".

These four words, "What is the problem?", are among the most helpful that have ever been written for a commander, as once he has made up his mind what his problem is the rest of his difficulties become less.

A leader must remember that his plans will invariably have to be made on insufficient data and with the bugbear of time always to the fore. That necessitates a good military imagination, for a commander must be able to visualise the enemy's dispositions and what he is likely to do in the particular circumstances. The simpler the plan, the easier and quicker it is for troops, who will often be weary, to carry it out.

All plans require a tremendous amount of will-power in order to carry them through successfully. It is certain that, no sooner has a plan been made, than further information, some true, some false, will come in and it will tend to make the commander think that he should modify his plan. No doubt there are occasions when further reliable and important information will cause him to make a change. More often than not, however, the additional information only has the effect of making him try to improve an already sound plan. We must never forget that "The Best is the Enemy of the Good", and that a reasonably sound plan which can be carried out in the time available has every chance of success, while a perfect plan which has not sufficient time for its execution is bound to fail.

Once the commander has made his decision and his staff are working out the details, he must use his imagination and foresight and think out what the enemy can do to embarrass his plan. No action is required of him at this stage, but if he thinks wisely, then when the enemy does take action, he will be able to counter it immediately.

* Cf. *The Qualities of A Leader* by the same author in the January 1943 issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*.

When the troops have started to move in accordance with the plan, a leader's difficulties are by no means over and he has to bring very much to the fore his qualities of tenacity and optimism. The American book, *Infantry in Battle*, describes this state of affairs very picturesquely:—

"Battle impressions tend to weaken the will of a commander. Casualties, confusion, reported failure, exaggerated stories of actual conditions, all batter at the rampart of his determination. He must consciously resist these onslaughts; he must deliberately take an optimistic view. Otherwise he and his unit with him, will bog down in a mire of discouragement and despair."

TRAINING FOR COMMAND

Training for command is not always given the attention it deserves. I shall try to give the reader some hints which I hope will prove useful both for improving himself and for training those under him in the art of leadership.

The first thing is to realise that although the administrative side of war may be an affair of pure mathematics, the tactical side of war can never be thus considered. It is no good, as is often done, dividing an operation area into equal portions and giving each portion to a unit or sub-unit. Ground is the key to all tactical considerations. Here are some words of wisdom about ground in the breezy style of *Infantry in Battle*:—

"Manoeuvres that are possible and dispositions that are essential are indelibly written on the ground. Badly off, indeed, is the leader who is unable to read this writing. His lot must inevitably be one of blunder, defeat and disaster.

"On the other hand, the intelligent leader is aware of the fact that the terrain is his staunchest ally. Realizing that it virtually determines the formation and scheme of manoeuvre, he will constantly study it for indicated lines of action. For instance, there may be no evidence of the enemy, yet the terrain may say clearly and unmistakably, 'If you come this way, beware! You may be enfiladed from the right'; or it may say, 'Right-o! This way to the hostile position'; or again, 'Close your formation here or a platoon or two will be lost'.

"The ability to read the writing on the ground is an essential to the infantry leader. In open warfare he will never be able to arrive at a detailed idea of the hostile dispositions. He can, however, see the ground. He can see where enemy weapons are likely to be located. He can see critical points from which a few well-emplaced machine guns can knock his attack into a cocked hat. He can see what areas the enemy can cover effectively and what areas are difficult for him to defend. He can pick out the routes of advance which permit effective fire support by his own supporting weapons. From this study of the ground he can plan his attack, make his dispositions and send back requests for definite artillery missions.

"So it goes. If we have a clear idea of the enemy's dispositions, which will be seldom indeed, we will attack him, taking the terrain into consideration. If his dispositions are obscure and the situation vague we can still solve the problem. *By attacking the terrain, we can effectively attack the enemy*".

We train our leaders by holding T.E.W.Ts. and exercises with the troops, and we must endeavour to produce those difficulties of command, which I have already mentioned, in all these exercises. It is of course impossible to bring out things like danger to life and limb, but most of the other points can be brought out.

We usually make our plans during training in favourable conditions, very often in the comfort of our tents, before proceeding on the exercise. In war, this may happen at the beginning of a campaign, but once it is under way, we usually have to make our plans lying under a bush in the drenching rain. Although we cannot

rely on the elements to produce their inconveniences just when we want them, we can at least make our plans in the circumstances in which they might be made in war.

War is not a game and we cannot expect the enemy to abide by the rules we have framed ourselves. We must anticipate that the enemy will do things to thwart our plans before they have been put into execution. If, for instance, we make a nice plan and fix zero some hours ahead, we must not expect that the enemy will have done nothing in the meanwhile, especially if our reconnaissance and other movements have led him to suspect that something is in the offing. In our T.E.W.Ts. we must make a habit of arranging for the enemy to do something if there is a long time-interval, so that a commander has practice in making up his mind whether he will let his original plan go through or whether he will have to make other dispositions to counter the enemy's movements.

It is usually assumed in training that all messages get through to their destination and for this reason we do not think enough of sending important messages by alternative routes. This must be practised during training and if the commander sends a message by only one means, he must be made to realise that such a message may not get through. It does not require any great imagination on the part of a director as to how to do this.

In war it is safe to say that all plans have to be made on very meagre information. This information has always got to be sought for and, more often than not, fought for. So we must get out of the habit of dishing up information in a T.E.W.T. We must make a commander realise that his Intelligence Service has to dig out the information for him. This will undoubtedly be a strain on the imagination of the director and will entail a certain amount of "play-acting" and the production of "characters". Do not be frightened of this "play-acting", as it helps to keep up interest and certainly introduces more realism into all exercises. A commander is always wanting more information and he gives to his information-gaining officers, either ground or air, questions he wants answered. A commander should be made to realise that if he gives vague instructions he will get vague information. That can usually fairly easily be brought out during exercises.

In written exercises and academic discussions, a definition of the object is often one of the hardest military problems; in practice it is not so difficult, as all it really is, is making up our minds as to what we want to do. It is probable that we shall get somewhat vague instructions from our superiors. If this is the case, it is up to us to tackle them and to make them give us something more precise. If a subordinate gets indefinite instructions and accepts them he has only himself to blame when his subsequent actions meet with disapproval. We must realise, however, that sometimes vague instructions may be all that a superior can give us. Then a frank discussion may assist in clearing up the doubtful points. Once we have made up our minds about the object, all our energies must be directed on its attainment. Nothing is easier and nothing more likely to lead to failure than an attempt to do everything, or worse still, to chase each hare as it crosses our path. In war, many things will tend to draw us away from our objective; such as unsuspected enemy dispositions, threat of hostile action from unforeseen directions and information arriving in after we have made a plan. T.E.W.Ts. and exercises with a view to bringing out the difference in action when a commander sticks to his objective and when he allows himself to be influenced by mere trivialities should occasionally be introduced into training.

Battle is still chiefly a combat between the wills of the opposing commanders and no battle is lost until a commander thinks it has been lost. Often a battle has been won or lost before a shot has been fired. Sometimes the bravery and staunchness of troops can turn what ought to have been a defeat into a victory. Most commanders are prone to consider their own difficulties and to forget that the enemy leader is almost certain to be in a like state. Having made up our own minds, we

should try and exploit indecision on the part of the enemy until we get him into a complete state of nerves. To achieve this we must always be thinking out ways and means, big and small, to keep him guessing. An integral part of any plan is the steps to be taken to deceive the enemy. Without detriment to his initiative a leader can make use of reserves and mobile troops to do this. A preconceived idea is a very dangerous thing and if we can sow in the enemy's mind the seed of a false idea, we should be able to keep such an idea alive by movements which would tend to confirm it.

Speed in action is largely the result of organisation and clear thinking during training. In nearly every operation of war there is a preliminary drill by which we can gain time. Without taking an unjustifiable risk, it is impossible to speed up by cutting down the time allotted to the junior leaders for reconnaissances and orders. When time is short, the few minutes spent by a commander in making an appreciation and division of the time available are invaluable. If, for instance, a commander can only give himself a very short period for his reconnaissance, he will only be able to go to one point on the battle-field and will have to use the eyes of somebody else for the other portions. As this speed in action in training is largely a question of organisation, there should be no excuse for a commander who wastes time, and directors of exercises must make a point of checking if there has been an avoidable loss of time. There is, of course, a difference in the time factor in training and in war. Reconnaissance will always take longer in war when there are enemy bullets and shells and we have to crawl on our stomachs instead of assuming the ostrich-like movements so often seen in training. Directors must watch this question of realism during reconnaissances. In battle, we shall probably only just have the inclination to poke our heads quickly over or around some form of cover to take a very hasty look at the ground. This form of reconnaissance must be practised during training.

We are rarely, if ever, in the enviable position of having sufficient troops to be safe everywhere. Usually in order to concentrate all available means in one place we have to take calculated risks in another. We must remember that the greater strength we collect at the decisive point, the greater will be our chances of success, and if we win there, it does not matter much if we are defeated locally elsewhere.

Some people like to keep a reserve instead of having one; that is, they like to keep a unit or sub-unit always in reserve for use at the last possible moment, or, preferably, not to use it at all if an emergency does not arise. Having a reserve is slightly different. In this case, a unit or sub-unit starts off in reserve, but, when a sudden opportunity—not an emergency—presents itself, the reserve is pushed in, may be quite early in the operations. Immediately the reserve has been put in, it must be built up again by collecting troops that have done their job or have been squeezed out when the first reserve was put in. A reserve is a necessity, but it is just as necessary to use it when opportunity offers.

It is a platitude to say that battles cannot be won without offensive action, but at the same time, Field Service Regulations warn us against adopting the offensive just for the sake of so doing. When there is any doubt as to what to do, offensive action almost always pays, and on these occasions we should remember the parody on the old maxim:—

“Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just,
But ten times he who gets his blow in first”.

The spirit of the offensive is one that should be encouraged in all leaders down to the most junior. The balance between victory and defeat is surprisingly small. There have been many examples in history of victory being achieved by the action of a few individuals or a sub-unit. Our training can help very greatly in fostering this spirit. Unfortunately, sometimes, this independent action may upset the director's carefully arranged plan. In spite of this, however, sub-units must be

given credit for successful action, otherwise they become discouraged and their leaders will not take similar steps on another occasion. It is largely a question of intelligent umpiring and sufficiency of umpires. There is no reason why a director should not allow his plans to go away. If he has any imagination, he should be able to produce something fresh. We have the excellent system of "stand fast" and "continue" bugle calls, and with an intelligent use of these, a director should still be able to bring out the lessons he requires, even if temporarily upset by the action of a junior leader.

A commander, however junior, can never "let up". As soon as he has made a plan and issued orders for it to be put into effect, he must start thinking of the next phase of the operations. His thoughts will probably run on two lines; possible enemy reactions to his plans and the movements of his headquarters and reserves to take advantage of success or to retrieve failure. In an attack, a commander should be constantly asking himself if it is time to move his reserves forward remembering the principle that:

"Reserves should be moved forward.....as the attack progresses, so that they can be used with the minimum delay".

Here it is always a question of taking a risk. A commander may decide that, when his forward troops have reached a certain area, it is probable that his attack will succeed and that he should move up his headquarters and reserves. If he has guessed right, his reserves will be in a position to deal with any enemy counter-attack. If he has guessed wrong, he is no worse off, provided that he has moved his reserve to a tactical area. Moreover, it will often have the effect of causing surprise to the enemy who will not expect to meet it so far forward. So it seems that in war the commander's time is divided up into distinct phases: phases of quick physical action in making reconnaissances, seeing things for himself or moving from old to new headquarters, alternating with phases of deep mental concentration in making plans and then thinking ahead as to their effects.

TEN COMMANDMENTS FOR LEADERS

1. The making of decisions is the duty of a commander; there is no other duty equal to this.
2. Thou shalt not make to thyself any complicated thing either in thy planning, or in thy order, or in thy formations. For in difficult situations and in excitement only the simplest movements can be carried out. Those that are complicated will result in calamities upon thee, upon thy troops, even unto all that thou hast.
3. Thou shalt not fail to supervise the actions of thy troops, for he will not be held guiltless who faileth to exercise supervision.
4. Remember that surprise is usually decisive and much can be sacrificed to achieve it. In all engagements, regardless of importance and for all units, regardless of size, thou and thy leaders and thy troops shall labour to obtain surprise; for without surprise thou shalt not be blessed with victory nor rest from thy labours.
5. Study well the ground that thy days and those of thy troops may be long in the land.
6. Thou shalt not neglect to maintain thy object.
7. Thou shalt not be pessimistic.
8. Thou shalt not fail to consider the welfare of thy troops.
9. Thou shalt not forget the difficulties of thy enemy.
10. Thou shalt not fail to co-operate with the other services, thou shalt not fail to co-operate with the gunners, nor the sappers, nor the tanks, nor the infantry, nor all the administrative services.

THE MILITARY ART AS AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT *

CYRIL FALLS

Chichele Professor of the History of War, Oxford

I HAVE been compiling a lecture to be given to the most famous of British military educational institutions on the study of military history. I have been writing a review of the official volume covering the final phase of the First World War in France and Belgium, concluding with the complete defeat of Germany and the Armistice of November 11, 1918. I have been listening to discussions in a military mess on the form which the official history of the Second World War ought to take. And I have just paid an instructive visit to the School of Infantry. All these experiences have led to fresh consideration on my part of the value of military history and theory to professional soldiers. This is a matter of moment to the Army in the present circumstances. In the third year after the conclusion of the greatest of wars the Army is being reduced in strength to an extent greater than the most pessimistic in its rank had expected. The infantry, without which, according to Field Marshal Lords Montgomery, it is still impossible to win battles, has recently been subjected to another drastic cut in the elimination of the second battalions of regiments. There is a tendency, which I must assume to be inevitable but which fills me with anxiety, to do away with front-line fighting troops for the sake of a large number of administrative or ancillary soldiers who do not themselves fight. So far as one can see, the fate of the real fighting units of the Regular Army in the near future is to be a cadre for expansion on the one hand and, on the other, a mother to the Territorial Army, which cannot yet be said to have been born.

In these circumstances the quality of the training which the Regular Army receives becomes of even greater importance than it has been in the past. It has to provide what may be called yeast for a considerable mass, actual or potential. The fighting force which it can produce immediately on demand must be small, so that it is urgently necessary that this should be efficient, and, indeed, there is no excuse for its not being so. Yet its other function, that of permeating, staffing, and in general animating a force on the scale which would be required in time of emergency, is even more vital. Both call for the best methods of training. As I pointed out in an article some time ago, the layman's conception of training as a mixture of drill or "square-bashing" and of unit exercises on Salisbury Plain and other open spaces, is inaccurate. Useful as such types of training are, they represent only a small proportion of that which is imparted in the units and above all, in the schools, under which term I include the Staff College, the Royal Military Academy, and every type of educational establishment. These two in particular have to include a great number of subjects, and there is no time for any which are not of practical value. The question to be answered is whether military theory and military history can be ranked under that heading.

As regards theory, there can be no doubt about the answer, even though some senior officers profess to find no purpose in it. In fact, it cannot be avoided. The simplest tactical training contains a large element of theory, that theory which is founded upon experience. It would be impracticable to work out each small problem purely in the light of commonsense, necessary though that element must also be. When a company commander learns that by night he must make different disposi-

tions from those which he assumes by day, an element of theory is being introduced into his instruction. The same thing occurs when he studies the principles of village fighting, whether with a diagram or a model or in the open. Theory is, in fact, a short cut. It must accord with commonsense and be accepted by the student as doing so, but it saves time and prevents errors and divergencies of method by creating a series of by-passes round obstacles which it would otherwise take too long to surmount. If it should be adhered to in a wooden and unimaginative manner, it will undoubtedly cramp initiative and originality, and that is a danger always present. It can be overcome if the instructors are up to their work. I believe that they are nowadays, as in the years immediately after a great war they should be. And if there has been laid down, as in the British Army and most others, a list of "principles of war", what can they be called but theory?

In the case of military history, the answer is more difficult, since it does not provide ready-made answers to any problem. The mere bookworm, who has steeped himself in the campaigns of the great captains and failed to learn how to command a sub-unit or carry out the functions of a junior staff-officer, is unlikely to be efficient in war. Yet Napoleon was a great reader without being a bookworm. It was he who advocated reading and meditating upon the wars of the greatest captains, and he practised what he preached. He profited from this form of study more than most commanders can hope to. In his first command he was called upon to operate in the Alpine theatre of the War of the Austrian Succession, which he had particularly studied and though the situation in which he found himself was not an exact reproduction of that of the Prince de Conti and Marshal de Maillebois in that campaign, it was close enough to it for his reading to become of direct practical value to him. Admittedly this is rare, because military history does not repeat itself. It does, however, repeat situations which bear a general likeness to each other and which are governed by the same principles, precepts or warnings. It can never be more than one factor in military education—and that as regards strategy rather than tactics, because strategy changes to a lesser extent than tactics—but in my view it still has a part to play. And I am glad to say that this is at present the official view.

In "The Use of History", Mr. A.L. Rowse writes: "You will already have guessed what I think to be the prime—though not the only—use of history. It is that it enables you to understand, better than any other discipline, the public events, affairs and trends of your time. What could be more important? If you do not understand the world you live in, you are merely its sport, and apt to become its victim. . . . For that is what history is about. It is about human society, its story, and how it has come to be what it is; knowing what societies have been like in the past and their evolution will give you the clue to the factors that operate in them, the currents and forces that move them, the motives and conflicts, both general and personal, that shape events". And what can be said of history in general can be applied to the particular branch of the history of war. It enables the student to see and comprehend war as an entity. It shows him not only how and why wars break out, but also their nature and tendencies in relation to the type of civilisation and social order, the geographical and economic situation, of the nations concerned, and the type of armament and industrial standard of the age. That it is often extremely difficult to read the lessons aright and that those who succeed in doing so are often disregarded, is no more than an illustration of human fallibility and the complexity of the subject. It does not imply that military history is of no use.

* Mr. Rowse remarks that this interpretation in the light of the past is not the only use of history, and again we may proceed from his general to our particular history. There is besides the more purely utilitarian benefit a remarkable fascination, a deep inspiration, in discovering how our fore-runners lived and toiled and died. It cannot fail to stir the imagination of every intelligent soldier to learn how his ancestor under Vere or Marlborough in the Low Countries, Galway or Wellington in Spain, Abercromby or Wolseley in Egypt, existed and behaved, how he was armed and how

he handled his weapons, what he thought of the war and of his commander, in what estimation he was held by his foe, how he was fed, what compensations he found in the hard and bleak life of warfare. It comes to us with a shock of amused delight when, in a foreign verdict on the English soldier of the sixteenth century, it is stated that he was a good fighting man but grumbled mightily if he did not get what seemed to the Continental soldier a vast quantity of food, also that one of his weaknesses in siege warfare was a habit of leaving the trenches to dig up conies. Information of this sort is not going to afford direct assistance in the winning of a battle, but it has its value in the broadening of the mind and in the stimulation of the imagination. The officer needs this as much as the man in any of the higher professions.

The first need of the soldier is to be able to fight, or to administer, or both, as occasion offers. The second is to find himself at home in the atmosphere of warfare, to have an understanding of war as a whole, to possess the power of estimating in what circumstances war will occur, what the upshot will be, and the significance of the successive phases of a war or a campaign. This latter must rank below the former in importance, but it is not to be despised. And as it is something which the military correspondent and student of warfare may share with the professional soldier, it may not be beside the point to describe my own experience here. I found myself, on the outbreak of the last war, called upon at the shortest notice to act as a military correspondent. My assets were a relatively short period of service as a junior regimental officer and junior staff officer, and a longer period as a student and writer of military history, together with some interest in the theory of war and a certain knowledge of military geography. And I am sure that such success as I had in exposition and analysis was due to that background, and that I could not have tackled what for me was a novel task without it. As I have said, this is by no means the primary job of the serving soldier, but it may easily become one of his jobs, and I believe that he will find it useful in any job.

There is nowadays a good deal of pressure from various points to narrow the military officer's education at all stages down to the severely practical. But severely practical men, who are nothing more, often reveal serious limitations. It is thus a matter of satisfaction to me that there appears to be an intention to resist this pressure and to make of our officers, so far as is practicable, what Bacon calls "full men", as well as men of action. The Royal Engineers have definitely that end in view as regards the students they send up to Cambridge. The science degree which these serving officers are expected to take, is intended to be of practical value to them in their profession, but besides that they are expected to benefit from the life and association of a great residential university. On narrower lines all can be given similar opportunities and the Army itself may exercise some of the functions of a university.

THE GAIETY THEATRE, SIMLA

BRIGADIER W. E. H. CONDON, O.B.E. *

THERE must be few English speaking people who have never heard of the Simla Amateur Dramatic Club and the Gaiety Theatre of Simla. Kipling's immortal stories gave them their first world-wide fame, and the departing generation of British servants of India maintained the century old tradition of the spirit of the Gaiety. Indeed, its reputation as one of the oldest established amateur dramatic clubs in the world and the only one with its own theatre, has probably never stood higher than during the last quarter of a century.

Now that, together with a host of other legacies of which the British connection with India is justly proud, it has passed to Indian control, a glimpse into the past of this most interesting building with its numerous associations with personalities of the past is worthwhile.

The earliest records of an amateur dramatic club in Simla go back to the first year of Queen Victoria's reign over 110 years ago; but its history during the first fifty years of its existence was lost through a disastrous fire that destroyed the old Assembly rooms. These rooms were in fact the theatre of those days and held the records of the Club. They stood on the site of the present Simla meat market, and it was not till after they were burnt down that the present theatre was built in 1887.

The history of the sixty years from then till 1947 is complete in the records of the meetings held, the photographs, critiques and programmes of plays produced, and in such works as the late Sir Edward Buck's *Simla Past and Present*. In point of fact, since 1888 over 570 plays, etc., have been staged in the Gaiety Theatre. Their range has covered Grand Opera such as *Cavalleria Rusticana*, musical comedies such as *The Geisha* and *The Arcadians* and revues of the modern type with of course many presentations of the works of Gilbert and Sullivan. In straight plays, practically every outstanding stage success from London has been presented including tragedies and farces, romances, thrillers, problem plays and comedies. Many productions ran for as much as ten performances. The record year was 1896 in which twenty-one plays were produced.

When Simla was the capital of India and did not have to share the honour to any great extent with any other city, it was natural that her only theatre should receive patronage from the highest in the land. That patronage still exists and is shown in every programme, but in days gone by it was very real and amounted to regular attendance at plays, if not active participation in the affairs of the Club.

During the 19th century, Lord Lytton, himself a famous author, wrote and produced a drama; Lord Roberts, India's most famous Commander-in-Chief and one of Britain's greatest Captains of all time, was an active President; Lord Baden-Powell, a colonel in 1899, figured on the stage of the Gaiety Theatre as a successful comedian in the comic opera *The Geisha*. These three stand out from a long list of names of men and women themselves famous in their time, who helped to make the Gaiety Theatre what it is. Of Kipling it is said that he both wrote for and acted in the theatre but was not inspiring as an actor.

* A former President of the Simla Amateur Dramatic Club.

Apart from the theatre's primary role as the scene of plays produced by the Simla Amateur Dramatic Club, it has served many other interests as well. Its excellent acoustic properties, convenient seating, and central position have made it the venue for debates, meetings of local societies, concerts and lectures. In regard to the last named, it was the regular policy of the United Service Institution of India to organise a full programme of lectures (generally fortnightly) throughout the summer seasons of Simla. The subjects covered the widest range of activity, civil and military, and the lecturers were often men of the greatest eminence. With the departure from Simla of the headquarters of all the departments of the Government of India, there has been little field for the resuscitation of such enterprise after the close of Great War II. In the future, however, if Simla regains any of her former position as a summer headquarters, the means to renew this illuminating side of the institution's activities are there in the shape of the theatre and its amenities.

With regard to its use in war-time, its facilities were lent in both the Great Wars to further objects connected with the welfare of the Fighting Forces. It was natural that these activities should be directed towards organising travelling companies, concert parties etc., and many a successful company was collected in Simla and put through its rehearsals at the Gaiety Theatre. Since World War II, the theatre has returned to its original function, and in 1946 and 1947 although lacking the support that the Simla of old was able to give, a full programme of plays was successfully produced. The box office results showed that public appreciation had not waned and those who could compare vouched for the fact that the standards of acting and presentation were as high as ever.

In 1937 the Club held its centenary and a booklet was produced giving some interesting extracts from the past history of the theatre. It was natural that a major bogey in the eyes of the Club was the rise and spread of the cinema. To quote Noel Coward (and the author of the booklet) *Who is going to pay four rupees to see the Simla amateurs when you can get Garbo for eight annas?* Nevertheless, the intervening ten years have shown that the Gaiety can hold its own with three cinemas in Simla even when showing Garbo and a host of other stars. When the run of a play is in progress, the public prefer to pay their four rupees and see acting which Lord Curzon in his farewell speech in 1905 described as "vainly endeavouring to disguise the genius of the professional under the guise of the amateur". Such is the story of the Gaiety Theatre of Simla as founded and administered by the British connection. To quote once more the author of the centenary booklet: "This Club is a Simla tradition and we owe it to the famous generations of the past to maintain and hand it on".

In October 1946 the Indian members, then still a minority but an energetic and enthusiastic one, produced Ibsen's *A Doll's House*. The setting was altered to India and the characters and script adapted to the setting. The play was a success and in 1947 the experiment was repeated with Priestley's *They came to a City*. Gaining confidence and experience the Indian cast achieved the highest standards of artistic achievement in this play, and took it to New Delhi for a run during January and February 1948. Unfortunately, after the first performance, the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi plunged India in mourning and put an end to the venture. However, the reception at this performance was enthusiastic and a start had been made. Let us hope the seeds of successful production in the future have been sown.

The Simla Amateur Dramatic Club and the Gaiety Theatre are now under Indian management. They are not the least of the many legacies of artistic achievement and tradition that have passed to India with her independence. The good wishes of past members of the Simla Amateur Dramatic Club go with the Gaiety Theatre. May her spirit flourish in the future as it has done in the past.

ARE WE NEARER WAR ?

DR. BISHESHWAR PRASAD, M. A., D.LITT.

IS war in sight? All premonitions will easily point to it. The three Great Allies of the Second World War are, it seems, pulling at crossways.

Symptoms are not lacking to denote an almost open antagonism between the two great giants, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. An unseemly competition is going on between the two for perfecting and inventing the deadliest weapons of war. In each country armament is piling up. Ideologically there is open warfare against Communism in the non-Soviet states, which borders on the witch-hunting of medieval times. In the diplomatic field, in every phase of Central-Eastern European politics open conflict between the two has been in evidence. Whether one takes Trieste, Greece, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia or Austria, everywhere Soviet-American conflict has prevented any lasting or just settlement. And on the question of the reconstruction of Germany, particularly control over Berlin, a serious crisis has developed leading to blockades and counter-blockades, recriminations and counter-recriminations, even leading to the threat of reference to the Security Council, which have fogged the amicable relations between the two.

The U.S.A. has tried to fortify her influence in the Mediterranean world, which cannot be viewed with complacency by the U.S.S.R. The recent elections in Italy brought the issue to a head, but the defeat of the Leftist elements there has for the present thrown into shade the pro-Soviet elements. Nonetheless, it cannot be supposed to imply the cessation of Soviet interest in that region. The cruising of the U.S. Fleet, ostensibly for training exercises, in the Mediterranean, the open aid to the Turkish Government and the support of the Rightist elements in Greece cannot but be resented by the U.S.S.R. Further, between the two lies the dispute regarding Korea. It may also be presumed that the Chinese Civil War interests the two Powers in so far as the support to the contending parties is concerned. Recent developments in South-East Asia tending to the increasing strength of the Communist elements are bound to create alarm in the U. S. A. This clash of interests between the two great Powers, ideologically separated, and equally influenced by expansionist ambitions, does not augur well for the peace of the world. It is their unveiled hostility and the almost daily pricks of the bubble in one part of the world or the other, which create the scare of war and denote a condition of war-preparedness.

History is eloquent about the evil effects of the formation of coalitions, ententes, leagues and Power blocs. Both the first and the second World Wars were preceded by such alignments which, every objective historian will say, were more than any other single factor responsible for the conflagration. The war has not long ended but we see again glaring symptoms of the division of Europe, rather the world, into hostile groups. The recent attempts to form a West European bloc, ostensibly with the active assistance of the U.S.A., which has thrown its gold into war-exhausted Europe, have reacted in the strengthening of the Soviet-influenced group in Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Cominform, the meeting of the eight notables, in Warsaw, and the expulsion of France and England from the Danube Commission are all clear indications of the tightening of the bonds among the eastern states which are openly in league with the U.S.S.R. This group-politics is responsible for the distractions in Italy and the division of Germany. It is not unlikely that efforts will be made again by one bloc or the other to resuscitate Germany and Japan, as apparently Italy has been, to take their place in the fight against the hostile bloc. Europe is distracted and financially bankrupt. The intense nationalism of the smaller states, which are

unable to stand on their legs in this age of competition, compels them to throw themselves into one pool or the other. This condition promotes grouping and incites aggression. Now that Europe has again taken to this path, danger to peace is clear enough.

More than Europe, Asia has become the danger spot whose nimble flames might any moment develop into a bonfire. The Middle East has led to two wars in the present century, and even today the situation there is not free from anxiety. Its immense resources, its geographical situation, and the traditional weakness of its people, have lured Western Powers to seek bases for exploitation there. England has a long association with the Persian Gulf region, and would not prefer to let Iran, Iraq or Palestine pass under any other influence but her own. The U.S.A. has recently transacted an alliance with Saudi Arabia which is but a bridge-head for establishing control over this region presumably for its oil resources. Her interest in Zionism has led her to countenance the establishment of an independent Israel which has involved Palestine in a war. The U.S.S.R. is also not without ambitions in this region, though they may not be apparent yet. Her support of the Leftist elements in Iran, pressure on her to permit exploitation of oil resources in northern Iran, and her interest in Iraq are well known. In the nineteenth century Czarist Russia had an eye on the Persian Gulf as an open sea board for the practically land-locked Russian Empire. The situation may not be vitally different now. Thus the three main Powers have each interest in the Middle East, which could at any moment assume a condition of antagonism. To complicate issues, one has to reckon with the growing nationalism of the Middle Eastern peoples. Arab nationalism had been encouraged by the Allies in World War I. It blossomed in the establishment of the independent States of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Syria. On the Palestine issue Arab solidarity, which is a rare phenomenon, has found expression, and with the active support of Egypt, a united Arab bloc is coming into being. Arab nationalism, if strong, would not permit the relapse of North African lands into a state of colonialism, whether under Italian aegis or under British or American. Arab antagonism to Turkey on the one hand, and to Iran on the other, together with their efforts to have one solid Arab phalanx from the Sudan to Morocco in Africa and from Syria to Iraq or even Iran in Asia, might tend to create new problems distasteful to the Western Powers. The Middle East situation does not augur well for peace, and the present Arab-Israel conflict in Palestine might any day kindle the spark for a general world war.

The situation in South-East Asia or in the Far East is also not without its dangers. Intense national sentiment in Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaya and Burma will not long tolerate any vestige of colonialism which has kept these lands under heel so long. The writing on the wall is clear enough, but weak Dutch and French imperialisms do not seem to take the warning. Britain also is reluctant to lose her grip on Malaya, for Singapore may once again become the base to dominate the Indian Ocean and the South-West Pacific. Britain has granted autonomy to Burma, but even the faintest glimpse of foreign influence is a red rag to the extremists there. Nationalism, under whatever appellation, Communism or any other 'ism', is in open conflict with imperialism in South-East Asia. It is impossible to keep the fire confined to those limits. Major power politics might find it necessary to intervene there, and thus a seemingly local national struggle might enlarge into a world war. The same is true of China, where the Civil War, between the Nationalists and Communists, each supported directly or indirectly by one of the major rival Powers, has the potentiality of involving the world in a war.

On analysis, the whole aspect on the international canvas resolves itself into the eternal conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. As long as this condition lasts, there is a glaring prospect of war. No other conflicts, unaided and uninfluenced by this antagonism, can assume any major phase, rather it must be said they will languish to the mselves. Local hostilities may be there, often tending to clash of

arms, but these will have a mere fleeting existence and will end in mutual agreement, if there is no expectation of aid from one or the other of the two major Powers. If, therefore, war is in sight, it is because of the mutually hostile intentions, and ideologies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which vitiate every endeavour to ban war and establish the reign of peace on this earth.

But still it will be difficult to hold that we are nearer war. The United Nations Organisation is a force for peace. Despite its feebleness, this plant has taken roots and may soon be expected to fill the earth by its fragrance. There is a growing tendency to refer disputes to its Security Council. Its meetings provide a forum for ventilating grievances and feelings. This open discussion of international disputes is a sure means of shattering secret diplomacy which has brought the world into war before. The U.N.O. has taken steps to limit armaments, to create a world police force, and above all to focus public attention on peace. It is true that it has not yet succeeded in tackling finally these matters, but the very effort in these directions is a happy augury for the future. The U.N.O., therefore, is one factor dissipating the fears of an early war. The second factor is the horror of war (and increasing scientific inventions have multiplied manifold the destructiveness of war), which forbids people from entertaining war as an agency for national self-realisation with complacency. Governments might not hesitate to invoke the god of war, but the people have no appetite for it. But little reliance can be placed on the feelings and fears of people, for regimentation of public opinion and party domination can in an instant drive people into warlike frenzy. Party government leads to dictatorship even under democracy, and it is uncertain when it may suit the fancy of a leader to demand the people's blood in the name of national honour. Yet, it will be true to say that people do not want war and that is a factor for peace. The third factor is the unpreparedness of the major Powers for war. The next war will be no trifle. The atom bomb may be eclipsed by something deadlier still. The major Powers are developing their armaments and harnessing science to produce weapons of greater destruction but as yet not one of them believes to have secured absolute superiority, the last word in destructiveness; hence the hesitation to hurl the world into the flames of war. Finally, it is the fear of being termed aggressor which prevents every party from taking the initiative.

While on the one hand, the international situation and the mounting antagonism of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. indicate the imminence of war, the U.N.O. and public opinion point to a contrary direction. If war has to be avoided, these forces of peace have to be strengthened. Imperialism, both in the past and the present, has been an element for war. If peace is desired, imperialism must end. It is here that India can play an important role in preserving peace and with that all that is of value to humanity.

Destroyers for Royal Indian Navy

Three destroyers of the Royal Navy, whose service during the war included many operations against the Japanese in the Pacific, are following in the wake of the famous cruiser *Achilles* and being transferred to the Royal Indian Navy. They are the flotilla leader H.M.S. **Rotherham** and two other destroyers of the same class, H.M.S. **Raider** and H.M.S. **Redoubt**, all of which were launched in 1942.

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WITH 20 IND DIV IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA

BRIGADIER M. HAYAUD DIN, M.B.E., M.C.

THIS article deals with the part played by the 20th Indian Division in French Indo-China after the surrender of Japan in August 1945. Due to operations in the Netherlands East Indies which were going on at the same time, the news from this part of the world, certainly at that time, got little publicity.

In order to provide a clearer picture of the situation I have included a brief description of the geographical and political background. I would like to emphasise that the views expressed are entirely my own personal ones based on what I saw when playing a comparatively insignificant part.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The country consists of five components, Annam, once a kingdom now a republic, Cochin-China, Tonkin, Cambodia and Laos. The last two are kingdoms and correspond to our States. The population of the country is approximately 23 million. Of this nearly 15 million are Annamites. About 12 million Annamites are in Annam and Tonkin and the rest are mostly in Cochin-China where they are in a majority. Annam and Tonkin are nearest to the southern provinces of China and have in the past been more than once annexed to the Chinese Empire. Racially the people of these two territories are of Chinese stock and one can say that culturally they are under Chinese influence. Movement of population from one side of the border to the other has been common and the same applies to inter-marriages and other social relations.

The people of Cambodia are racially distinct from the Annamites and have not been influenced by the Chinese to the same extent.

The people of Laos are distinct again from both Annamites and Cambodians. They are more primitive than either of them and were the last to come under the French rule.

Both Cambodians and Laotians are Buddhists. Much of their culture is derived from India. Even today some of the court ceremonies at Pnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, can be traced to Indian origin. The ruins of Angkor Vat bear testimony to the influence exercised by people from South India in these parts many hundred years ago. Incidentally the Cambodian court also maintains a white elephant, held in great respect, which is taken out in procession during festivities.


In addition there are a considerable number of Chinese, Malays and Chams besides the French settlers.

The principal port is Saigon which is in Cochin-China in the south, about 60 miles inland on the bank of the Mekong river. It is also a great commercial town. The seat of French administration is at Hanoi which is in Tonkin. Cochin-China contains the rich rice bowl on which the north has always been economically dependent for food and financial assistance. It must be appreciated that the Southern Annamites, although equally hostile to a return of French rule, have a traditional antipathy towards the more industrious and able Annamites of the North. Moreover the South is comparatively rich and contains a large middle class which though generally, but by no means universally, anti-French is also naturally anti-Communist.

MAP OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA

SCALE

MILES 50 0 50 100 150 200 250 MILES



The French domination began in 1862 after the treaty of Saigon when France secured Saigon and three provinces in Cochinchina, followed by annexation of the three remaining provinces in 1867. In 1873-74 the Kingdom of Annam and Tonkin came under French paramountcy. By 1883 practically the whole of Indo-China was under France. China had continued to exert a nominal control in the northern part but that also came to an end with the collapse of the Manchu Empire in 1911.

The establishment of French influence bears a close resemblance to that of the British in India even to the maintenance of a "princely order".

France and Siam disputed over four provinces near the Siamese border. These provinces had been under dispute among Siam, Cambodia and Annam for centuries. In 1908 Siam agreed to cede these in favour of France. The provinces are part of Laos, west of the Mekong, part of Cambodia, and the provinces of Battambang and Bassac.

There have been, now and again, risings against the French. In 1932 a serious revolt broke out in Annam which was ruthlessly suppressed. There had long been an Annamite revolutionary movement, and, as in Java, its opportunity came when Japan surrendered.

WAR PERIOD

In 1940, with the fall of France, the authorities in Indo-China sided with the Vichy French, and offered practically no resistance to Japanese pressure. Siam, encouraged by Japan, declared war on Indo-China and the French were forced by Japan to return the four disputed provinces to Siam. (These provinces changed hands once more when Siam returned them to France in 1946 on the advice of the U.K. and U.S.A.). In July 1941, Japanese troops came into Indo-China with little opposition from the French and thereafter it became one of the main bases for Japanese operations in Malaya and Burma and remained as such up to the end of the war. The Japanese maintained the French administration until March 1945, when they assumed complete responsibility. Not until then had the Japanese given any genuine support to the Nationalist movement. This was for two reasons:-

- (i) The Japanese hoped to retain Indo-China in a compromise peace treaty and therefore did not want any Nationalist movement.
- (ii) The Japanese did not have the personnel to run the country.

When the Japanese saw the end of their occupation approaching, they decided to make it as difficult as possible for the French to return by supporting the independence movement. As in Europe, the resistance movement against the occupying Power, i.e., the French, received great impetus in a somewhat fertile field. Although the Japanese had made use of the French administration they were careful not to antagonise the Annamites. Through their propaganda of "Asia for Asiatics" they were already enjoying considerable popularity.

With the collapse of Japan, and before the French could reassert power, the Annamite Nationalist leaders set up an administration and collected what arms they could from the Japanese, under the leadership of a Russian trained revolutionary, Dr. Ho Chi Minh. He had fled from the country many years ago and had lived abroad as a refugee, including a few years in Moscow, ultimately settling down in China, from where he controlled the Nationalist movement in Indo-China, working underground until the fall of Japan provided him with the long awaited opportunity to make a bid for independence. Undoubtedly he is an outstanding personality by any standards. Dr. Ho Chi Minh held an important position in the Comintern. He is the President of the Republic. The Government he formed calls itself the "Democratic Government of Viet-Nam," which in fact is a coalition of the Viet Minh, which is the largest party, with several smaller parties forming a popular nationalist front.

JAPANESE SURRENDER

At Potsdam it had been decided that when Japan surrendered British troops should occupy Indo-China south of, and Chinese troops north of, the 16th parallel of latitude, a dividing line which in practice proved unsatisfactory as it bore no relation to any known reality.

A Control Commission and the 20th Indian Division, both under command of Major-General D.D. Gracey, were ordered to proceed to Indo-China from Burma where the Division was located at the time. In early September, the 80th Brigade Group plus the Control Commission flew in by air, the remainder following by sea as sufficient aircraft were not available. My Battalion was one of those flown in and the men, most of whom had not flown before, thoroughly enjoyed their flight. The bulk of the Division completed its move by sea by the middle of October 1945.

General Gracey had been directed to—

- (a) Disarm and intern the Japanese.
- (b) Restore law and order in certain key areas of Cochin-China.
- (c) Protect and repatriate Allied prisoners.

The Japanese Supreme Headquarters for War in South-East Asia was located in Saigon under Field Marshal Count Terauchi, an old man in indifferent health but one who had great influence in his Army. His father also had been a Field Marshal at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

On his arrival on 13 September, General Gracey found himself faced with a Viet-Nam regime established in Saigon and French officials and troops interned. The Party obviously knew that the time had arrived, and had seized its chance at the right moment, when on August 22 under the leadership of Dr. Ho Chi Minh it proclaimed Viet-Nam to be a Democratic Republic and assumed power as the provisional Government. In fairness to Viet-Nam I must say that they were reasonably successful in administering Saigon. When we arrived trams were running, electricity and water supply systems were functioning and traffic was under control. There was no apparent sign of dislocation. Viet-Nam even offered to assist in the disarmament of the Japanese. Anti-French feelings were, however, high and until the arrival of the British Forces the French population lived in a state of terror. There was a social boycott of the French by the local people.

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

General Gracey had been instructed to confine his troops to areas which were essential for him to carry out his task. The fly in of the 80th Brigade was delayed by bad weather and the small size of his force which had not yet completed its arrival made this imperative. He, therefore, decided to consolidate his position in Saigon. He also made it clear that the British recognised only French authority and refused to negotiate with the Japanese-sponsored Government of Viet-Nam at this stage. The situation as it stood at the time was most unsatisfactory as Viet-Nam did not recognise the French and were in control of Saigon. They were well armed, reasonably organised and enjoying popular support. On September 22, the Viet-Nam administration in Saigon was brought to an end by a *coup de force* which was carried out without bloodshed, though resistance broke out later. French officials were released and reinstalled and their men rearmed. Soon after that French troops started arriving from Europe in increasing numbers. The arrival of French troops was a signal for the outbreak of serious disorders. The Annamites started destroying Government and private property, pursuing more or less a scorched earth policy, in an attempt to stop all public services. This brought them into open clash with our forces. In order to restore law and order, force had to be met with force. The Annamites used to operate mostly at night, often sniping and resorting to jittering tactics. Bombs

were thrown and convoys ambushed. Some fierce actions took place. Like civil war in any country our greatest difficulty was to distinguish foe from friend. Consequently disarming of the Japanese was temporarily suspended and they were used to assist in putting down disorders.

Our military activities were largely confined to Saigon and the surrounding countryside. This mainly took the form of organising flag marches, patrolling by night and day, and provision of static guards with occasional columns going out into the countryside. The Japanese were chiefly used to protect food convoys, which they did with efficiency and promptitude. Gradually order was restored in Saigon and French garrisons were firmly established. The French commander General Leclerc arrived on October 5 with the 2nd French Armoured Division, a seasoned formation, which had seen service in North Africa, France and Germany. A large contingent of the French Foreign Legion also arrived, curiously enough consisting mainly of Germans who were mostly ex-members of the Wehrmacht, and the Africa Corps. The fighting quality of these troops was undoubtedly good. Strangely enough they were fighting Viet-Nam troops who contained a number of Japanese on their side acting as instructors. American equipment was used on both sides; Viet-Nam is believed to have obtained it from the black market from Chinese sources. At the end of the month the French High Commissioner, Admiral d'Argenlieu, arrived. He was a remarkable person with a chequered career, having been a monk before the war for some years. He has since gone back to a monastery on his recall from Indo-China.

By early January sufficient French reinforcements had arrived in the country to allow withdrawal of our troops. They were strong enough to take over nearly all military and civil administrative responsibilities from us. The Japanese prisoners were concentrated in Cap St. Jacques area about 60 miles east of Saigon on the estuary of the river. My Battalion was detailed to be in charge of this area where we moved in December. Cap St. Jacques is a delightful little spot which before the war used to be something like a local Brighton. There were nearly 73,000 prisoners to cater for including a Field Marshal and three Divisional Commanders, besides a large number of other senior officers. Some of these formations and Commanders had fought against our Division in Assam and Burma. We succeeded in getting a full account from them of their version of the fighting which was most interesting.

The French did not take over this area till the middle of February 1946. The Viet-Nam Officials continued to function until then and were on friendly and co-operative terms with us. As a matter of fact the day the French troops were due to arrive, i.e., 14th February, I was being entertained to a luncheon party by the Viet-Nam Mayor of Cap St. Jacques. This party had been arranged some days previously as a gesture of goodwill without any knowledge of the French operations. However, everything went off well.

CHINESE FORCES

The Chinese sent an army of 200,000 troops in the North. Although they gave little support to Viet-Nam, which was Communistic in outlook, they were reluctant to help in restoring the French rule.

For example French troops in Hanoi were not allowed to carry arms, and Dr. Ho Chi Minh was in residence in Hanoi from where he directed his Government. In March 1946 when after protracted talks, agreement was signed between the French, Chinese and Viet-Nam Governments, French troops began to take over from the Chinese in the north. This process was not without some unfortunate incidents. The total number of French troops allowed was not to exceed 15,000. The Chinese also secured some concessions from the French concerning the trade and protection of their nationals.

REACTION TO FRENCH RULE

The reactions of the people towards the return of the French rule varied from province to province. In Annam and Cochinchina the anti-French feeling was strongest. The bone of contention in Cochinchina proved to be Saigon. In Cambodia the feelings against the French were slight and the kingdom remained on cordial terms with the French. The friction between the Annamites and the Cambodians has prevented the Viet-Nam Government getting a foothold in Cambodia. In Laos the kingdom remained loyal to the French even during the occupation.


FINALE

By the beginning of March, most of the 20th Division had left Indo-China either for India or Borneo and the Celebes. A British Military Mission under Brigadier M.S.K. Maunsell, D.S.O., O.B.E. was left behind with two Battalions (2/8 Punjab Regiment and 9 F.F.R.). The French assumed full responsibility though the task of pacifying the country had hardly started. By the end of March these two Battalions also departed, leaving the Mission behind with a detachment of 2/8 Punjab Regiment.


When we left almost all the Japanese had arrived in the concentration area. As a matter of fact their repatriation to Japan had also begun. Count Terauchi, owing to ill health, was removed to Singapore, where he died soon after his arrival. It will be remembered that it was his sword that was surrendered to the Supreme Allied Commander. The attitude of the Japanese towards us was not only correct but also respectful. Although they had been disarmed they were allowed to retain their military organization to simplify administration. I found their staff work extremely good. The only criticism I have to make is that it tended to be too detailed. Most of the area they were allotted was swamp and jungle but in a short space of time they converted it into large agricultural farms providing them with most of their requirements. They even went to the extent of planting Japanese crops and vegetables. It was astonishing to watch their senior officers working in the fields with their men like ordinary farmers. They were very good in making full use of local resources and improvisation.

When we were leaving, they gave a farewell theatrical show for us which was highly enjoyed by the men. I also discovered that a number of Japanese had learnt Urdu and a number of our men had picked up a smattering of their language. The day we left Cap St. Jacques, 29th March, 1946, all the local Japanese turned out to line the streets, quite unexpectedly and entirely on their own initiative, to bid us good-bye. And so came to an end another interesting, though at times unpleasant, episode in the annals of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth.

The French paid high tributes to our forces and General Gracey was created a Citizen of Honour at Saigon at a picturesque ceremony. This was a unique distinction as he was the first to receive this honour. In January 1946, the King of Cambodia had conferred on him the highest award of his State. Our troops departed taking with them the warmest goodwill of the French, the Japanese and the local inhabitants.



(By courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla)
A cart in the March Indo-China.



(By courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla)
Indians take over guard duty at the Imperial Palace, Tokyo from a sentry of the U.S. Army.

HOW MACARTHUR RULES JAPAN

LIEUT.-COLONEL RAJENDRA SINGH

MACARTHUR is a soldier and he commands Japan as he would command a score of armies on the battlefield. In brief he is a dictator, benevolent or despotic, we are not prepared to discuss here. He may be a democrat at heart but as the head of SCAP he has to assume the role of an all-powerful, whether he likes it or not.

When Macarthur landed in Japan, his object was quite clear, to occupy it and destroy the will-power of the Japanese nation to wage war. As by that time the idea of a United Nations Organisation had come up for open discussion and Russia had declared its intention at Yalta to throw its weight in against Japan, it was anticipated that this occupation and imposition of allied will-power will be carried out by a combined Allied Force. Macarthur smelt a rat in that, he had seen the chaos of combined control in Europe ; so the object was modified and it became the occupation of Japan and imposition of American will-power.

Japan had surrendered to America. The Japanese were told, and generally feel, that they were defeated by the Americans alone. This belief was constantly strengthened by propaganda in America and in Japan itself. This helped in the attainment of the political object, that of bringing Japan into the orbit of America. In direct ratio with the deterioration of the international situation, the political superseded the military object.

Before Japan surrendered it was agreed that the Emperor of Japan would be retained, though he would be completely subservient to the wishes of the Occupation Authorities. The surrender and occupation was made easy because the Emperor ordered his subjects to lay down arms and to remain peaceful. And the Japanese still believed in the divinity and authority of their Emperor. Soon after the surrender, American Marines landed and occupied strategic places.

The Japanese main territory consists of four main islands—Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. Being small and isolated, it was easy to occupy and control them. Once the navy was eliminated the access to and from them automatically ceased. To satisfy the Russians the Americans gave them the lower half of the Sakhalin Peninsula, the northern half of which already belonged to them. Thus the Americans became the complete masters of the Pacific.

It was quite obvious from the start of the occupation that Australia and other Pacific states who had made great contributions towards the defeat of Japan would demand their share of flesh. The Americans anticipated this and offered to receive a token British Commonwealth Force. They made sure before the Allied Troops arrived that all power was vested in American hands, and what to the world was Allied Control, in reality was American domination.


The military task of occupation was made much easier for Macarthur because he remained the overall commander, satisfied world opinion, obtained well trained and well equipped troops to carry out garrison duty and helped to conserve American man power required badly for American industry.

From the very beginning the Japanese put up no opposition. With complete discipline the Japanese nation carried out in practice the non-violence in mass as preached by Mahatma Gandhi in India for over two decades. The task of occupation

ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

(U.S.A., Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada, India, China, Philippines, U.S.S.R., Holland and France).

Far Eastern Commission Washington



was therefore almost finished before it started. The other tasks of stopping illegal Korean entry and patrolling were routine matters of no significance.

The military object consisted in the destruction of Japanese militarism in all its stages. Firstly it was the destruction of all military equipment which was directly available to make war, secondly the liquidation of the Army organization as such, and thirdly the reorientation of the spirit of the masses. The last being more political than a military object we will discuss later. For the liquidation of the Army organization it was necessary to destroy all military institutions, to take punitive action against all militarists and to ensure that no military reorganization in any form was possible. Once again the Japanese beat the pistol and destroyed all semblance of military power or even apparent roots for its resurgence. The only task which remained to be accomplished was the political—the subjugation of Japanese will-power for the benefit of America.

In consonance with the world opinion, the public pressure in America and perhaps the fear of Russia, it was essential for MacArthur to concentrate on the quick achievement of the democratisation of Japan. If this could be practically achieved in spirit and form, all the other requirements would be automatically fulfilled. With American thoroughness and with only one object, to get good dividends for America, SCAP produced a complicated machinery.

We will start with the Japanese people. They come under the triple control of :—

- (a) Their own Government.
- (b) Allied Military Government.
- (c) Occupation Authorities.

From the start of the occupation the administrative machinery of the old Japanese regime was maintained except that instead of nominations by the Emperor or by the militarists in Tokyo, the high posts were now filled by elections. But SCAP ensured that no person was elected, and if elected allowed to retain the post, if he was not a "Democrat" or in SCAP language, if he was "Suspect". The machinery, supported by American trained Japanese police, was quite capable of controlling the well disciplined Japanese masses, who believed in biding their time. I am convinced that secret instructions were and are constantly issued to the Japanese through channels not known to anyone, how to behave during the occupation and towards the Occupation Troops. The practical Japanese are fully aware of the fact that they cannot succeed in an armed revolution and the only way to facilitate the early departure of the foreign troops is to go to the other extreme—proclaim them as benefactors.

In a way the Japanese people, at least quite a large proportion, have to thank Occupation Troops. After the first impulse of hatred had passed, and war memories began to fade as veterans were replaced by new personnel who had not faced the Japanese in battle, the troops adopted a humane attitude towards the masses. In this the Japanese women, the discipline of the masses, and the blackmarket activities, had a great part to play. After the fear of rape and molestation, instilled in the minds of women over a long period of time, was dispelled by the gentlemanly attitude of the majority of troops, the Japanese women with their natural charm, docility and hard work won the hearts of most men. I do not say that there have been no cases of high-handedness towards women, but they were comparatively very few, and the culprits have been dealt with firmly and properly. Even in cases where there have been extreme provocation, the Japanese men have exercised great self-control. There have been very few cases, hardly half a dozen, in which the Japanese have retaliated with violence. The blackmarket activities have provided occupation, food and wealth to many a Japanese. It is an institution about which I will write separately. In brief the Japanese planned to make the best of the situation and in this they have succeeded admirably.

There is a great deal of controversy about the Japanese having changed during this short period of occupation. The answer is difficult to give and must be so due to the two objects, the political and military, being controversial, if not diametrically opposite. While we have demilitarised the nation we now feel the necessity to put it back on its feet. I will leave it at that and go back to discuss the other prop of the Allied Control of Japan.

The Allied Military Government, in name Allied but in fact American, is the chief machinery through which authority is exercised on all forms of activity of the Japanese nation. Though the A.M.G. Regions and Teams come under the direct control of U.S. Army, it is a well-known fact that they have direct contact with SCAP and in this dual position they exert great pressure on the Japanese Regional or Prefectural authorities and also on Occupation Troops. They are inclined to be dogmatic and, depending on the Head of the Region or Team, are mostly bureaucratic.

There is, no doubt, an agency to check on the activities of A.M.G., the C.I.C. (Counter Intelligence Corps), who are under the direct control of SCAP. They generally confine their activities to tracing the Japanese underground activities. In this they are greatly assisted by the American born Japanese. The Japanese call them NI-SEI (NI-Second, SEI-Generation), and this nickname has stuck to them, to the detriment of the Japanese people themselves. Like any convert who finds power in a new position the NISEI generally adopt a very aggressive attitude towards the Japanese, trying to prove that they are really Americans and to overcome their inferiority complex. It is my belief that within a very short period the Americans with their business acumen will rule Japan for America through these Japanese. The trend is already noticeable as more and more of this tribe appears on the streets of Japanese towns, running about with pretty Japanese damsels in American Jeeps run on W.D. petrol. They are having the time of their lives and they will do their utmost to retain this power, may be over their own people.

The A.M.G. Team exercises a very strict control over the Prefectural Government. Everything has to go through them. They are a bottleneck and unless the best type of American officers are recruited for these jobs this control will very shortly undermine the whole machinery of SCAP. If SCAP wanted, it could get a large number of first class officers from the other Forces and this mixture I am sure would have produced better results. Unilateral control in the end is a bad thing.

Perhaps it is too late to change things because the A.M.G. Teams have spread the belief that Occupation Troops are no longer required. In the very near future they themselves will remain the sole arbiters of Japanese destiny. The intelligent ones amongst them know that they would not be able to control the situation by themselves. However these are in a minority.

I am convinced that it will take at least five years more to put Japan back on its feet. After the Peace Treaty, it is quite possible that the form of occupation may change but the SCAP machinery will carry on directly or indirectly. The Japanese Government is not yet in a position to shoulder all responsibility.

The Japanese cabinet has a formidable task, but every Japanese whom I have met has so much faith in the future that this task will be carried out with courage and will be accomplished sooner than we believe. An example is Hiroshima. While the debris still lies on the main roads of slightly bombed Rangoon, a new township, may be only of wood planks, has risen to house many millions with all modern facilities, electricity, trains and schools. That speaks for itself.

It is yet too early to say how the future of Japan will shape, but while Macarthur is there, it can be predicted with certainty that there will be peace and Japanese economy will be built up to self-sufficiency.

AMERICANS IN INDIAN ARMIES

SIR PATRICK CADELL

BEFORE the last World War, American soldiers were unknown in India. It is, however, difficult to set bounds to individual enterprise, especially when it is American, and occasional instances of warriors claiming birth in that country who found their way to India have occurred. These may be divided into three classes. Firstly, Americans by birth and subsequent nationality; secondly, men born in America of families that adhered to the British connection, thus remaining British subjects; and, thirdly, those who claimed for their own purposes an American birth to which they almost certainly had no title.

After the American Revolutionary War, and the bitter memories left behind it, there was no room for American subjects in the British or East India Company's Armies. The end of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century was, however, the age of military adventurers in the forces of Indian States. Three Americans are recorded among these, two of whom reached the rank of general, though in the case of one of them the rank may have been bestowed by the recipient himself. The two generals have reached the Valhalla of the *Dictionary of American National Biography*, and all three men had a highly adventurous career.

* * * * *

The first of them was John Parker Boyd, born on 2nd December, 1764, at Newbury Port, Massachusetts. He obtained a commission in the American Army just after the termination of the war in 1783. His American biographer tells us that he arrived in India about 1789 in quest of fortune. Probably he brought some capital with him, which enabled him to pay soldiers willing to serve under him. Otherwise it is difficult to account for his early progress. We first hear of him early in 1795 commanding, with the rank of major, two disciplined battalions numbering about 1,500 men in the army of Tukoji Holkar. At that date the forces of the Mahratta feudatories, particularly those of Scindia and Holkar, were collected near Poona, to meet the invasion of the Nizam's Army, the most formidable portion of which consisted of the battalions trained and commanded by Raymond and his French officers. Compton in his *Military Adventurers of Hindustan* states that Boyd's battalions formed part of the Nizam's Army and the American biographer has naturally followed him. Boyd's men, however, with four other battalions under a Frenchman, Du Drenec, constituted the disciplined portion of Holkar's contingent in the Mahratta Army. In the battle that followed at Kharda on 12th March, 1795, Boyd's and Du Drenec's men were driven in by the first onset of Raymond, but rallied behind Perron's disciplined battalions of Scindia's contingent, and the British Agent, Uhtoff, informs us, were engaged at three different periods of the day. The decisive victory of the Mahrattas was due to the Nizam's lack of nerve rather than to any prowess of his opponents.

A peace was concluded: but the British authorities were rendered anxious by the only disciplined portion of the Nizam's Army being under the leadership of French officers, France being then at war with Great Britain. The British Resident at Poona therefore suggested to the Nizam's Minister that he should entertain a body of troops led by persons of other nations. The result was that Boyd transferred himself, complete with his corps, to the service of the Nizam, who also entertained another body of men under an Irishman, Finglass, an ex-quartermaster of the 19th Light Dragoons. It should be reckoned to Boyd's credit that, when Raymond was believed to contemplate an attack upon the British Resident at Hyderabad, Boyd

and Finglass signified their intention of supporting the Resident. Soon afterwards, however, Boyd had a disagreement with the Nizam's Minister which the Resident described as a mutual disgust. It was probably due to the remissness of the Minister in making payments.

In consequence Boyd transferred himself again, always with his corps, to the Mahratta country. Here in the welter of intrigue over the succession to the dignity of Peshwa, the head of the Mahratta Confederacy, there was ample room for an adventurer with a useful corps at his command. There appears to have been some doubt as to Boyd's attitude, but he finally came down on the side of Nana Fadnavis, the astute Minister who was seeking to place Baji Rao on the Peshwa's throne. The movement was successful and Boyd was appointed on a salary of Rs. 3,000, to the command of the Peshwa's regular infantry, the bulk of which was probably provided by his own corps. Boyd, however, was no match for local intrigue. The most powerful man at Poona was Daulatrao Scindia, who doubtless wished the control of the Peshwa's forces to be in the hands of his own subordinate, a Neapolitan of low birth and indifferent reputation. The British Assistant Resident wrote on 12th October 1797: "Mr. Boyd has been obliged, much against his will, to hand over his corps to Michael Filose, and departs to Bombay to sail immediately for his native country." The sum he was to receive for his corps was Rs. 35,000 an inadequate sum which, however, he seems to have had difficulty in recovering, as the British Agent writes on 11th December that Boyd, who had been living in the Residency since 2nd November, had left for Bombay on the 10th December, to sail for his own country.

His career in India must have been interesting enough without being quite so colourful as a writer quoted in the *American Dictionary* makes it out to be. "Riding into the very heart of Tippoo's dominions, he would strike a series of paralysing blows, burn a dozen towns, exact a huge indemnity. Military history presents no more fantastic picture than that of this Yankee adventurer, spurring across an Indian country side with a brigade of be-turbanned lancers, and a score or so of lumbering elephants, the muzzles of field guns frowning from their howdahs, tearing along behind him." On this it may be remarked that Boyd never was near Tippoo's country, that his command consisted wholly of infantry, and that elephants would certainly tear along if field guns were fired from their backs.

Although his American biographer says that Boyd returned to America "after nearly a score of years in India", there seems no reason to doubt that he left it at the end of 1797, as suggested by the Poona Resident. If he had remained longer in India he would certainly have been heard of in the next few years when military adventurers had so many opportunities. We hear of him next when he re-entered the American Army in 1808 as colonel of the 4th Infantry Regiment. When war broke out in 1812 between Great Britain and the United States, officers with field experience must have been rare in the army of the latter and it is not surprising that Boyd was commissioned as brigadier-general, and sent to the Canadian frontier. He thus came to be in command at the battle of Chrystler's Farm on 1st November 1813, about which it is sufficient to quote the verdict of an American historian. "About 2,000 Americans were defeated by 800 enemy. The battle was ill fought both by generals and men, and had no redeeming feature."

A fellow officer thus describes Boyd. "A compound of ignorance, vanity and petulance with nothing to recommend him but that species of bravery in the field which is vamping, boisterous, shifting reflection, blinding observation". A more important witness, Winfield Scott, afterwards Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, is more restrained but sufficiently damning. He describes Boyd as "amiable and respectable in a subordinate position but vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief under high responsibility." It is hardly surprising that he was discharged from the army in 1815. Towards the end of his life he was employed as a Naval officer at the Port of Boston and died in 1830. Boyd must have been

competent leader of men when a youthful adventurer in India: but this was not sufficient to qualify him for high command. There is, however, nothing against his conduct in India. The European officers of his battalions were British, and he clearly was on good terms with the British officials.

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Though James Murray did not reach so high a titular rank as the other two of his countrymen, he probably saw the most fighting and alone of the three held a combatant commission in the British Indian Army. His exploits and character are known to us almost entirely from the autobiography of William Long, a British adventurer, but the outlines of his career are confirmed by the historians of the period. Born about 1771, Murray must still have been young when he entered Holkar's service. Here occurred the most creditable episode in his career when he prevented Holkar from killing in cold blood some of Scindia's European officers who had been taken prisoner. Murray is said to have drawn a dagger upon Holkar himself, and Long, whose admiration for him was distinctly limited, rightly says: "This was a noble and generous action, worthy of record as Murray risked his own life for those who were not his own countrymen, but Englishmen and foreigners." With the other European officers of the Mahratta armies Murray came over to the British when war became inevitable. He was granted a monthly pension of Rs. 400 but was soon actively employed.

In September 1804 he was appointed to raise a cavalry regiment in the Shekhawati country, with Long as his only European officer. The latter did not altogether approve of his commanding officer, partly because Murray proposed the sacking of an inoffensive town to which Long would not agree, and perhaps also because Murray had once sold him a worthless horse which almost cost Long his life in the next action. Murray was according to Long, very savage and almost crazy brained when he had become what Long calls "cherry-merry" over a bottle. A court of enquiry on some outrageous action of his was only lenient because of Murray's good conduct in action on several occasions, a testimony to his military capacity, if not to his sobriety. Long, however, allows that Murray was a good judge of character, and there was no doubt about his courage. It was no light task to raise a regiment from men many of whom had served with the forces whom they would meet in the field, and whom there was no time to drill or even to clothe uniformly. Shortly after the formation of the corps, Murray found that a large portion of it intended to loot the treasure which they had been ordered to escort. With the loyal section of his men he attacked and dispersed the remainder with the result that the corps was temporarily reduced from 1,200 to 400 men.

After being engaged in the first fighting which occurred between the Sikhs and the Company's troops, Murray was ordered to Moradabad to escort treasure. He fell in with Amir Khan, the leader of the Pindaris, with 7,000 horsemen. Murray took up a position round a small village while Amir Khan called up Holkar's main force of 11,000 men. Long describes Amir Khan, whom he could see through his telescope, as a cut-throat looking fellow, as ugly as sin, and unkindly adds: "He and Murray had been old acquaintances and were certainly of one fraternity of plunderers." This bond of union did not prevent Amir Khan from launching thirteen assaults on Murray's position, in the last of which Amir Khan's nephew was killed by Murray himself. It was, as Long says, a remarkable performance for 800 men to beat off 18,000, of the same description as themselves, and just as well armed.

Murray reached the rank of major but did not live to return to his native land, with the fortune he had acquired, though he bought and freighted an American ship for the purpose. He was showing off a favourite horse, being, as Long tells us, considered one of the best horsemen and swordsmen in India, when he was thrown and received injuries from which he died at Calcutta on 3rd September, 1806 at the age of 35. As soon as his death was announced, Long says, the American captain of the

ship he had freighted set sail, and was never traced, "leaving Murray's widow minus about £40,000." This widow was presumably the Moslem "Bebec Jiu", who was described as his widow when she died in August 1810. Murray's grave still exists, and he may claim the distinction of being the first national of the United States known to be buried in India. Whatever his faults, much may be forgiven to one who showed such gallantry and resource in action.

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The last of these American subjects, Josiah Harlan, was the greatest adventurer of the three, though he came too late for the golden age of such men. He is the only one to have left an account of his own exploits, in a book published in 1842 and in a second volume which, though its approaching appearance was trumpeted in the first book, did not see the light till 1939. It was then edited by Mr. Frank Ross who had previously written the notice of Harlan to be found in the *American Dictionary of Biography*. As Kaye, the Indian historian, observed: "General Harlan has written an account which only wants a conviction of its entire truth to be extremely interesting." We are not, however, dependent entirely on Harlan's own flamboyant writing. He is mentioned by many writers of his day, connected with the Indian frontier, Henry Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes and others. He also figures in the intelligence reports preserved in the Punjab records. As many of these references are given in Grey's *Adventurers of Northern India*, only a brief outline of his career need be given.

Born in Pennsylvania in 1799, of Quaker parents, Harlan first appeared in the East in 1823. When the Burmese War began, the East India Company engaged a number of temporary assistant surgeons for that unhealthy campaign. There is no trace of Harlan's having studied medicine. He had, however, a brother who was a doctor, and, his American biographer suggests, may have had some of this brother's books with him. Possibly, according to others, he may have borrowed his brother's qualifications. He was accepted for service as an assistant surgeon in July 1824, and served in Burma for about eight months in the following year, when he was invalided to India. There he served with various corps till 1827, when the temporary medical officers were dispensed with. Harlan tried unsuccessfully to obtain service with Ranjit Singh, the Ruler of the Punjab, and then turned to Shah Shuja, the ex-king of Afghanistan who was living in exile at Ludhiana. Harlan undertook the dangerous task of visiting Afghanistan to work for Shah Shuja's return, and went to Kabul in the garb of a dervish. The Punjab records show, however, that he had a second string to his bow, as he offered to supply information to the British authorities in India. He sent some letters to Wade, the Political Officer in the Punjab, who, however, stopped the correspondence as he thought that Harlan was posing as a British agent. Harlan returned to the Punjab and to Shah Shuja, who could reward him only with the titles of "Companion of the Stirrup" and "King's Nearest Friend."

It may have been at this period that, according to Kaye, he hoisted the American flag at Ludhiana, raised a rabble and raided some villages. If so, this was probably the first occasion of the Stars and Stripes being flown in India. He was, however, successful in entering the service of Ranjit Singh where he remained for nearly seven years, and was Governor, which must be taken as the translation of Kardar, of some small districts. He does not seem to have had any military command, but when Dost Mahomed in 1835 brought down an Afghan Army to try to recover Peshawar, Harlan was sent by Ranjit Singh, to seduce the Amir's brother and to corrupt his soldiers, with money. This, he tells us, he did with such success that the army faded away.

In the next year, 1836, came his parting with Ranjit Singh. According to his own story he was angered by some action of the Ruler. Other accounts say that he attempted to obtain an extortionate fee from Ranjit Singh for medical attendance while a German doctor in the Punjab service unkindly relates that Harlan was detected in the making of false money. He joined Dost Mahomed, and takes most of the

credit for the defeat of the Sikhs by the Afghans at Jamrud in 1837. More impartial accounts ascribe the credit for the victory to the action of a disreputable British adventurer named Rattray. There is no record of Harlan's having commanded more than a regiment of infantry in the Amir's service, but by his own story he was made a general, and as such, under the nominal command of one of the Amir's family, led an expedition against a prince in Tartary, across the Hindu Khush: or, as he puts it: "I surmounted the Indian Caucasus, and there unfurled my country's banner to the breeze. On the highest pass of the frosty Caucasus, the Star Spangled Banner gracefully waved among the icy peaks."

In 1839 came the British expedition to restore Shah Shuja. According to Harlan, Dost Mahomed appointed him Commander-in-Chief to meet the invasion, with the title of "General on the Staff," an institution which the Afghan Army seems hardly likely to have possessed. The more prosaic story in the British records is that Harlan did medical work and was treated by the Amir with unmerited severity. Following the British invasion, he returned safely to his native land. Here he found himself less well off than he had hoped, the money he had sent from India having been badly invested by his doctor brother. He acquired a wife, however, his first words to his bride after the wedding being "How does it feel to be Mrs. General Harlan?" It is perhaps not surprising that the Pennsylvanian Quakers found him domineering and haughty.

The American Civil War gave him a fresh field of activity. In 1861 he raised a regiment known as Harlan's Light Horse, though he only served till 1862 when he retired through ill health. Towards the end of his life he migrated to California and ended his career, as he had begun it, practising as a doctor though still without any regular qualification. He died in San Francisco in October 1871. Although the verdict of Kaye that Harlan was "versatile and unscrupulous" can hardly be disputed, his personality and striking appearance impressed many who met him. Indubitable also was the courage with which he faced risks enhanced by the tortuous line of conduct which by his own showing he often followed.

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The next class of Americans in India to be noticed are those who were born in the territory now the United States, but entered the service of the mother country. The oldest of these, Ensign Samuel Pippit, must have begun his soldiering long before the Revolution was thought of. His tombstone at Ganjam in Madras Province shows that he died on 21st December, 1800, aged 70 years, having been born in New Jersey and having served the King and Company for over 50 years. As he obtained his commission in the Company's Service in 1779 he must have risen from the ranks, and probably served previously in a King's Regiment. We know nothing more of this old warrior, who may fairly claim to be the first soldier of American birth known to have died in India. A fair number of sons of American Loyalists entered the Company's Service both civil and military, and several rose to high rank, but the only well known one was Sir David Ochterlony (1758-1825). His father, of good Scottish landed family, settled in Boston and married a lady of that city. The father died in 1765, and the mother took the children to Great Britain. Ochterlony's distinguished services in India are still commemorated by the monument in Calcutta. Major General Anthony Monin of the Madras Establishment may be mentioned, as one whose father is said to have fallen in the American War, and who therefore was given a "child commission". His tombstone at Trichinopoly states that he died on 5th January 1839, in his 65th year, having served the King and the Company for a period of 60 years. His commission as Ensign in the King's Service was dated 22nd October, 1778, so that the claim of 60 years' service is correct. It appears from his own statement in his papers, however, that he was born in North America about 1768, so that he was nearer ten than five years of age when he received the commission due to his father's death.

Another interesting figure was Henry Clinton Cortlandt whose father, Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt, descended from an ancient Dutch family in New York, fought as strenuously on the British side in the War of Independence as some of his relatives did on the American side. Henry, one of Philip's 23 children, though never in the Company's Army, served for many years in British regiments in India, and was still living there till nearly 1850. His son was Henry Charles Van Cortlandt, who was a general in the Sikh Service, and did such good service at the Siege of Multan and in the Indian Mutiny, finally retiring on the full pay of a British colonel.

The third class of Americans have no real claim to that distinction, and are only noticed because to this day, in spite of numerous exposures, they are occasionally described as such. The assertion of American nationality by deserters from the British services was useful, to conceal their identity, and as a convenient excuse for Ranjit Singh, whose service they generally sought, if he was reproached for entertaining deserters. The most notorious of these men was Alexander Gardiner, whose accent was recognised by Henry Lawrence, who ought to have known, as being Irish. He was concerned in a peculiarly disgraceful case in which he mutilated a Brahmin prisoner of Jawahir Singh, when the latter's Indian subordinates had refused to do so. Owing to Gardiner's skill as an artillery man, he was retained by Gulab Singh, Maharaja of Jammu, who made him a colonel. Though Gardiner's character was scathingly exposed by Henry Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes, he got away with it so well that Sir Henry Durand wrote an article, and Major Pearse a complete book, about his imaginary achievements. A less sensational and less disreputable person was Francis John Kanara, who is probably identical with the Kenny or Kennedy, mentioned in the British records as serving in the Khalsa Army. Like his friend Gardiner, he claimed to have been born in Philadelphia. Like him also he had a strong Irish accent. Whatever his life, his end at least was creditable. In command of a battery in Hazara he refused to obey the order of the rebellious Sikh officers to move without Captain Abbott's sanction, and, as the inscription on the obelisk which Abbott erected to his memory states, fell singly combatting the foe. In a recent article in an English journal mentioning this still surviving memorial, the statement is made that it commemorates "Canara the only American to die on the Frontier." On the other hand, when Kanara's last surviving son, Patrick, died about 1938 at the age of ninety, it was stated in an Indian paper that his father was a Frenchman. That he was really Irish there can be no doubt.

The last adventurer claiming to be an American was the most remarkable and the most respectable. James Lewis, the son of a London liveryman, was born in 1800, and enlisted in the Company's Artillery, in which he served at the Siege of Bhurtpur in 1825. He must have deserted very soon afterwards, as his travels began in 1826. He gave himself out to be Charles Masson, an American born in Kentucky. His adventures would take too long to narrate. Suffice it to say that he was distinguished as a geographer, an archaeologist and a numismatist. He gave most valuable information to the Company's Government; his desertion was pardoned, and he was given a sum of money and a small pension till his death in England in 1853. It is curious that, though his identity was known, and is mentioned in several books, the belief that he was an American has persisted. Even so well informed a geographer as Sir Thomas Holdich described him as such in 1910. It must be added that, apart from his desertion from the army, there is nothing against Lewis or Masson and much in his favour.

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Such is the story of Americans, genuine or asserted, in Indian Military Service. Their experiences were colourful, and, whatever moral failings may be suggested against some of them, they were generally successful in getting away with it.

INDIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE GURKHA BRIGADE

LIEUT. COLONEL D. K. PALIT

LET me begin by declaring right at the start that much nonsense has been talked about the Gurkhas being a race apart, and a very special people to deal with. There is nothing "different" about them. With certain minor reservations, arising from geographical and economic factors, I am of the firm opinion that they are the same as any other Indian troops. Their good qualities and their shortcomings are the same. They will follow if they are led, they will go to pieces if they are neglected. A Gurkha can be as brave as a lion, hardworking, loyal and honest—or he can flinch in battle, shirk his duty, change his colours. In this and in all else, I have found him to be the same as any other troops with whom I have served. This is a most important fact, and I wish to emphasise it before I go on to discussing those special conditions which made the changeover of Gurkha command, from British to Indian, a ticklish problem.

The first point that struck me on taking over command of my battalion, was that all the Gurkha officers and senior NCOs were definitely apprehensive of the future. For generations a legend had been built up by the British, backed by their undoubted qualities of leadership, that only the British could lead the Gurkha. I do not write this with any intention to hit back at my predecessors. I would impress upon my readers that most of us have always been aware of the glorious fighting traditions of the Gurkhas and the leaders who had been responsible for building up this tradition. The very fact that the Gurkhas have always been well disciplined and loyal soldiers, respected by fighting men the world over, is ample testimony of the qualities of their erstwhile leaders, and if we succeed in following in their footsteps we should be justly proud of ourselves.

Another problem which faced us was the new literacy consciousness of the Gurkha. For years he had been kept the most illiterate of all the various classes recruited in the Indian Army. In a country where an awakening of a feeling of equality in all things was spreading amongst the common people it is natural that the Gurkha should feel that he was being left behind. Very few Gurkhas had been granted commissions from the ranks; virtually none was being recruited in the technical arms. This feeling of being left behind was creating an inferiority complex in them, which naturally showed itself in an attitude of suspicion and mistrust.

Lastly, there were the ever-present administrative difficulties as regards leave, family problems and home economy. Nepal is a very distant country from the point of view of time and socio-economic conditions. Only those who have dealt with the problems of sending their men on leave to Nepal, arranging their family problems, and so forth, can appreciate the difficulties which face them. It sometimes takes a Gurkha a good fourteen days travelling on foot to reach his home from the rail-head near Gorakhpur. On his way there he has to negotiate numerous customs and monetary-exchange formalities—all calculated to fill the coffers of the Nepalese Government at his expense. In the past, the British officer with his flair for man-management had done much to relieve the Gurkha of his burdens. A simple but money-conscious people, they had great faith in their English officers. Would the Indians be as painstaking in their efforts? Could he rely on the new Indian Government to give the same unselfish devotion to these troublesome and politically embarrassing details? These were the doubts which assailed his mind.

These then were the three main problems which faced us—their distrust of the

ICO as a leader, their consciousness of illiteracy, and their administrative difficulties in matters affecting their homes. I shall deal with them in the reverse order, beginning with the last, first.

The morale of any soldier is high if he knows that the home front is secure while he is away in the service of his country. It is therefore a prime responsibility of his officers to see that such matters as the welfare of his family, his financial arrangements, and the assurance of regular leave, are safeguarded. In the case of the Gurkha his family affairs are often beyond the reach of the regimental officer. Much can be done by officers touring the country, but this is a matter for arrangement between the two governments. I hope that in the near future facilities will be provided for ICOs to tour Nepal, and open up welfare centres in the distant reaches of the Nepal hills, on the same pattern as exists in India. Matters regarding monetary-exchange and postal conveniences are already under consideration of higher authorities. It is up to regimental officers to ensure that existing facilities are fully exploited by GORs when proceeding on leave—such as permission to import a certain fixed quota of cloth, cigarettes, soap etc., into Nepal. If left to themselves the Gurkhas are apt to neglect these opportunities of benefitting their people at home.

In the way of savings, regimental centres are the only means of ensuring a workable scheme. Many of the Government sponsored Savings Funds and Provident Funds cannot be availed of by the Gurkhas owing to the non-existence of any suitable organisation in Nepal. Here again, it is only by the careful supervision of his officers that the Gurkha can be assured of a workable solution.

I do not intend to go into the details of the numerous difficulties incident to the leave question amongst the Gurkhas. I merely wish to impress upon the reader that much can be done to alleviate their lot. It sometimes entails a hard struggle against staff officers in higher formations, but when these sterling men from the hills realise that their officers are taking the trouble to solve their administrative problems, it is surprising what valuable dividends they will pay.

The question of education is a far more difficult one, for only a long-range policy will produce any results in this field, and long-term planning is seldom appreciated by troops. However, it is my opinion that most of the senior GORs realise that it is not in their lot to aspire to the higher ranks of the army. I have never tried to disillusion them, for it is not a profitable policy to base their future on false hopes. I have made it quite clear to them that whereas the new policy in officer-selection gives everyone the same opportunities theoretically, the lack of education amongst the more senior ones would stand in their way. It is the younger generation amongst them to whom special attention must be paid. It is from them that future leaders will be chosen. It is true that a certain number of senior GOs were granted King's Commissions at the time of the change-over in Command, but these old soldiers are more decorative than useful.

In this connection, I would like to explode another myth which has existed too long in the Indian Army—that the Gurkha is a simple and rather stupid person, greatly lacking in intellect. I do not hold with this opinion. I think that his intelligence is surprisingly high, and that by nature the Gurkhas are a people with very quick powers of perception. I am certain that if subjected to the modern tests of intelligence, their IQ will be found to be very high. They may be illiterate by circumstance, and their educational standard kept low by neglect, but they are not the dull and lack lustre people they are so often made out to be.

When I took over command of my battalion, one of the first things I noticed was that the British officers always spoke to their Gurkha officers and other ranks in Gurkhali. Even the one English-speaking G.O. we had was always addressed in his native tongue. My predecessor pressed upon me the necessity of making my officers learn Gurkhali as soon as possible. It would bring them nearer to the men,

I was told. I did not agree. I felt that since the Gurkhas were now destined to be an integral part of the Indian Army, they should acquire the first hallmark of our citizenship—that is, to accept our language as their professional means of intercourse. At the risk of foregoing one method of gaining quick popularity, I decided that it would be more advantageous to the Gurkha to learn to accept Hindustani. With these considerations in view, I made it quite clear to the GOs and senior NCOs that it would be compulsory for all ranks to speak to their officers in Hindustani and that the learning of Gurkhali on the part of the officers would be incidental and not policy. I felt convinced that this was the first step towards what I call the “emancipation of the Gurkhas”. It certainly succeeded in my battalion. It did not affect the efficiency of the battalion in anyway.

In general education also, a great task lies before us. The Gurkhas are very keen learners, and their newly acquired consciousness makes them very eager students. There are many ways in which the education drive can be stepped up in units. Under the provisions of certain existing A.I. (I)s, Gurkha battalions are entitled to employ civilian instructors in their schools. The fullest use should be made of these provisions, because at present there are very few trained G.Os and J.C.Os in our battalions.

Lastly, I come to the all important question of leadership.

The main point that we have to realise is that the initial distrust which the Gurkha felt towards the ICO was a natural result of the entire trust and confidence which he had in his British officers. For generations his forefathers had come to depend on the leadership of these men from another country. It is natural that when the change-over came, he should harbour suspicion and doubts against a people under whom he had never served. Be it remembered that they are a people who render service thousands of miles away from their homes. However primitive might be their own native methods of administering justice and rectifying grievances, in a foreign country they feel homeless and helpless, and there is no one to whom they can turn to protect their constitutional and social rights except their own officers. What should be realised as the prime factor in the successful command of Gurkhas, is that they should be made to trust and rely on us to the same extent as they have always done on their erstwhile leaders.

How then does one acquire this leadership? It is a difficult thing to define leadership, for it is not a quality complete in itself. It is a relationship between the leader and the led. Leadership is fundamentally a relative term. For example, a man can be a leader under one set of existing circumstances, but when those circumstances are changed and he is placed in command of a new group of men he cannot immediately expect to find himself an accepted leader without any effort on his part. He has to establish this relationship of the leader and the led all over again, in order to ensure that his followers do in fact accept him as a leader.

In the Army, leadership entails a far greater trust and confidence than in other professions and callings. For here reason and logic are not necessarily the most important factors which make for confidence in the leader. Leadership in the army is not based on democratic foundations. For, what is the final test of leadership in war? It is, that when at last the order comes from the officer to fix bayonets and charge, the men under his command should—without any doubts in their mind as to the tactical soundness of the plan, without any flinching or reasoning, without any apprehensions regarding their own safety, or without any doubts as to the security of their families in the event of their death—go forward into the assault with their bayonets fixed. There can be no “democratic” debate, or solution by reason and majority vote. Even if the plan be tactically unsound, it has got to be carried out without hesitation. If it is, then even an unsound plan may succeed. If it is not, then even the best plan may end in ignominious failure.

This particular leadership in the army to which we all aspire is not an easy thing to establish. How then does one acquire this terrific confidence, by which men will follow one to their deaths without question?

In my opinion an army officer becomes a leader of men under three main circumstances:—

- (a) By traditional acceptance.
- (b) By gradual association over a period of time.
- (c) By personal example and effort.

Let us see which apply in the case of the newly Indianised Gurkha Brigade.

Traditional acceptance. This can only exist in normal times, when the system of officer-intake and officer postings runs smoothly over a long period. By long usage a tradition is created, and an officer becomes a leader, and is accepted as such, by the traditions of the regiment or corps to which he belongs. For example, when we ICOs were first posted to our battalions or units in pre-war days, we were accepted as leaders by our men because of the traditions of leadership and service built up by officers who had served before us. The men accepted 2nd Lieut. A. Singh as a leader automatically, because he was of the same machinery which had produced Lieut. B. Khan or Capt. C. Chand before him. He was of a "type", and a type which had not let them down in the past. Therefore, unless 2nd Lieut. A. Singh proved himself unworthy of his trust, he was spontaneously accepted by his men as a fit and proper leader to lead them.

These circumstances do not apply in our case. The ICOs took over the Gurkha Bns. very suddenly and, in some instances, under very adverse conditions. We could not expect the Gurkhas to accept us as leaders when they knew nothing about us. As far as they were concerned it was a new regime. We would have to establish our leadership before they would accept us as leaders.

So now let us examine the next condition—*gradual association over a period of time*. Here again, it is possible to fulfil this condition under normal circumstances only. When an officer has served in the same unit for some years, his troops get accustomed to receive orders from him, and learn to obey him through sheer habit. It does not require any special effort or act of distinction on the part of the former. He merely carries out his duties in a normal manner over a long period of time, and the relationship of the-leader-and-the-led is established by constant association.

It might be argued that this perhaps is not a very inspiring method of establishing leadership, but it should be remembered that during years of peace, it is mainly by a combination of the conditions (a) and (b) mentioned above, that an officer's authority is established. During long periods of continued inactivity, he does not get an opportunity of displaying those qualities of leadership which are usually associated with the field of battle.

In actual fact, this method of gaining the confidence of one's troops is a very stable one, and not as uninspiring as it first sounds. The force of habit dies hard in the human mind, and if one's troops have mechanically obeyed orders for long periods, they will do the same without hesitation in an emergency, provided their leader is the same.

Again, this does not fully apply in the case of the Indianised Gurkha Regiments. It is true that the "habit" of obeying orders was inherent in the men we took over but that fulfilled only half the condition. The leaders had changed, not only in individual personality but also in nationality. They did not know us; they could have no confidence in the judgement of their leaders; they did not know how we would react when faced with a critical situation. It was not until we were able to

establish our leadership by personal example that our men regained their first class fighting potential.

Lastly, therefore, I come to this question of establishing one's power of command by *conscious effort and personal example*—in my opinion, a great test of leadership. I do not intend to go into this question of "personality", a term which is constantly misused to cover up a host of misstatements. What I wish to bring out is that when an officer has had the normal opportunities of establishing his command, his individual share in that undertaking is not as important as the machine of which he is a part. If the discipline in that corps or regiment has always been good, then his individual capabilities or shortcomings are not necessarily the deciding factor in his leadership. The machinery to which he belongs tides him over his difficulties, and unless he is basically unsuitable, he "makes the grade". On the other hand, when he has to start anew and build up that machinery to conform to accepted standards, it is then that his individual leadership means so much.

In the case of the Gurkha battalions, it was left to those Indian officers who took over from the British, to re-establish that spirit of confidence in their men. As I have mentioned before, the fact that the men themselves were already trained and well disciplined, completed only a half of this relationship. The other half was left for us. The problem therefore, as I have tried to point out at the beginning, lay not in the fact that we were going to command a special type of men, but that we were taking over command under very unusual circumstances.

The most important factor which influences the attitude of troops towards their officers, is man-management. Consciously or unconsciously, the men in the ranks will size up the ability and value of their leaders by the manner in which they can keep up their morale, keep them contented, and maintain their interest. It is not within the scope of this article to go into the implications of the term "man-management", but if any of the readers are interested I would refer them to the excellent essay by Colonel Morton in the January issue of this Journal. The only warning I would give is that the men must not be pampered. The British were experts in the art of man-management, but as far as the Gurkhas were concerned it is my opinion that under the cloak of their esoteric "Gurkha cult" they were apt to pamper them. The men must be made to do as much as possible to look after their own interests. The duty of the leader is to see that they are given all the support and backing they require when they come up against difficulties, especially difficulties that are extra-regimental. It is not an easy matter to gauge just how much an officer must do to fulfil his role as leader, and just where the dividing line lies beyond which his efforts could be classed as "spoon feeding".

The other important factor is personal example. In everything that the men are required to do, the officers must set the example. If the men are expected to be well turned out, the officers must show them how to dress smartly. If anti-malaria precautions are to be rigidly observed, then there is no excuse for a disregard of these precautions in the Officers' Mess. It is the same on the field of battle. There should not be any doubt in the minds of the men who fight under our orders. They should be made to realise that what we expect them to do for us, we are prepared to do ourselves. Their leaders have to earn for themselves the right to issue whatever orders they think necessary, and expect them to be carried out.

The reaction of the Gurkhas to their new Indian officers is a question in which many are interested, and I have therefore expressed my own views and conclusions in this article, for what they are worth. I think that the most important point arising out of those discussed above, is that the Gurkha must no longer be treated as a race apart. Help him in every way where his difficulties are peculiar, certainly, but do not make him continue to feel that he must be treated differently to other Indian troops. Neither pamper him nor neglect him. Remember that if he is to fight for us in future wars, he will fight best if he feels that he is an Indian—even

if by adoption only. That feeling can only be induced by extending to him the rights and privileges of our citizenship. Every effort must be made to base his morale on the same foundations as other troops. This I consider to be absolutely necessary in order to make the Gurkhas merge with the Indian Army. There should be no more nonsense, in them or in their officers, about the "Gurkha cult".

"Essentials of Military Knowledge"

This book by Lieut.-Colonel D.K. Palit was reviewed in the April issue of the Journal. We have great pleasure now in reproducing portions of a letter to the author from Captain B.H. Liddell Hart with the latter's kind permission—*Ed.*

"I have now made time to read your book "The Essentials of Military Knowledge," and am writing to congratulate you on it. I think it is an admirable summary—very clear, discerning, and remarkably well-balanced.

The quality of your book impresses me all the more, because I started with doubt that was caused by seeing your initial "list of books consulted." I saw that a number of these were books that are cloudy, shallow, and historically incorrect. Yet you managed to extract much of the essence of the historical lesson without being misled by your sources. "That is a great tribute to your own penetration. It raises still greater hopes for the future as your own study progresses, and I shall look forward very much to seeing anything further you write. In this connection you might like to have a copy of a list of books that I compiled some years ago as a course of military reading, in response to numerous requests. It was a development of a list that I had made out originally about fifteen years ago for Lord Wavell, when he was in charge of the Staff College candidates at Aldershot, and asked me to provide him with a list of books that would be helpful for the students. I will send this list by separate post. I do not know how far you have read my own books, but you might like to have a copy of the latest edition of my "Strategy of Indirect Approach", as it is largely a summary of the decisive wars of history. I was interested to see that Pandit Nehru quoted the bulk of my preface in his own book "The Discovery of India." I was particularly glad to see that it made so strong an impression on him, as I gave a lot of thought to the preface.

Another book of mine that might be particularly helpful to your historical study is "The Ghost of Napoleon" as it consists of my Lees-Knowles lectures at Cambridge and deals with the movement of military thought from the 18th to 20th century. Unfortunately it is now out of print, but you will probably obtain a copy from one of the military libraries in India.

You ask me for my opinion on your style and phraseology of the book. I think it is very good in both respects. It would be superfluous to mention points with which I agree in the book itself, but in case you are bringing out a further edition—as I hope the demand will call for—you might perhaps find it useful to have a few suggested corrections, and I will give these in detail.....

I hope these points may be of interest to you. I do not often write at such length, and the fact that I have done so is a tribute to the way that your book has stimulated my reflections. In conclusion, may I again express the hope that you will continue with your studies and give us further and larger works on the history and theory of war. I shall look forward keenly to the outcome.

Sd/-B.H. Liddell Hart".

MY CANTEEN

BRIGADIER F. L. BRAYNE, C.S.I., C.I.E., M.C.

THE welfare and amenities of the troops of the Indian Army receive so much attention nowadays that the pioneer beginnings of the 1914-1918 war sound very crude. Even so the early story of a regimental canteen may be of interest.

As soon as I joined the 18th Lancers on the Somme in September 1916 I began to plan a canteen. There was some discussion about the need or the desirability of such a modern institution, but I got my way and was allowed to try my hand—with my own capital of course. The canteen was a success from the word “go” and I began to feel I had missed my vocation in life and should have taken to shopkeeping and run a dry-store. I found it fairly easy and great fun anticipating and supplying the needs of a unit on service. I was in the Sikh squadron and my manager, in his spare time, was a very wide-awake and resourceful Jemadar, Munshi Singh by name, who years after the war I believe became a Territorial Subedar Major. The salesman was a whole-time trooper, Sawar Charan Singh, who had been a policeman in Sind before he joined the army. He could not read or write, but both Munshi Singh and Charan Singh were first rate and my principal job was scrounging for supplies.

Sugar and milk were in continuous demand, and I could never get enough for my own regiment and for the visitors from other Indian units in the neighbourhood, who used to be allowed to share our supplies when we had a fair stock. Whenever I had a spare afternoon—and that was pretty often during the “static warfare” of those days—I got on to my charger and, followed by a half-limber, I scoured the countryside for many miles around for E.F. canteens. I soon became only too well-known in the nearby area and they learnt to be cautious when I asked how much milk or sugar they had. But when I got into new territory and, with the shy and innocent air of a newly married man buying underwear for his wife, asked how much milk and sugar they had, they would spill the beans, and before they could recover their wits I was off with two, three and sometimes four hundred-weight of sugar or a dozen cases of Nestles. I had two little-known medal ribbons—the Delhi Durbar and a very conspicuous affair in pale blue and white which looked like a half-blue for chess—and these worked wonders on canteen salesmen.

Chocolate was a good seller and of course cigarettes and all the usual needs of a sepoy, boot-polish, soap and all the rest. Wrist watches were coming into fashion and the ones with a luminous dial were the cat’s whisker for a smart young N.C.O. They were called “*gas-wali ghari*”—“gas watches”, gas being to the jawan of those days the last word in scientific invention (like the atomic bomb to-day). I used to order watches in large quantities when they were to be had; and one consignment of sixty odd ordered from Palestine went to the bottom of the Mediterranean in a torpedoed ship. Fortunately everything I ordered was covered by the Government Insurance Scheme.

Being “an I.C.S.” in peace-time I was expected to be a go-between with the District authorities in India for all the sepoys’ innumerable troubles. They nearly always concerned land—and sometimes irrigation water—and women, with an occasional robbery or assault usually connected with the latter. Before putting pen to paper I closely examined the petitioner and insisted on getting down to the basic facts. They often bore little relation to the highly romantic tale he started off with!

But knowing the background of Punjab village life, and the system of land tenure and land record, I was generally able to get through all the camouflage and reach the hard core of actual fact. I could then suggest what I thought was the best way of tackling the problem and if the jawan agreed, I wrote off to the Deputy Commissioner. My spade work made his task far easier and I had quite a high percentage of successes as a regimental—or rather a brigade—petition-writer. That of course is the only way to deal with complaints and every officer should make a point of visiting his men's home districts and learning all he can of their home life, and the land system and the civil organisation. All this should be a subject of Army Education for Officers.

But back to my canteen. I went with the advance party when the Indian Cavalry moved from France to Palestine in the spring of 1918. It was then that the fun began. I had handed over my official canteen before I left, but before we had gone very far in the train I raised some capital from the men and managed to get a van put into the middle of our special train. There I installed a new canteen, buying what I could as we went along. At every halt I ran down the train and we opened up and did a roaring trade among the jawans, who had nothing else to do day in and day out on our long trek from near Amiens to Taranto. The salesmen usually got locked in between the halts, and sometimes so did I, but it was great fun and a complete antidote to the boredom of a week in a military special. Some time before Mont Cenis tunnel I was told that all copper coins lost half their value when we passed the frontier into Italy. Hitherto the copper coins of all nations had been pennies or half-pennies according to their size. In Italy they would become half-pennies and farthings! I had a big pile of copper in the till and the devil entered into me. I told the salesmen to give change in copper and unloaded the whole of my stock on to the confiding jawans! I was punished for it of course. In those days every little town in France had its own notes and when I finally wound up my canteen after the armistice, I had a huge budget of filthy bits of paper belonging to Boulogne, Rouen, Marseilles and every other place any jawan had ever visited. When I got home in 1919 I changed them at Charing Cross for a small fraction of their face value!

All down the East Coast of Italy I was buying up whatever I could and telegraphing several stations ahead for vast quantities of oranges and eggs, "*uno mille orancie*", "*seceuto uove*", etc! The amazing thing was that the Station Master or the R.T.O. produced them, and at the most reasonable prices. I had learnt elementary Italian in Albania two years before but apparently had not got the right word for "hard-boiled" and I was presented with sixty fresh eggs, and only half an hour's halt to make do. There was a wild rush of willing jawans, an enormous copper was produced from somewhere in the station, we lit a fire on the platform and just got them all hard-boiled before the train moved on. I never heard what the "I.T.I." thought of it all but the eggs were good enough! At Taranto it was pouring with rain, and horribly cold. We went into a transit camp, sodden with water and ankle deep in sticky mud, with the prospect of at least a week to wait. Although the camp staff were extremely helpful there were no amenities of any kind whatever; they had not been invented yet! My dry canteen in a bell tent didn't seem to meet the bill and I had never sold a cup of tea in my life. But something had to be done, so we got cracking. The Y.M.C.A. produced urns and crockery and the camp commandant found me a Nissen hut, and in a few hours we had lashings of hot tea, all manner of food, cigarettes and the rest of the stock-in-trade, and a nice warm canteen and recreation room. The jawans weren't half grateful for that! We sold several thousand oranges and five hundred eggs a day. Six days later we embarked in a P. & O. I went down to the ship and asked for a site for my canteen, for which I had provided 15,000 oranges, as well as biscuits, chocolate, milk, cigarettes and everything else, about £500 worth of my own money! To my horror they said that my oranges would dirty their ship and moreover they had their own canteen. To which I replied "What money do you take?" "English money of course." "But our jawans have nothing but Italian and French money and heaps of dirty municipal notes from all over France." "We can't accept that". "Then let me bring my canteen on board and serve the

troops the only way they can be served". "No!" "So wot?" My stuff had already been loaded on to two lighters, and the ship would be off in a couple of hours. I didn't favour dumping it all into Taranto Harbour. I rushed on board and found General Guy Beattie. He sent his salaams to the O.C. troops (Pat Sangster), and in half an hour I started bringing my stuff on board and my canteen was opened. I had done a big thing in orange and a day or two later I received a message by devious channels that the ship was covered with orange peel and would I see about it. I sent back an answer by the same channels that if so desired I would undertake the tidying of the ship as well as the running of the canteen! I heard no more about it. From Amiens to Egypt the profits of my canteen—in spite of many oranges going bad!—were about 600 francs.

We disembarked at Kantara and went into camp at Tel-el-Kebir to wait for the rest of the division and the horses. I slipped off to Cairo to see what I could buy and found a great ally in Mrs. Norton, wife of the O.C. of a London Regiment. She was "O.C. Comforts, Egypt" and quickly helped me to buy all my stock. By a stroke of good luck I found the N.A.C.B. (Navy and Army Canteen Board) was selling off milk and they allowed me to buy 1,500 cases (£500 worth) and to pay as I sold it—what it is to have an honest face and two unfamiliar medal ribbons! I got the stuff down to Tel-el Kebir and was given a tent and a guard for my huge stack of cases. I was also able to make arrangements for the mending of watches. My jawans had not yet learnt to leave their new toys alone!

To the horror of the senior officers I next proposed to produce barrels of beer for B squadron. Alas, they only allowed me one or two barrels but it was a great moment when we hammered in the tap and turned it on. We didn't have to turn it off; it just ran straight down the thirsty throats of the "Singers"!

The moment we left the cold of France the demand for chocolate and sardines stopped altogether and we had to cut our prices to get rid of our stocks. Milk and sugar and cigarettes of course continued in as strong demand as ever and watches became more and more popular, but lemonade was now wanted instead of tea. The Canteen Board was surprised at the way the jawans insisted on good quality in everything they bought. I was very critical of the canteens run by the N.A.C.B.—I thought them a very poor show—and they refused any discount on wholesale purchases for a regimental canteen!

After five weeks we moved up to Palestine and then my milk became a real problem. We never stayed long in one place and I found the best way was to keep several dumps, at Ludd, Jerusalem, and in the Jordan valley. Believe it or not, I never had a case stolen and when we finally left the Jordan valley to train for Allenby's great attack, I sold my Jordan valley dump to another regiment, the 2nd Lancers I think, at a nominal profit of £1 a case, far below the market price at that time, as I had made the best bargain of my life at Cairo, when I found a glut of milk at the N.A.C.B.

In the Jordan valley the Turks had an irritating habit of shelling us with camel guns. My stock was in a dry well—the sort of place Joseph was put into by his jealous brethren—and one day two shells pitched one each side of it and only a few feet away.

Our camp was on the way up to the line of outposts round Mussalabeh, and the Australians used to buy from us on the way up to the line. One day the Jemadar went to take the cash and the salesman said that he had given change for a ten-pound note to a Digger buying tinned fruit. It was a ten rupee note. Pretty cool, passing a ten rupee note for a tanner on an Indian! I told the C.O. and he wrote a tactful note to the Aussie Brigade but got no sympathy. So the devil once more entered into me and I gave orders that for the Aussies all prices were up 100 per cent.—or as high as they would pay. When the jawans saw them coming they would start

making bogus bargains at absurd prices in broad Punjabi and the Aussies never knew how many times they repaid me for that fast one! The only regret I had was that for twenty odd years I was never able to tell them the joke. However during this war I had the good fortune to meet several Australians in India and at long last got it off my chest. The next move is with Australia!

When the regiment went battle-fighting I was sometimes able to present every jawan with an iron ration of chocolate, milk or whatever I had in stock. It was "on the house" of course, but even so when I became what the military called the "uncrowned king of Aleppo" after the armistice and had to give up my beloved canteen, I was able to hand over with it, to the regiment, nearly £400 profit. To be on the safe side and to ensure that I pocketed no profits myself I probably lost about £50, but I got £500 worth of fun out of it, and must have been one of the few officers who never knew what boredom meant. In spite of much help from officers who had come in from business, it was, in fact, extremely hard work, in addition to the many other jobs my Indian Civil experience let me in for and the normal work of a regimental officer and a squadron commander.

As a memento of my canteen the regiment very kindly gave me a lovely gold watch which will be a treasured heirloom in my family.

Seventy-Seven Years Ago

"When a nation extend its sway by permanent conquest over foreign countries, politically weaker or inferior in military skill to itself, one of the chief means of spreading its power and consolidating its empire is the employment of the conquered people, the direct appliance of their warlike material, their soldiery, to the purposes of the conquerors, the enrolment of the vanquished under the standards and the leadership of the victors.

This would appear to be a theoretical anomaly, but that all history proves it to be a general law, true of Rome and her legions, true of Russia, true of France in Algeria, and especially true of the conquest of India by the British."

From a lecture published in The Journal of the United Service Institution, of India 1871.

A STOUT HEART TO THE STEEP HILL

“NAP”

THE year was 1942. Our brigade was located at Jhikargacha in malarious East Bengal. The author was a junior staff officer at brigade headquarters.

The Japanese were riding on the crest of a wave and the myth of the Nip being a superman had gained some hold among our troops, British, Indian and African alike. Our new Corps Commander paid us visit and, as is customary with general officers on such occasions, addressed us. It was in the nature of a morale-building address. Among other things he asserted that he had always regarded courage as the highest of virtues. “We can all be brave for a little while”, said the General, “but the chap who can be brave a little longer than the fellow on the other side will always carry the day.” These words have stuck in my memory ever since and often, in moments of relaxation, I have tried to analyse them. The notes that follow are the result of such reflection. The Corps Commander later became world famous as the Commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma.

A dictionary defines courage in these words: “Readiness to face and capacity to endure danger, inherent freedom from fear or from its disturbing effects.” Courage and valour are synonymous.

Courage as we must all know, is of two kinds—physical courage and moral courage. We, all of us, possess one or the other or both to a greater or a lesser degree. Sometimes you have a man who has in him the elements of both the hero and the coward. At times a normally courageous man fails at the great moment. He is not necessarily a coward because of such failure. Lucky indeed is the man who has a combination of both. I shall illustrate all this by giving a few examples.

Those of us who have read his life story will agree that Disraeli was no coward; yet there is a delightful remark attributed to his wife on the great man’s courage. “Dizzy”, she once said, “has wonderful moral courage, but no physical courage. I always have to pull the string of his shower bath.” It is as good an example as any of that fight between the coward and the brave man that takes place in most of us. Disraeli’s moral courage carried him to the bath but there his physical courage failed him. He could not pull the string which administered the cold shower.

Failure to execute a parachute jump is another example of the presence of moral but the lack of physical courage in the same individual. Parachuting is done with calculation—in cold blood, as it were. It requires that “two o’clock in the morning courage” of which Napoleon spoke. I am a parachutist and have often been asked by friends and others as to what it feels like to jump. All that I can say is that it is very frightening and every jump is the same. If you ever get the opportunity to travel in a plane carrying a parachute “stick”—go to it! The atmosphere inside the plane is well worth studying. The nervous tension is very great. The parachutists, rigged up in their paraphernalia, give you the impression they are mentally deficient or at least are in the early stages of suffering from a mild form of dementia. Like a man whistling or singing in the dark to gain or sustain self-confidence, the parachutists try to whistle or sing. You suddenly hear a sharp command: “Action Stations, No. 1”. Every one jumps to his feet and the parachutist nearest the door, with fixed and expressionless face, stands in the aperture followed by the rest of the “stick”. The jumping instructor or despatcher

says: "No. 1 Go". All you hear is the thud of the static line hitting the side of the door and the aperture is empty. No. 2 gets a similar command and jumps out into the lap of the open and inhospitable void outside. No. 3 is now at the door. "Go" says the jumping master, but No. 3 sits there and refuses to jump. He wants to jump very much indeed but just cannot. He would jump if some one pushed him out and is, as a matter of fact, making a request to the despatcher to this effect. The latter has instructions not to "pull the string" for anyone. The plane does another round. The "jibber" is given another chance to jump. There is no pressure of any kind because the successful landing of a "stick" depends on instinctive and immediate response to the command "Go". No. 3 finds it again impossible to face the ordeal. He has moral courage to come up to the door but can go no further. The plane lands and No. 3 merely disappears from the scene and returns to his unit. If you study this man's service record, more often than not, you will find that he has a fine war record of courage and bravery in the field. A psychologist would perhaps give you some good reason for this particular lack of courage under particular circumstances.

Now for the man who is normally courageous but fails in the great moment. Mark Twain tells us about the courage of a great man whom he knew. "I knew him well," says Mark Twain, "and I knew him as a brave man. Yet he did the most cowardly thing I have ever heard of any man. He was in a shipwreck, and as the ship was going down he snatched a lifebelt from a woman passenger and put it on himself. He was saved and she was drowned. And in spite of that frightful act I think he was not a coward. I know there was not a day of his life afterwards when he would not willingly and in cold blood have given his life to recall that shameful act." I would like to add that in this case failure was not in moral courage but in physical courage. He was overcome by the peril which was engulfing him and the coward in him came uppermost.

As I have mentioned earlier we can all be brave on occasions, but the opposite is also true. "Know your enemy", was a common slogan one saw displayed at every training institution during the last war. I would also advocate "Know thyself". We may have a great deal of courage in us without knowing it, and it is also true that we may be more chicken-hearted than we suspect. Whether we are real heroes or cowards will be discovered only when we are, to use a highly satisfactory phrase, "in a tight corner". A reputation built up in an armchair will not always stand the test of battle.

Is there a yardstick for measuring courage? The answer is no, but it is interesting to compare the old and new conceptions of bravery. In the old days, long before the age of oil and the atom bomb, war, we learn from the writings of Fuller and others, was a festival and battle a competition of courage. Fighting was between man and man, between individuals with no great odds against one or the other. The bravest and not the most crafty and intelligent were the real leaders of men. The place of honour was in the front rank and not in an armchair many miles away from the front. Who is not aware of a Greek war song in which the author acclaims: "Glorious indeed is death in the front rank of the combat where the brave man dies for his country." Twentieth Century warfare and combat bravery are very different. I do not know what the reader thinks but, in my opinion, it is a moot point whether the pilot of an airplane, flying some 30,000 feet above the earth carrying an atomic bomb and assisted by the most accurate precision instruments in the hunting out of his quarry, is really a brave man. There is about one in a thousand chance of his being hit back. Do you remember that ghastly story of 1945, when an American B 29, with a crew of eleven men, flew at an altitude of some 20,000 feet over Japan and, when above the city of Hiroshima, one of the crew pulled a small lever and released an atomic bomb attached to a parachute. As a result about 160,000 people were killed and thousands rendered homeless. There was no casualty to the attackers.

Are men born courageous? It is difficult to say one way or the other but heredity, upbringing, early environment, climate and national traditions, etc., do affect this aspect of human personality. I have no space to enlarge on this but if you wish to find out more about this aspect of human personality I commend to you the story of Shakuntala and her brave little son. The less a person is acquainted with the sweets of life, the less reason he has to be afraid of death. It logically follows therefore that he would be more courageous than the man born to luxuries. Peasants and farmers are born and live very close to nature, consequently they are less afraid of death and that is one reason why they are enlisted in every army in preference to the "townee". To say that peasants are always brave and the "townees" cowards would not only be grossly unjust but wrong; only the particular occasion and circumstance would decide. We all have fear as we all have courage. There would be no merit in being brave if one had no fear, just as there would be no merit in becoming a Mahatma if you knew no evil and when there were no temptations in your way. Have you heard of that familiar story of Nelson when he was a small boy? "Fear! Grandmother. I never saw fear. What is it?". The story is essentially false. Nelson, like many other great men, did some very brave things but there were occasions when he could be as fearful as anybody else.

Can courage be developed and maintained? The answer appears to be in the affirmative. The courage of a soldier is heightened by his knowledge of his profession. Physical fitness, skill at arms, moral health, the knowledge that his family interests are safe in the hands of his government, and the feeling that God is on his side in a righteous cause will go a long way in making a man scorn death. And those who are not afraid of death may be foolhardy but they will be brave. "Pep talks", A.B.C.A. lectures, proper amenities and welfare, good man management and intelligent documentation will help to keep troops in good courage.

Is courage constant? The answer is *no*; nothing is so variable. To suppose all men to be brave at all times is to be a very poor student of psychology. I mention this particularly in relation to troops in action, especially defensive action. The courage of such troops is reborn daily. A true leader of men will guarantee this by his dispositions, sharing in his men's discomforts and ensuring a proper system of ammunition supply, rations and evacuation of casualties. The same troops, who if attacking, would have been victorious, may be defeated if on the defensive. This is as true of individuals as of groups. I once knew a junior NCO who was really very afraid. He was in command of a piquet just outside the perimeter. Night after night he had been directing his Brens on some chimerical enemy trying to creep up to his piquet. The mornings always revealed no trace of any enemy anywhere in the vicinity. We knew the enemy were not so daring and as it meant unnecessary "stand to" for all the other piquets I had the NCO up and asked him why his men were so "trigger happy". His reply simply was that the nights were very dark and he fired his Brens just "*rob ke waste*". In passing, I would like to mention a case of mass "trigger happiness" or mass fear. The battalion was in position on the banks of the Arielle facing the famous village of Tollo. One night a German patrol came and literally snatched away twenty-five of our men as prisoners. No one was taking any chances on the following night. No German patrols came but there was a strong wind which disturbed the dry leaves of the trees in front of our forward companies. Within a period of two hours about ten thousand rounds had been fired off by the battalion.

A coward cannot be a real leader of men and the presence or lack of courage in a leader is very infectious. A man is really what he thinks. Present day leaders are more educated than the men they command. Educated people are more imaginative than those who have not had the benefits of modern education and it is the imaginative people who suffer most from fear. If you are born imaginative do not give the men you command any hint of being afraid. If you do, they will explore in their own way, the whole circumference of the disastrous fear circle. Once

an infection starts there is no knowing where it may lead. To quote a concrete example of temporary lack of courage, *en masse*, being infectious, I shall narrate the story of a small "action" fought in Italy. My friend's battalion had occupied a small mountain town known as Celenza on the north bank of the Trigno. No opposition whatsoever had been met in capturing the town but to restore confidence in the locals a flag march inside the village was carried out and every one was congratulating himself on the "good show" they had put up. At about midday the enemy started shelling. There were a few minor casualties. Suddenly orders were received: "*pichhe hat jao*". No one knew where these orders had emanated from; but as good soldiers never question orders, everyone left his position and ran back as fast as he could, some senior NCOs and men withdrawing as far back as B Echelon which was about ten miles behind the front line. It took nearly five hours to restore the situation. Subsequent inquiry revealed that the order to "*pichhe hat jao*" was never given by any one in authority but every one had received it. Further detailed inquiry was of no avail. I would like to add that here was the case of normal men who had temporarily lost control of themselves as the result of a wrong order which must have started from the fuddled brain of a junior NCO or officer overcome by sudden fright due to enemy shelling.

Can courage, like greatness, be thrust upon men? The particular circumstance will dictate the answer. Civilised troops fighting against superior numbers, and knowing that their retreat has been cut off, will put up a good fight but eventually will raise the white flag if fighting a civilised enemy. They will not fight to the last man and the last round. The same troops, when up against an uncouth and savage enemy will fight to the last man and last round not because they have been given such an order but because they know that this enemy will give them no quarter and that death in battle is much preferable to being thrown down a 100 foot precipice as a "prisoner of war". The order to fight to the last man and last round should only be given on rare occasions and after thorough deliberation. Those so ordered must be told of its necessity. The Twentieth Century sophisticated soldier—Japanese excepted—has been educated to think for himself and platitudes will never do with him.

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These notes are becoming a great deal longer than I intended them to be but they will be incomplete without an illustration of the man who has in him that priceless jewel, that supreme combination of physical and moral courage. Every one has heard of the boy on the burning deck but the sailor on the FORMIDABLE was a greater hero. This unknown sailor had won by ballot a place in one of the boats. The ship was going down fast but he was to be saved. Can you picture the scene? The boat is waiting to take him to the shore and safety. He looks at his old comrades who have lost in the ballot and who stand there doomed to death. He feels the passion for life surging in him. He sees the cold, dark sea waiting to engulf its victims. And in that great moment—the greatest that can come to any man—he makes the triumphant choice. He turns to one of his comrades. "You have got parents", he says, "I haven't". And with those words—so heroic in their simplicity—he makes the other take his place in the boat and signs his own death warrant. I have paraphrased the above from a book which has been my companion for a long time. I have read this story almost every day for the last six months and, in some mysterious way, I feel the better for every reading. The sailor did not take his decision on the spur of the moment, he dealt in cold certainties; the boat and safety; the ship and death; his wife or the other's. And he thought of his comrade's old parents at home and chose death. I wonder how many of us could pass such a test. I have no right to speak for the reader, but speaking for myself, I would give much—even my parachute wings—to feel that I could answer in the affirmative.

Before I conclude a word to the reader appears to me to be necessary. The subject I have tried to deal with in this paper is a vast one and in a short article I can

barely do it justice. I wrote these notes—for they are nothing more than notes—partly to amuse and instruct myself and partly to dispel my boredom during a period of forced attachment to a large headquarters in the beginning of the hot weather. My purpose will be served if these notes stimulate interest in this subject among the readers of the Journal. In my very limited study of psychology and military history I have come across few writers who have dealt with this subject at any great length, or have accounted for its many aspects in a reasonable manner. As I have said before it is an immense subject and, to my mind, it is of the elements of war and psychology—one that is most necessary for us soldiers to study. It is a matter of the human heart and ultimate success in battle depends on the soundness or otherwise of human hearts. Morale is only another name for this condition. A leader in command of troops in the field who neglects this study of the human heart and spirit will be gambling with fate, and the favours of fate are seldom constant.

Contributions to the Journal

Contributions to the Journal should be typewritten (double spacing) and forwarded in duplicate. Articles, etc. may vary normally from two thousand to five thousand words.

SOME SERVICE GHOSTS

"PHEON"

BELIEF in the existence of ghosts and spirits is world wide amongst rural people of a low standard of education. It is normal amongst Gurkhas.

Many times, after being informed of an unusual incident, the writer has heard senior Gurkha V.C.O.s say "It's all nonsense but the sepoys all say that it is the work of ghosts". On these occasions he has gained the impression that the V.C.O. himself is not sincere about the "nonsense" part of the statement.

Some Gurkhas say that ghosts live in organised communities, ruled by a king and employing a regular army that even includes horsed cavalry. These communities are said to live within fixed boundaries and will wage war against neighbouring communities if their rights or frontiers are infringed. They consider that the Nepalese hill ghosts are quite different from ghosts met with on the plains of India or those of the Frontier hills; the latter are thought to be Mussalman ghosts. There are many types of Gurkha ghosts from the diminutive Kichkini, with its mischievous tricks—such as milking cows dry—to the dreadful Airi that, armed with a bow and arrows and aided by large hounds, hunts men to the death. There is some doubt about the appearance of the dangerous ghosts as it is said that one cannot see them and live. It seems, however, that certain species are both large and strong. Ghosts are said to be nocturnal in their habits; though they may be met during daylight in isolated places. They like to congregate at cross roads and, after dark, can sometimes be heard in thick trees. All ghosts are said to be frightened by the sound of the human voice.

Few Indian stations are without their ghost stories and haunted localities. Here are a few examples.

DHARAMSALA

Dharamsala, the home of the 1st Gurkhas, is said to possess many ghosts. These include a haunted single officer's quarter and a Mess ghost. Night sentries on the Mess have, on occasion, seen apparitions of one or more British officers, dressed in ancient uniform playing cards or writing letters, in the card room of the Mess. On the path to the Mess, by the tennis court, walkers after dark are annoyed by twigs brushing against their faces. As all trees are well clear of the path this is thought to be a ghostly manifestation and, for this reason, some people avoid this path after dark.

One of the bungalows, Kennedy Lodge, has a ghost who, after the occupants have retired for the night, is heard to enter the drawing room, walk about in the room, and then to leave, opening and shutting the door. This ghost is only heard and is not seen. Other bungalows suffer from doors opening by themselves or beds being moved. There is also a story of a headless ghost, whom it is unlucky to meet, for anyone who sees it is said to die within a week. It is suggested that the Dharamsala earthquake of 1903 is responsible for the numbers of ghosts in the station but the writer has been unable to confirm if any of these manifestations were seen before the earthquake or not.

LANSDOWNE

Lansdowne, the home of the Royal Garhwal Rifles, and, until recently, also of the 2/3rd Gurkhas, has several ghosts. The highest bungalow in the station—on the hill to the West of the old 2/3rd Officers Mess—is said to be haunted. Servants do

not like to remain in the bungalow after dark if it is empty and, if the occupants are out after dark, will go and sit in the *muli's* quarter at the bottom of the garden. The writer knows of one occasion when a British officer saw a ghost in the bungalow. This officer woke in the middle of the night and found an Indian woman attempting to strangle him. He could not see her face but, by the light of the moon, could distinguish her outline. After a struggle he threw her off and raised the other occupants by his shouts of "thief". Nobody else saw or heard the woman but a dog, that had been sleeping in the room, refused to return to it. The original owner of the bungalow was killed in action in France in 1915 but his ghost returns to Lansdowne and frequently rides at night. The strange thing about this apparition is that it is seen on the lower parade grounds of Kitchener Lines. As far as the writer can ascertain these lines were never occupied by the ghost's regiment, the 2/3rd Gurkhas. This ghost is only seen on the parade ground, at night, during the monsoon and is always dressed in uniform and mounted on a white horse. The apparition appears on the parade ground, is seen by one of the sentries on the quarter guard, who reports to the guard commander. The guard commander, after seeing an officer in uniform mounted on a horse, assumes it is the officer of the week and orders the guard to turn out. The ghost then disappears and has never been seen by the whole guard; though, on occasion, several men have seen him. It should be noted that Lansdowne is spread over a large area and that some officers, in the past, made a practice of using a horse to visit guards at night. When the ghost is seen there is normally some mist present.

Several other bungalows have ghostly associations. One has a woman, dressed in a mackintosh coat, who is seen coming up the path to the front door but who disappears before she reaches the bungalow. This apparition only appears in the rains. Another bungalow has a disembodied voice—an infant is heard crying. There was one case when a British officer, new to the regiment, saw a group of old men passing outside his bungalow in the middle of the night. From descriptions given by him next day many of this group were identified as former officers of the Royal Garhwal Rifles. Doubters suggested that, after looking at old portraits in the mess, he had been the victim of a nightmare.

Some of the bungalows in the Lansdowne and Kalagarh Forest Divisions are also reputed to be haunted. The writer knows of one case when an officer was tormented by poltergeists in one of them. The officer was on a lone shoot and was reading in bed after dark, after all the servants had retired for the night. Door and window *chicks* were rattled, there were loud bangings on the roof and the chairs on the verandah were dragged up and down. The officer got out of bed and went round with an electric torch. Wherever he went the noise and movement ceased, to be renewed at some other part of the bungalow. At last he gave it up and dropped off to sleep in spite of the din, assisted by wads of cotton wool in his ears.

The writer has done two shoots from the Salkhet Forest Rest House. This rest house is little used by shooting parties as there is a better one in the same block. On each occasion there were tigers present in the valley but the writer failed to shoot one. One day an old coolie told him that the tigers in the valley were under the special protection of a spirit and that nobody had ever shot a tiger there. The coolie added that if one made an offering at a shrine, beneath a tree at the bottom of the valley, the goddess Devi might intervene and allow a tiger to be killed. This was some years ago and, at that time, there was no record of a tiger being shot in the rest house occupation register. The writer would be interested to know if any reader knows of a tiger having been shot in the Salkhet valley.

A FRONTIER GHOST

In 1942, while inspecting "Band" permanent piquet near Damdil Camp in Waziristan, the writer received a report of ghosts who had caused the platoon garrison to stand-to on the previous night. The piquet stood on a high feature overlooking

"Armoured Car Ridge", the scene of bloody fighting between the 6th Gurkhas and Pathans in 1937. After dark, lights were seen ascending the hill on which the piquet stood. The sentry informed the N.C.O. who, on seeing the lights, at once called the V.C.O. in command of the piquet. The whole garrison turned out. The V.C.O. after watching the behaviour of the lights for some time decided that they were the work of *rakhe bhut* and allowed the garrison to stand-down. These ghosts appear to be a type of "will-o-the-wisp", "St. Elmo's fire" or "Marsh fire" and are natural phenomena. The writer is not qualified to say if they can appear in high, dry areas but, at the time, he thought it unnecessary to mention the fighting of 1937.

A RECRUIT SNATCHER

During the recent war Gurkha Centres at Dohra Dun were expanded and many new buildings were erected. In one centre some latrines were built on the slope of a wooded valley below the new barracks. Men visiting the latrines at night were frightened by the appearance of ghosts. Several recruits, over a period of months, disappeared for several days, and, on return to the centre, reported that they had been seized and carried off into the jungle by a ghost. Inquiries amongst the local villages failed to clear up the mystery. Ambushes were laid to trap the ghost and, after some time, a man dressed in a bed sheet was seen and chased. It was then assumed that the incidents were the result of a practical joke. The nuisance stopped for some time and the majority of the centre personnel were changed by demobilisation. As recently as November 1947 a recruit disappeared after visiting these same latrines. The recruit had only arrived from his home in Nepal a few days previously, he had no money and was most inadequately dressed; he was seen by a night sentry going towards the latrines at about 1 a.m. He was reported as a deserter and has not been heard of since. Many men consider that the ghost has carried him away.

REPORTED KILLED.

During the course of the recent war there were instances of men reported as killed in action who were in fact prisoners of war. There was one such case of an N.C.O. in the 2/1st Gurkhas who had been captured by the Japanese in Malaya but was officially reported "killed in action". This man returned to his regimental centre in late 1945 and then proceeded to his home in Nepal on leave. On nearing his village he met a friend who fled away from him; a little later several other acquaintances acted in a similar manner. The man was much mystified as he did not know that he was supposed to be dead. Just before he entered the village he met a party of several men who knew him; all fled except one, braver than the rest, who came up to him and after much talk and feeling his body broke the news to him that he was meant to be dead and that the rest had run away as they took him to be a ghost.

The man belonged to the Gurung tribe and his *Arghun* (death ceremonies) had been performed some time previously and his wife had remarried. He was told to wait outside the village until the village elders had discussed his case. At length it was decided that, as he was officially dead, he must be born again as another person and therefore he must remain outside the village until he had gone through all the ceremonies connected with birth, naming, weaning and hair cutting. These took some days, while the man lived under a tree near the village. At last with a new name he entered the village, accepted as the son of his parents. On return to the regiment his name had to be altered on all his documents.

A HAUNTED AEROPLANE.

Just in case it is thought that ghosts are the peculiar property of the uneducated infantry here is a story concerning the Royal Air Force. Some twenty years ago 84 Squadron R.A.F. was stationed at Shaibah, Iraq. The squadron was equipped with De Havilland 9A aircraft. At that time the D.H.9A was obsolete and

only used by general purpose squadrons overseas. It was a heavy biplane, fitted with a 400 h.p. Liberty engine, and, due to its Delco ignition system and a small gravity petrol tank on the top wing, was liable to catch fire if it crashed. New aircraft were shipped direct to Shaibah in their component parts and were erected by the squadron fitters. Before issue to a flight they were tested by a competent pilot. One day a new aircraft, on its first flight, was found to swing in a curve as soon as the wheels touched earth. The under carriage was again overhauled and retested but on its next flight the aeroplane behaved in the same vicious manner as soon as the wheels touched down. Innumerable tests and checks were carried out by all the best riggers and all the best pilots but the aeroplane continued to swing on landing, in a most dangerous manner. Technically the aeroplane was perfect and the riggers swore that it was not possible for it to behave as it did. It was said that the commanding officer even reported to Air Headquarters that the aircraft should be written off charge as dangerous. Certain other ranks employed in the station workshops said that the aeroplane must be haunted. For some time the aeroplane remained an unsolved problem, grounded in the workshop hangars.

One day a senior staff officer from A.H.Q. Baghdad visited Shaibah. His official duties did not include testing aircraft but he was a keen and fearless pilot. He had heard of this aeroplane and pressed to be allowed to test it himself. After some discussion the squadron commander agreed. As on previous occasions the aeroplane took off normally and behaved well in the air but on landing it swung violently, the staff officer did not check the swing in time, the undercarriage collapsed and the aeroplane was wrecked beyond hope of repair. The pilot escaped without injury and, as he had checked the undercarriage himself, before flight, could not blame the machine. The final result was thus inconclusive but the riggers still said that it must have been haunted.

During the recent war air forces were said to have been plagued by "Grem-lins", a type of imp, who were blamed for all minor defects to airframes and engines. It is also said that similar ghosts were busy in all large military headquarters in India—removing letters or hiding files that affected such matters as leave, pay or passage applications.

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It appears that ghosts can only be seen by believers in them, or by individuals who are psychic. Whilst this state of affairs is satisfactory it robs life of many thrills for large numbers of people. Still, every country in the world that owns ghosts, is reputed to have some that are well disposed towards human beings. It thus seems probable that if members of the Fighting Services keep their consciences clear, and their weapons bright clean and slightly oiled, they should only meet good ghosts.

THE SERPENT SYMBOL

LIEUT. COLONEL B. L. RAINA, I.A.M.C.

SYMBOLS have been used all over the world for centuries. The greatness and grandeur of nature stimulated the human mind to express mental reactions by signs and figures. Ideography and hieroglyphics helped in communicating thought through visible signs and pictures. Painting, poetry and prose are only symbolic representations of mental impressions. The attributes of God, different philosophies and ideologies resolve into symbols. Christians, Jews, Mohammedans and Buddhists—in fact peoples throughout the world—associate themselves with one symbol or another. The Cross of the Christians (the Supreme Sacrifice of Christ), the Easter Egg during the Spring (symbol of universal resurrection), the Crescent and Star (symbol of Artemis, the Virgin goddess of purity and beauty; Egyptian Isis the Queen of Heaven whose tear in the Nile causes inundation of river and brings health and food; ancient Byzantium or Constantinople), the Buddhist Wheel and the Trinity (Brahma the creator, Vishnu the preserver and Shiva the destroyer, the three attributes of God) of the Hindus are well-known examples. New signs are being devised to-day, on roads, houses, factories, farms, in units and formations, to facilitate easy recognition and to avoid confusion. Different schools of thought and professions likewise have adopted different symbols. The Rotarians are recognised by their wheel and medical men and women by their snake symbol.

The reasons for adopting many of the existing signs are easily understood. One can readily appreciate the movement and progress represented by a wheel, innocence by a dove, courage by a lion, beauty by a lotus, the brilliance of an ever-burning torch dispelling ignorance, but the serpent sign of doctors seems to be incomprehensible. Surely medical men do not want to associate their art with a vicious poisonous reptile or intend emulating the subtle, malicious qualities of a snake.

The snake symbol of doctors can be traced—like all other symbols—to the dim historic past. It unfolds a fascinating history of the development of human thought. Mythologists tell us that people in ancient times observed that the snake with serpentine spiral movements was the most active of all reptiles and could go anywhere. Its poison and tongue were associated with fire, spirit and conscious flight to heaven. Its gliding motion was suggestive of winding rivers. A snake biting its tail was associated with the earth surrounded by a river. Its long life and changing of skin suggested the idea of immortality and resurrection. It was therefore adopted as a symbol of spirit, wisdom and eternity. "Be ye therefore wise as serpents and harmless as doves" (Matthew x, 16) is a well-known saying. Moses at the command of God set up a brazen serpent so that those who had been bitten by serpents would be cured by looking on the brazen serpent with faith (Numbers xxi, 9). According to Tertullian this serpent gave rise to Ophites who revered the serpent as the symbol of the hidden divine wisdom. A serpent on the Cross is quoted by St. John, "Whoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (John, iii-14). The blind emperor Theodosius is said to have recovered his sight when a serpent laid a precious stone on his eyes. Garga, an Indian Astronomer, is reputed to have learnt the secrets of the stars from the serpent god, Shesh Naga. Religion, mythology and folk lores of India, Greece, Rome, Crete, Babylonia and Peru are full of snake symbols. The snake was carried by Apollo in his right hand, by Hermes or Mercury round a stick, by Aesculapaeus intertwined round his staff and by Shiva around his neck. Vishnu is said to have rested on the body of a thousand headed serpent and Krishna stood on the hood of an enormous snake.



ÆSCULAPIUS



Badge of the Army Medical Service of the U.S.A.



*The insignia of
the Indian
Medical Asso-
ciation.*



*Badge of the
Indian Army
Medical Corps.*

The story how worship of Aesculapaeus started is an interesting one.

Aesculapaeus was the son of the Greek god Apollo and Coronis, a Thessalian nymph. Apollo himself was gifted with the divine knowledge of healing and had imparted that knowledge to Cheiron. Apollo had married Coronis secretly. The father of Coronis, not knowing that she was the wife of Apollo, married her to Ischus. A white raven brought this news to Apollo. He became wild with rage and turned the raven black. (The black colour became since then the conventional sign of mourning throughout Greece and Rome). Apollo soon after killed Ischus and his sister killed Coronis. When Coronis with Aesculapaeus lay on the funeral pyre Apollo rescued his infant son and took him to Cheiron who taught him the art of healing. Aesculapaeus soon became the great healing god of Greece. His two daughters, Hygeia and Panacea, became the goddesses of health and healing herbs. According to the legend Aesculapaeus became greedy and started restoring life to the dead. Pluto, the god of the under-world was worried. He complained to Zeus. The latter killed Aesculapaeus with a 'thunderbolt'. Apollo was stricken with grief and with help of the gods including Zeus himself placed Aesculapaeus amongst the stars and made him a god. Descendants of Aesculapaeus erected temples in his memory. The treatment of patients by putting them to sleep was commonly practised in these temples. The central figure of the temple was Aesculapaeus holding a staff with a snake intertwined. Snakes were tended in these sanctuaries of Aesculapaeus. In the dim light of the dawn, priests accompanied by a dog and a snake visited the patients. The dog licked their hands. The snake moved slowly across their bed. The priest reassured them. The patients were cured. The glory of Aesculapaeus spread throughout Greece and later to Rome through the Sibylline Books.

The Cumaeen sibyl (the most famous seeress who was consulted by Aeneas before his descent into Hades) offered to sell nine books of oracles to Tarquin. He refused to buy them. The sibyl burnt three books and offered the remaining six at the original price. Tarquin again refused. The sibyl burnt three more books and offered the remaining three at the same price as the original nine and Tarquin accepted. About 293 B.C. there was plague in Rome. These Sibylline Books were consulted. The oracles prophesied that Aesculapaeus could save them. A temple of Aesculapaeus was built on the island in the river Tiber opposite the city of Rome. The worship of Aesculapaeus was started forthwith. The priests began putting the snake symbol at the head of their prescriptions. The symbol of the medical profession in all the countries which derived inspiration from Rome and Greece, became the rod of Aesculapaeus.

The rod of Aesculapaeus had only one snake but many medical symbols included two snakes. The latter resulted in the great Caduceus controversy. The Caduceus was the staff of office of Hermes or Mercury the messenger of gods, the god of eloquence and gain and conductor of souls to the lower world. It was originally said to be of olive wood adorned with gold but afterwards two serpents coiled round it and two wings at the top appeared. This was adopted as the emblem of couriers and is the familiar Signal Corps Sign. The rod of Aesculapaeus is the recognised medical symbol but diversity in the number of snakes round it has persisted. The Royal and Indian Army Medical Corps have within a laurel wreath the rod of Aesculapaeus with one serpent intertwined but the Indian Medical Association and many other organisations (including publishers of medical literature) display the rod surrounded by two snakes.

Lately further light has been thrown on the snake symbol. It seems that the snake sign was born originally in India. In the seals excavated at Mohenjodaro, the remains of the Indus Civilisation dating back to 3250-2750 B.C., two snakes are found carved around the Asvattha tree (*Ficus religiosa*). Similar carvings are also found at the Chauki Ghata and Gorain Ghata of Benaras (*Mohhopadhyaya History of Indian Medicine* Vol. III p.13). The carvings are surprisingly identical

with those seen in medical publications. The Rt. Reverend C.W. Leadbeater corroborates the same. He says, "The spine is called in India the *Brahmadanda*, the stick of Brahma, and the drawing shows that it is also the original of the *Caduceus* of Mercury, the two snakes of which symbolise the *Kundalini* or the serpent fire which is presently to be set in motion along these channels, while the wings typify the power of the conscious flight through higher planes which the development of that fire confers". (*The Chakras*, p. 18). It may be added that the medical science is associated with God. "*Dios que da la Ilaga, da la medicina*" (Cervantes *Don Quixote* II, 19), "God who sends the wound sends the medicine"; "The Lord created medicine out of earth", are common sayings. In *Ayurveda* (the Science of Life), the oldest work in the world on the art of healing, Dhanvantri told Susruta that Brahma (the Creator), the first divine physician composed a hundred thousand verses divided into a thousand chapters on the Science of Life. The *Atharveda* also mentions that "God that has caused disease shall perform the cure. He is Himself the best physician. Let Him indeed, the Holy One, prepare remedies for thee, together with the earthly physician!" (*Bloomfield's Translation* V, II, 95). It is not surprising, therefore, that the staff of the Creator with the sign of knowledge and eternity came to be acknowledged as the medical symbol.

Changes of Address

Members are requested to notify any change of address to the Secretary without delay. This will ensure prompt delivery of the Journal every quarter.

THE OLD KOI HAI

MAJOR A. C. MACNEILL

AS he came into the bar there was no mistaking him. He was the Old Koi Hai in the flesh.

Bars may vary. Sam's is different from Firpo's, both are different from the Taj and the Eastern Exchange is different from them all. But the Old Koi Hai in mufti is the same in each of them and in a Piccadilly Dive as well.

His green pork-pie hat was at just that angle, the raglan coat was light and easy fitting and his light tan shoes were mirror bright. The slightly sallow cheeks were criss-crossed by a net-work of tiny, thread-thin veins and round his eyes the crows had stamped close and deep. It was a frowsty bar and his coming brought the breath of a cleaner life. The three blondes summed him up in one glance as an unlikely prospect and went on with their low whispering. For a moment he weighed them with his hard, light blue eyes and, catching my stare, sent the same unmistakeable message to me.

"Gin. *Pao peg*", he snapped at the barman.

"*Hamare waste bhi*", I ordered.

For a moment he hesitated, then took the stool beside me.

"O'Kane, *Seventh*". His eyes were level and bleak. "You?"

"With the *Fifth* in the War".

For a full minute he considered my answer, then nodded. Evidently the Mahrattas were acceptable but, of course, they were not Rajputs. He poured an equal part of water into his *pao peg* and lit a cigarette striking the match away from himself. "*Pucca* or E.C.O?"

I watered my gin gently and asked the barman to bring small white onions. The blue eyes were friendly as he dropped an onion in his glass.

"British Service attached", I told him and the tight line of his lips curved a little, almost smiled.

"Have the other half, old boy. It's good to meet someone these days."

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Yes, the Old Koi Hai in the flesh, one of the many who'd fought in two world wars and held the Indian Army together in the years between. Today, with his brothers, he's living in a world he doesn't quite understand on a pension that barely stretches from quarter to quarter, a stranger in his own land.

The first of the type I met was the worst. Early in '41 with fifty others I went to the Indian Army as a "Middle Piece" Captain and he welcomed us. He was a Brigadier, boot-livered and gin-cured, but his kit was beautiful. The bush-shirt was cavalry cut and the shorts dhobied glass hard. We, somewhat travel-stained after a twelve-week voyage round the Cape, were looked on with undisguised disgust. He cleared his throat, judged a dramatic pause and burst into voice. What he said

doesn't matter but it was neither kind nor complimentary. A charming fellow, and I've heard that that welcome cost him his job. May pie-dogs dig up and gnaw his bones.

But he, over six years, was the only one of his kind. True, at first, our welcome was not too warm but we soon got to know each other. My first Colonel was typical. Five of us, all Scots, arrived to help him form a new Battalion of a class previously not recruited. A South Irishman with twenty-five years' service he looked us over and pushed the boat out.

"Ye'll speak divvil a word of English in this Battalion till your Urdu's as good as a Punjabi pandit's", he said. "Till then you're no use to me but we'll make a battalion between us. Now we'll have the other half."

In three months we all spoke the language naturally and, in less than six, were in the line in the Kabaw.

More hospitable men never lived. Almost without exception soldiering on their pay ready cash was a thing unknown to them in that land of the Almighty Chit. When U.K. leave came they took the train to Bombay, talked it over with Lloyds or Grindlays and, letting the overdraft take care of itself, went happily home.

From leaves they brought back young wives—and the right young wives. Till the next arrived each was the pet of the station, learned to give parties to the right people in the right order, speak the "Sahib-bat" and make the best of the Ladies' night at the Club. She accepted and understood the subtle distinction between Civil Police and Box-wallahs and, when the Battalion went to the Frontier or to war, she, took a bungalow in Ooty or Ranchi and hoped for the best.

When some misguided Staff wallah at G.H.Q. classed all ladies separated from their husbands through war service as "Abandoned Wives" she thought it rather funny and left it to the wives of E.C. Bankers and Box-wallahs to feel offended. She was the salt of the parched earth, the partner commemorated in the rhyme,

"Into the Club, all dry and dusty, there strode the *Great Hamare Waste*,
And by his side as dry as he *Memsahib Hamare Waste Bhi*".

Now they're at home where the clapped hand or the shouted "*Idhar Ao*" mean nothing. They lived hard, fought hard, sometimes drank hard and often died hard. There was always the pension to come.

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He speared the little white onion from the bottom of his glass and chewed it thoughtfully.

"The other half?"

Silently the barman pointed to the empty bottle.

"*Achchha*", said the Old Koi Hai. He set his hat at the correct angle, brushed ash flecks from his coat and turned to the door. To the three blondes he bowed lightly, to me he smiled.

"*Ram Ram*", he murmured and walked out into Piccadilly.

Salaam, my Old Koi Hai. *Bara salaam aur Khudda hafiz*.

THE VALUE OF MESS LIFE IN THE TRAINING OF OFFICERS

MAJOR J. D. MALIK

IN this article it is proposed to examine the first six years of a commissioned officer's life, when he normally has no alternative to mess life, and to analyse the benefits that might accrue from such a life in his early training. Does mess life tend to develop leadership? To answer this it is desirable firstly to attempt a grouping of the qualities of a leader, and secondly to have some idea of the conditions of "mess life".

The qualities essential in a leader may be broadly divided into two categories—*inherent* and *acquired*. It is the latter category that is under examination, the former being out of the scope of this article. The acquired qualities, again, can be divided into three groups falling under different types of training.

(a) Physical qualities

(i) Toughness

(b) Moral qualities

(i) A spirit of loyalty to the service and a high sense of duty.

(ii) Adaptability

(iii) Sociability

(iv) Maturity

(c) A sound basic military knowledge.

This is far from being a comprehensive list but *only* qualities that bear some relation to mess life have been taken.

Now let us consider what mess life implies. It is assumed that the composition of an average mess would include the normal quota of subalterns, probably a certain number of captains, and possibly one or two field officers, living in the mess. The Commanding Officer may or may not be living in but drops in occasionally for a chat and a meal with his officers. All the other members attend dinner nights and other organised functions in the mess. Against this background a survey of the problem is now possible.

Esprit de Corps. The cultivation of a spirit of loyalty to the service is a gradual process. Its seeds are first sown in the form of affection one develops for those with whom one comes into contact every day. The closer the association the stronger are the ties of attachment. This feeling of affection is not confined to individuals alone. Groups of individuals exhibit a similar feeling towards entities bigger than themselves. *Esprit de corps* and patriotism are but sublime forms of the same feeling of affection which a human being has towards other fellow beings. The young officer after emerging successfully through the personal struggle of training years, is no exception to the rule. He is yearning to identify himself with a group and he starts off with his fellow officers in the mess who in their turn pride themselves on being part of their unit. And gradually a sense of devotion to the service is invariably accompanied by a high sense of duty; the latter being a natural corollary of the former. Devotion provides the inspiration, and the sense of duty results in the urge to live up to the traditions of a particular unit.

Adaptability. Adaptability to changing conditions is essential in every walk of life, but it is more so in the profession of soldiering. Lagging behind in the field of new ideas portends trouble both for the soldier and the Army. Here again mess life gives the young officer a flying start. In this life his personal freedom is curtailed to a certain extent under the conventions and customs of the mess, and unconsciously he learns the most important lesson of "live and let live". He cannot afford to be blunt in his speech, not only out of consideration for others but out of sheer necessity and has to compromise in his thoughts and actions. He is also confronted occasionally with new ideas which might clash violently with his own rigid ideas, but which would demand consideration all the same. It might be thought that such surroundings will strangle the young officer's own individuality and irreparably damage his initiative. This certainly is not the case. The change is effected through the mild corrective of a slight unpopularity in the mess whenever the youngster is guilty of a solecism. There is no compulsion behind it and the adjustment is made without any qualms. Sometimes, of course, his ideas are upheld and the adjustment is made on the other side. He learns through experience that in the present day world few dogmas are tenable, and as a result acquires a resilient and open mind.

Sociability. Sociability is the art of getting on with others. This does not mean giving in whenever there is any difference of opinion or forcing one's own opinion, for that matter, on others. It can best be described as the art of getting what you want out of others without injuring their self-respect. Experience alone can teach this. It is not claimed that such experience can be had only in mess life. Mess is merely one of the many places where the young officer can be grounded in that all important attribute of a leader—the understanding of human nature. The officers come to know each other through playing games, mess meetings, discussions and their individual reactions to various domestic arrangements in the mess.

Maturity. Maturity is the result of mental acquirements such as a sound judgement and an ability to see a problem in its true perspective. With the development of an unbiassed outlook, personal idiosyncracies and fads disappear. Mess life offers more opportunities for an early start in this respect than the comparative seclusion of married life at this stage.

Military Knowledge. A sound basic military knowledge is not a quality but achievement more tangible than the moral qualities hitherto discussed. The officer living in the mess, being free of domestic distractions, is capable of real concentration on his work. He is goaded to greater effort under a natural instinct to emulate the achievements of his brother officers around him. "Talking shop" is not very popular in the majority of messes, but there is nothing against discussions on general military topics. An atmosphere thus steeped in military traditions and conventions is bound to evoke the young officer's desire to improve his military knowledge.

The Commanding Officer who is ultimately responsible for the training of his officers can use this opportunity in a tactful way to disseminate the right ideas and principles without making it too irksome. Much depends on him and the senior officers in fostering the right spirit.

The training outlined in this article, is imparted without the officer being conscious of it. But the qualities of adaptability, sociability, maturity and *esprit de corps*, thus acquired, are very much in evidence in the personality of the young officer. In addition to this moral development he also gains in military knowledge. Experience has shown that the officer who has had a chance of living in a mess is much better off in all respects than the officer who has never lived in a mess.

ARMS AND THE MAN

LIEUT. S.P. SHARMA, R.I.N.V.R.

THE part that war plays in history has not probably been studied as such in any country except Germany. In India particularly, the subject has not only not been studied but is even looked down upon with a lot of pious sentimentalism. Nevertheless, this country has seen wars and devastation as much as any other. Especially today, when with freedom, the responsibility for declaring and conducting war is about to rest on her shoulders, it is but proper that India should shake off her complaisance and tackle a problem as unavoidable as, perhaps, unpleasant. Life may be *maya*, illusion, but wars are not, certainly not the death that wars entail.

The causes of war have varied with time and country. Long ago in the history of political progress, when kings were all-powerful, wars arose out of their greed for power over other kings or out of their lust. Later the Church took a hand in the game, and wars were waged for putting down heresy. During the last century and a half, as the common man began to throw off the yoke of royal or sacerdotal autocracy and to gain more collective power in the determination of his country's policy, economic gain became the main incentive to war, gain in the shape of raw materials or of markets. For our immediate purpose, however, the causes of war are of no concern: war itself is what matters. There are indeed many aspects of it according as it is conducted on land or sea or in the air, or according as reliance is mainly placed on the infantry, cavalry or artillery, or again according as it is confined to combatants or is extended to non-combatants. There are numerous other viewpoints too, but we may confine ourselves to only one, *i.e.*, the influence that the increasing complexity of armaments has had on the conduct of war and on human society.

The Biblical account of the origin of man differs radically from the Darwinian one but in either case, early man would have had few chances of survival, had not his physical endowment been coupled with a spark of intelligence somewhere in his make-up. That spark enabled him to make fire, to use instruments of stone, and to prepare for himself shelter against wind and rain. Proceeding on these lines, he not only overcame the beasts of the forest in the struggle for existence, but also made his own life free of anxiety over food. His first armament thus was very simple, and it depended very greatly on his own strength and skill for its effectiveness.

It is needless to go into any detail of the various types of armament, offensive and defensive, that developed through the ages till today we have the latest of them all, the atom bomb. But it should be noted that success in war depends not merely on armaments but also on how they are used. The former embraces questions of organisation while the latter connotes operations and policy. Again instruments depend for their effectiveness not on their quantum only but also on factors like their portability, range of action, and accuracy of aim, etc. In other words, human ingenuity is needed in the manufacture of suitable instruments no less than in their proper and skilful use. Thus at any particular point, the civilisation of man is closely related to the nature of the weapons he uses. And these, in turn, have an intimate reaction on his mind. This point merits a little elaboration.

Right at the outset, we have the Age of Valour when bravery and strength were the requisites of leadership. The tales of Homer in the west and of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata in India depict this age. Cleverness and strategy were present

too in increasing measure as time went on, but popular imagination distinctly favoured the brave and strong as the heroes, not the crafty and the trickish who were indeed looked down upon. Then came in Europe the Age of Chivalry. The Roman Empire had disintegrated and society was wholly disorganised. It was then that the knight-errant arose as the champion of the weak, to support right against unjust might. He had a keen sense of obligation to the church and felt it beneath his dignity to do anything wrong. Essentially, he was an aristocrat who would not cross swords with a common man. Wars at this time were mainly individual combats, even sieges were thus laid or held. In India, the Rajput warrior offers a close parallel to the knight of the Middle Ages.

Next we come to the Age of Gun-powder when the idealism of the fighter disappeared and a hard realism took its place. The feudal castle became a thing of the past with the advent of the new explosive device, but so also did the contempt for fraud and deceit on the battle-field. The unmounted fighter came into his own, displacing the mounted knight-errant. Every year saw human inventiveness producing new types of weapons, each more destructive than the preceding, till by the end of the sixteenth century, we had reached the stage of fixed cartridges, rifled pistols, and the percussion fuse. Naturally, with the effectiveness of the new arms the tactics of war changed. Wars also became more costly, for artillery required horses and wagons for transport, the length of the marching column grew and consequently the need for its protection. The rise in production costs involved heavy calls on industry for standardised equipment. From all this, it is easy to see how much of man's thought and energy were occupied by war or the threat of war.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century appeared the Age of Steam which synchronised with the industrial revolution. Scientifically advanced nations began to spread over the whole world in search of raw materials or markets. Production was switched on to a credit basis, and wealth began to accumulate in manufacturing and trading countries. In politics, a wave of democratic feeling swept over Europe which, in turn, led to the rise of the people's army in a revolt against tyranny. This is what happened in the French revolution, and in the American War of Independence. Wars on a mass scale allowed little room for personal valour or chivalry; they aimed at the destruction of the enemy and did not scruple over means. This expansion of warfare to unprecedented proportions was possible only because steam could produce armaments on a large scale and enabled ships to carry factory products to distant lands.

For nearly a century steam was predominant, but towards the end of the nineteenth century were invented the internal combustion engine and wireless telegraphy. The first easily solved the problem of road transport and later of flight, taking war into the third dimension. The wireless facilitated the transmission of energy through ether, and in a sense added a fourth dimension to warfare. These two inventions were not of course the only ones, for there were many others in the metallurgical, chemical, biological and other sciences. All of them together had the effect of rendering warfare even more technical than mechanical. Man's physical strength became less important than ever, his valour or emotions ceased to have much influence over the course of warfare, his intellect now took charge.

Military research is recognised and encouraged by all nations for no country can overlook it except at its own peril. War production aims to meet an unlimited demand, and if that demand contracts with the advent of peace, production machinery will still have to be kept at work to satisfy the needs of the returned soldiers. But the switch-over from war production to peace production will involve a time-lag during which men will have to remain in uniform. Thus begins a vicious circle among nations which explains the terse statement that with technology, militarism advances. The state of society that thus ensues is very different from the old one of a nation at arms, when the military aspect of a nation's life was confined to the fighting man. To-day with total war, a whole nation has to prepare for it in the

fields of technology and industry. The effect that such a state of affairs has on a nation's psychology is not difficult to imagine. War against the enemy of the moment becomes the sole object of national existence, propaganda is directed to this end, the entire life of the country is attuned to the achievement of the one object.

Three years ago, on August 5, 1945, flying at a height of 20,000 feet above the Japanese city of Hiroshima, an American B29 introduced the age of the Atom Bomb. The result was that four and one-tenth square miles of a built-up area was obliterated, 160,000 people were killed and injured, and 200,000 rendered homeless. And this is but the beginning of atomic warfare, for it is stated that a bomb can be made eventually a thousand times more powerful, and that if only a few per cent of the atomic mass be converted into energy instead of the present 0.1 per cent, mankind would be in a position to commit suicide at will. Atomic energy can prove equally destructive at sea because depth-charges are quite conceivable which are equivalent to the detonation of 20,000 tons of TNT. Height charges are possible too against aircraft, propelled by atomic energy and carrying an atomic war-head: be it noted that there will be no need to score direct hits, for the charges can achieve their fell purpose without.

In the history of armaments, weapons of offence have always given rise in due course to those of defence. In the case of the atom bomb too, it is possible that protection against it will eventually evolve. But in the meanwhile the prospect is bleak. We cannot be too sure that the secret of the atom bomb is not known now to more than a few nations. Such a belief inclines dangerously near to wishful thinking. The general picture is therefore dark. The life of humanity has become as uncertain at the hands of the self-propelled atom bomb as that of the individual was at the hands of Fate.

Is this the end of it all, the doomsday of humanity? Something in the depths of our being refuses to concede an affirmative answer. But afraid of facing the truth, we deceive ourselves with false answers. Thus in some quarters consolation is sought in the fact that a defence against the atom bomb is sure to be discovered in the future. This hope may be realised but it should not be forgotten that such defence can never be complete. In fact, it can only be a palliative, never a preventive. There are other quarters which hope the atom bomb can be outlawed as gas-war has been, but they presume some universally recognised body which can enforce the law against the offender: such a body however is yet to come into effective existence. All the same, to go to the root of the matter, the real cure for the present ills seems to lie not in the direction of more skill and inventiveness in man but in the awakening of his moral being, and paying some heed to its behests. To-day it is the soulless intellect that is always at work, waging wars and preparing for them. If however conscience and idealism were to direct the inventive brain, what is a death-dealing machine now could be turned into a blessing for humanity, curing its physical ills, or increasing its food supply, or in other ways multiplying its amenities. After all, skill by itself is not a curse; what makes it so is the use to which it is put. And that use depends on the moral stature of an individual or society. It is thus wrong to deplore the discovery of atomic energy, which is just unmoral: it is only power. Whether we use it for good or for evil depends entirely on us. The solution clearly lies thus not in just condemning the atom bomb or deploring it but in trying to use it for the purposes of our higher self. To this end, every nation and every individual can help. Armaments will continue to be necessary as long as man remains frail and delinquent. But with an awakened conscience functioning in him, they will cease to be his masters and become his useful servants.

MILITARY ROADS AND TRAFFIC

"FORWARD"

*"Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary :
Then fiery expedition be my wing"*

Richard III.

EVERY fighting man and every item of stores and equipment is moved by road during part of its passage from the base to the army or the air force in the field. Roads, supplemented by air, provided the greater part of the lines of communication in France and the Netherlands, in Africa, and in South East Asia. In the last theatre the total length of all-weather roads built by the engineers in connection with the campaign in Assam, Arakan, and Burma amounted to 2,400 miles, as far as from Lisbon to Leningrad, mostly over appalling country. Many more miles were constructed to serve bases and airfields in India.

This paper draws attention to some factors in the use of roads, and suggests lines for further study and development.

ROADS IN GENERAL

In the United Kingdom roads have developed from the old pack-horse trails, from the military lines of communication left by the Romans, and in some cases from still older, pre-historic tracks. Realignment has had to compete with vested interests, high land values, and numerous natural as well as artificial obstacles. Scientific planning of the system has thus been largely confined to relieving congestion, control in dangerous areas, and safety surfacing. The traffic has had to adjust itself to the roads, and the design of both private and commercial vehicles has been affected.

The U.S.A. with a larger and "newer" area, much less densely populated, has had to make much greater use of road transport. There has been the need, the capital and the space to "tailor" the roads to fit the traffic. While research and design are concerned with materials, construction methods, surfaces, and so on, the main accent is on study of traffic so that plans can be made to provide what the road users want and what will save them money. This involves detailed and continuous investigation into such matters as: what vehicles go where and why; where, and why, and for how long they halt; and where and why they run into each other. The aim is to save the nation's money by increasing the efficiency of road transport by:—

- (a) Building roads that allow traffic to go where it wants at high speed in safety and to get off the road when it has got there, and
- (b) Teaching drivers to be safe, and ensuring that their vehicles are safe too.

Results of this policy include the following:—

- (a) Principal roads are divided into lanes for traffic moving at different speeds. Particular attention is paid to the question of passing, which is regarded as one of the most frequent causes of accidents. Restrictions are imposed on the passing of traffic which is moving in the same lane; and these restrictions are indicated by road-markings which it is hoped to standardise throughout the country.

- (b) Particular attention is paid to inter-sections and their design so as to avoid traffic having to move out of its lane or even to slow down.
- (c) The larger a town, the greater the proportion of its traffic is in and out and not through, and, therefore, the greater the need for good access roads and parking facilities and the less the benefit obtained from long by-passes.

The goal, it will be noted, is convenience and safety without the sacrifice of speed. Roads are now designed for speeds of upward of sixty miles an hour, and it is normal for heavy commercial traffic to move at high speeds within its own lanes.

India is favourably placed at the beginning of a period of industrial expansion in which road traffic will play a big part. She should be able to prepare for that traffic by developing her roads on scientific lines unhampered by existing systems in which large amounts of capital have been sunk. India, of course, has many disadvantages to overcome as well. The weather is one, but this chiefly affects engineering design with which this paper is not greatly concerned. Other disadvantages include:—

- (a) The bullock cart, which need not be enlarged upon.
- (b) The standard of education (by which is meant education as a road user) of the average driver. This disadvantage can be overcome. No one who has travelled the roads of India can have failed to notice the contrast between the kindliness and readiness to help shown by the drivers of commercial vehicles, and the astounding disregard of other users of the roads which they at the same time display in such matters as their determination to hold the centre at all times, even when changing wheels.
- (c) The state of the average vehicle. Shortage of capital both to develop roads and to buy the equipment which can give true economy by moving heavy loads at high speeds go together. Nationalised transport should be of a highly efficient type, and not merely the same old vehicles painted a different colour.

APPLICATION IN PEACE

The army and the air force will be building new cantonments and depots, or will be improving temporary war-time ones. It behoves those services to give very serious consideration to the design of their own road systems and the management of their traffic. This may be yet another way in which they can give a lead to the nation. It should not be too difficult for them to do so.

Firstly, they have a traffic which is easily predictable. No elaborate and expensive surveys are needed to discover where the traffic starts and where it goes (amenity transport can be disregarded in this connection). The traffic is also controllable, at least to a very much greater extent than civilian traffic can be; and, of course, its weights and dimensions are known.

Secondly, drivers are under discipline and can be trained or, if untrainable, removed.

Thirdly, provision already exists for elaborate reports on all accidents (although it is realised that the value of these reports tends to diminish from the fact that almost every service driver involved in an accident was moving well within the regulation speed, blew his horn—thereby of course conferring on himself the right of way—gave the proper signals, and in fact behaved correctly in every way).

It is quite certain that the M.E.S. vote or Cantonment Board funds will not enable the services to build four-lane *autostrada* in and around cantonments and

depots, nor would there be much to gain if these lead into potholed, narrow roads with a file of bullock carts plodding down the centre. But something can be done. Congestion can be relieved and training given for war by encouraging traffic to move at faster (*i.e.*, more economical) speeds. This means that it must be able to get on to the roads or off them without slowing down and holding up other traffic. This in turn involves the proper design of turn-outs and inter-sections, and the control of traffic not merely as regards its behaviour on the roads, but in many cases its actual presence on the roads at all. It should be easy to arrange for example that all traffic into a certain depot shall time itself to arrive and leave between certain hours and that it shall do so at a speed which will clear the roads for the timings in and out of other depots, camps, etc. Control of this kind in peace should yield a dividend in reducing accidents and also afford very useful practice for war.

APPLICATION IN WAR

In war, especially in Eastern theatres, the demands on the engineers are already so great that the prospect of their being able to build roads with many traffic lanes is remote. The way to increase the room on the roads will be less to widen them than to make traffic go faster and so, though perhaps taking up more *space*, take up less *time and space*. For this purpose roads must be designed for speed as regards curves, gradients, and lines of sight. Though this may not always be possible, for example over steep mountains, the provision of earth shifting equipment on a proper scale should make these improvements in road design practicable. Surfaces must also be attended to within the limitations of materials. Particular attention, again, must be paid to getting traffic off the roads into harbours, camps, depots, headquarters, etc. This must be arranged so that vehicles can turn off without slowing down and so avoid making all the vehicles behind them slow down too.

ROAD LAY-OUT

It is not the purpose of this paper to go into details of engineering; but some ideas on lay-out might be of general interest and should concern anyone who may be responsible for siting installations.

Assume a depot of, say, bridging stores on a road L. of C. Its entrances and exits might be arranged as follows. Traffic approaching it so that it lay to the left would be greeted at some distance away with a sign telling it to get off the road to the left, and an access lane parallel to the main L. of C. would be provided, which in the first instance need not necessarily be of a high specification. Drivers who had been taught would sidle off into this approach lane in such a way as to allow uninterrupted passage to through traffic. Similar arrangements could be made for any traffic which might leave the depot and go on in the same direction.

Traffic entering or leaving the depot from or to the opposite side of the road, *i.e.*, with the depot lying to its right, is not so simply dealt with. The ideal to aim at would be similar lanes on the left leading to an overhead (or under—) bridge with embanked approaches. This would enable traffic to cross the roads after being fed out to the left or before being fed in from that side. This bridge could be a later development from a harbour on the opposite side of the road from the depot. At this stage, traffic would turn off the road to the left into this harbour and then be rapidly fed across it into the depot at times (which might be pre-arranged) when through traffic was not passing. Similar arrangements would be made for traffic to get out of the depot, across the road when it was free, and then having assembled in the harbour to be fed into the main road from the left.

Nothing is more productive of blocks and exasperation than attempts to pass when the road is not clear. If all traffic moves fast and gets off the road when not so moving, then the urge to pass will be less. If the presence of traffic on sections of the road is controlled too, then there will be still less need to pass. Finally all drivers must be well grounded in established rules about passing, so that they only do it when it is essential, safe and considerate.

DRIVING TECHNIQUE

We now turn to the drivers. Army and other orders devote considerable space to adjuring drivers to go slow. Officers far more often tell their drivers to slow down than to speed up. It is not denied that very many service drivers drive faster than is safe; but then the safe speed of most of these drivers is about five miles an hour and they ought to be driving bullock carts. We should in future encourage drivers to get the best out of their vehicles without damage to the vehicles, to themselves, or to others. If the army and air force have high powered vehicles for cross country performance, those vehicles can be geared to give a high economical road speed. We have shown in the Indian Army and Air Force that if we try we can train our men to do such things as man and maintain radar sets and drag-line excavators. We can certainly train them to drive if we try.

It is not known whether any study has been made of the accident reports which units compile and submit. These reports contain much valuable data beyond the reach of civilian organisations to obtain. Such a study should be made and the results disseminated. It is suspected that it would show that most accidents are not so much due to speed in itself as to drivers not being able or willing to stop when travelling at quite low speeds. It is the writer's belief that the training of drivers aims at too low a standard, stops too soon, and is diverted into training in messing about with the inside of the machine.

It would be ideal if every driver could complete his training in dense but well-behaved traffic, preferably with his horn disconnected. This is unfortunately impossible. Nevertheless a spell of driving in a big city with a passenger who forbids unessential use of the horn and who insists on such things as turning into main streets with proper caution, movement in correct traffic lanes, and general considerate behaviour has been proved to be of marked educational value.

Some of the things which we can and should teach our drivers in the interests of fast and safe road movement are:—

- (a) To get off the road when halted. How often have we seen convoys halted with their near-side wheels nicely aligned on the edge of the tarmac, closed up head to tail, and an obvious air of conscious rectitude? At the beginning of the war, such a unit, new from the fenced and hedged roads of England, halted nicely drawn in to the ditch beside the desert road near Bagush and caused the most almighty block spreading for miles in both directions when it could, but for the force of habit, have driven across the shallow ditch into boundless desert.
- (b) That there is a connection between interval and speed; that as speed is checked a convoy can close up; and that as speed increases so it must spread out. It is time past a point that should be constant not parade-ground formation; yet many of our drivers get into a panic if the interval in front of them becomes too great, and they then speed madly to make up, scattering the other users of the road and doubling the panic of those behind them. As an example of what can be done, the writer is reminded of a journey with a "Cape-coloured" transport company. The route lay across country where the going was good on the whole but intersected by sandy nullahs with ramped-down sides, brushwood causeways, and badly cut-up approaches deep in dust. In the intervals between the nullahs the speed was about 45 miles per hour and the interval between vehicles some 300 yards; at the nullah-crossings speed came down to 10 miles per hour or less and interval to about 50 yards or less. There was practically no checking for other vehicles, and a high average speed of about thirty miles in the hour was kept up for the whole 150 odd miles. All the drivers were expert. They were not merely speeders. On a subsequent journey they were noted on the main

Italian-built road, suitably graded for sixty miles an hour or more but surfaced with gravel which melted tyres at any speed above 25 miles per hour. This company kept their speed down to a maximum of twenty, and a wearisome business it was. This standard can certainly be reached by our men too.

- (c) The above does not imply that drivers should avoid checking their speed until they are on top of the vehicle in front. If we are to achieve high road speeds we must teach our drivers to slow down in time so that they do not need to stop, and can be accelerating when they pass the obstacle. How many drivers have we met who know no better than to roar up to the back of a column of carts when the way past them is not clear, halt immediately behind the last cart and then, when the road does clear, pull laboriously out and slowly churn their way up through the gears, thereby halting also the traffic coming from behind?
- (d) We must of course teach drivers how to turn off roads to the right and to the left when other traffic is about, without blocking the through route. At present most drivers hug the curb before turning right and swing out to the right before turning left, and in this way secure the maximum interruption to through traffic.

These are all comparatively minor matters easily dealt with. Training to the required standard demands:—

- (a) The immediate rejection of the man who from slow reactions or other causes will never "make". It should be possible to spot such men by means of simple tests. Unfortunately the subject of testing (like that of "Methods of instruction") is one about which much exhortation but little information has been given and it is a pity that officers (most of whom can read) cannot be provided with details.
- (b) Greater ambition in training. It is certain that if only we aim high we shall achieve a large measure of success.

SUMMARY

The object of road traffic is to get the maximum load to its destination in the least time and with the least expenditure of effort; and to get it off the road on arrival. This can be achieved within the limitations of time, labour and materials by designing roads to take fast, heavy traffic, to avoid congestion, and to allow traffic to enter and leave the road without interfering with other users. The traffic itself should be designed, and the drivers educated, so as to take full advantage of the road facilities offered without danger to others.

In the services we have knowledge of traffic requirements and facilities to educate drivers, and we can control traffic. Although there may be limitations of finance in peace, and time and labour (the same thing) in war, nevertheless we can design roads, train drivers, and control traffic so as to make scientific use of what road facilities and vehicle capacity are available. And in this respect we can set an example to the nation.

NEW ZEALAND NEWS LETTER—No. 1

LIEUT. COLONEL J. WILSON STEPHENS

ONCE, when I was playing with the idea of going to live in New Zealand, I wrote to a friend who was out there on leave. In his reply he said that "it was a country of big landscapes and wide horizons with a climate comparable to England at its best." He was, as it happened, writing from Nelson, which is reputed to have the finest climate in New Zealand. Nevertheless generally speaking, he was correct.

As this News Letter is, I hope, the first of a series, I do not propose to go into much detail. To begin with I have myself only been here for five months, and as Lawrence said of himself in the opening paragraph of his autobiography: "After thirty years in India, spent mostly in the Punjab, I know a little of the Punjabi, but nothing of India," or words to that effect. I know a little of Timaru—the town outside which I live—but little or nothing of New Zealand. Having read many books of travel and met some of their authors during my years in India, I hesitate to be dogmatic about, or to pretend to a knowledge of, a country in which I have lived for so short a time. But there is much that, from a general information point of view, I can write with confidence. And I hope I will be forgiven if, at this stage, I do not go into details of cost of living, rates and taxes, and so forth. I will try to do that later.

One of the first things that strikes the new-comer are the houses. These, almost all of them, are built of wood-clinker, many of them bungalows. They give the impression of impermanence because of this, and suggest rather the rash of jerry-built bungalows that are sometimes to be found near a popular seaside resort in England. But they are comfortable inside, and do in fact stand up to the years. Lack of stone and labour are responsible for the wood. At the moment houses are extremely difficult to obtain and prohibitive in cost, and for this labour is again responsible.

For those who come from long residence in India, as for those who for the first time exchange the north of India for Bengal, there is some difficulty with the names of meals and, for the visitor from the East, the times of eating. When I first visited Bengal I found that *chota hazri* was known as *palang ka chha*, while breakfast was called *chota hazri*. With the result that, if one ordered early morning tea, one was liable to end up with breakfast in bed! In New Zealand, tea is the name given to almost any meal. As a drink it is taken on all possible occasions, particularly between breakfast and lunch. Tea, the meal, goes in most cases for what is usually called dinner, and is eaten at any time from five-thirty to six-thirty in the evening. But as, in any case, you or your wife will have to prepare it—for servants (domestic aids! I beg their pardons) are non-existent—you may of course call it whichever you prefer. Those who had to do with New Zealand or Australian Divisions during the war will know this habit.

The country.—This is magnificent, and one is continually catching a glimpse of England. Where I live, fourteen miles outside Timaru in South Canterbury, it is open downland—bits of it speak of Somerset and the West Country—with to the east the Pacific and to the west the lovely, snow capped line of the Alps, Mount Cook presiding. Agricultural, and mostly under sheep, it is indeed a green and pleasant land, and with views unrivalled I should imagine, anywhere. It manages

somehow to combine the grand and magnificent with the comfortable and homely to a remarkable degree. A combination not easily come by.

Trees.—These are mostly imported and include the fir, used to a great extent as a wind-break, and the gum. Also the oak, though this has not, as yet, had time to attain the growth and dignity of its English forbears. Larch and Silver birch, willows and native trees in abundance. But there are few, if any woods, in the English sense, to be found. Their place is taken by native bush, which looks to me as if it should grace a tropical rather than a temperate clime.

The country as a whole, its roads and roadsides, are very untidy. There is no doubt in your mind that this is a new country still in its youth, and in something of a hurry to reach maturity. You will be told again that labour, or rather the lack of it, is responsible for this. So it is, and one is not surprised. Manpower is short, and the country is vast. Also, as usual in this modern world, the town attracts the wage earner; and wages are absurdly high.

Climate.—The further south you go the wetter it becomes, but it is no wetter than England can be. As a whole I should say that my friend was correct when he said that it was "England at its best;" and the temperatures are as alike the Old Country as makes no difference. This, of course, does not go for the north of the North Island where semi-tropical conditions obtain. But the South Island has a delightful temperate climate. It is important to remember that, being in the southern hemisphere, the seasons in New Zealand are reversed. Christmas comes in mid-summer, and it is coldest in July. I apologise for mentioning this known and obvious fact, but it can be muddling to the new-comer, particularly should he be talking shooting or fishing.

Which brings me to sport.—I should like to be able to go into this in some detail, but as I have not, as yet, amassed sufficient data to do so, it were best if I continue to generalise. So far as shooting is concerned one can, in literal fact, go for one's evening walk with a gun under one's arm rather than a walking stick. I do anyway. Hare and rabbit—to the great and legitimate annoyance of the farmer—abound, and only yesterday the owner of a sheep run told me that he had as many as thirteen thousand rabbits taken off his property in a recent clean up. Not shot, of course, but removed by other means. In some parts you have almost to brush them aside as you walk, and the name of the halfwit who first introduced them into the country is not held in reverence! The hare is hunted as we hunt the fox at home, and good fun it is. There is a small pack of hounds close by, run by a friend of mine, and they hunt twice a week. A good sporting country and an enthusiastic field, mounted on everything from a blood horse to the butcher's nag. To hark back to shooting; you need no license for a shot gun, either imported or otherwise.

The duck shooting is, I am told, not what it used to be by a very long chalk. The duck—mallard; grey duck; Paradise duck (actually a goose), spoonbill, and others, are all indigenous and never leave the shores of New Zealand. The result is that they have been overshot. Also some bright spark introduced the stoat and the weasel at some distant date, and they do much slaughter amongst the ducklings and other young fowl. The grey duck is a beautiful bird and a fast and sporting shot. Black swan and Canadian goose are to be had, and there is a bird that looks to me like a cross between a moorhen and a coot, which goes by the name of the pukeko. He does a lot of damage to crops, and one is encouraged to shoot him. But he doesn't do well on the table.

When I first came to live in South Canterbury, I was told that I could shoot the local pond when and as I liked. It is a big pond, and there are usually a host of duck on it. I was also told that I would most certainly be asked to shoot on neighbouring properties in season. I therefore brought with me three hundred No. 6 cartridges to carry on with, and made arrangements to have more sent me in

due course. I did not then know that the season only lasts a month, and that when you have let off your first round at the jheel-side, you will be lucky if you get another shot that day. The season ended yesterday, and I have fired my piece exactly a dozen times! But they say the shooting is better in the North Island from the point of view of organisation.

Keen sportsmen, in the best sense of the word, seem to be few and far between. As a license for the season only costs fifteen shillings, everyone has a go, and the standard is rather that of the gentleman who the other day was heard to remark in one of the county clubs, apropos of the next day's shoot: "Not many ducks there, but may be I'll get one on the wing".

To those who come from northern India, there is a pleasant surprise in store. One day, and to his great astonishment, he will see an old friend. He will, unless he has been told what to expect, undoubtedly blink his eyes and, if he has been in the Scouts, probably begin to mumble to himself in Pashtu. Yes, the chikor! He was imported here about fifteen years ago from India, and by all accounts he is doing very well. This particularly in Central Otago, where the country and the climate is not unlike some parts of the N.W.F.P. Someone I met recently who did not know that I came from India said to me: "We've got a bird here called the chikor (he is known as the 'chiker' by the locals). I bet you've never had to sweat after a game bird as you'll have to do for this fellow." I told him he was wrong, very wrong! But it is good to see the colours of the old Frontier Corps tie again, and when I get homesick for the Frontier and realise, as I have not yet fully realised, that I shall never see it again, I shall go out and find the *zirke* and exchange a *sterai-ma-she* with him for old times sake.

Fishing.—This is excellent and dirt cheap. Brown and rainbow trout abound, both in river and lake. Also *salmo salar*, and of course big game fishing. But of the latter I know nothing at present. Again I am told that it is not as good as it was. My neighbour told me the other day, as we were looking at the local stream, that some years ago he had been rung up by one of the schools in Timaru. They said that they were short of food, and could he get them some fish? "I went out to this creek before breakfast," he said, "and I sent them in ninety pounds of trout before nine o' clock. All to my own rod." It may not be so good now, but it's good enough for me. Personally I like the dry fly, and here anything with red in it is in favour. The Red Tipped Governor for preference. But you can use what you like; wet fly or minnow, and huge bags are reported almost daily from the lakes and elsewhere. They say that if you get right out into the back country you need never cast in vain. Poaching and contamination are taking their toll, but even so it is still amongst the finest fishing in the world. The season is from the first of October till the end of April.

License for the season round about twenty shillings for the whole of New Zealand!

So far I have heard of only two ex-Indian Army officers who have come out here to settle. One, an ex-7th Gurkha, complete with a record family of, I think I am right in saying, ten, is farming with his brother. He, at least, should have no labour difficulties! The other, late of the Judge Advocate General's Department, has been taken on in a like capacity out here. But I don't think he has started as yet. As a whole they don't seem to want trained soldiers from elsewhere. Why I can't say, as one would have thought that they were badly in need of them. But the New Zealand Armed Forces, at least to the eyes of a regular, would seem to be almost non-existent, and such of their officers as I have met have been tied to office tables for years beyond counting. I know of two ex-Indian Army officers, both Staff College graduates and with fine records, and both, as it happens, New Zealanders, who tried their best to get themselves placed in the N.Z. Forces, Nothing doing!

However, I have reason to believe that the dawn is breaking in this connection, and I will write more on this subject in my next letter.

The people? Kind, generous, and very friendly. Jack is, of course, as good as his master. But he doesn't thrust it down one's throat quite so forcefully as his counterpart in another country I wot of not a million miles from New Zealand. For myself, I have never felt anything but at home since I arrived. We all seem to speak the same language. The Old Country is still home to most New Zealanders, and His Majesty the King has a very definite place in their hearts.

The Limbless Can Drive Motor-Cars

Special equipment has been developed by a British firm of car-makers which enables limbless ex-servicemen to drive the normal types of cars. This is the first of its kind ever to be made and it is the first time it has been possible for those with amputated limbs to use standard makes of cars.

The equipment supplements the normal driving controls so that the car can still be driven in the usual way. The principle on which it works is that the physical operations are cut down to a minimum by using vacuum motors attached to the controls. It does not prevent the car from being used by any other person and can be removed from one vehicle and installed in another of similar make.

Tests have shown that experienced motorists can acclimatise themselves to these special controls in half an hour. A new driver can learn as quickly as on an ordinary car.

REVIEWS

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL

B.H. LIDDELL HART

With maps. Cassell 10/6.

THIS book bears the subtitle "Germany's Generals, their rise and fall, with their own account of military events 1939-45." At the end of the late war, Captain Liddell Hart was fortunate enough in getting an early opportunity of interrogating many of the senior German Generals who took leading parts in the campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht. From their reports he has been able to provide us with a picture of what took place on "the other side of the hill." The result is a fascinating book, especially for those who have made a study of the German campaigns from information and statistics which were previously available from Allied sources only.

The book is presented in three parts. The first deals with the careers of those generals of the older school, products of the German General Staff system, who became, directly or indirectly, the chief executants of German strategy during the war. It starts with Von Seeckt, who died three years before the war, but who was mainly responsible for rebuilding the German Army after the 1914-18 war. It then describes the influence of all the other German Generals who rose to prominence during the various stages of the last war. Rommel is given special place, as one who became perhaps the most famous of all—rising from Colonel to Field Marshall during the course of the war. Rundstedt, on whom the spotlight was largely focussed during the last year of the war, is dealt with last.

The second part of the book deals with the rise of Hitler and the rise of armour. The story of Hitler is told from the point of view of the Reichswehr, an angle which has never been presented before. The author tells us how Hitler gradually assumed Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces and of his ultimate control of strategy. Unlike in the 1914-18 war, the strategy in the late war was entirely controlled by the head of the State and the German Generals became merely the professional executants of the Fuhrer's plans. It was the fact that he so often proved right in his earlier campaigns, conducted much against the opinion of the professional soldiers, which helped him gain influence at their expense. The result was that when his strategy finally failed in Russia, and again in the West, the Generals no longer had the power to contradict his policy.

The rise of German armour, from the first tank battalion in 1934 to the Panzer Divisions which later overran Poland, France and Russia, makes an interesting chapter. As in Britain, most of the opposition to the growth of armour came from the senior Generals. It was not until Thoma, who was in command of German ground troops in the Spanish Civil War, proved the value of armour in the actions he fought in Spain, that much attention was paid to the raising of tank regiments and armoured divisions. The detailed talks that the author had with Thoma and Manteuffel reveals much information about the handling of tanks by the Germans, and their development of the tactics of tank-air co-operation.

The third and largest part of the book gives us glimpses of the various campaigns of the war as seen through German eyes.

It is surprising to note that none of the German Generals had any confidence in the success of the invasion of France, and Hitler alone believed that a decisive victory was possible. Such was the opposition from these old Prussian soldiers,

that at one time, after the November Conference of 1939, there was open talk of rebellion against Hitler, and had there been any chance of support from the men in the ranks, some sort of *coup d'etat* would have been attempted by the German General Staff.

The story is told of the last minute change of plan for the invasion of France. The original one, worked out under Halder, envisaged a stereotyped method of attack putting greater weight on the right wing, through Belgium. It was Manstein, a junior general on Rundstedt's staff, who conceived the idea of attacking through the "impassable" territory of the Ardennes and had to "sell" his plan to Hitler over the heads of his military superiors.

The other revealing feature about the campaign in France is the author's conviction that it was Hitler's secret admiration for the British, and his hopes of concluding a peace treaty with them, that made possible the evacuation from Dunkirk. He withheld his leading armoured elements from entering Dunkirk in order to allow the B.E.F. to reach the port and slip away. In the months that followed, he never considered the invasion of Britain seriously. In fact, the so-called preparations for the invasion of Britain were always regarded by the German Generals more as a "war game" than a serious plan which was to be put into operation. Finally, when Goering failed to drive the R.A.F. out of the skies, the plan was completely dropped.

This is an interesting revelation. Historians had so far explained Hitler's failure to attempt invasion in various ways—his lack of strategic appreciation, the lack of sea-transport and naval cover, his eagerness to conquer Russia, or over-estimation of Britain's fighting strength. Captain Liddell Hart tells us that all these factors, though they existed, did not constitute unsurmountable difficulties. He suggests that it was this "mixed love-hate feeling towards England similar to the Kaiser's," which really came to the rescue of Britain in the most crucial hour of her history.

General Thoma, who was captured by General Montgomery's troops in 1942, brings out three important aspects of the war in the Mediterranean. He asserts that Hitler was again reluctant to conduct an all-out offensive to drive the British out of Egypt, and sent only one armoured division in the beginning to "stiffen up the Italians"; that Gibraltar was saved by Franco's reluctance to allow German troops to pass through Spanish territory; and that after the heavy losses suffered at Crete, Hitler was of the opinion that the days of para-troops were over. It was not until the invasion of Sicily by the Allies that he could again be convinced of their value.

The initial success of armour in the Russian Campaign and its subsequent frustration because of lack of air-co-operation, make interesting reading. The German Generals, blame Hitler's refusal to accept strategical withdrawals when the Wehrmacht found itself bogged in the Russian Winter, for their losses. The defeat in Russia was the beginning of Hitler's failures as a strategist. He refused all advice from his military executants, and sometimes held up the campaign for weeks during critical periods, because of his indecision. When the Russians eventually assumed the offensive, the Germans could have held out much longer, and even with success, had it not been for the fact that the defence lost all its elasticity because of Hitler's insistence that no withdrawals—not even on a restricted front on a tactical scale—would be carried out.

The pre-invasion preparations in the West disclose a series of blunders. The troops assigned for the defence of the coast were war-weary divisions from Russia, often decimated in strength. The defences were committed too near the coastline, and Rundstedt's intention of keeping a central reserve north of the Loire as a manoeuvrable counter-attack force, was overridden by Hitler. Even the system of command was unsound, in that Rommel's appointment to improve the

Coast defences gave no indication as to his relationship with the Commander-in-Chief in the West, Rundstedt, and led to many natural complications.

After giving us a few little-known facts about the anti-Hitler plot of July 1944, and its reactions in the Western front, the author goes on to describe Hitler's last gamble—the Ardennes counter-offensive. This operation was entirely Hitler's idea. Rundstedt would have no part in it, and stood back from it, leaving the conduct of the offensive to Model. The aim of the offensive was to force the B.L.A. to evacuate from France by cutting off its bases of supply. In this manner Hitler thought he would get breathing space to check the Russians in the East long enough to reorganise all his defences. The reasons for the failure of this counter-offensive—as expressed by Rundstedt and Manteuffel—were mainly the lack of preparations, lack of reinforcements, ammunition, and petrol, and the small number of tanks employed (contrary to Allied beliefs). When it became clear that the offensive could not achieve its aim, Hitler refused to call a halt and, as at Stalingrad, kept pursuing it until there were no chances of organising a determined stand against Allied counter-strokes. The failure of the Ardennes thrust wrecked any further hopes of serious resistance.

The book will be invaluable to all serious students of military science. It is not often that a conquering nation can avail itself of the opportunity of frank discussions with military leaders of the opposing side. In this instance, the German Generals have been most obliging in giving out a host of information. In the expert hands of Liddell Hart, the results of these talks have produced a very balanced analysis of the conduct of the late war by the Germans. Its greatest service to history will be that, to future students of the German campaigns, it will help produce an objective picture of what really happened.

D.K.P.

THE PATTERN OF WAR

LIEUT-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS TUKER, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.

With sketch maps. Cassel, 8/6.

THIS is an absorbing and thought provoking book, and is essentially a call for military study, not only by soldiers but also by the whole nation. The book sets out to show that throughout history wars have always been fought on a traditional pattern, and that by a careful study of military science and international socio-economic problems, the nature of future war can be forecast. It is the author's belief that by such study the soldier can help his nation to prevent the re-occurrence of war.

The first part of the book deals with this "traditional pattern" of warfare, by a brief survey of the brief battles of history from the earliest times up to the last war. From these battles and from the conduct of the great commanders who fought them, the author has traced out his "pattern"—a standard stratagem to which these great commanders of history had resorted with astonishing consistency in order to achieve success. This "pattern" is nothing more or less than a workable generalisation arrived at by a balanced analysis of the accepted Principles of War.

General Tuko lays down three conditions which are essential prerequisites to the conduct of battle along this traditional pattern. They are, briefly, that

a tactical or strategic flank should be sought or created; that the mobile arm should be predominant; that the administrative machine should make it possible for that mobile arm to strike at the decisive time and place. When these conditions are wholly existing, then the traditional battle of manoeuvre develops, as in the case of the battles fought by Jenghiz Khan, whom the author regards as the most consummate land soldier that the world has ever known. He was a great exponent of the classical war of manoeuvre, the traditional pattern, that is, to separate and destroy in detail the enemy's mobile arm, and then to surround and lay siege to his infantry. Sometimes the three conditions are totally neglected, as was the case during what the author calls the "Ice Age of Military Thought", i.e., the period of the 1914-18 war and the ensuing years of peace until the outbreak of the last war. He holds that during this period the neglect of these three conditions was responsible for the general state of stalemate which existed in the conduct and planning of warfare.

This classical or traditional pattern, however, can only be followed if the development of the mobile arm has kept pace with the development and the usefulness of infantry. As the author himself points out, for centuries the mobile arm had not been predominant on the battle-fields of the world. After the decline of the Tartar hordes and the Saracenic cavalry, the mobile arm faded out of the picture until the advent of the tank. It is not therefore always predictable that this traditional pattern will in fact be the manner in which wars of the future will be fought. In the campaigns of Marlborough, Wellington and Napoleon, it was seldom that the mobile arm was the deciding factor on the battle-field.

Modern developments have however brought the classical pattern of the war of manoeuvre to the forefront again, as was amply proved by the predominance, and the decisive nature, of armoured warfare in the Middle East and on the European fronts. It is also certain that this traditional pattern will be followed in future wars, if the developments in aircraft and army-air force co-operation are not overshadowed by developments in static or projectile warfare.

The second part of the book impresses upon the reader the importance of changing our whole concept of geography, if we are to appreciate correctly the problems which will confront us in future wars. The age of air-travel will change our present attitude towards movement and transport across the earth's surface in what the author calls the "Icarian Age". He then develops, in a very interesting discourse, the consequent changes in manoeuvre and stratagem that this new concept will entail. The surface of the world, he foresees, will be divided into large groups of "Icarian" islands. These islands will be large strategic land masses, recognising no seaborders, but consisting of land-spaces of such extent as to allow a great depth outside its vital war-supporting areas, in order to give time to actuate the defence, information on which to act, and space to wear out the attack. Oceans of adequate extent may be accepted as giving depth. Narrow seas will not be acceptable as borders in an air-borne war.

In the last part of the book, the author introduces the subject of the atom bomb, and gives us his forecast of the manner in which future wars will be fought. He shows us however that even in an Icarian World, dominated by nuclear energy, the traditional pattern of war will, in its basic principles of manoeuvre, remain founded upon the three conditions he has enumerated. Although the aggressor nation will try to put out of action the defender's surface industries and nuclear installations by bombarding them with a hail of short and long-range projectiles, the final land battle must develop along the traditional line. Whether it be the counter-offensive of the defender, or the occupational effort of the aggressor, the war of manoeuvre must be the end of all war.

"An interesting point brought out in this book is the continued importance of the siege train" of medieval history. The author emphasises repeatedly that the

siege train, which was originally organised to lay siege to the fortress cities which held out as isolated centres of resistance in medieval warfare, is just as important today against the "defended localities" system. It was the neglect of this "arm", and the consequent hasty improvisations on the battle-fields of two World Wars, which caused many fateful delays and even failures. In the extensive Icarian Islands of the future, with their inevitable mountain fortress centres of industry, the organisation of an air-borne siege train will have to be fully considered in order not to prejudice the success of the eventual war of manoeuvre.

Although this book was written nearly three years ago, it is refreshingly new in its ideas. It makes stimulating reading, and opens up new fields of thought for future military problems. Written in clear and concise style, it should be a valuable addition to the libraries of all who are interested in the future conduct of warfare—be they soldiers or civilians.

D.K.P.

AFRICAN TRILOGY

ALAN MOOREHEAD

WITH A FOREWORD BY FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WAVELL, G.C.B., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E.,
C.M.G., M.C..

Hamish Hamilton, London. Thacker & Co. Ltd., Bombay

THAT part of the Second World War which was fought in Africa, had, as its chronicler, a man of unusual literary ability and insight—Alan Moorehead.

Moorehead went to Egypt as a war-correspondent in 1940. Being, temperamentally, no shirker, he quickly gravitated into the centre of the war's vortex. From then on, till the end of the campaign in 1943, he lived, moved and worked in the very heart of the war's turmoil. What he observed, he wrote down with unswerving accuracy.

Being a gifted writer, he produced three of the finest of the war's chronicles, all relating to the allied campaigns in Africa. He called them *Mediterranean Front*, *A Year of Battle* and *The End in Africa*. All the three works are now available to the reader in one volume—aptly called the *African Trilogy*.

The book offers more than five hundred pages of quickly readable matter. The trilogy is made up of the three mighty acts of the colossal war drama enacted in Africa. Each act lasts about a year. The first concerns itself with the years of Wavell, 1940-41; the second with that of Auchinleck, 1941-42; and the third with the year of Alexander and Montgomery, 1942-43.

In the first part of the narrative, Mr. Moorehead brings back to life in vivid colours, events of which one got a vague idea from newspaper accounts in the years gone by. He discloses more than the newspapers were then permitted to do. He introduces the reader to the secrets of Wavell's brilliance in a few sentences such as these: "Now at last we were close to the front and able to see Wavell's game of bluff in action. It was vitally necessary, the general saw, to convince the enemy that

we were much stronger than we actually were. They had an all important, outstanding order; make one man appear to be a dozen, make one tank look like a squadron, make a raid look like an advance." This was done by flinging men, vehicles and guns from one place to another. This was how Wavell managed to keep afloat in those days of meagre supplies and reinforcements.

Then as to the enemy, here again is a valuable secret in a few words: "The Italian communiques were absurd. Again and again some Italian hit-and-run pilot would return to his Libyan base with stories of how he had shot down ten, fifteen, twenty aircraft or destroyed two or three battleships. The Roman newspapers outdid the communiques. When Graziani destroyed a dozen vehicles, he claimed two thousand." With evident fidelity to truth, the author records several such observations which he was privileged to make in the field. Presently the reader finds himself looking at the war from inside outwards—a delightful experience.

The second part of the African Trilogy deals with the struggles of Auchinleck and Rommel, of the German Africa Corps and the allied Eighth Army, of determined dog-fights and the ebb and flow of the war's fortunes. This period of hard battles demands writers of great talent to present details in right colours and proportions. Mr. Moorehead rises to the occasion. The war passes before the reader's mind in an array of brilliantly coloured living pictures such as only a practised artist can produce. The busy, humming G.H.Q. in Cairo, the side-show of an invasion in Persia, the increasing rush and welter in the Western Desert, the attack, the advance, the retreat, the unsuccessful stand at Gazala and the successful stand at Alamein—all flit across rapidly as the reader turns page after page. The grim war is resurrected in every detail and the reader lives through it, as a part of it.

The last part of the book deals with the classic successes of Montgomery. From the landings of the Americans in Algiers until the arrival of the allies in Tunis, the book is not allowed to flag in interest. Here again with an amazing economy of words, the author in a few, pithy sentences puts across illuminating information. Speaking of Montgomery, he says, "He believed in surgery, not homeopathy. If a thing was not going right or only partially right, cut it altogether." Then again, "By the Montgomery method the whole art of war was reducible to a pattern and a series of numbers." Such sentences, like the lines used by a lightning artist, raise word-pictures which make the reading easy to follow.

The accounts of the war are interspersed at intervals with narration of the author's tours to peace stations. Of particular interest to the Indian readers, among these tours, is the author's visit to India during the days of the Cripps's mission, when he interviewed Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and other leaders on the scene.

P.C.B.

THE PLACE OF WAR IN HISTORY

CYRIL FALLS

Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1947.

IN these days when politics, international diplomacy and economic rehabilitation absorb public attention to the exclusion of practically everything else, the average person has little time for reading war stories or any inclination for anything so dry as war history. A salutary counter to this frame of mind is in this little pamphlet by Cyril Falls whose contemporary talks on the progress of World War II will be remembered by all who heard them.

Unfortunately, while everyone listens with acute concern to war news while a war is in progress, people are not so ready to listen to or read about it when the war is over. As contemporary accounts are severely censored if not actually made into gross misrepresentations (for propaganda purposes), wholly inaccurate impressions of war history remain that are never corrected. This is particularly true of modern war when radio facilities added to the newspapers, release a flood of information that is almost bewildering to the public.

In his pamphlet, Cyril Falls points out that war history cannot in fact be divorced from the course of politics, and that all men great and small (not only the fighting forces), are profoundly and increasingly influenced by war. In elaborating his theme, he cleverly whets the readers' interest in past campaigns by mentioning instances where actions of which little notice has been taken in history have vitally influenced the fate of nations and the races of mankind. As a modern instance of this (though he does not mention it), who as yet realises the profound effect on the outcome of World War II of the comparatively small and unnoticed actions in the Mid-East and Iraq? Had the latter area not been secured by the Indian Army in 1941 thereby ensuring the safety of the vital Persian oilfields and the supply route to Russia, who can say what the outcome of the war would have been?

At the conclusion of his pamphlet, Cyril Falls sounds a note of warning against the reliability of certain sources of information available to the war historian. In this connection, he writes in particular regarding war biographies and despatches of Military Commanders as follows:—

“.....there is a tendency to believe the reminiscences and autobiographies of military commanders to possess some special virtue. I regret to say that these men are not always as innocent and candid as the simple soldier would appear to be. They should be tested.” Generations of Staff College students will recollect the warning in this connection that the least reliable of accounts of that most analysed and dissected campaign “Waterloo” are those written by Wellington and Napoleon Bonaparte themselves.

This pamphlet should be studied by every officer whose heart is in his profession as a soldier.

W.E.H.C.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR

• MILITARY OPERATIONS, FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1918 VOLUME IV

With maps and sketches. His Majesty's Stationery Office, £1/7/6

Printed at His Majesty's Stationery Office and priced at £1/7/6 (but charged at Rs. 24 in India), this book comes on the market nearly 30 years after the events it describes. The preface remarks that it was completed in typescript in December 1940, but owing to paper shortage its publication was postponed. The average officer will wonder at a policy regarding official war histories that entails a delay even of 22 years—let alone nearly 30. The senior commanders in the operations described, if they are not dead, will be too old to take much interest in this book, and the juniors will have more recent battle experience to think about.

Of course official histories are final documented records and are primarily for the use of students and for libraries as reference works. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the research for a work that appears after so long an interval must be open to question. Memories fade, and diaries are anything but complete and reliable. It is only by early research and record that facts can be accurately established.

In other respects the book is up to the highest standards. The style is eminently readable, the maximum of detail and cross-referencing is included and the maps are admirable. The manner of dealing with the enemy picture is particularly commendable. Each chapter after describing the events it covers, from the Allied point of view, presents in concise form the German picture as taken from their records. Well balanced commentary that is of value to the military students is also inserted.

It is perhaps of interest to remember that the operation described in this volume of the British 4th Army on August 8th, 1918, and referred to by Ludendorff as the black day of the German Army, was the first co-ordinated attack to succeed in completely breaking the defensive tactics that had bogged down World War I for nearly four years. This attack was in fact the first model on which the "blitzkrieg" of World War II was built and elaborated, and it merits attention accordingly.

The smashing effect of the same method of attack when staged with the power of modern weapons was clearly appreciated by the Germans 20 years later. Had this history of World War I been produced 20 or even 15 years earlier and been studied at the Staff Colleges, a similar appreciation might have dawned on British and French military leaders. Under such circumstances who can say that the debacle of 1940 might not have been averted?

W.E.H.C.

"ESCAPE TO LIFE"

EDWARD HOWELL

Longmans, 8/6

THE jacket of this book introduces it as something that is not "just another War Book." It is perhaps tragically eloquent of the aversion that seems at the moment to be in evidence towards reading about the Second Great War, that such a caption should be used to introduce an interesting and readable story of an individual escape from enemy hands.

The book is indeed exceedingly well-written and holds the attention throughout. It lacks, however, much that the military student would seek to find in such a story. Such things as the author's preconceived plan and degree of preparation before his successful attempt was made, are insufficiently discussed.

Squadron Leader Howell was the last fighter pilot left operational in Crete when the German airborne invasion took place in May 1941. He is shot and both arms broken by a German paratrooper shortly after the enemy landing commenced. He is captured and sent to a German hospital first in Athens and later in Salonika. He narrowly escapes death from his wounds, and with great gallantry he climbs out of the Salonika hospital unobserved and sets out on foot to escape to Turkey. His arms are useless but he receives from the Greek peasantry constant help and hos-

pitality. As already remarked, he seems to have no preconceived plan but is kept in good heart and given guidance by his faith in God and his religion. From the time of his escape from the hospital onward, the latter is the ruling theme of the book, and the last phase of his journey is by boat through the islands of the Aegean.

Apart from its readability, the book provides a vivid account of the Battle of Crete, concerning which much misleading propaganda was published at the time. It also gives an interesting picture of Greece in 1941 under the German occupation, when the enemy were still on the crest of their wave of success. Like all other stories of escapes from enemy hands (in both Great Wars), it is a monument to human grit, determination and perseverance. The handicap under which Squadron Leader Howell laboured by both arms being crippled by incompletely healed fractures, is almost incredible under the circumstances. The author omits to record to what extent he ultimately recovered from his wounds.

W.E.H.C.

THE ATOM

SIR GEORGE THOMSON

The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge., 5/-

THIS is described as a book addressed to non-specialist readers but in every way authoritative. The fact that the author is a winner of the Nobel prize for physics and has taken a leading part on both sides of the Atlantic in research into nuclear energy is a guarantee for the correctness of the latter statement. Unfortunately the intention to address the book to non-specialist readers has not succeeded in making it very intelligible to anyone without considerable knowledge of chemistry and physics. Much less indeed is it in any sense a simple, popular or easily readable exposition of the science of atomic energy. No one would expect a book of this kind to divulge atomic secrets, but if by any mischance such information were included, only an accomplished physicist could identify or utilise it.

The book is the third edition of a work originally produced in 1930. A second edition published in 1937 heralded the discovery of neutrons, positrons and other advances in the physics of atomic nuclei. The present edition is able to discuss atomic energy as an accomplished fact and one that enters into questions of world politics.

Bearing in mind the difficulty experienced by current journalists at the time of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, to present in a lucid and interesting form some idea of what is so far known regarding atomic energy, it is perhaps understandable that any work on this subject at the present time is liable to be technical and somewhat difficult to understand.

W.E.H.C.

CORRESPONDENCE

"COSTLY INEFFICIENCY"

*"Grist In Pakistan"**

IN the *U.S.I. Journal's* issue of January 1948, "Millstone" has come out with an interesting article entitled "Costly Inefficiency" in which he has sought to establish the inefficiency as well as the costliness of the Military Accounts Organisations in both Pakistan and India. How far that article shows a correct appreciation of the position, those uninitiated in the technicalities of accounting work would not perhaps readily gauge. On the other hand the seemingly plausible emphasis on the limitations of finance, on the administrative worries of officers of the Forces on account of delays in payments, etc., and on the morale of the troops, is likely to make "Millstone's" thesis appear less assailable than it actually is.

Before his proposals and suggestions could be fully explained, it seems necessary for the reader to have a correct appreciation of the different systems of accounting to which he refers.

Under the Unit Accountants system, also called the Peace System of Pay Accounts, the claims are prepared by a clerk of the Military Accounts Department attached to the Unit for this purpose and called a Unit Accountant. The Unit Accountant claims in the pay bill the full pay and allowances of individuals less the amount of the Government's claims against them, for Payment Issues, etc., and submits the claim to the Controller of Military Accounts. The C.M.A. issues a cheque in favour of the Commanding Officer of the Unit for the amount due on the bill after pre-audit or post-audit of the bill according to the type of the bill submitted. The responsibility of the Military Accounts Department ceases at that stage. A running account for each soldier is then kept in the Pay and Mess Book maintained by the Unit in which are entered the total amount received on account of the soldier in the pay bill, the periodical payments made to him, the authorised deductions due from him and the net Cr. or Dr. balance due to or from him. In the case of the Officers' claims the C.M.A. remits the amount to their bankers as instructed by them and no further accounting is done by the C.M.A. or by the Unit.

In the Individual Running Ledger Accounts System, also called the War System of Pay Accounts, the officers and men are paid advances, on personal cheques in the case of officers and acquittance rolls in the case of men; these in due course are cleared to the centralised offices maintaining the I.R.L. As for the officers or men. The amounts drawn on personal cheques or acquittance rolls are entered in the officers' or mens' I.R.L.As and a running account for each officer and soldier is kept by the Military Accounts Department.

In war time, Field Service conditions do not admit of the maintenance of the Pay and Mess Book by the Unit or of the functioning of the Unit Accountant in the field, and therefore the Peace System of Pay Accounts must give way to the War System. Under such conditions the Peace-time Pay bills are closed and I.R.L. As are opened for all officers and men.

The bills for Supplies and Services are always prepared by the suppliers or contractors, scrutinised and suitably endorsed by the Services concerned, and then paid to the suppliers or contractors by the C.M.A.

*See Editorial Notes.

The pension claims for individuals are initiated by the units' Training Centres and are sanctioned by the C.M.A.

The suggestions made by "Millstone" in brief amount to the following:—

- (i) Claims for pay and pension should be prepared by Unit Accountants attached to Units.
- (ii) the claims should be scrutinised and cheques issued in offices at Area and Command Headquarters, and
- (iii) the compilation of the Centralised accounts should be done in a small office based on mechanical accounting

The suggestion at (i) aims at re-introducing the Unit Accountants system. Under this system a Military Accounts Department clerk can keep the accounts of some 600 men as opposed to the accounts of 450 men under the I.R.L.A.'s system and it would consequently lead to a saving in clerks in the Military Accounts Organisation. On the other hand the Military units and formations will have to keep individual's accounts in the Pay and Mess Books. These accounts are complicated and involve a considerable amount of work. Even under ordinary conditions many units found it difficult to keep the Pay and Mess Books properly or up-to-date. To impose this work upon them when the Forces in the two Dominions have not yet been fully reconstituted after the partition of the country would tie more men and officers to desk work which "Millstone" seems so anxious to avoid. Another drawback of the Peace System of accounting is that it is difficult in times of emergency quickly to switch over from it to that of war. In the last war the change over from the peace to the war system caused such heavy dislocation and arrears in accounting work that the Military Accounts Department in old India could shake off the effects of the change over only towards the end of the war.

The respective merits of the Peace System of Pay Accounts and the War System of Pay Accounts were very carefully weighed by the Pay Accountancy Committee set up by the Government in undivided India in 1943, and they put the case for retaining the latter system in peace in a nutshell. They said, "We further recommend that the war system should be continued after the war. Since the essential function of the Army is to fight, its pay services should be permanently on a basis suitable for war conditions and should not be subjected to any radical alterations and procedure, when these changes come about." The Army Headquarters, Pakistan, have been considering this very point recently and agreeing with the views of the Pay Accountancy Committee, they have decided in favour of the continuance of the war system of accounts in Pakistan.

It might be added here that "Millstone's" picture of the happy conditions as they existed when Unit Accountants were employed with the units is not based on facts. Those of us who were in service at the time will remember that the Controller's Main Offices had to issue voluminous objections on the accounts prepared by the Unit Accountants. This was as could be expected under conditions where the accounts were prepared by comparatively junior members of the Military Accounts Department working independently and without the supervision or guidance of their own officers. The Military Accounts Department was then subjected to much greater criticism than what appears in "Millstone's" article. This criticism assumed such proportions that the then Adjutant-General for India found it necessary to make clear by means of a circular the functions and limitations of the Military Accounts Department and thereby to show how misplaced the criticism was.

"Millstone" in his article visualises that the Unit Accountants should also deal with pension claims. He is influenced in making this suggestion by certain delays in payment of pension claims which have been noticed during the post-war period. These delays according to Army Headquarters, Pakistan, were caused mainly

by the "multitude of the pension claims to be dealt with as a result of two major wars and the inefficiency and neglect, in many cases in the manner in which documentation of personnel has been conducted." So the root cause of the trouble lay in spheres where the Unit Accountant, if he had existed, would not have been able to help. There were certain other causes of delays which also were unconnected with the existence or otherwise of a Unit Accountant. For example, family pension claims are required to be investigated by the civil authorities. Enquiries in this connection have to be mostly made in villages and these must necessarily be long drawn out. Again, under orders as they stood prior to the appointment of Medical Advisers in the pension office, disability claims which had an element of doubt in them were required to be submitted to the Government of India. It is understood that thousands of such claims were held up with the Defence Department in India at the time of the partition of the country.

The liability for all pension claims up to and for 14.8.47 vests in the Dominion of India and all claims, old and new, up to that date will be dealt with in the Pension Office of that Dominion since established at Allahabad. The Pakistan Pension Office at Lahore is starting now with a clean slate from 15th August, 1947. It has been manned adequately and we hope that if the documentation of personnel by the Record Offices is satisfactory, we shall be able to keep our pension work current without having to change the present system of preparation and sanctioning of payments.

"Millstone's" suggestion at (ii) has been prompted by the conditions in the old undivided India in which payments for the entire country were made in centralised offices which covered Forces scattered over vast tracts of the country. The emoluments of all the officers in the country, for example, were paid and accounted for at Poona; the claims for Supplies and Services and the salaries of the Defence Services Civilians in the Southern Command, which at one time extended from Nagpur District in the north to Cape Comorin in the south, were paid at Poona. Pakistan is a much smaller country than old India and there actually exist four Military Accounts Offices in the country located at Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca. These offices conform more or less to Area Headquarters as suggested by "Millstone" and deal with all pay and accounts matters for the respective areas except for the pay of militarised personnel and their pensions. The pay accounts of Military officers and the pension work of Defence Services Personnel are done at Rawalpindi and Lahore respectively, while the work connected with the pay accounts of Other Ranks is done at Lahore and at several Pay offices attached to the units' Regimental Centres in Pakistan.

The compilation of the centralised accounts in Pakistan is already being done in a mechanical accounting section at Rawalpindi and so "Millstone's" suggestion at (iii) is already covered.

"Millstone" talks of the heavy cost of the Military Accounts Department. According to the budget estimates of the year of commencement of the First World War, the percentage of expenditure on the Military Accounts Department to the total Defence Services Expenditure and Receipts was 1.5. In Pakistan today the corresponding percentage is 1.3. An outlay of this size on the accounting and audit work of the Defence Services of a country can by no means be termed "costly".

MILITARY BADGES AND BUTTONS

*Mr. W.A. Stewart, Librarian, Canadian Officers' Club and Institute,
426 University Avenue, Toronto 2-B, Canada.*

As Librarian and Curator of the Canadian Military Institute, I am most anxious to build up our large collection of British and Colonial Army Badges.

Sorry to say through the negligence of my predecessors, the Indian Army is rather poorly represented in our collection.

Would it be possible to advise me as to the proper channels of contacting the Indian Ordnance Corps in regard to obtaining a group of badges of India?

Being a collector of badges myself, I have had several correspondents in India before the last war, but through lapse of time have lost contact with them.

If you happen to know of other collectors over there, or could publish somehow a short note stating our wish to contact collectors with a view to exchanging badges, we would be very grateful for your help.

I notice that the Journal of the United Service Institution of India has not been arriving recently. As we have been binding yearly volumes in the past, we are most anxious keep ourselves up to date with the latest Journals. Please advise as to what we may expect in the future.

Mr. William S. Mills, 4104 Ingalls Street, San Diego 3, California.

I would like to have members of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan interested in exchanging military badges and buttons get in touch with me. I have many duplicates of Britain and Canada, including the hard-to-get C.E.F. of 1914-18. I also have duplicates of the U.S.A. enamelled insignia.

I am interested in badges and buttons from any part of the Empire, including those of the old numbered Regts. of Foot.

"MAN MANAGEMENT".

Lieut. Colonel Gurbachan Singh, H.Q., Western Command, New Delhi.

I have read and reread Colonel C. W. Morton's masterful essay on "Man Management" in the January issue of the Journal. I have thoroughly enjoyed reading it and hope to profit by it. I should like to express my appreciation to Colonel Morton through these pages. I have a suggestion to offer, and that is, that this essay be published in pamphlet form by the General Staff and distributed to units. The distribution should be on a fairly wide scale so that it can reach down to company or equivalent commanders' level.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Hadow, C.M.G., Kester, Kemsing, W. Sevenoaks, Kent, England.

I have been a Life Member since 1909 (1914?) but I was an ordinary member for some years previous to that. I should be interested to know if there are many older members than myself. I am very pleased to see that the *Journal* is being maintained and I am always interested in getting it.

Lady Noyes, Broomdowns, Watlington, Kent.

I was delighted to get the January 1948 edition of your *Journal*.

William S. Mills Esq., 4104 Ingalls St., San Diego 3, Calif.

I also received by the morning mail the January issue of the *U.S.I. Journal*. Very interesting indeed.

Captain S. P. Mahadevan, 1st Bn. The Madras Regiment.

With great interest I read that most valuable talk by the President of our Institution ("A Call to Duty" in the January issue). Similar advice by very senior officers will go a long way in moulding the character and efficiency of the future Armed Forces.

I wish the *U.S.I.* and its staff the very best of luck and everything else, in this new era.

Major R. Stanage, R.E., "Riversleigh", Etherley Lane, Bishop Auckland, Co. Durham, England.

India has passed through a big phase in her history but to me after many years' service there it is still the finest country I have ever been to and the Indian Army I feel proud and honoured to have served in.

Captain G.W. Thomas, Loopland, 8 Cunningham Road, Bangalore.

In thanking you for the January issue of the *Journal*, let me add my small quota to the host of congratulations you have already received on the thoroughness with which the *Journal* has been piloted in its new era.

Wishing you every success.

Lieut. Ijaz Ahmad Khan, RPA, 4th Field Regiment, Quetta.

I received the January 1948 issue of the *U.S.I. Journal* a few days ago. I must thank you for it as I always feel richer in my knowledge after going through it.

Sir Patrick Cadell, C.S.I., C.I.E., V.D., Holmwood, Boar's Hill, Oxford.

I have just received the *U.S.I. Journal* for April. It is an excellent number, full of good matter.

With all good wishes for the success of the *Journal* and of the Institution.

Major J.E. Heelis, 1/7th Gurkha Rifles, Seremban, Malaya.

With best wishes to the Institution and fellow Indian and Pakistani members.

Major-General A. N. Sharma, D.D.M.S., H.Q. Eastern Command, Ranchi.

I wish the Institution every success.

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

Before this issue of the Journal could go to press there was another change of Secretaries, the present one taking over on the 1st of September. That was not the only change. It will be noticed that the printers too have changed. Communication difficulties made it imperative to shift the printing from the C. & M. Gazette Press who had given us such excellent service for many years. This and the delay in the delivery of paper to the new printers have still further retarded the time-table for the production of the journal. We thank our readers for their patience and forbearance and hope that by the time the next two issues are out we should be well back to normal.

Special Council Meeting.

A special meeting of the Council was held in New Delhi on 8th June 1948 and was attended by members from India and Pakistan.

The Council recognised that the abnormal conditions created by the constitutional changes had made it impossible to hold the election of a new Council in March 1948. As the Institution's own constitution was being revised, a draft of which had already been circulated to members of the Council, it was decided to postpone the election until March 1949.

In view of the fact that no entries had been received for the Gold Medal Essay Competition for 1947-48 and that the subject "Are Officers Messes Suitable for Indian Conditions?" was such an important one, it was decided that the closing date for the competition should be extended until 1st November 1948.

On the question of transferring the U. S. I. from Simla to Delhi it was felt that the move was dependent on suitable permanent accommodation being available in New Delhi.

It was decided that the Annual General Meeting of the Council should be held on Monday 1st November 1948.

Honours to Members.

The following members of the Institution received Honours on His Majesty's Birthday :—

- K. C. B.—Air Marshal Sir Leslie N. Hollinghurst, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F.,
- C. B. —Major-General S. Greeves, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. Quartermaster General, Pakistan.
- C. B. E.—Colonel H.V.S. Muller.
- O. B. E.—Lieut.-Colonel K. Campbell-Meiklejohn. Lieut.-Colonel S. W. Packwood.

New Members

The number of members joining the Institution is growing daily. Since 17th May, up to the time this issue of the Journal went to the press, over 250 new members have joined. The total membership is now a record. The following is a list of new members:—

*AGARWALA, Captain S.D., R.I.A.S.C.
 AHLUWALIA, Major B.S., 9 Gurkha Rifles.
 AHSAN, Lieut. M.E., R.P.A.S.C.
 AJAIB SINGH, Brigadier, R.I.A.S.C.
 AJAIB SINGH GREWAL, Major, Sikh Regiment.
 AJIT SINGH SIDHU, Captain, Jat Regiment.
 AKEHURST, Brigadier C.H.I., O.B.E., Brit. Serv.
 AKHTAR, Captain S.M., P.A.O.C.
 AMAR SINGH RAI, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.
 ANAND, Captain A.J., Sikh Light Infantry.
 APPAYA, Captain N.N., 9 Gurkha Rifles.
 ATMA SINGH, Major, Dogra Regiment.
 AYUB KHAN, Major-General M., Pakistan Army.
 BHAL, Major A.L. 2 Punjab Regiment.
 BAJWA, Major H. S., I.A.O.C.
 BALI, Major J.S., 16 Cavalry.
 BAKSHI, Major M.M., 11 Gurkha Rifles.
 BALWANT SINGH, Lieut., I.A.O.C.
 BARLAS, Major M.H., 8 Punjab Regiment.
 BARRETO, Lieut-Colonel T., Indian Signals.
 *BASAPA, Lieut-Colonel D.C., 3 Cavalry.
 BASHIR AHMAD, Major R.P.I.A.S.C.
 BATRA, Lieut-Colonel, M.N., Indian Signals.
 *BATRA, Major R. K., R.I.A.
 BATRA, Colonel R.N., O.B.E., Indian Signals.
 *BHAGWAN SINGH, Major, R.I.A.
 BHALLA, R.L. Captain K. N., 1 Gurkha Rifles.
 BHAND, 2/Lieut. P.D., I.E.M.E.
 BHATTI, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.
 BHIDE, Captain W.G., R.I.A.
 BHONSALE, Major J.K., Mahratta Light Infantry.
 *BHUPENDRA SINGH, Major, R.I.A.
 BILGRAMI, Captain R.H., P.A.O.C.
 BILIMORIA, Brigadier R.M., I.A.
 BISHESHWAR PRASAD, Dr. M.A., D.Litt.
 BOKHARI, Captian S. H. A. 13 Lancers.
 *BRAGANZA, Major A.S., Rajputana Rifles.
 *BRAGANZA, Major J.V.P., R.I.E.
 CARDOZA, Captain M.A., 13 Lancers.
 CHANDA, Esq., A.K., O.B.E.
 CHANDAR, Major B.B., R.I.E.
 CHANDEL, 2/Lieut. Kr. H.S., 1 Gurkha Rifles.
 *CHANDORKAR, Major D.K., Rajputana Rifles.
 CHANDRA SEKCHARAN, Captain T.M., Mahar M.G. Regiment.
 CHAUHAN, Captain B.S., Rajputana Rifles

*Life Member

*CHOUDARY, Major P.L.N., R.I.E.
 CHIBBER, Major S.L., I.A.O.C.
 COWLEY-FREEMAN, Captain R.S., R.I.E.
 CUNNINGHAM-BURLEY, Major T., R. Signals.
 DALVI, Captain J.P., 8 Cavalry.
 *DAS, Brigadier CHAND N., O.B.E., I.A.
 DATT, Major R., R.I.A.
 DAVINSON, Captain W.J., Assam Regiment.
 DEBU, Major M.J., 2 Royal Lancers.
 *DEOSKAR, Major B.G., Mahratta Light Infantry.
 DESHPANDE, Major V.D., Indian Signals.
 De'SOUZA, Captain H., Indian Pioneer Corps.
 *DHALIWAL, Major G.S., I.A.M.C.
 DHANI RAM, Lieut., Indian Signals.
 *DHILLON, Lieut-Colonel, K.S., Kumaon Rifles.
 DHINGRA, Captain H.S., I.E.M.E.
 DORASWAMI, Captain Raj Kumar D.E. Mahratta Light Infantry.
 DULEEP SINGH, Major Raj Kumar, Mahratta Light Infantry.
 *DUTTA, Lieut.-Colonel, K. N., R.I.A.S.C.
 DWARKA DASS, Captain, I.A.M.C.
 DWARKADAS, Captain D., Indian Signals
 ELLIOT, Brigadier J.G., C.I.E.
 ELMHIRST, Air Marshal Sir Thomas, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C.
 EUGENE, Major A.F.
 FALLON, Lieut. F.D.W., R.I.A.S.C.
 FERGUSON, Captain M.O., Central India Horse.
 *GADKARY, Major P. V., R.I.A.S.C.
 GAIND, Major B.S., 13 Air Liaison Section.
 *GAMBHIR SINGH, Major, Survey of India.
 GHOSH, Major N.K., R.I.E.
 GHULAM MURTAZA, Captain R., 19 Lancers.
 GIAN SINGH, Major R.I.E.
 GREWAL, Major H.S., I.A.O.C.
 *GUHA, Major J., Rajputana Rifles.
 GULATI, Major K., Dogra Regiment.
 GUPTA, Captain U.K., Mahratta Light Infantry.
 GURBACHAN SINGH, Major, R.I.A.S.C.
 GURBACHAN SINGH SARAN, Major, Rajput Regiment.
 GURBAKSH SINGH, Major, Rajput Regiment.
 GURCHARN SINGH SANDHU, Captain, 18 Cavalry.
 GURPARTAB SINGH, Major, R.I.A.
 HABIB AHMAD, Major, R.P.A.
 *HARDIAL SINGH, Major, 2 Airborne Division.
 HARI CHAND, Major, Jat Regiment.
 HIRA SINGH, Major, R.I.E.
 HUSAIN, Lieut. Colonel A., I.A.O.C.
 HYDRI, Lieut. M.H., P.A.O.C.
 INDER PAUL SINGH SETHI, Major, I.A.O.C.
 ILAHI, Lieut. S.M., R.P.N.
 JAMSHED ALI, Captain, 13 Lancers.
 JANJUA, Air Commodore M.K., R.P.A.F.
 JASWANT SINGH SEKHON, Major, 2 Punjab Regiment.
 JESUDIAN, Major M.S., Dogra Regiment.
 JHALMAN SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.S.C.
 JOGINDAR NAYAR, 2/Lieut., R.I.A.S.C.
 JOSHI, Captain A.K., Indian Signals.
 *KALHA, Lieut.-Colonel S.S., R.I.A.
 KALWANT SINGH SANDHU, Brigadier, I.A.

KANDHARI, Lieut.-Colonel H.S., 5 Royal Gurkha Rifles.
 ***KAPILA**, Major S.P., M.C., R.I.A.
KAPUR, Captain H.S., 5 Royal Gurkha Rifles.
KARIM, Captain M.I., 19 Lancers.
KHAN, Captain R.D., 16 Punjab Regiment.
KHAN ZAMAN, Captain, 1 Punjab Regiment.
KHATRI, Lieut. D.S., R.I.A.S.C.
 ***KRISHNA RAO**, Major K.V., Mahar Regiment.
KRISHNAMURTHY, 2/Lieut. S., 16 Cavalry.
 ***KULDIP SINGH**, Lieut.-Colonel, R.I.E.
 ***KUMARAMANGALAM**, Brigadier P.P., D.S.O., M.B.E., I.A.
KURIYAN, Major P.K., 7 Cavalry.
 ***LACHHMAN SINGH**, Captain, R.I.A.
LORETZ, Lieut.-Colonel S.J.
 ***MAHADEVAN**, Captain S.P., Madras Regiment.
MAINI, Major S.D., Rajputana Rifles.
MAJOR, Major DADY S., Indian Signals.
MAJUMDAR, Captain K.A., Dogra Regiment.
MALIK, Captain A.R., 6 Lancers.
MALIK, Major N.A., 1 Punjab Regiment.
MANKU, Major I.S., R.I.E.
MAN MOHAN SINGH, Major, Mahratta Light Infantry.
MARTIN, Lieut., E.J.
MATHUR, Major L.S., R.I.A.
MAZAR-UD-DIN, Captain, 14 Punjab Regiment.
MEHTAB SINGH, Lieut.-Colonel, Rajputana Rifles.
MENON, Esq., K.P.S., I.C.S.
MISTRY, Major D.K., Madras Regiment.
MITTRA, Major B.N., Mahar M.G. Regiment.
MOHAN SINGH, Major, I.A.M.C.
MOHARIR, Major V.J., R.I.A.S.C.
MOKHTAR KARIM MALIK, 2/Lieut., R.P.A.
MOHD. AFZAL KHAN, Captain, 1 Punjab Regiment.
MOHAMMAD AKRAM, Major, 13 Lancers.
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Sale of Periodicals

The notice regarding the sale of old periodicals which appeared in our previous issue seems to have been misunderstood by some readers. These notices are an annual feature, when periodicals not required for preservation in our library are offered for sale. Please note that only periodicals for the previous twelve months are thus sold.

Back Issues of the Journal

The Army Library in Washington is anxious to obtain one copy each of the issues of the U. S. I. Journal for April 1943 and October 1943. Will any member who desires to sell these kindly inform the Secretary?

The Library

A list of additions to the library is being inserted as a loose leaf in this issue of the Journal. Suggestions are invited from members of the three Services in regard to the purchase of new books.

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The headquarters building of The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan in Simla is open daily, including Sundays, from 9 a.m. to sunset. It contains a reading room, in which is available a wide range of illustrated periodicals, newspapers, magazines, etc., as well as a number of Service journals. A well-stocked library is also open to members, who may borrow volumes without charge, while members stationed elsewhere may obtain books on loan post-free.

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The Journal of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan

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By courtesy of the Director, Historical Section, Simla
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR WILLIAM SLIM, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.
The new Chief of the Imperial General Staff

*(From an official war photograph of the famous Commander of the Fourteenth
Army in Burma)*

The Journal of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan

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OCTOBER, 1948.

No. 333.

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

EDITORIAL NOTES

Field-Marshal Slim

We have referred in the last issue to Field-Marshal Slim's active association with the Institution and the Journal at one time. The following messages were exchanged between the Council of the Institution and the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff:—

"The President and Members of the Council of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan offer you their congratulations on your appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and send you their best wishes."—U.S.I.

"Would you please thank on my behalf all Members of the Council of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan for their kind message of congratulations which I greatly appreciate—Slim."

The 1948 Olympic Games

It is always difficult to judge to what extent an Olympic meeting has been successful. There are so many factors which contribute to the making of a successful Olympiad, so many varied nations and

peoples to satisfy, that even under the most favourable circumstances the occasional "incident" rears its ugly head. The success of the games is a severe test of organisation and diplomacy.

Of the near-million spectators who were fortunate enough to witness the 1948 Games in London, the majority will agree that the XIV Olympiad was an unqualified success. In contrast to the over-hurried organisation of the 1908 London Olympics, this year's meeting was an achievement that Britain, still struggling with her national crises of the post-war period, may well be proud. Not only was there a record number of entries, and the largest number of broken records, but the spirit of sportsmanship also—of which the Olympiad is intended to be a promoter—was never more spontaneously upheld. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this right spirit was the enthusiasm with which the crowds cheered the final camera decision which overruled the initial disqualification of the magnificent American relay team in favour of the British. The crowd might easily have shown its disappointment at this additional victory of the envied Americans, who seemed to be walking away with most of the events.

The Berlin Air-lift

The tremendous efforts of the RAF and the USAAF to feed, clothe and supply fuel to the Berliners of the British-American zone, can be reckoned as the greatest military feat of the post-war period. Not only had present requirements to be met, but winter stocks had also to be built up—for flying conditions in the winter would not permit of the same large-scale undertaking. Russian policy continues to hold up settlement. Had it not been for this monumental undertaking, Berliners, with no outlet to the Allied zone, would now be facing starvation and death from freezing.

The task was immense, bigger than any which faced the Anglo-American air forces during the war. The difficulties which were placed in the way of the organisers were numerous, and it was only by a miracle of organisation and co-operation that the various obstacles were surmounted. Hundreds of planes fly daily to Berlin, along strictly limited air-lanes and under the most adverse conditions. Loading and unloading drill, economic packing, and detailed time-programmes on limited air field spaces, have been brought to a fine art. Facts and figures have not been released, but should make profitable study when available.

UNO Security Force

The murder of Count Bernadotte by Jewish terrorists in Jerusalem has once again brought to the forefront the urgent need of

a permanent Security Force of the United Nations Security Council. It is becoming more and more evident that however hard nations may try to solve their problems around the conference table, when it comes to complying with an adverse decision, no nation can be expected to submit to loyal and spontaneous compliance. One of the main reasons why the former League of Nations died a natural death was that, whereas it had many consultative facilities and a certain amount of economic backing, it had no executive power.

It must now be urgently realised that if a sincere effort is to be made to settle international differences by submission to a consultative and adjudicating body, there must be an executive force of sufficient military power, which could be called upon to enforce a decision. For this reason, the sooner the signatory powers of the UNO get together and form a UNO Security Force, the better would be their chances of ensuring world peace.

The three greatest obstacles which have to be faced in regard to the formation of such a force are—composition, financial commitment and geographical dispositions. The composition of the force will be a matter of dispute and difficulty; dispute, because of decisions required on the proportion of representation by nations on the Security Force, and difficulty, because those members of the armed forces who serve on the UNO Security Force would have to subordinate their nationality and patriotism to an international citizenship and oath of loyalty for the period of their service. Obviously an Indian, say, who is serving in the UNO Security Force, could not be asked to take part in a possible punitive measure against his own country unless his original loyalty and oath of allegiance were to be supplanted by a higher and international oath of loyalty. This is a matter which may easily lead to dispute.

The financial undertaking for such a force would be tremendous. As it is, the expenses of the UNO are extremely high, and the scale of contributions allotted to the signatory powers constitute, in most cases, a substantial load on their national finances. To maintain a Security Force of any appreciable size, this load would have to be greatly increased. And lastly, the question of geographical disposition would be much disputed. From many points of view, the garrisoning of a UN Security Force contingent would be of great value and convenience to some countries. To others, it would be a matter viewed with distrust and suspicion. All these points would require settlement before a satisfactory solution is reached, but there is no reason why a start should not be made right now.

The Russian Navy

According to the latest edition of "Jane's Fighting Ships",

the Russian Navy has gone in for the construction of submarines on a large scale. More than 100 new submarines have been ordered, over and above the existing number of some 250 war-time craft. It is evident that Russia is following on the footsteps of pre-war Germany, and is going to rely chiefly on the submarine as a naval weapon. It is interesting to note that this latest edition of "Jane's Fighting Ships" includes fifty new photographs of the Russian Navy, besides a host of recent information. Incidentally, the foreword to this authoritative volume says of Britain's decision to discard the three ships of the Royal Sovereign Class, and the Nelson, Rodney and Renown, "Seldom has such a powerful group of capital ships, aggregating 280,000 tons, been removed from the list by a single stroke."

Anniversary of Alamein

The texts of signals exchanged between the War Office and the C-in-C Indian Army on the anniversary of Alamein are reproduced below :—

"For C-in-C from Field-Marshal Montgomery. On this sixth anniversary of Alamein we send from the Albert Hall in London our warm greetings to all our old friends and comrades in arms in India who fought with us at Alamein."

"For Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery from General Sir Roy Bucher, C-in-C Indian Army. Your greetings much appreciated. All in India who fought at Alamein remember this anniversary with great pride as a turning point in the War in which they played a part under your inspired leadership."

Campaign Digests

We are starting a series of brief campaign studies of the Second World War by Lieut.-Colonel D. K. Palit, the author of "Essentials of Military Knowledge". The first of these appears in this issue.

ADVICE TO GENTLEMEN CADETS*

GENERAL SIR ROY BUCHER, K.B.E., C.B., M.C.

I would like to take this opportunity of offering to you Gentlemen Cadets some advice as to the future, which I recommend that you should bear in mind when you are finally permitted the honour of becoming officers in India's Army.

Why do I say that you are being permitted the honour of joining the Army? It is because you will join a Service which has great traditions — traditions which have been and are most jealously guarded by its officers, both past and present and because you will join an Army which is second to none. When the late war finished, the Infantry of the Indian Army was the finest in the world. In the case of other Corps, the highest standards will undoubtedly be achieved, but they have been faced with a more difficult task than has the Infantry, since they have had to compete with modern and complicated equipment which was new to them.

The future of the Army lies with its officers, and, in particular, with its junior officers. How are you going to set about ensuring that its great standards and traditions are maintained? An Army is as its officers are; if they are good so will the Army be good, if they are poor so will the Army be poor. The men reflect their officers and they are, in fact, the mirror in which you can see yourselves. What then are the hallmarks of a good officer—the outward and the visible signs?

Firstly, I would put **DEVOTION TO THE SERVICE**. The interests of the Army must come first in your thoughts and in your actions all the time. Remember that the Army, and indeed all the Services, are the servants of the Government in power at the time, and the political complexion of a particular Government makes not the slightest difference to this fact. As soldiers you are not concerned with politics. There is nothing wrong in your having political opinions and in expressing them with moderation in private conversation, but that is a very different matter to expressing political opinions in public or allowing such opinions to influence your action in any way. No Army which concerns itself with politics is ever of any value. Its discipline is poor, its morale is rotten and its reliability and efficiency is bound to be of the lowest order. You have only to look at certain foreign armies which are constantly mixed up in politics to realise the truth of what I say.

It follows, therefore, that the Army has never the slightest right to question the policy of Government. Implicit obedience to the orders issued by Government is essential, and only in this manner will the interests of the country be fully served. And so you see that devotion to the Service implies devotion to the Country as well.

Secondly, **EFFICIENCY** is undoubtedly a hallmark of a good officer. Unless you are efficient, you will not be respected by your troops nor will you have their confidence, two essentials in the officer-man relationship. Without efficiency, you will have no self-confidence and without self-confidence you cannot possibly lead troops in war, nor for that matter can you train them in peace. Having made the Army your profession, you must put everything you can into being and remaining efficient. The Commandant and the Staff at this Academy have spared no efforts to set you on the right path, but I would not like you to go away from here believ-

*Extract from Address by the Commander-in-Chief to the Staff and Cadets of the Military Academy, Dehra Dun, on 28th May, 1948.

ing that you already have the requisite knowledge to enable you to train troops or to lead them in war. You have still much training to do and much to learn; in fact, you will never cease to learn throughout the whole of your career.

Thirdly, I put **HIGH PERSONAL STANDARDS**. You must set yourselves the very highest personal standard in everything you do — in your work; in the games you play; in your conduct in the mess; in your conduct in your own homes, and in your conduct in public. Nothing else is good enough. The maintenance of high personal standards leads to self-respect, and self-respect is one of the important elements of discipline. Included in personal standards is loyalty, and I would like to draw your attention especially to it. You will find during your service that there will be occasions on which you will be called upon to show loyalty to your men, to your superiors, to your unit and to your Service as a whole. You must never let any of them down either by word, thought or deed. It will not always be easy, but it is an essential factor of life in the Army.

When I talk about high personal standards, I do not imply that you must aim at a standard of living which may possibly be far beyond your means. That would merely be senseless and to do so would show a weakness of character and a lack of balance, neither of which can be tolerated in an officer of the Armed Forces. I will go further, it is nothing short of criminal for an officer to run himself into debt, and crime in the Army is dealt with severely.

As junior officers you should remember that your personal bearing will exercise a dominating and permeating influence not only with your own men, but with the general public, and that the tone of an Army is set by its officers. In public, therefore, as on parade, you must conduct yourselves in such a fashion that the uniform you wear is regarded by the general public less as a uniform than as the hallmark of the great profession of arms to which you belong; a profession whose prestige in time of war is always vitally bound up with the Nation's destiny.

Fourthly, is **DISCIPLINE**. I have recently issued to the Army some notes on what discipline is and how it is achieved. You will find them in *Durbar Notes No.3* and you should study them carefully.

Fifthly, is **LEADERSHIP** or the **ABILITY TO COMMAND MEN**. The two vital attributes of a leader, with which he will succeed, and without which he will fail, are decision in action and calmness in crisis. These apply, although in varying degree, to both peace and war. But there are other qualities with which you must also seek to equip yourselves if you wish to be good leaders. Readiness to accept responsibility is one, efficiency and self-confidence I have already mentioned. A leader must be firm and just in his dealings with his men; he must be clear-cut and definite in giving his orders; he should pay attention to administrative details and he must keep his men informed of all new developments.

There is another aspect of leadership and that is its relation to morale. The best type of leader earns the respectful admiration of his men because he possesses certain good qualities which they lack, and brings out in them the quality of self-respect. A brutal leader who disregards the feelings of his men will not infuse them with self-respect, and the morale of the troops he commands, regardless of his qualities as a leader, will not be of the highest. This ability to instil the quality of self-respect in troops is one of the principal attributes of a leader.

Now I want to say a few words to you on the subject of "*esprit de corps*". "*Esprit de corps*" comprises personal sentiments of duty, of courage and of loyalty, and a sense of pride in country, service, unit and self.

It is the task of every officer and every non-commissioned officer to play his part in making his sub-unit, unit and the Army as a whole into a formidable fighting machine. To carry out this task he must appreciate the distinction between an Army and a mob. It is not by its arms, for mobs have arms, but by its "esprit de corps" and discipline that an Army is to be so distinguished. These two qualities are essential to secure co-ordinated action by a body of men, and to ensure that singleness of purpose which can alone enable them to achieve the intention of their commander. Fear is the enemy of morale; fear unchecked will lead to panic, and a unit that panics is no longer a unit, but a mob. There is no man who is altogether without fear, but with high morale, men will face danger because of their sentiments of duty, courage and of loyalty, and because of their sensible pride in their country, in their unit, and in themselves; in other words because of their "esprit de corps".

There are several outward signs of good "esprit de corps". One is dress, another is good saluting, a third is good drill and a fourth is good physical fitness of a unit as a whole. Again, there is the general behaviour of a unit; in fact you will see that the matter of "esprit de corps" is closely bound up with discipline and if a unit's "esprit de corps" is always in evidence, its good bearing in public will contribute to the good reputation of the Army as a whole.

For method, planning and almost perfect sanitation, give me a military camp.
—*Mahatma Gandhi.*

CAMPAIGN DIGESTS

Lieut-Colonel D. K. Palit.

I. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

PRE-WAR STRATEGY

IN order to understand fully the reasons behind the collapse of the Allied armies in France, it is necessary to begin with a study of French strategy and planning between the two world wars. It should be realised that the French plans to meet the German onslaught in 1940 were not the haphazard creations of the moment, but the outcome of twenty years of military thought. It is only then that the immensity of the blunder can be fully appreciated.

Military thinkers in France based their policy on one great assumption, which was that the First World War had proved beyond doubt the superiority of modern defensive weapons over the offensive. They considered that the only way to prevent any future invasion of French Territory was to face the invader with a continuous line of strongly defended fortifications. Since the greatest threat came from Germany, it was decided to cover the entire northern frontier of France by a line of permanent defences. Behind this front line of fortifications there would be a belt of highly mobile and concentrated reserves whose task would be to restore the gaps in the fortifications in the event of local break-throughs by the enemy. This in a nutshell, was the result of twenty years of French military thought.

In the light of subsequent events, this policy of the "continuous defensive front" seems utterly illogical and antiquated, but it must be remembered that between the two World Wars, there was virtually a standstill in military experimentation and research in the democratic countries. New tank or aerial tactics had not been evolved; artillery and machine-guns were still considered to dominate the battle-field; and modern industry had made it possible for armies large enough to cover long frontiers to be equipped and to be able to take the field at short notice.

It is therefore understandable that the doctrine of the continuous front should have gained so much support. What is quite beyond comprehension is that, having decided upon this defensive policy of covering the whole of the French northern frontier with a continuous line of fortifications, the French Army failed to adhere to it when translating the policy into action on the ground. The eventual plan, which was finalised so late as in 1940, was neither entirely defensive nor was it based on the continuous line of fortifications actually constructed.

In the early thirties, Marshal Petain, then Commander-in-Chief and President of the War Council, argued that for several reasons, the continuous front could not follow the line of the Northern Frontier. The length and shape of the frontier, the existence of concentrated industrial regions north of the River Somme, and the numerous lines of communication with Belgium in that region, made it militarily uneconomical to continue the line of fortifications along the north-western frontier. Petain also believed firmly that the Ardennes Forest was a sufficient obstacle to prevent any major invasion of France through that area. In 1932 he, therefore, finally turned down all proposals of continuing the Maginot

Line beyond Montmedy. The result was that the rest of the line, the entire front north of Montmedy, was covered by a system of fortifications which only allowed sixteen pill boxes per mile, protected against only light and medium artillery, of simple construction, and armed with machine-guns and anti-tank guns.

This policy weakened the continuity of the front. Petain did not stop at that; he also disregarded the policy of the defensive. In the north-western sector he prepared for a war of movement, of movement forward into Belgian territory at the first signs of a German offensive. Thus we see the incongruity of a plan of campaign which on the whole is defensive, based on a continuous line of fortifications, but in which the conception of the defensive and the continuity of the front are both disregarded when actual details are worked out on the ground. Petain's ideas did not keep in step with his strategic planning. In tactical policy also, having accepted a war of movement and offensive action in a major portion of his front, he should have equipped his armies with the arms and weapons of movement and attack. On the contrary, he discarded the suggestion of building large numbers of tanks and planes. Tanks, he said, were too expensive and cumbersome; planes were only useful in strategic bombing enterprises—they were of little use in a war of defence.

General Chauvineau, a close associate of Marshal Petain, in his book, '*L' invasion, Est-Elle Encore Possible?*' wrote :

"If our frontier is barred by a solid front....if we equip our field armies with inexpensive meansthen our country is attack-proof.....if we place two million men with the appropriate number of machine-guns and pill-boxes along the 250 mile frontier....we shall hold them up for three years. When armies have no flanks, resistance to greatly superior forces....becomes merely a routine matter."

Being wedded to such principles, it was impossible for the French General Staff to appreciate the potentialities of modern arms. They completely overlooked the fact that modern bombers could cut communications to the rear and isolate the strongest forces; that heavy tanks were penetrating weapons, armour-proofed against all but the heaviest anti-tank artillery; that mechanised infantry following up armour formed a mobile striking force independent of slower moving mass armies. French military doctrine calculated the effectiveness of modern offensive weapons with a spirit of wishful thinking which always had for an assumption the superiority of the linear defensive.

It was not that there were no advocates of modern warfare amongst the French strategists who foresaw the future of blitzkrieg tactics. Reformers such as de Gaulle and Reynaud were constantly demanding the formation of a mechanised shock army—the combination of armour and mobile infantry. They pointed out the weakness of their own so-called mechanised forces—seven divisions consisting of conscripts and reservists mounted in trucks, with a sprinkling of light tanks. But the answer of the Petains and the Weygands was always the same. In the words of General Niessel, they replied, "All these palliatives that have seduced certain deputies and journalists have been unanimously rejected by every high officer in our army."

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THE FRENCH PLAN

Before the First World War the Schlieffen Plan had been to hold the French right wing with a comparatively weak force (spread out in Alsace and Lorraine), and to smash in the French left with an overwhelming force striking through Luxemburg and Belgium. The more timid von Moltke reduced the strength of the right wing to reinforce his left as a safety measure. Even so, but for the timely Russian offensive on Germany's Eastern Front the attack might have succeeded.

As it was, the German Army arrived at the gates of Paris in much quicker time than Hitler's invading forces in 1940.

The success of the Schlieffen Plan gave the post-war French strategists a "Right-Wing-Attack" complex. They assumed that the Maginot Line was impenetrable and that the Forest of Ardennes was too difficult a terrain for the German mechanised army to operate through. They therefore concentrated all their attention on the northern half of the Franco-Belgian frontier. They started their planning with the firm conviction that the Germans would launch a right wing attack through northern Belgium.

In order to meet the attack by a perpendicular front, the French General Staff decided that the best dispositions would be to advance into Belgium and form a north-south defence line facing the German line of attack. In this way also the Northern Channel Ports would be kept free from enemy ground interference, and the rich industrial area of Northern France would be left well in the rear of the front line.

The next step was to decide how far to advance into Belgian territory. From east to west, there are three natural lines of defence in Belgium. The first is the line of the Albert Canal-River Meuse, from Antwerp to south of Liege. The advantage of this line was that it prevented the invader from occupying too great a portion of Belgian territory. The disadvantage was its convex shape, which would entail the employment of a much larger defensive force along the front lines. The second line was the line of the Rivers Dyle-Meuse, which more or less divides Belgium in half. The third was the line of the River Escaut. This was at first the most favoured because it allowed for the French Army being rushed up to occupy its positions along the river within a very short time of the start of the invasion. Its disadvantage was that it was only about 30 miles from the sea at the narrowest part, and thus gave the position no depth for manoeuvre behind the first line of defences. It also jeopardised the position of the Channel Ports.

The French were helped in making their choice by the decision of the Belgian General Staff, who suddenly decided to move back their original main line of defence along the Albert Canal to the line of the Dyle. The gap between the Dyle and the Meuse was then covered by a strong anti-tank obstacle, and this line was finally fixed upon as the main line of resistance.

Working under the assumption that the main attack was to come in the north, the French High Command decided to hold their northern sector (north of Namur), with their strongest forces. The total strength dispersed along the front was to be four French Armies, one British, and the Belgian Army which consisted of about 18 divisions.


From the western extremity of the Maginot Line, through Sedan, up to the Netherlands border in the north, the armies were organised into one French Army Group. General Georges was the Commander of this theatre. (The second French Army Group under General Billotte covered the Maginot Line). The dispositions of the armies were as follows:—

- (a) The French 2nd Army—commanded by General Huntziger
Frontage .. Longwy-Sedan
Strength .. 7 Infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade.
The major part of this army was made up of reservists.
- (b) The French 9th Army—commanded by General Corap
Frontage .. Mezieres-Namur
Strength .. 9 infantry divisions and one cavalry division.

SKETCH 1

THE ALLIED PLAN

SCALE 1 INCH = 45 MILES (APPROX.)



This army was almost entirely made up of reservists. At the time of the invasion, this army was in fact the weakest amongst the Allied armies. It had also to travel forward about 30 miles, after the invasion started, to occupy its position.

- (c) The 1st French Army—commanded by General Blanchard
 - Frontage .. Namur-Wavre
 - Strength .. 4 infantry divisions and 4 light mechanised divisions, all well trained. The task of this army was made more difficult by the fact that the anti-tank obstacle between the Dyle and the Meuse was not completed.
- (d) The British Expeditionary Force—commanded by Lord Gort.
 - Frontage .. Wavre-Leuven
 - Strength .. 10 divisions, well trained but sadly lacking in equipment. Its tanks were obsolete, some being armed with machine-guns only. Guns and ammunition were also very scarce.
- (e) The Belgian Army—commanded by General Michiels
 - Frontage .. Leuven-Netherlands border
 - Strength ... 18 divisions, but because it had to withdraw from the line of the Albert Canal after the outbreak of hostilities, It was assumed that not more than about 10 to 12 divisions would ever get into position.
- (f) The French 7th Army—commanded by General Giraud
 - Strength .. 6 infantry divisions and one light mechanised division
 - Task .. It was to be concentrated south of the Franco-Belgian border, between the Rivers Yser and Lys. On the outbreak of war, it was to make a wide sweep along the coast of Southern Netherlands, and support the Netherlands army in the area of Breda.

The reserves behind the "front line" forces consisted of small groups of reserve divisions scattered along the Belgian frontier in Champagne, Lorraine and Bourgogne. The last named area was some hundreds of miles away from the scene of operations. (The entire 6th Army, for instance, was grouped round Lyons, about 300 miles from the Belgian frontier).

The Allied armies were quite a formidable force. Compared to the German armies, they were not much inferior in numbers. By January, 1940, the Germans had some 75-80 divisions massed on the frontiers of the Low Countries. As opposed to this the Allies were able to muster about 60-65 divisions between the Maginot Line and the sea. (This figure includes the reserve divisions, but does not include the Netherlands Army).

The Allies went into battle with a numerical inferiority in airplanes of about one to two. The combined strengths of the French and British air forces was about 7,500 planes, of which about half were first line. The total German strength in aircraft was about 16,000. The real disadvantage lay in the fact that the French had no equivalent of the dive bomber plane which had been developed by the Germans.

In May, 1940, the Germans had some 7,000 tanks, the French about 3,000 and the British 600. The French tanks were scattered all over the country, from the Swiss front to the Channel Ports, including a large number attached to the reserve divisions. Even in individual divisions, the tanks were distributed down to infantry platoons and defensive posts. Their armour was generally thicker, but armaments, speed and range less than the Germans. They were essentially infantry tanks and were not designed for armoured warfare.

In anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns the Allies faced an overwhelming superiority. In the French Armies there were virtually no anti-aircraft guns for high-flying planes..

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THE GERMAN PLAN

The first step of the German High Command was to find out the general Allied plan and their strategy. This they did by means of their "war of nerves" during the period November 1939 to April 1940. The two false alarms, in November and January, resulted in the concentration of the Allied forces according to their general defence plans. This gave the Germans strong indication of the projected dispositions of the Allies and their general strategy. They then set about formulating their own plan of attack.

The German plan was based on the central purpose of an attack through the Ardennes Forest and a break-through at Sedan. At the same time a diversionary attack of undisclosed proportions was to be made in Northern Belgium between Namur and Aachen. This was planned in order to prevent the French General Staff from gauging the exact point of the main attack for as long as possible. After the break-through, the Germans planned to execute a wide flanking movement to drive the Allied armies to the coast and to encircle them there.

The German General Staff proposed to carry out the whole operation against France and the Low Countries with three Army Groups:—

- (a) Army Group "A"—commanded by General von Rundstedt
 Strength .. The 4th, 12th and 16th Armies and one armoured group
 Task .. to break through in the Aachen-Moselle front
- (b) Army Group "B"—commanded by General von Bock
 Strength .. The 6th and 18th Armies
 Task .. (i) to invade the Netherlands (This was to be an independent operation until the Netherlands forces had been crushed, when certain units were to be directed to the Franco-Belgian front);
 (ii) to attack in the Limburg area, as a diversionary and containing measure.
- (c) Army Group "C"—commanded by General von Leeb
 Strength .. The 1st and 7th Armies
 Task .. to hold the front from Switzerland to the Moselle.
 (This was a defensive role, aimed at containing the French forces manning the Maginot Line).

The main effort against France was therefore entrusted to Army Group "A", and was to be carried out as follows:—

- (a) The Armoured Group—commanded by General von Kleist
 Strength .. 6 armoured divisions and 3 motorised divisions
 Task .. to break through between Namur and Sedan
 It comprised three separate spearheads:—
 - (i) An army corps of 3 armoured divisions and one mechanised division, under General Guderian, (the theorist of the German Panzers), who was to strike at Sedan.
 - (ii) An army corps of 2 Panzer divisions and 2 mechanised divisions, under General Reinhardt, who was to break through further north in the area of Montherme-Givet
 - (iii) One independent armoured division under General Rommel, who was to break through between Dinant and Namur.

- (b) The 4th Army—commanded by General von Kluge
Task .. to attack south of Aachen
- (c) The 12th Army—commanded by General von List
Task .. to attack between von Kluge and von Kleist and
to protect von Kleist's right flank.
- (d) The 16th Army—commanded by General von Busch
Task .. to attack south of Sedan, down to the Moselle, and
to protect von Kleist's left flank.

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THE BELGIAN INVASION

At dawn on 10 May, 1940, the blitzkrieg in the west had begun. Without negotiations, warning, or any declaration of war, the German armed forces attacked Holland and Belgium. As in Poland, the attack began with the bombing of a number of aerodromes and industrial centres in France, Belgium and Holland.

On the decisive Ardennes front, the Germans took just over three hours to cross Luxemburg, the distance through Luxemburg to the Belgian frontier being about 30 miles. On reaching the Belgian frontier, Guderian's leading elements came up against stiffer resistance. Huntziger and Corap had both decided to send their cavalry forces across the Meuse into the forests of the Ardennes, so that they could meet the advancing Germans on the most favourable ground. It was unfortunate that Corap took longer to reach the line of the Meuse River in the post-invasion dash to occupy the defensive line. He was therefore far behind Huntziger in his time-table, and left the latter's northern flank exposed. In spite of this tactical set-back, Huntziger managed to offer strong resistance in the forest areas, and at the end of the first day's fighting had held up Guderian's armoured columns within a mile or two of the Belgian frontier.

On the second day, fierce battles were fought in the forests. The German advance was confined to narrow roads and embankments, but they had all the advantages of tactical air support. Not one Allied plane appeared over the battle areas throughout these operations. The Germans were able to employ dive bombers to break up enemy localities and concentrations wherever open ground permitted them. In some instances German aircraft even came to the rescue of individual tanks held up by the French cavalry.

At the end of the second day the columns of Reinhardt and Guderian had reached the line of the River Semois, which flows parallel to the Meuse about seven miles to its east. The French had lost heavily in cavalry. Two of Huntziger's cavalry divisions and Corap's Spahi division had been decimated. Corap therefore, now decided to withdraw his remaining cavalry from the area of St. Hubert back to the Meuse. The Germans had complete control of the forest areas east of the Semois by the evening of 11th May.


Besides von Kleist's attacks in the southern sector, there were two other major offensives—one in northern Belgium and the other in Holland. They were carried out at the same time and with the same vigour in order to keep the Allies baffled for as long as possible regarding the main point of break-through. This is not to say that the other two were mere diversions, for they were intended to be strong enough to bring important results irrespective of the main objectives.

In the Northern Belgian sector, the Belgian Army was supposed to fight a delaying action on the Albert Canal line; and also to hold up the German advance through the intervening area east of the main Dyle line long enough to allow

SKETCH 2

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM

SCALE 1"=50 MILES (APPROX.)



Blanchard's First Army and the BEF to rush up and occupy their defensive positions on the Dyle. According to the defence plan, the Belgians were expected to delay the Germans for forty-eight hours.

This phase of the battle was fought out in the area of Liege. Before the decision to move the main line of defence back to the Dyle had been taken, the Belgians had prepared the line of Albert Canal-North Meuse into a strong line of fortifications, in places resembling the Maginot Line.

The attack commenced with the bombing of Belgian air fields, which put more than half of them out of action. Reichenau's 6th Army advanced through the Limburg salient and attacked the Belgian line just south of Maastricht; von Kluge aimed directly at Liege, and von List south of Liege. All the bridges across the canal and the Meuse had been heavily mined and some, particularly in the northern sector, were guarded by strong fortifications. The new fort at Eben Emmel, between Liege and Maastricht, was one of the most powerful Belgian defensive posts, having been constructed at a cost of over a million pounds. The Germans however surprised the Belgians completely by the employment of parachutists and glider-borne troops. They had erected exact models of these forts in their training areas, and rehearsed their capture in the minutest detail. Most of the bridges in the northern area were eventually captured intact, and within a few hours from the launching of the attack, the German armoured hordes poured into Belgium.

By the night of the 11th the entire front in the Liege sector was crumbling. The Belgian Army decided to withdraw to the Dyle line, but their communications were so badly disrupted that the withdrawal would have been a failure had it not been for General Blanchard's armoured counter-attack from the French 1st Army. General Blanchard sent up 2 light mechanised divisions to counter-attack the Germans, and though it was not a part of the general Allied plan, its timely action was the main cause of the Belgians reaching the Dyle line in any strength. This gallant covering action is of particular interest, for it was the first occasion on which the German Panzers were challenged in a direct tank-versus-tank battle.

The total tank strength of the two French divisions was about a quarter of that of the Germans opposing them in that sector. The tanks in these two divisions were undoubtedly the best in the Allied armies, but could not compete with the Germans in mobility and fire-power. In spite of these disadvantages the French gave a very creditable account of themselves. On the 12th there were three or four major tank actions, which were on the whole indecisive. The French artillery co-operated with the armoured elements and helped offset the German advantage of the tactical employment of Stuka dive-bombers. By nightfall on the 12th the French were still holding their own though they had suffered numerous casualties in tanks and men.

On the 13th, the German Panzers put in a decisive attack due west of Liege, with three armoured divisions. The French had been expecting the attack and were able to hold them for a time, and even stage a major counter-attack. In each engagement, however, the French came off by far the worst as regards casualties; even though the armour of their heavier tanks was thicker than the Germans they could not compete with the Panzer fire-power. By the 14th the French had suffered such numerous losses that further engagements would have been suicidal. The order was given to withdraw to the main line, and by the evening they had reached the safety of Blanchard's 1st Army's protection. Even though they had been defeated in local engagements their mission was a success, in that they had enabled a large portion of the Belgian Albert-Canal troops to reach the Dyle line.

To return to the northern sector. The battle had not progressed as fast in the initial stages as the forcing of the Albert Canal defences. On the evening of the

11th, Guderian had been halted on the Semois. On the next day he put in a strong infantry attack on Bouillon, with the object of capturing and rebuilding the bridge which the French had blown up. This was the first occasion Allied aircraft took a tactical part in the battle. They bombed the attacking infantry and supporting armour and held up the engineer parties working on the bridge.

By the evening of the 12th, Guderian had crossed the Semois, and was advancing on the Meuse. On the next day Guderian, Reinhardt and Rommel controlled the east bank of the Meuse from Namur to Sedan.

Even up to this stage the Germans had not given away their main strategic surprise—the break-through on the Ardennes front. The initial successes in the Liege sector had been spectacular and fast, and had naturally led the French to confirm their opinion that the main German thrust would be in the north.

Von Rundstedt now decided to cross the Meuse at three points—Guderian at Sedan; Reinhardt at Montherme; and Rommel at Houx. Of the three, the Sedan sector was the most difficult because of the Ardennes Canal, which ran parallel to the Meuse immediately behind Sedan, joining the Meuse to the Aisne. It ran from west of Sedan southwards, and an enemy force crossing the Meuse from the east would have to cross the canal also in order to break loose from the bridge-head area. The advantage of the crossing at Sedan was the net-work of roads running west from Sedan, which would facilitate the advance of the German mechanised columns in their post-crossing break-through.

Guderian launched his attack on the morning of the 13th and by the same evening he had established enough troops on the west bank to start the construction of pontoon bridges across the river. In the meanwhile, motor cycles and light vehicles were being ferried across on rubber boats. The attack on Sedan itself started with infiltrating columns of infantry supported by artillery, from the east bank, and dive-bombers. By evening Sedan had fallen.

The crossing having been achieved and Sedan taken, Guderian set about securing the bridge-head. His first step was to try and find out the meeting point of Huntziger's and Corap's armies, the weak point in this area. He first struck south and engaged three of Huntziger's divisions; though he was stopped, he had found the 2nd Army's flank. He then turned to Corap in the north, located the weak junction area and struck with his Panzers. He broke through, captured two bridges over the Ardennes Canal intact, and crossed the canal in spite of a determined counter-attack by Corap. By the evening of the 14th, Guderian had established the whole area between the Meuse and the canal as his bridge-head, and was ready to strike west.

The crossing at Montherme did not move quite so fast. The Germans met stronger resistance on the river, and suffered a number of casualties in the initial assault. Even after the crossing had been achieved they were harassed by a number of fierce counter-attacks, and it was not until the morning of the 15th that they were able to build a bridge for their tanks. In the move forward from the Meuse therefore, Reinhardt was a full day behind Guderian in his time-table, and consequently found a great advantage in his secure left flank. This stood him in good stead, for his break-through after the crossing was eventually much faster than Guderian's. He was able to advance over 40 miles in one day, and had taken Montcornet by the morning of the 16th.

At Houx also, the French were able to hold up the initial assault crossing for some time, and it was not until the morning of the 13th that the main crossing was effected. The bridge-head was established on the 14th.

Corap now flung against Rommel his strongest counter-attack so far. Believing in the general French theory that the main German effort would come in the north, he had concentrated a strong reserve behind the Houx-Dinant area. On the 14th he sent against Rommel one light mechanised and one motorised division, supported by a North African infantry division with orders to repulse the enemy from the bridge-head area. The attack may have achieved a certain amount of success had it been launched in time. As it was, by the time it got started, the Germans had consolidated their crossing, and news had also come through about the German successes at Sedan and Montherme. Corap halted his counter-attack, and hurriedly decided to pull back his whole front. By the 15th, orders for the withdrawal had been given and the whole 9th Army began to retreat from the line of the Meuse.

From three localised crossings the German bulge increased to include the whole front from Namur to Sedan. The campaign was now six days old; the Germans had taken three days to get through the Ardennes and three days to secure their bridge-heads over the Meuse. Corap was made the scape-goat for this disaster, and on the 15th he was relieved of his command. Giraud, just returned from his fruitless Netherlands adventure, was sent to replace him. Corap was sent temporarily in command of Giraud's 7th Army, but was dismissed altogether on the 19th.

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THE CONQUEST OF THE NETHERLANDS

Despite Hitler's assurances of peace and friendship since the occupation of the Rhineland, the Dutch Government had taken certain precautionary measures for defence after the invasion of Poland. Partial mobilisation had been ordered and an agreement made with Belgium that if either State were attacked, the other would come to its help. By January 1940, there was no longer any doubt that the German concentrations along the Netherlands frontier were the preliminaries to an invasion.


A glance at the map of Holland reveals the difficulty of organising a plan of defence in this country. It has large land and sea frontiers, with little of it covered by any natural obstacles. The north-eastern provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe and Overijssel jut out to the north, and are devoid of any strategical lines of defence. In the south, Limburg lies in an equally precarious position. Under these circumstances the Netherlands Army was forced to exclude these areas from their permanent defence scheme.

The defence plan of the Netherlands Government was based on three successive lines:—

- (a) The first resistance was to be offered at the line of the Rivers Meuse-Ijssel. This line was to be held mainly as a line of outposts. It could not be manned as a continuous line of defence owing to the shortage of manpower. (The Netherlands army consisted of 8 divisions and some garrison units).
- (b) The second line lay along the Peel marshes in the province of North Brabant, extending northwards up to Rhenen and then northwards to the Zuider Zee. The northern half of this line was based on a network of waterways which enclosed an area which could be readily inundated. It should be noted that the southern extremity of this line ended about 20 miles short of the northern sector of the Belgian defences.
- (c) The defence of Vesting Holland (or Fortress Holland) was the last stage in the plan. Vesting Holland could be made into a virtual island after inundation had been carried out. This area could be strongly defended

THE INVASION OF THE NETHERLANDS

SCALE 1" = 32 MILES (APPROX.)



owing to its restricted length of frontier. It contained the four important cities of Amsterdam, Utrecht, The Hague and Rotterdam.

The first two defence lines were not planned for prolonged resistance. Vesting Holland was the area which the Dutch Government hoped to hold on their own before the intervention of the Allies. If on the other hand, they could get early help from the Allied armies in Belgium, they could possibly hold the second line of defence as the main one. This was the main reason for Giraud's 7th Army being employed in southern Netherlands.

The French of course realised that the collapse of the Dutch second line would give Zeeland to the Germans; and that German possession of Zeeland would virtually become an outflanking move against the French Channel ports. It was therefore decided to send Giraud's army not only to help the Belgian north sector but sufficiently into Holland to help the Netherlands Army hold the second line of defence in North Brabant.

The German General Staff decided to invade Holland with Kuchler's 18th Army, using Reichenau's 6th Army against the Limburg salient as a containing move against both the Franco-Belgian and the Dutch theatres. Kuchler's plans were centred around three attacking columns:—

- (a) In the north, one column advanced across the northern provinces of Groningen and Friesland in a south-westerly sweep, with the object of attacking the fortified area of Vesting Holland across the Zuider Zee.
- (b) In the centre, a strong column attacked along the line Arnhem-Rhenen, with the object of capturing Utrecht on the borders of Vesting Holland.
- (c) In the south, the third and strongest column advanced across the Peel Marshes to Tilburg and Breda, with the object of turning the southern flank of the Vesting Holland defence line. It is probable that the Germans, who had known of Giraud's projected move into Holland, intended this column to be a counter-measure against any disturbances on the southern flank.

The total German forces to be used in Holland were about 30 divisions, with approximately the same number held in reserve.

The invasion began with the three columns striking westwards simultaneously on 10th May. To counteract the effectiveness of the Dutch inundations which would isolate Vesting Holland, the Germans employed a large number of air-borne troops to attack the fortified area. Numerous flights of Dornier flying-boats, carrying heavily armed and equipped men, alighted on the rivers in Vesting Holland, particularly in the area of Rotterdam. After preliminary air bombardments parachute troops were dropped on all the important aerodromes. Many of the paratroopers wore Dutch and British uniforms. Parachutists in civilian costume were also dropped on road-junctions, important highways and centres of telephonic and telegraphic communications. Their orders were to disrupt communications wherever possible and create panic amongst the civilian population.

The attack on Rotterdam was most successful. At the Hague and several other places, Dutch garrison troops were able to repulse the air-borne attacks. In some places the Germans suffered heavy casualties, but on the whole they did fulfil their strategic purpose of containing large numbers of Dutch troops. It is estimated that the equivalent of some 2 or 3 divisions were engaged in fighting the German

air-borne invaders. With an army as small as the Netherlands the employment of such a large proportion entailed a serious shortage in the front areas.

In the meanwhile, the 3 enemy columns marching on the inner fortress of Vesting Holland were gradually drawing nearer. In the north the Germans were least successful. The Dutch forces withdrew across the Zuider Zee Dam. The Dutch Navy, helped by British and French torpedo boats, held up German attempts to cross the Zuider Zee in assault boats until the 13th.

In the centre, the Germans crossed the first line easily, but were held up for some time at the line of waterways in Central Holland. Their attack on Rhenen on the 12th was repulsed and held up until the evening of the 13th. This delay afforded the Netherlands troops time to withdraw into Vesting Holland.

It was the southern thrust which really won the land battle. Giraud's column had started the race to the Breda-Tilburg area via Antwerp. After much enemy interference on the way, they arrived at Tilburg on the evening of the 11th. Having arrived there, however, they realised that their forces were strung out on a long line parallel to the German advance in Holland and Belgium. At the same time, the unexpected German advance through the Ardennes Forest left them with no strategic advantage so far north. Also, by the time they got to the Tilburg area in strength, the French High Command realised that the attack could not be put in before the Germans reached Vesting Holland. It would take too long for the whole of the 7th Army to concentrate at the battle area. It was therefore decided to recall Giraud's forces, and the whole adventure turned out to be a fiasco.

The defeat of the Netherlands was now a foregone conclusion. Kuchler's leading armoured columns reached the Vesting Holland defensive line at Moerdijk on the 14th and were soon speeding towards Rotterdam. The four main cities in the area could have held out for a while longer, but the German bombing of Rotterdam was made an example of what would happen to the other cities if they did not surrender. The Dutch Commander-in-Chief surrendered on the 14th of May (though Zeeland was not occupied until the 19th). In exactly five days the Germans had crushed the Netherlands resistance.

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THE BREAK-THROUGH

On 15 May, Giraud was transferred to the southern sector to replace Corap in the command of the 19th Army. By the time he arrived the Namur-Sedan front had ceased to exist. The Germans had broken through the bulge, and except for small detachments holding out on the northern and southern extremes of the sector, the French were in full retreat.

The Germans were bringing up more and more reinforcements and exploiting their success with all the speed and numbers they could muster. The French now decided to call in their reserves, and the 6th Army was sent for from Lyons. It was soon realised that they were so far away that they would not be able to take part in the break-through battle. The next step therefore was to break up Giraud's former, and now useless, 7th Army. This army was now without a strategic role, and so three of its divisions were sent up to the 9th Army. Finally, the French began to draw upon their Maginot Line troops to reinforce the Allied resistance, though only 7 divisions were transferred when many more could have been spared.

Giraud's first step was to plan an armoured counter-attack against the German advance. He had counted upon the three light mechanised divisions already with him, and a fourth armoured division now being formed under de Gaulle, who had

been brought up from the Swiss frontier and raised to the rank of Major-General. As it turned out, defective French armoured policy made this attack an impossible feat.

The 3rd Armoured Division had been broken up into small packets and distributed under command of infantry formations. The 1st and 2nd Armoured Divisions were exhausted from previous engagements, and were also dispersed over a wide area. To reorganise them as complete fighting units would have taken more than 3 or 4 days. In fact the only division which could mount a counter-attack straightaway was de Gaulle's though it was far from being up to strength. And so it came about that de Gaulle's 4th Armoured Division was sent into the fight, not yet up to full tank strength, without sufficient artillery and infantry support, and with no aircraft for tactical co-operation.

De Gaulle's first counter-attack came on the 17th, when he attacked north-eastwards from the area of Laon. He met with a certain amount of success at first, but German fire-power again proved too effective for the French. On the 18th de Gaulle was forced back to the Laon area, which he held until the 19th morning. He tried a second counter-attack, but was again repulsed. That same night he was ordered to withdraw behind the Laon area, for his division was by now almost decimated in tank strength and in no position to fight any further battles.

Though strategically fruitless, de Gaulle's counter-attacks were the first example of brilliant and determined leadership on this part of the front; and they at least achieved this little, that they held up the Germans in the south for two days. In the north, the Germans had already reached the Oise on the 16th, and Giraud had actually passed orders as early as the 17th for a general withdrawal to the rivers Oise and Sambre. So in the larger picture, de Gaulle's counter-attacks were really a covering role for the withdrawal.

On the morning of the 18th, leading German columns reached the River Escout. The French withdrawal had by now turned into a rout. By the 19th morning most of the 9th Army had either surrendered or been destroyed. Small detachments had succeeded in crossing the Aisne in the south to join Touchon's 6th Army which was now in position there. Some had also escaped to Blanchard's 1st Army in the north. Giraud himself was captured by a small German patrol on the 18th. By the night of the 19th the Wehrmacht had complete control of all French and Belgian territory east of the Sambre-Escout-Oise Line.

On the 19th, Premier Reynaud had Gamelin replaced by Weygand as the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army. He had already replaced National Defence Minister Daladier by Marshal Petain.

In the Belgian sector the battle had not moved so fast after the withdrawal of the Belgian Army from the line of the Albert Canal to the Dyle Line. Blanchard's 1st Army was somewhat disorganised after its armoured counter-attacks, and was also harassed by several German attempts to break through at Gembloux; but the BEF had been relatively undisturbed ever since their arrival at the Dyle defences.

Although there was a comparative lull along this front, there was no unanimity of purpose among the High Command regarding their plans for this theatre. On the 14th Georges ordered that Blanchard, Gort and Michelle should hold fast on the Dyle Line. Gamelin, who had by now realised that the main German thrust was against Corap, suggested on the 18th that Blanchard should counter-attack von Kleist's right flank in order to help Corap out. Nothing of course came of these suggestions, for in the end it was not the Allied High Command but the immaturity of French strategic doctrine which decided their retreat in Belgium.

On the 15th Corap passed orders to his 9th Army to surrender the line of the Meuse. This move left Blanchard's southern flank exposed. The strategy of the "continuous line" demanded that should a gap occur, the whole line must be drawn back in order to maintain the essential continuity. There could be no question of the Allied armies in Belgium separating and fighting their own battle in their present areas in the north. They were forced to retreat. Thus it came about that Blanchard, Gort, and the Belgian Army were each in turn ordered to withdraw. The Germans took the line of the Dyle with little effort of their own.

Having caused this strategical retreat of the Allies in the north, the Germans now pressed home their advantage by concentrating as much against them as was available. Von Kuchler came down from Holland and struck on Michelle's left. Reichenau increased his pressure in the northern sector; and von Kluge hammered away in southern Belgium. The Allies were gradually forced to withdraw to their 3rd line in Belgium—the line of the Escaut. By the evening of the 18th the majority of their troops had reached this line. The German pressure had not been too severe, for their main strategic concentration was still against Corap. The northern Armies were therefore able to maintain their continuity of front on the Dyle—about 75 miles long, from the coast down to Atras in the south. In the southern sector, the story was vastly different.

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THE DRIVE TO THE CHANNEL

With the collapse of the French 9th Army, the Germans found that virtually no opposition was left between them and the Channel Ports. In the Meuse battle, and during the advance to the Sambre, the 9th Army had been able to put up some sort of fight. After the Sambre the Germans had it all their own way. Not a single battle of any consequence has been placed on record. The main reason for this was the haphazard manner in which both Corap and Giraud had used up their reserves. At each stage of the German advance, French reserves had been thrown in, always just a little too late and always in insufficient numbers. There had been no concentration of reserves at any stage. Had the 6th Army and Maginot troops, together with de Gaulle's armour, been employed in a concerted counter-attack after the Sambre crossing, the Germans would have faced a serious setback to their plans regarding the Channel Ports.

While de Gaulle was fighting his southern counter-attack on the 17th, advanced elements of the Germans, attacking the northern half of the 9th Army area, had already crossed the Oise. On the 18th their leading armoured columns had reached Amiens, and only halted when they found that they had outpaced their administrative system. They took Abbeville, on the mouth of the Somme River, almost without a fight on the 20th, thus completing the race to the coast in exactly 11 days from the outbreak of hostilities.

The Allied armies were now cut into two halves, and presented two new fronts to the enemy. In the south, the front was based on the rivers Aisne and Somme. Huntziger's 2nd Army held the line from the northern flank of the Maginot Line to the area of Attigny; from Attigny to the area Soissons-Laon it was covered by Touchon's 6th Army. When the German advance passed Soissons, Giraud's old 7th army was hurriedly reorganised under General Frere, and given the task of holding the line up to Peronne. When the Germans thrust even further forward and reached the coast, another new army had to be formed—the 10th, under General Attmayer—to continue the front down to the coast.

These new dispositions were made very hurriedly, and were not fully effective until about two or three days after the Germans had reached the coast. Had

the Germans so wanted, they could have struck south through this gap and crossed the Somme without much trouble. However, it was not their intention to strike south yet. They concentrated against the northern pocket.

In the north, it will be remembered that the Allied armies had occupied the line of the Escaut down to Arras. When the Germans broke through the 9th Army, the northern armies found themselves completely cut off from their southern half, and in want of a southern front. This was not an easy task. Unlike the southern half, the Armies in Belgium had no reserves to draw from. The 1st Army had had a bad knock, having borne the brunt of the attack in the Liege sector, and was not yet settled in. The Belgians were too far to the north, and unwilling to concede any more Belgian territory to the invaders. Under these circumstances, it was left to the BEF to find troops to hold the south.

The BEF had had a comparatively easy war so far. Gort, however, had got only seven divisions on the front line. The other three were territorial divisions, recently arrived, ill-trained, and with very little artillery or armour. So far they had been employed on lines of communication duties. In any case the major part of two of these divisions had been cut off and remained with the southern half—at the Abbeville-Peronne area. Gort therefore had only one division to use for this task, and instead of weakening the eastern front, he decided to cover the south with this one territorial division.

At this point, relations between the various commanders began to deteriorate. Even during the earlier part of the campaign, complete co-operation had never existed between Gort and the French commanders. There is no doubt that during certain important stages, decisions had been made without consulting the commander of the BEF. Now that he was shouldered with this new responsibility, thrust upon him against his own judgment, a definite rift occurred between him and both the Belgians and the French.

Gort had already been thinking of a possible evacuation of the BEF in order to save it from complete annihilation. He appreciated that the Germans, having achieved their object of dividing the Allied armies into two parts, would now set about concentrating against each in turn. He felt that the only way of continuing the struggle would be for the northern half to evacuate as many troops as possible.


He communicated his appreciation to the War Office on the 20th, but it was not well received there. On the 20th General Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, came over to France to convey the instructions of the British Cabinet himself. These instructions had been drawn up in consultation with Weygand, and required that Gort should attack south in an attempt to close the gap. It envisaged a massive thrust by the whole BEF. Gort argued in vain for a cancellation of these instructions. Weygand had won over Churchill and Ironside. What Gort eventually did succeed in doing was to cut down the proposal to an attack with two infantry divisions and an armoured reconnaissance brigade, reinforced by all the tanks available.

Gort put in his attack on the 21st attacking south from the area of Arras. In the initial stages the attackers met with a certain amount of success and were able to advance about 5-7 miles. Near Arras, however, they encountered strong infantry forces of the enemy and the fighting became very heavy. For two days the British troops fought hard, but were gradually thrown back. Eventually Gort had to withdraw his troops to prevent envelopment from his right flank, and the attack petered out.

SKETCH 4

THE ENCIRCLEMENT

SCALE 1 INCH = 50 MILES (APPROX.)



As it so happened, this attack was the only serious attempt to close the gap. It is therefore all the more remarkable that no attempt was made to co-ordinate this attack with an attack from the south. Actually, even as Gort's troops were being thrown back from Arras, Weygand was planning a second attack—this time a co-ordinated operation from north and south. It is one of the mysteries of this campaign that Weygand, who of course realised the strategic necessity of a joint effort from north and south, should have urged Gort to attack alone only two days before his own co-ordinated offensive, and that Churchill should have backed him.

The plan Weygand now produced entailed—

- (a) The withdrawal of the Belgians to the Yser.
- (b) An attack southwards in the direction of Cambrai by the BEF and the 1st French Army, co-ordinated by Blanchard, who had taken over command of the northern theatre after the death of Billotte in a motor accident.
- (c) An attack by the southern armies northwards from the area of Peronne, to join hands with the northern thrust.

The attack was supposed to go in on the 23rd.

Both Leopold and Gort opposed these plans. Leopold was reluctant to concede any more Belgian territory to the Germans. Gort thought that any further attacks from the north were impracticable, and that the main effort should come from the south. The northern attack could at best be a sortie. He also ruled that the earliest an attack could be put in from the north was the 26th.

In the meanwhile, the Germans thrust relentlessly forward on all sides. The pressure on the north increased, and in the south a drive up the coast towards Boulogne and Calais was making steady progress. Boulogne was isolated on the 23rd and fell on the 25th. Calais fell on the next day, after some of the fiercest town-fighting seen during this campaign.

Gort now started to pull back his BEF to the French frontier defences in the north. The split between him and Weygand was final. In order to counter the German threat on the last remaining Channel port, Dunkirk, Gort had to send at least two divisions back immediately. On the 24th von Reichenau put in a strong attack on the Belgian left flank at Courtrai, and forced a crossing over the Lys River. This threatened a breach between the Belgians and the BEF. Leopold had already made public announcements regarding his intention to surrender. Under the circumstances Gort had no alternative but to order a general retreat to Dunkirk.

The British Cabinet at last realised the threat to the safety of the BEF. On the 26th they finally confirmed Govt's move, and ordered the BEF to fall back on all the beaches and ports around Dunkirk with a view to evacuation.

On the night of the 27th, the Belgian Army surrendered to the Germans. The charge of treachery is often levelled against Leopold. But in all fairness it must be mentioned that Leopold had voiced his intention from as early as 21st May. His army had fought bravely, and given the Allies all the co-operation it could afford. Had it not been for their resistance at Courtrai, it is doubtful whether the BEF could have finally been evacuated from Dunkirk. Lastly, had the Belgians fallen back on Dunkirk with the other armies, the congestion on the beaches, and on the roads would have increased, and made embarkation much more difficult.

The fact that neither the British nor the French were informed in time, can be blamed on the general confusion. It has been proved beyond doubt that Leopold informed the French and British liaison officers at his headquarters hours before his final act of surrender. The possibility of such an act had been known to all for nearly a week.

Leopold himself refused to escape to the United Kingdom. He preferred to stay and surrender with his troops. His government escaped to England, and there declared that it would continue the struggle, thereby assuring that the rich resources of the Belgian Congo would be available for the Allied cause.

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THE EPIC OF DUNKIRK

During the later stages of the campaign, Dunkirk was the forward base from which the BEF was being supplied and maintained. With the surrender of the Belgians the position of Dunkirk became most vulnerable, for the Germans were given an excellent route to envelop the BEF from the north and attack Dunkirk. Gort, therefore, hurriedly threw out a defensive line to cover the front Ypres-Nieuport. The southern front still lay along the River Lys, curving round to meet the coast between Gravelines and Dunkirk. In this box-shaped area round Dunkirk, the French were now holding the southern and south-eastern tip, and the British the northern part.

The evacuation now began in earnest. While the troops on the frontier tried to hold off the Germans, the rest of the Armies began their march to the beaches. Arms and equipment were abandoned wherever convenient, and masses of battle-weary soldiers, ill-fed and ill-clothed, began to collect on the sandy beaches. German bombers were relentless. The troops on the beaches were not their only targets; the English Channel was now full of little boats of all shapes and sizes which had come over from England to evacuate the army. Earlier in the month, the British Admiralty had invited the owners of small craft to register their vessels voluntarily in case the country had need of them. The response to the invitation had fulfilled the highest expectations. When the need came and the call went out, over 700 craft—tugs, trawlers, pleasure boats, motor launches and fishing boats—manned by civilians, were pressed into service. It was this civilian navy that suffered the casualties and it was they who picked up individual soldiers from the beaches. The larger ships of the navy and the minesweepers did not suffer so greatly from aerial bombardments, and were at least able to hit back; but these small ships on their heroic missions were no match against aerial bombs and machine-gun attacks.

British courage stood the test. There was little panic on the beaches. Men lined up and waited for their turn; they waded out to the boats which picked them up; at every stage there were bombs bursting all around them. It seemed impossible that complete disaster could be avoided. But the evacuation did succeed, for the masses of helpless men who were such perfect targets for German aircraft did not lose their heads or their nerve. Between the 26th May and the 1st of June, over 200,000 British and about 130,000 Allied troops were evacuated.

Only one thing marred the heroic efforts of these last few days. The disagreement between the Allied leaders flared up afresh over the evacuation, and reached its most bitter stage. It will be remembered that Gort had been urging the British Cabinet to prepare for the evacuation as early as on 20th May. It was for this reason that so many craft had been made available when the crisis came. The French on the other hand had refused to consider the possibility of evacuation by sea. They had staked on being able to close the gap between the northern and southern areas, and only in the last two days were any arrangements made to send French ships to

help in the evacuation. They were also bearing the brunt of the fighting on the southern sector of the beach-head, and were acting as a covering party for the BEF. It was inevitable, therefore, that they should come off second best in the race for the beaches. It was the British who got away first whilst the French held off the Germans.

Up to the 31st only 15,000 French troops had been taken off the beaches, compared to some 150,000 British. Weygand and the other French Commanders protested strongly to the British Cabinet. In answer, Gort placed two ships of the Royal Navy at the disposal of the French. Fortunately on 1st June French ships began to appear in force, and the problem was eased.

The evacuation was completed on 4th June. On that date the Wehrmacht were in possession of the whole of France north of the Somme. It is true that they were partly foiled in their object of the annihilation of all the Allied armies in northern France; but they had captured the most important industrial areas in France, the Belgian Army had surrendered, and some 30 French divisions had been destroyed or captured.

On the 5th the Germans launched their new offensive.

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THE FALL OF FRANCE

Weygand now had about 35-40 divisions left to defend France against which the Germans could concentrate some 40 divisions in the area north of the Somme. Quite a large proportion of the French armies was still stationed on the Maginot Line.

The "Weygand Line", along the River Somme, had been breached by the Germans at certain points during their drive to the coast. Despite several counter-attacks—one notable armoured one led by de Gaulle—these bridge-heads had not been recaptured by the French. The Germans had clung on to them with a view to their eventual invasion of southern France, after the liquidation of the Belgian front.


Von Bock's armies now started the attack, advancing on three main axes. The most westerly one was a drive down the coastal strip, with armoured spearheads fanning out towards the important ports, such as Cherbourg and Brest. The object of this column was to prevent any reinforcements sent by Britain from reaching the French ports.

The main German attack on Paris started on 9th June, with an infantry assault across the Oise, east of the capital. The crossing was effected without much trouble, and armoured columns poured out from the bridgehead area towards Paris, followed by mechanised columns of infantry. Paris was declared an open city to escape bombardment, and was finally occupied by the Nazis on 14th June.

On the Maginot front, von Leeb kept up his pressure from the north, while the main German forces attacked it from the rear. This column had forced a crossing over the Aisne, opposite Reims, and swung left south of Nancy, in the general direction of Strasbourg. On the 16th, the enemy from the north breached a passage through the French fortifications, having forced a crossing of the Rhine at Colmar—some 50 miles south of Strasbourg near the Swiss frontier. When von Bock's troops joined hands with these northern invaders, the Maginot Line garrisons had at last been isolated from the rest of France.

In the centre, the Germans pursued the fleeing French divisions across the Loire. The rapid development of these attacks, together with the incessant bombard-

BLITZKRIEG IN FRANCE



ment of communications and important towns in the rear gave the French no opportunities to reorganise their forces. Everywhere there was chaos. So completely was France stunned by this disaster that no rear-guard actions were fought by regular troops after about 10th June. It was left to civilian guerillas, the French underground of the future, to harass the Nazi conquerors.

It was at this stage that Mussolini struck his cowardly blow in the hopes of sharing in the spoils of victory. Wrapped in his cloak of "non-belligerency", he had avoided all friction with the French Government until he was certain that there could be no chances of a military defeat at the hands of the French Army. Even when the German drive to the coast had been completed, and the Allied Armies cornered in Belgium, Mussolini was not tempted. He preferred to wait until the very point of collapse, before he struck with the "hand that held the dagger, into the back of his neighbour".

With her Allies out of the war, her own armies routed on the field, and a treacherous attack from the back, France at last surrendered. On 21st June, 1940, in a railway carriage at Compiègne, where Marshal Foch had granted Germany an armistice in 1918, Hitler finally had his revenge.

COMMENTS

True to the teachings of Clausewitz, the German General Staff planned the strategy of this campaign with a military and not a geographical object. As in Poland, the main object of the Wehrmacht was the annihilation of the Allied armed forces, not the capture of any capital city or vital territory. After the break-through of the Ardennes the Germans were faced with three alternatives—an encirclement of the much flaunted Maginot Line, the capture of Paris, or the destruction of the Allied forces in Belgium. Either of the first two courses would probably have been more spectacular; a successful drive on Paris would certainly have been a great political victory. Either course however would have prolonged the war indefinitely. German strategy did not falter—they concentrated on the annihilation of the enemy first. It is to their adherence to this main object that the Nazis owed their remarkable victory in the summer of 1940.

To achieve this object, their plans were based upon three main principles—surprise, mobility and concentration. They gained surprise not only by a breach of international law—attacking the Belgians without a declaration of war—but also by attacking from the one direction from which the French had felt reasonably secure. The easy success of the Germans in the Ardennes Forest tends to give the impression that it was not such difficult country for an invader after all. Such is not the case. The Ardennes was undoubtedly a formidable obstacle; the primitive state of its paths and trails, through dense forests and narrow defiles, offered a by no means easy passage to armoured and mechanised columns. It was the thoroughness of German preparation and training and their determination to effect surprise, which gave them their success.

By their containing moves against the armies in the northern sector, they maintained this surprise for as long as possible. When at last their main point of break-through had been disclosed, they depended on mobility to continue the advantage gained by surprise. They struck so fast, often exposing their lines of communications to grave danger, that they gave the enemy no opportunity to recover from the first blow and effect counter measures.

Mobility was also essential if the failures of the last war were not to be repeated. Once the enemy front had been breached, they ought not be allowed to localise the

attack by bogging down the infantry. The break out must be led by armour. Thus, the exploitation in the 9th Army area after the Meuse crossings was carried out so swiftly that the armoured spearhead of penetration was always one stage ahead of any counter-attacks by enemy reserves.

When von Kleist was faced with the choice of three crossings at the Meuse, it was again a consideration of mobility that made him choose Sedan. The crossing at Sedan was tactically the most difficult, for it entailed two crossings—the main river and the Ardennes Canal. But the network of roads from Sedan to the west would give him strategic mobility. Von Kleist decided on Sedan and again his gamble proved successful, for the French had not expected this move, and had left two bridges intact over the Ardennes Canal.

The purpose of concentration is to divide the enemy's forces and defeat each part in detail. Even though the strength of the Wehrmacht was far superior to the Allied armies both in numbers and equipment, in order to ensure a swift and decisive victory the Germans planned to divide the enemy armies in two. With this intention, they struck west to the Channel Coast instead of turning south towards the Maginot Line or towards Paris and Central France. The death-blow to the forces in Belgium was dealt before the gap dividing the two halves could be closed. The whole might of the German forces in Holland and Belgium then turned south to liquidate France.

The division of the Allied armies into two parts is a good example of a strategic ambush in the offensive. The Germans had known that French military leaders had forecast an invasion from the northern sector. In order to support this misappreciation, the Germans kept up the pressure in the Liege area even though it meant the commitment of a large number of troops which could have been employed at the decisive front further south. This was planned as a trap; for, when the attack came, all the northern armies of the Allies were fully committed and their reserves thrown into the battle. When the collapse of the 9th Army eventually gave the Germans their expected break-through, no French reserves from the northern sector could be released to stem the Germans. It was not until a week later that the French could stage even a feeble counter-attack as an attempt to close the gap.

The only criticism of German high strategy is levelled at its failure to appreciate the weakness of Britain after Dunkirk. Whether this criticism is justified or not will be a debatable subject amongst historians for many generations.

After the liquidation of the Allied forces in Belgium, the Germans had only a fraction of the mechanised element of the French Army to oppose them in the south. They had wiped out 6 Allied armies, broken up the effectiveness of the Dutch-Belgian-British coalition, and sent the BEF scurrying back across the Channel with virtually no military equipment with which to continue the fight. In Britain itself there were not more than fifty obsolete tanks and about two hundred guns, most of them relics from the First World War. The local Defence Volunteers, the forerunners of the Home Guard, were mostly armed with clubs and spades. With such advantages, it is incomprehensible why Hitler did not invade Britain in June, 1940.

The reason often put forward, that the campaign in France was too swift for a change of plan, cannot be accepted, for the German High Command were quite capable of dealing successfully with such a situation. Elasticity in planning is a part of military strategy and the Germans have repeatedly proved themselves masters at it. Perhaps the main reason was the racial hatred of the Germans for the French and the fear that France may again effect a miraculous recovery, as in the last war

after the initial German offensive. Whatever the reason, there is little doubt amongst many Allied strategists that this was the greatest mistake which Hitler made in the last war. Had he first subdued Britain, even Russia might have fallen an eventual prey to the might of the Wehrmacht.

As explained earlier in the chapter, the French appreciation of German plans and courses of action was unsound because it was based on certain erroneous assumptions. As a result of this appreciation, the final Allied plan was rigid, and over-committed in manpower. It tried to anticipate German intentions and moves. When the Germans attacked, and attacked contrary to Allied appreciations, Allied planning was found too inelastic to stand the test. It is not the intention here to imply that the Allied forces could have prevented defeat, but there is no doubt that better planning could have averted the disaster which followed.

Besides the planning, several points of strategy were either overlooked or ignored which further weakened the Allied position. In Poland and Norway, the Germans had brought about the collapse of individual armies by a series of enveloping moves aimed at cutting the enemy's lines of communication. These enveloping and double enveloping moves were one of Hitler's favourite stratagems; but the French High Command had not learnt the lesson from Poland or Norway. They were content to leave their lines of communication insecure without taking adequate measures for their protection.

The lines of communication of the Allied forces along the Belgian sector lay oblique to the front line. The communications of the more northern armies—the Belgian Army, the BEF and the 1st Army—were almost parallel to the expected German line of advance. Furthermore the convex shape of the front caused by the hinge between the 9th and 2nd Armies had given the Germans the advantage of interior lines geographically. The threat to the Allied lines of communication was therefore very serious.

Under these circumstances, counter-measures should have been taken to minimise the threat. Reserves should have been detailed for this role, and lateral communications along the sector improved, so that the German advantage of interior lines would have been neutralised. As has been seen, no such steps were taken. The reserves were inadequate and situated too far away to counter any immediate threat. The lateral communications were not sufficiently improved to enable the Allies to concentrate from one point of their front to another. French strategy did not stand up to the Germans whether in planning or in execution.



The French plan did not balance the conflicting demands of the two principles—security and economy of force. In order to ensure the safety of her eastern frontier, a certain proportion of the French Army had necessarily to be posted away from the main theatre. The distribution should have been made so that the minimum number of troops were so detailed, as to allow a sufficient concentration in the Belgian sector. In actual fact, over 60 per cent of available forces were immobilised on the eastern frontier. General Pretelat's Second Army Group, firmly established behind the Maginot Line, were given 26 divisions, and General Besson's Third Army Group facing the Swiss Frontier, 36 divisions. Only 40 divisions were detailed for General Billotte's First Army Group, which was expected to fight the crucial battles in Belgium.

The French "active" divisions, which were the best trained and equipped, were distributed in the same proportion. Billotte had 11, Pretelat 9, and 11 were earmarked as reserve, though stationed nearer the south than the north.

The handling of reserves was deplorable. They were grouped in little clusters, spread out over the whole of Northern and Central France. Once the

GENERAL MAP OF FRANCE AND BELGIUM

SCALE: 1 INCH = 23 MILES



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Germans had forced a break-through, it was almost impossible to collect in any one area sufficient reserves to close the breach in time. The doctrine of the "continuous front" demanded that the reserves or second line, which were to plug the holes in the front line, be also spread out in uniform density from the north coast to the Swiss frontier. With such doctrines governing military dispositions, no such thing as a "mobile, central reserve" could exist.

No commentary on Allied strategy would be complete without a mention of the curious defensive-offensive role of Giraud's 7th Army. Its wide sweep across Northern France to Holland was to commence after the German invasion had started. It was then to proceed to the Breda area, always supposing that the Dutch Army had been able to hold the Germans at that line. After having successfully dealt with the Germans in that area, it was then expected to turn south and menace the right flank of the Germans attacking in Belgium, who it was presumed would be held up by the Allies at the Dyle Line. The whole scheme was very carelessly thought out. Its success depended on a collection of "ifs" and as it turned out the whole operation ended in a fiasco.

In tactical doctrine, the Allied Armies were bankrupt. Tactics are the changeable element in warfare. The Germans had developed new tactics from their experiments with new weapons—tanks, fighter-aircraft, dive-bombers, anti-tank artillery, motorised infantry, and so forth.

As far as the Allies were concerned, little change had taken place in tactical theory. The employment of tanks and aircraft was based on the same doctrines as those evolved from the experiences of the First World War. The "continuous front" theory, the penny-packet employment of tanks in support of small infantry units, the lack of air co-operation and the lack of mobile infantry were the main drawbacks of Allied tactics. Even the Polish Campaign had failed to bring home these lessons. At every step the gallantry of Allied soldiers failed to compete with the superior tactics of the Germans. It was not until the campaign was nearly over that any attempts were made to review the tactical policy of the French Army. After the collapse of the Weygand Line, a succession of training notes were issued inculcating the concepts of the area defence system and the use of massed tanks in battle. But by then, it was too late.

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WRITING HISTORY

"MOUSE"

"Mais l'homme, est de préférence l'historien, est plein de vanité; il faut qu'il fasse une belle part à son imagination; il faut qu'il intéresse les lecteurs, même au préjudice de la vérité."

—Napoleon

IN 1946 when my battalion honoured me by an invitation to write the complete history of its activities since its raising in 1844, I accepted the job with enthusiasm. In my innocence I had visions of myself sitting at a well-upholstered desk surrounded by appropriate maps, with a stream-lined filing cabinet alongside containing all the data in accessible, documented form. Then all I had to do was to apportion certain fixed hours daily for my historical research, buy a pair of becoming horn-rimmed spectacles and one of those ball-tipped pens which write by instinct—and the job was in the bag.

In the immortal words of Dudley Davenport, R.A.F. "I was a fool." Sitting in the middle of an Irish bog, interrupted incessantly by the clamant exigencies of the farm flora and fauna, separated by one hundred and eighty-six miles from the nearest reference library, is a pitiful location for an amateur historian. I should of course have realised from previous editorial experience that the writing of any history is sheer hard work—much more grinding, compulsive and relentless, than any fiction. History is the record of facts, strung together in a readable form. Far too many regimental histories, however, are merely factual, a long procession of dates, names, campaigns, casualties and appendices, of interest only to the regimental officer and then only for some vivid episode which lightens up the dull pages at far too infrequent intervals. In the pride of my imagination I thought I could improve on this class of stuff.

When I had collected all the available material, I read it over a few times, pondered it, slept on and over it, and made notes for further desirable information. I wrote many letters to regimental officers, past and present, and followed most of these up with reminders. By the time 10 per cent of my correspondents had replied to my queries the original reasons for their urgency had been forgotten. Meanwhile I was dissatisfied with the proposed title: "THE HISTORY OF THE 9th HALLELUJAH N.I. (late 19th HALLELUJAH MARINE BN. later 219th HALLELUJAH RIFLES, now 9th BN. (P.T.O.) HALLELUJAH INFANTRY)." Nobody, except a devout Hallelujahan, was going to read a book with such a title. I discovered a solution. In one of the manuscripts an eminent General had described the battalion's behaviour in a small expedition in these words: "The 9th Hallelujahs have served throughout the campaign with a fortitude and a gallantry as conspicuous as their previous reputation had led me to expect. Although I must state that in its private character this regiment, from Colonel to drummer boy, are a lot of *pukka budmashes*, in its public profession of arms it is without peer in the East India Company."

I immediately wrote to the Colonel of the Regiment that the title of my history should be "PUKKA BUDMASHES", which I thought original and arresting. The Colonel demurred at this Kiplingesque caption. Quite sensibly he pointed out that such an opprobrious title was not truthful as a general description, and therefore from a historical point of view wrong. He furthermore pointed out that the eminent General had used the expression to express his disapproval of the alleged theft of a

case of alleged brandy from his tent during an alleged battle. The Mess Havildar (a resourceful Sikh) had been implicated in the subsequent investigation but nothing had been proved, beyond the recovery of a few alleged empty bottles from the Officers' Mess. The Colonel suggested "WITHOUT PEER" as a more suitable title, and this was eventually adopted.

The point of this anecdote is to emphasise what I consider is a most important factor in writing a regimental history; that is to have a central theme, the string on which all your facts, like pearls, are strung. With a title like "Without Peer" as a constant factor the historian can construct a continuous narrative, a harmonious entity, all written in the same key with this main *motif* as his guide and inspiration. When the records are examined it will be found that most units of a hundred years' age have some dominating characteristic; it may be their motto, e.g., "Semper Fidelis", or "Hamesha Hamla"; their role as irregular light infantry or lancers or grenadiers; or it may be their marksmanship or scouting ability. When the historian has marked down this fibrous trend, he can hang his hat on it and get down to work.

But this simple rule must not be taken too literally. During these hundred years there are certain to be episodes not running true to form which would need to be twisted, or indeed suppressed, if the pattern is to be preserved in all its purity. The good historian will not be tempted to distort or suppress truth. To paint only the highlights of a regiment's story is not only bad history, it is bad art. Without shadows the bright colours cannot be seen in their true perspective. Cromwell insisted on having his warts depicted. They were ugly little blemishes, but their inclusion made his portrait alive and characteristic of his integrity.

For whom is a regimental history written? First of all, I think, for the present and future officers and men of that regiment, secondly for those who have served in that regiment, and lastly for the general public. Tradition is probably the most powerful influence in maintaining a unit's morale in peace and war, under good or bad officers, in calm or stormy weather. No regiment in the Indian or Pakistan Armies, which has survived the Mutiny and the two World Wars with its Colours intact, can be anything but a fine unit—with a glorious record to inspire it, to sustain it in adversity and to share glory in fresh achievement. When one reads the past pages of one's own regiment one may feel sorrowful that one's own part was so small, but, at the same time, there is a glow of quiet happiness that one was privileged to serve in such proud company.

For the earlier chapters of my work I was indebted to Sir Patrick Cadell, the distinguished historian of the Bombay Army, whose notes and manuscripts, completed in 1938, were made available. Having served with the battalion from 1918 I was in touch with many officers with pre-1914 experience, most of whom helped with useful notes and suggestions.

It was the 1939-1946 years which gave me most trouble. The War Diaries for two years had been lost at Mersa Matruh, and although the Commanding Officer with commendable foresight, had a short history printed in Cairo to cover these years, many essential details were not readily available. From El Alamein onwards the War Diaries were intact, but these were of necessity very laconic statements requiring much enlargement and elucidation. I collected valuable material from the "Tiger" series of the Indian Divisions and from some contemporary war correspondents' reports. Unfortunately when I was writing about this period of the war the relevant War Despatches had not been published, and consequently for the strategic background of the Desert and Greek Campaigns particularly I had to rely on superficial knowledge. For the historian a little knowledge is most dangerous, but I confess that I was encouraged in my superficiality by a classical historian's remarks

on this subject: "Some men," Macaulay said at the opening of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution in 1848, "are haunted, as it seems to me, with an unreasonable fear of what they call superficial knowledge. Knowledge, they say, which really deserves the name, is a great blessing to mankind, the ally of virtue, the harbinger of freedom. But such knowledge must be profound. . . . I must confess that the danger which alarms these gentlemen never seemed to me very serious; and my reason is this: that I never could prevail on any person who pronounced superficial knowledge a curse, and profound knowledge a blessing, to tell me what was the standard of profundity. The argument proceeds on the supposition that there is some line between profound and superficial knowledge similar to that which separates truth from falsehood. I know of no such line. . . . if we compare the little truths we know with the infinite mass of truth that we do not know, we are all shallow together. . . ."

Judging by Macaulay's history of Warren Hastings I doubt if he is a sure guide for any historian, but I admit that these words comforted me when I plunged into the confused history of the Middle East battles in which my battalion played a small part. Similarly the story of the Liberation of Greece was a tangled web on which only superficial comment can still be made. In all this portion of the history I found it almost impossible to draw the line between profundity, based on hope and faith, and superficiality, based on charity. It was always a relief to resume the day to day activities of the battalion.

Another bugbear for the historian is the introduction of light relief. There is always the temptation to aerate the quiet ink with a bubble of humour, generally with some quite irrelevant anecdote of what old Buggins said to the General when inspecting the cook-house in 1867. I committed this error, but on re-reading the draft I found to my dismay that these carefully worded jokes threw the book out of proportion and, what was worse, were not funny. I thereupon made myself a rule that I would not mention any personality whomsoever unless his personal appearance had a direct bearing on the narrative. Believing implicitly in the old aphorism—"There is no such thing as a bad regiment: there are only bad colonels"—I took pains to sketch the character of Commanding Officers whom I knew personally, or of whom I obtained authentic information. I discovered a curious fact; the good and efficient C.Os had, consciously or otherwise, modelled themselves on a commandant who had been C.O. from about 1860 to 1880, and whose name still lives. That, of course, is the value of tradition. The bad C. Os have disappeared into that limbo of Valhalla reserved for all stupid soldiers.

The indefinable quality, called style, also gave me considerable anguish. I read several good regimental histories and other recommended essays in an attempt to capture style,—Harold Nicolson was my goal,—but I soon realised that my pen (the ball-tipped horror) was an unworthy instrument. Even the suggestion of that garrulous chronicler, Mr. Aloysius Horn,—“Present the truth with all the airs and graces of fiction, and let your fiction wear a semblance of solid truth. In two words—style.”—was useless. In the end I tried to follow Napoleon's advice to historians “*de narrer simplement et de marcher toujours avec les faits des mains*” (to relate simply and to march onwards with the facts in their possession). Nevertheless in revision I found my draft repetitive, inclined to be tedious, and often ungrammatical; by too close application and too frequent revision my literary appreciation and self-criticism becoming blurred and careless.

The final blow came recently when I was in London making contact with the Historical Section of the Commonwealth Relations Office. I interviewed a man sentenced for life to the history of one of the major campaigns of the war. He had read some of my more light-hearted contributions to this Journal and obviously

and sorrowfully considered me no fit person to undertake such a momentous work as a history. "You're the last person," he said to me candidly, "who should be entrusted with such important writing. After all, you've only written comic journalism in India." I blinked back the tears of shame. He finished severely: "For God's sake don't write any of your mouse-work in the history, or you'll ruin it."

I slunk out of his office with an awful feeling that my history does include—and Heaven knows how desperately I fought the temptation!—some, just a little, "mouse-work".

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council of the Institution has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1949 :—

"In time of peace the task of a Unit Commander of any Armed Force to lead, train, keep up morale and command his unit is more difficult than in time of war, when there is usually a clear object before him and his men. What are the qualities required of a successful Unit Commander and how can we best ensure that our officers are trained in leadership in order that they may become both good commanders and good leaders?"

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers. They should be type-written (double spacing), submitted in triplicate and be received by the Secretary, The United Services Institution of India and Pakistan, The Mall, Simla, on or before 30th June, 1949.

Entries will be strictly anonymous. Each essay must have a motto at the top, instead of the author's name, and must be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto outside, and with the name and address of the competitor inside.

Essays should not exceed fifteen pages (approximately 8,000 words) of the size and style of the Journal, and should not be less than 4,000 words. Should any authority be quoted in the essay, the title of the work referred to should be given.

Three judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs 500 either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1949 issue of the U.S.I. Journal.

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RELIEF SUPPLIES TO PRISONERS OF WAR IN WORLD WAR II

COLONEL B. M. RAO, I.A.M.C.

THE Geneva Convention authorises prisoners of war to receive individual and collective parcels containing foodstuffs, clothing, toilet articles and material for their intellectual, recreational and religious welfare. In practice the International Red Cross Committee with Headquarters at Geneva acts as the agent for the transport and distribution of such relief.

These relief parcels are donated by Governments, National Red Cross Societies and private individuals for the benefit of their nationals or relatives, who are prisoners of war, and the Committee collects, ships, transports and delivers them to the prisoners for whom they are intended. The parcels are actually handed over to the spokesmen of the prisoners of war camps, whose receipts are then transmitted to the donors. Only then is the transaction complete. The camp spokesmen hand over the individual relief parcels to the persons concerned, and distribute the collective relief parcels equitably among all the inmates of the camps.

The magnitude of the task can be gauged by the following facts and figures:—

During the last war, the Committee despatched 430,731,743 kilos of such relief parcels making 43,309 railway wagon loads. The peak year was 1943, when 123,659,844 kilos were despatched. Due to the enormous shipping losses, and the fact that these relief consignments had to be carried across many thousands of miles of sea, the Allies were unable to provide the shipping space. The International Red Cross Committee therefore had to organise its own shipping fleet, under the aegis of the Swiss Government and flying the Red Cross Flag to ensure immunity from sea and air attacks.

The next difficulty was the supply of railway wagons and trucks. After surmounting many obstacles, the committee was able to obtain 275 wagons and 400 motor trucks from Allied Governments to carry these consignments from ports to warehouses and from warehouses to prisoners of war camps.

Ninety-eight per cent of these relief parcels were meant for Allied prisoners of war in German and Italian internment camps, where food and clothing were scarce. Their need was therefore much greater than that of Axis prisoners of war in Allied hands who were comparatively well off. Till the war was practically over, the Japanese did not permit the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee to supervise the distribution of these relief parcels to Allied prisoners in their hands.

At the beginning of the war, the War Organisation of the British Red Cross and Order of St. John of Jerusalem decided to send all prisoners of war of the British Empire a standard ration of one food parcel per man per week, as well as collective relief parcels of medicines, surgical dressings, invalid diet food parcels, uniforms, underwear, toilet articles, games and books in quantities specified by the prisoners' representatives. It was also decided that prisoners of war should receive parcels preferably sent from their own countries, and that they should receive supplies from other parts of the Empire only if the former were momentarily lacking due to transport difficulties. This decision was particularly important for the Indian prisoners of war who thus received parcels specially prepared to satisfy their tastes and habits and the prescriptions of their religion.

Indian prisoners of war in Germany were concentrated chiefly in the following camps:—

Stalag III A, IV DZ, IV VC, VIII B, XII A, XII A & B, XVIII C & B, (Merchant seamen), also in Oflag 54, VI B and VII D (Officers). In Italy the situation was more confused. Numerous Indian prisoners were in Sulmona, Razzanello, Villa Olivet, Camps 63 and 91.

In 1941 the Government of India decided to send 1,000 parcels per week for Indian prisoners of war, but the scheme had to be abandoned in 1942 because of transport difficulties. The Indian Comfort Fund in London came into being later, and organised the packing of 2,000 parcels per week and helped the British Red Cross to deliver a sufficient number of Indian parcels. Humanitarian associations in Egypt decided to provide special gifts for Muslim prisoners of war during Muslim feasts.

Camp leaders had drawn the attention of the International Red Cross Committee to the necessity of Indian prisoners of war receiving special gifts for their religious feasts, just as the European prisoners of war did for Christmas and Easter. The fulfilment of all wishes concerning the celebration of religious feasts remained a very difficult problem because of the growing transport complications on the one hand and the dissemination of Indian prisoners of war on the other.

The contents of an Indian food parcel were:—

1 tin	8 oz. Biscuits, Service Ration.
1 pkt	4 oz. Chocolate.
1 tin	16 oz. Fish
1 tin	8 oz. Tinned Fruit.
1 tin	8 oz. Butter.
1 tin	14 oz. Condensed Milk.
2 bars	4 oz. Sugar.
1 pkt	2 oz. Tea.
1 pkt	2 oz. Salt.
1 tin	1½ oz. Dried Eggs.
1 tin	16 oz. Atta.
1 tin	2 oz. Curry Powder.
1 pkt	16 oz. Dal.
1 pkt	16 oz. Rice.
1 tab	2 oz. Soap.
Weight 4.630 kg.

The contents of an Indian Comfort Parcel were:—

1 Towel	1 Hair Brush
1 Shirt	1 Pencil
1 Pullover	1 Comb
1 Scarf	1 Spool of Thread
1 Balaclava Helmet	4 Razor Blades
1 Pair of Slippers	4 Buttons
1 Pair of Gloves	2 Handkerchiefs
1 Vest	2 Rolls Darning Wool
1 Pair of Drawers	6 Tablets Chewing Gum
2 Pairs of Socks	2 Cakes Soap
2 Shaving Sticks	1 Packet Needles.
1 Tin Tooth Powder	1 Tooth Brush

In addition to these, Indian cigarette parcels, Indian medical parcels and Indian clothing parcels were regularly supplied on demand.

The Canadian pattern food parcels apparently contained more and were therefore in great demand by Indian prisoners of war. They made repeated representations to the International Red Cross Committee delegates to instruct the Indian Comforts Fund that 10 per cent of the food parcels should be of the Canadian pattern.

One great difficulty the Indian prisoners of war experienced was the shortage of fuel to cook chapaties, rice and dal, particularly in Germany. The ration of fuel was just sufficient to cook the rations supplied by the Government. One camp Commander in Germany reported to the International Red Cross Committee delegate that Indian prisoners of war under his charge, often used up straw from their palliases to cook chapaties and later complained that their beds were too cold to sleep in!

A great cause of discontent amongst Sikh prisoners of war was that they being non-smokers, were not issued with cigarettes like the rest. They complained to the International Red Cross Committee delegates repeatedly that they too should be supplied with cigarettes. It took a long time for the delegates to realise that a packet of cigarettes could be easily exchanged for a chicken or a dozen eggs. The dispute had not ended when the war in Europe came to a close and the prisoners of war were repatriated.

I am indebted to Dr. Otto Wenger, International Red Cross Committee delegate at Simla till recently, for the information contained in this article.

MEDICAL HISTORIANS' CONFERENCE IN OXFORD

LIEUT.-COLONEL B.L. RAINA, I.A.M.C.

THE conference of the Official Medical Historians which met at Oxford on 3rd August and concluded its proceedings on 7th August, 1948 marked an important milestone in the march towards mutual co-operation and progress in the production of the various official Medical Histories of the War.

INDIA AND THE INDIAN ARMY

The Second World War presented problems unprecedented in history. India and her Armed Forces of over two million soldiers played a vital part in defeating the forces of aggression. The Indian Army suffered from 3rd September, 1939 to 31st August, 1946, a total of 179,896 casualties including 29,491 killed and 62,234 wounded. India's strategic position provided the spring-board for the liberation of Burma and South East Asia. She became the supply line to China and the principal base of operations to strike at the co-prosperity sphere of the Axis partner in the East. She supplied essential goods and services to the United States of America, Russia, the United Kingdom, Aden, Egypt, Iraq, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Palestine, the Seychelles, Algeria and China. Her Armed Forces fought in Burma, South East Asia, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Tunisia, Sudan, Eritrea, Abyssinia, Somaliland, Sicily, Italy, Greece, the Dodecanese and France. Their courage and fighting equalities, their endurance and determination won the admiration of their allied comrades in every theatre of the War. Their gallantry and devotion to duty brought them 31 Victoria Crosses besides thousands of other decorations.

The War affected not only the Armed Forces in the field but also the civilian population. In 1942 about 500,000 refugees from Burma started on their trek to India for shelter and safety, through jungles, sand, swamps, mountains and rivers, under appalling conditions. During the War years famine overwhelmed Bengal and the Armed Forces were rushed to save thousands of lives from starvation, pestilence and disease.

THE MEDICAL SERVICES

The spectacular success of the Armed Forces depended in no small measure on its medical services. Manpower, its health and morale are vital factors in War. An efficient medical service reduces the wastage of manpower from wound and disease, and the very conviction of the soldier that he will be immediately picked up and well looked after if wounded, keeps the morale at a high pitch. Defeat or victory depends a great deal on the standard of the medical services. The extent of the country, the distances involved in the chain of evacuation by road, river and railway, the terrain, climate and epidemiology in the Eastern theatre of the War presented almost insuperable medical problems. It may be recalled that our troops had to fight mosquitoes, mud and monsoon, before defeating the Japanese. Enemy No. 1 was not the Japanese soldier but the mosquito. The medical services, however, succeeded in their task by evolving a comprehensive organisation and administrative machinery and by carrying on intensive research. Rapid advances were made in medicine, surgery, nutrition and public health. The medical services were continuously organised and expanded to meet the changing conditions.

THE OFFICIAL MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE WAR

It is essential that these historic events and valuable experiences should be recorded in considerable detail to serve as a guide for the future.

Thousands of reports and documents from various formations and individuals who served in the War, and hundreds of films and photographs taken under actual field conditions have accumulated at the Combined Inter-Services Historical Section at Simla. Two officers with clerical staff are now busy sorting medical facts from this mass of material. Four additional narrators are being posted shortly. It is proposed to produce progressively a series of volumes on the following subjects: (i) Administration and organisation of the Medical Services during the War 1939-45; (ii) Medical aspect of campaigns covering all troops in the Eastern Theatre, and Indian Troops only in the other theatres of War; (iii) Hygiene of the War, including malaria and nutrition; (iv) Surgery in the Eastern Theatre; (v) Pathology and Research; (vi) Civilian Health and Medical Services; (vii) Medical Services in the R.I.N. and R.I.A.F.; (ix) Ancillary Medical Services such as the Disabled Soldiers' Home, Indian Red Cross, International Red Cross, etc.; (x) Casualties and Medical Statistics; and (xi) Clinical. It is also proposed to publish a Popular Medical History and a pictorial brochure. The final Medical History, when completed, will not only be a story of the achievements of the Medical Services, but will include a free and frank record of mistakes and limited successes, with an analysis of the factors involved, so that future medical planners, organisers and clinicians may have the complete story and may not repeat the mistakes made in the past. For, after all history is intended to be a *vade-mecum* of past knowledge and a guide for the present and the future. When preparing clinical material it becomes necessary to take opinions of experts and to consider the subject matter over a certain period of time; explaining the position at the beginning of the period, subsequent development and the final position. The main lines of policy have to be indicated and success achieved and difficulties encountered have to be recorded. The preparation of such a Medical History is an ambitious undertaking. The duties of collators are arduous and time-consuming, for the work involves research into numerous documents and piecing together fragments of information from various sources and prolonged correspondence with experts who have specialist knowledge on the subject. It is gratifying that many specialists in India and abroad and the Medical Historians of the U.S.A., the U.K. and the Dominions are co-operating in this undertaking. It is anticipated that the final drafts of some of the volumes of the Medical History will be completed by 1949.

The Medical Services of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth had worked closely together during the War. They are all preparing their own Medical Histories. In the British Historical Section alone the following staff is busy preparing the Medical History:—

- (a) Central Office: Editor-in-chief with three editors, secretary, senior assistants and typists.
- (b) War Office: Editor with one narrator, one research worker, clerks and typists.
- (c) Navy: Editor with one assistant editor, research worker, clerks and typists.
- (d) R.A.F.: Editor with one assistant editor, one research assistant and typists.
- (e) Clinical: Two editors with some 200 (voluntary contributors) clinicians and consultants.

The work in the British History Section started seven years ago. It is estimated that it will not be completed before another five years.

OFFICIAL MEDICAL HISTORIANS' LIAISON COMMITTEE

It was felt that there should be the closest possible liaison between the Medical Historical Sections of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. A Liaison Committee was formed in 1946. The first meeting of the Committee was held in Ottawa in 1947 and the second meeting at Oxford in 1948.

THE DELEGATES

Representatives from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa and the United States of America were present at the Oxford Conference. Most of the delegates to the conference had arrived in London, on their way to Oxford, by air. Journeys which formerly used to take several weeks are now possible in a few days. The flight from India to U.K. takes only about twenty-four hours. The delegate from India left Delhi by a Constellation aircraft on 28th July and reached London on the following night. Leaving Delhi after dinner on 28th July, he had breakfast in Damascus (Syria), lunch in Istanbul (Turkey), dinner again in Brussels (Belgium), and was comfortably in bed in London on the night of 29th July. With time and distance thus annihilated, the world seemed to have become so small, that one felt no nation could live in isolation in the present times.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE

The conference was held in Corpus Christi College, Oxford. There could have been no better choice of time and place. The weather was sunny, warm and pleasant. Ice cream vendors were having a roaring trade. Occasionally clouds and drizzle, however, did belie the weather prophets and impressed on the visitors the traditional fickleness of the English weather. A heat wave had just preceded the conference, when people could be seen in shirts with sleeves rolled up, or lying stripped to the waist in gardens and parks. A research laboratory in Oxford had to place a notice requesting the staff not to use up ice from its refrigerators for cold drinks. The venue of the conference too was well selected. It gave the delegates an opportunity of studying at close quarters one of the leading centres of learning of which a don once said: "I did not go to Heaven. I went to Oxford."

Corpus Christi College, where the delegates also lived, has a great reputation for learning. Amongst its many distinguished members were Bishop Fox, Bishop Oldham, Bishop Jewel, the "Judicious Hooker" and John Keble. Corpus was the first institution in Oxford where arrangements were made for the study of Greek and Latin. It was founded by Richard Fox, Bishop of Winchester, the Keeper of the Privy Seal to King Henry VII as well as Henry VIII. Within the tower gate, which reminds one of the days of fights between "the gowns and guns", is a quadrangle with a curious cylindrical sun-dial constructed by Charles Turnbull, the mathematician, in 1605. On the top of the sun-dial are carved the arms of Henry VII, the University and Bishops Fox and Oldham. Prominent amongst these is a pelican with her beak in her blood-smeared breast, sitting right on top. At the base of the sun-dial is an equally curious tortoise carved in stone. The delegates were accommodated in the rooms of the undergraduates. The meals were served in the hall which has a timber roof of the sixteenth century. A portrait of Richard Fox, the founder, painted by Joannes Corvus adorns the wall. The long dining table, with fixed benches, was decorated with the College silver. Meals were good and generous. The helpings of meat and fish at each meal could compare with those served at three meals in London. The very resourceful Secretary of the Liaison Committee had arranged a liberal supply of cigarettes, for which one has to visit shop after shop in London, only to find a notice "No Cigarettes". (Visitors from India who smoke are advised to take 200 cigarettes which they can carry without

paying import duty. These are not only difficult to get in England but are also very expensive). The charges made during the stay in Oxford were only £1 per day. This is very moderate when compared with the expenses in London where bed and breakfast alone would cost 17s. to £3 daily and each meal would cost at least 5s. plus overhead charges for music, etc. and 10% to 15% in tips. The personal comforts of the delegates were looked after by scouts (the counterpart of batmen). They were willing workers and very serviceable. They even got clothes washed and ironed for a modest gratuity. (Sponging and pressing a suit in a London hotel costs about 4s. 6d. and laundering a shirt about 1s. to 2s.)

Sir Richard Livingstone, the President of the College, was very hospitable. He showed the treasures of Corpus, including the Founder's Chalice and Paten of gold dated 1507, salt cellars, rings, seals and staff. The six feet long silver gilt pastoral staff of the founder, over four centuries old, is still shining and beautiful. The only other staff of its kind is preserved at New College. How Corpus managed to keep these treasures remains a mystery. The library of the College has a collection of rare and ancient books and manuscripts, including a very interesting one on anatomy. The College Chapel has a beautiful altar piece by Rubens. Relatively modern buildings in the College are Turner's Buildings, built in 1706, where Ruskin is reported to have resided for some time. The general setting is grave, austere and monastic. It was indeed a pleasurable experience to live in such historical surroundings.

MEETING OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE

Sir Arthur Salisbury MacNalty, the Editor-in-Chief of the British Medical History of the War, was unanimously elected Chairman. His advice and guidance throughout the session were most valuable. The proceedings were conducted in a cordial and informal atmosphere. Delegates from the various countries gave details of the plans and progress of their respective medical histories. The details of the discussions held would take a lot of space. It may, however, be added that all the varied aspects of the medical history, administration, organisation, campaigns, clinical, research and statistics were discussed in great detail. All the members were unanimous in their opinion that the discussions would help a great deal in the preparation of their respective histories and stressed the importance of continuing the work of mutual collaboration.

Mr. Frank Mellor, the Secretary, with his exceptional zeal and organising capacity had arranged a series of pleasant engagements in between the official sessions including visits to Broadway and to the Sir William Dunn Laboratory and a tour of Oxford Colleges. Professor A.D. Gardner, the Regius Professor of Medicine, had arranged a reception at Christ Church, and the British Government had extended an invitation to dinner at the Savoy Hotel in London at which the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Rt. Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker, presided.

THE ENGLISH COUNTRYSIDE

The drive to Broadway was very pleasant. The August sun had changed the fields to golden brown. The countryside with these patches of gold surrounded by green and blue was a beautiful sight. Honey-suckle, geranium, dahlias and occasional carnations brightened the country houses. Autumn tints had started to show along the wayside. Half way to Oxford, on the return journey, Dr. Charles Newman very kindly entertained the party at a wayside inn, "The Lamb" at Burford. These inns invariably fascinate and intrigue visitors. The snug and cosy atmosphere within is a characteristic common to all of them, while the distinctive signs hanging outside are peculiar to each. The name of each inn is indicated by its sign. "The Three Swans", "The Sun", "The King's Head", "The Two

Brewers', 'The Catherine Wheel', 'Three Bells', 'The Green Dragon', 'The Red Cow', 'The Black Bull', 'The White Lion', 'The Blue Boar', 'The Fox and Grapes', 'The Cat and the Fiddle' are examples.

THE SIR WILLIAM DUNN LABORATORY

The visit to the Sir William Dunn Laboratory at Oxford was a unique experience. The delegates were met by Professor Sir Howard Florey, to whom must go the credit for the greatest practical medical research done during the War—the discovery of the use of Penicillin. He showed a cine film illustrating the first use of Penicillin on war wounds, and gave a very informal, humorous and instructive talk on the history of Penicillin. It was a memorable experience to listen to the inside story of one of the most remarkable achievements of our age, from the very person who was responsible for it. (Although Professor Sir Alexander Fleming had discovered Penicillin as early as 1929, it was left to Sir Howard to discover its life-saving properties in 1940).

OXFORD COLLEGES

Mr. Rice Oxley, an Oxford don, whose energy and historical lore seemed inexhaustible, took the delegates round the colleges. One afternoon was really too short to go round all of them. The study of the treasures and attractions of each would require several afternoons. The stained glass windows and the founder's Pastoral staff studded with jewels at New College, and the delightful avenue in Magdalen where Addison used to take his daily walk are some of the many sights which are difficult to forget.

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE

Time did not permit the delegates to visit all the colleges and institutes, including the Indian Institute. The inscription in Sanskrit on the tablet in the Institute is of great interest to people in India. It includes the following lines: "The building, dedicated to Eastern Sciences was founded for the use of Aryans (Indian and Englishmen) by excellent and benevolent men desirous of encouraging knowledge. The ceremony of laying the memorial stone took place on Wednesday, May 2nd, 1883. By the favour of God may the learning and literature of India be ever held in honour and may the mutual friendship of India and England constantly increase".

CHRIST CHURCH

The reception arranged by Professor Gardner was held in Christ Church in a room adjoining the great quadrangle 264 feet x 261 feet, which had two interesting paintings, one of Cardinal Wolsey, the founder of Christ Church or the House (then called Cardinal College,) and the other of Henry VIII who took over the control of the college in 1546 from the Cardinal and renamed it Henry VIII College. The Cardinal's statue still adorns the great gate (Faire Gate) of the college. As the great Tom (the bell in the Tom Tower of the college, weighing about 18,000 lbs) started chiming 101 strokes (the original number of students), it was the signal for closing Christ Church gates for the night, and the delegates returned to their rooms in Corpus.

CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE

On the last day of the conference, several important decisions were unanimously made. The members thanked the President and Fellows of Corpus Christi

College and the Regius Professor of Medicine of the University, for their gracious hospitality and expressed their gratitude to Mr. Mellor to whose efforts undoubtedly the success of the work of the Liaison Committee was due. The Oxford conference came to a close on the morning of the 7th August.

The conference was not merely a fact exchanging committee but a dynamic organisation which made practical and constructive suggestions for the preparation of authentic records not only for the benefit of the medical profession but for scientific workers, administrators and statesmen. How much can be achieved through mutual co-operation and goodwill, and how much more remains to be done in the same field, was realised by all of us. One could not help feeling that if the different peoples of the world sat frequently together round a table, with a sincere desire to solve each other's difficulties, as the delegates from eight countries at the Oxford conference did, many of our present day problems would be solved.

WAR-TIME PROGRESS IN CONQUEST OF DISEASE

H.M. Stationery Office has published a book entitled "Medical Research in War", describing the progress made between 1939-1945, in the work of Britain's Medical Research Council.

The control of malaria was a triumph of medicine, destined to be of value in peace-time. Its incidence has been limited by the wide-spread use of DDT insecticide, which was sprayed on clothing to combat vermin and disease-carrying insects, and used in swamps and other breeding-grounds of the anopheles mosquito, responsible for the transmission of malaria.


Mepacrine was first used for the treatment of patients. Later paludrine was substituted. This product, developed in the laboratories of Britain, was described with the restraint customary to science as "likely to prove the most efficient at present available."

The treatment of injuries reached a higher standard through the development of the Blood Transfusion Service, the use of sulpha drugs and penicillin and more especially through the recognition that frequent change of dressings on wounds and burns is undesirable. Stress is laid on the value of penicillin—discovered by the Nobel prize-winners, Florey and Fleming—as a therapeutic agent. It "must have resulted in the saving of many thousands of lives" and is now widely used in all hospitals.

The book closes with the assurance that the war-time research into means of saving life is at least as extensive as the "progress" achieved in methods of destruction.




By courtesy of the Bursar of Corpus Christi
HIGH STREET, OXFORD
(Photo by Walter Scott, Bradford)



By courtesy of the Bursar of Corpus Christi
CORPUS CHRISTI QUADRANGLE, OXFORD
(Photo by Valentine)



"LOOK INTO THIS WONDERFUL 'BOWL' "



NAINI'S LAKE

LEAVE IN NAINI TAL

“ TRAVELLER ”

THE glamour of the hills had always attracted me. But one has a general tendency to visit the same station for leave time and time again. Naini Tal had, however, stuck at the back of my mind as *the* place I had to see some time. So, in spite of being warned of a continuously wet weather in July and August, I decided to spend a month there with my family.

We caught the Grand Trunk Express from Delhi one afternoon and changed at Muttra. Having made ourselves at home in a compartment of the metre-gauge railway, we woke up the following morning to find the train squeaking and labouring up a hillside. The climb seemed to be gradually steep and the view similar to that seen from the train which climbs the Simla hills. What was missing was the increasing chill in the air. We reached Kathgodam, the railway terminus, at eleven o'clock, one hour later than the scheduled time.

We were met by two 3-ton lorries but taxis and buses are also available and run services to Naini Tal to coincide with the railway timings. The taxi fare is Rs. 7 per seat. A de luxe bus provides good accommodation for Rs. 2/8 per seat and takes only half an hour more than a taxi which takes an hour to Naini.

An excellent tarmac road winds up the steep slopes to the town. Twenty-two miles from Kathgodam, you reach Naini's taxi and bus stand. As the car stops you are surrounded by a screaming crowd of coolies, all shouting loudly to claim your attention. You pay no heed and select your means of transport—a rickshaw or a *dandy*. But before you move you stop, thrilled with the scene around you.

Imagine an oval shaped curved bowl with its long sides curving down towards its bottom at one end. At this end is the bus stand from where you look into this wonderful bowl, the bottom of which is filled with still mirror-like water, reflecting the white and red roofed buildings which are dotted among the woody slopes. This beautiful expanse of water is the principal topographical feature as the name Naini Tal conveys, 6350 feet above sea level, measuring 1500 yards in length and 500 yards in breadth. As you raise your eyes you see the peaks and ranges which form the top edge of the bowl, rising as high as 2000 feet above the lake.

The first impression of Naini is that it is a sparsely populated town. But the longer you stay and get to know more about the place, you begin to realise its size. The oldest building is Pilgrim Lodge built in 1842, by a Mr. Brown. Besides a number of schools and colleges there are hospitals and a Sanatorium. Among the well-known buildings is Government House on which 7½ lakhs of rupees were spent. It is reputed to be one of the finest buildings in the East. The lower slopes around the lake are dotted with Government and private houses while even the peaks, 1000 to 1500 feet above the lake have houses nestling upon them, thanks to the local municipality who supply water and electricity at any height. Serpent-like paths wind round the hills to the top. Even the post boxes are situated right near the peaks. The lonely builder in the woods could ask for no better amenities.

For a casual visitor the problem of accommodation always arises. There are a number of European hotels, which are crowded during the season and therefore

advance reservation is recommended. A few Indian hotels also exist. There is a Visitors' Home which provides accommodation for two days only. The Y.M.C.A. welcomes guests for nominal charges. Army officers and other ranks can arrange accommodation through the Leave Bureau C/o SSO, Naini Tal.

Shopping facilities are good. Every article is labelled with its control price. Compared to Delhi where the black market seems to have carried away all the goods from the shelves, articles never seen in shops are available for sale here. The shops line The Mall which runs on one side of the lake. Government supervised markets provide fruits, vegetables, eggs, chicken, etc., all checked and marked at controlled rates. Rationing is strictly observed but one's due share is always available. For Army officers there is a grocery and wines canteen, permits for purchases from which can be obtained from the SSO. Ration card for your servant also can be obtained from the same officer. Something which has impressed me most here and which is too often missing in business circles elsewhere in these days of scarcity is the extreme politeness and pleasant demeanour of the shopkeepers. Here the attitude is not one of "Buy or get out".

Amusements and amenities are plentiful. Sports facilities are diverse—tennis in clubs in the season, rowing, fishing, riding and sailing in Naini's Boat Club. There is also a skating rink. A number of restaurants provide for ballroom dancing. There are two English picture houses and one Indian. One advantage regarding sports here is that they are nearly all concentrated in one spot for the visitor to choose from and vary with mild amusements like dancing and pictures. The sports grounds all seem to be laid out in the area of the "Flats", which are the municipal grounds for polo, football and other games situated at one end of the lake, with a *pucca* amphitheatre to seat spectators.

We have been out on a morning ride around the shores of the lake, followed by rowing in a light boat on the shiny surface of the lake reflecting all the grandeur of nature's beauty; ice cream to bouncing tunes at the "Shady Grove"* followed by a climb up a hill 1500 feet high after lunch. That has laid us flat out, but one gets used to all this. To really enjoy the evening at a tea dance or a cinema a siesta in the afternoon is recommended.

Quite unlike the social activity of Mussoorie or the crowded official look of Simla, Naini presents a quiet, mild life. To the new arrival, but for the beauty of the lake, the place may appear to be disappointing at first sight. But to the trek enthusiast who is out to probe into the mysteries of nature, there is a vast treasure to unfold. Steep footpaths and gradually rising tracks girdle the hills carrying the aspirant to the summit. Treks up these hills should not be undertaken until you have been a few days in Naini or you will soon find yourself out of breath. Visits to the more important peaks are very exhilarating and enjoyable.

The first one we attempted to climb was the SNOW VIEW. We chose a stiff route, but with short rests on the way to admire the country around, the exertion was not unduly taxing. As you go up you get a bird's eye view of the lake and all around it. The little sail boats look like toys afloat. The lake, the flats, and reflections of clouds, sky and hills around present a scene unrivalled at times. There is a picnic spot on the top where a shed and water are provided for the visitors. The view of the distant hills beyond and the ravines below gives a queer feeling as though of a glimpse of where nature abides in calm and peace undisturbed by man or beast. The chill in the breeze reminds one of Simla.

LARIA KANTA, 8000 feet high, and CHEENA, 8500 feet high, are the other two peaks which should be visited. Our visit to LARIA KANTA was unfortunately ill-

* "Shady Grove" is a cafe in Naini.

timed, as very little could be seen through the dense mist that persisted. But the walk was enjoyable through the light drizzle which was interspersed with sudden outbreaks of sunshine. Here again at the top of the peak is a shed but no water. So remember to take your own water and you will need it too.

We could not find time to visit CHEENA, the highest peak. Although the climb is said to be long and arduous, the reward comes with the thrill in locating from the top the famous peaks of NANDA DEVI, KAMAT and BADRENATH in the far distance.

We decided to trek down to Kathgodam via Bhim Tal on our return. The first stage of the journey, a distance of $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Naini Tal, brought us to Bhim Tal. Only 4500 feet above sea level, the splendour of a lake is laid out here also. There are a couple of European hotels. The only other building of repute is the Maharaja of Jind's palace. The place has nothing much to offer to a casual visitor, but those fond of fishing and shooting must spend a few days here in the season. For the fishing enthusiast there are two more lakes within three miles—Sat Tal and Nau Kuchia Tal.

The trek from Bhim Tal to Kathgodam, a distance of 8 miles, is not very pleasant. The roadway is very rugged. However, it is all downhill, so there is no question of losing one's breath. As you reach the plains the heat warms you up again, the same clammy sweat that retards your breath and your pace, breaks out all over. A bath at the railway station puts one in the right mood.

So Reader! here is a suggestion for your leave. Three weeks is more than enough for the place. Once having been to Naini you would like to go there again. The ideal season is April to July and then in September. The new arrival can always get an excellent guide book from any bookstall.

THE FUNCTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS OF A REGIMENTAL CENTRE

"COMMANDANT"

THE OBJECT

THE Training Syllabus and Administrative Orders of a Regimental Centre are the Commandant's Plan and must receive the same attention from all concerned as an operation order in war.

It is just as vital to have a clearly defined object in a Regimental Centre as it is for an operation in war. The object is to organize a Regimental Centre which will be the foundation of the regiment and the upholder of its traditions, and which will watch over all the interests of every single officer and man in the regiment whether at the Centre, in active battalions, or elsewhere, and to produce well-trained soldiers with the following attributes:-

- | | |
|--|--|
| (a) Bodily cleanliness. | (f) Resource. |
| (b) Perfect turn-out and smartness on all occasions. | (g) Initiative. |
| (c) Pride of race and regiment. | (h) Pride in physical fitness and powers of endurance. |
| (d) Good discipline. | (i) Proficiency and confidence in weapons. |
| (e) Alertness. | (j) Powers of leadership. |

All these objects must be constantly kept to the fore and form an integral part of the Training and Administrative plans.

Importance of Regimental Centres

All officers, J.C.Os. and N.C.Os. must be made to realise that the efficiency of active battalions depends largely on the Regimental Centre. A recruit is made or marred as a soldier during his period of recruit's training. The large number of officers, N.C.Os and men of active battalions that pass through a Centre are affected by the general atmosphere at the Centre, which by this means and through the medium of drafts eventually permeates the whole regiment. The recruits we are training are not only the future soldiers of the regiment, but many of them are the future leaders. The attitude towards their profession that they acquire at the Centre remains with them for the rest of their service. The morale which they attain at the Centre, which transcends all other training in importance and is produced by a variety of means, sustains them in battle.

ATMOSPHERE

We all know that indefinable atmosphere in a unit which is very readily apparent within fifteen minutes or so of entering the lines. This atmosphere is necessarily different in every regiment, but whatever form it may take, the vital importance of its being the right atmosphere must be stressed. Having emphasised the necessity for this let us examine how it is built up.

In the first place, it is founded on the past traditions of the regiment and is compounded of a variety of the thoughts, actions and characters of past officers of the regiment. Given this basis it is possible to build on it the particular atmosphere that is desired. This should be an atmosphere of activity, cleanliness, shining efficiency, alertness, with everyone moving about as if they had some purpose in view.

The Officers

The right atmosphere necessarily comes in the first place from the officers. It is they who set the tone. Officers must not look on the Regimental Centre as a sort of transit place which they must get away from at the earliest possible opportunity. It is absolutely right that an officer's first thought in war time should be to join an active battalion on field service, but there is an exceedingly important job to be done at the regimental centre. Those selected for an appointment at the Centre, and they should be the best officers, must throw themselves heart and soul into the work of the Centre for the tenure of their appointment, while pool officers must take an equal interest in the Centre, for it is here that they learn all about the men, language, regimental history and customs, and administration, all of which are so essential before they move on to an active battalion. Any idea amongst the officers that the Centre is merely a transit place will quickly make itself felt throughout all ranks, with consequent deterioration of training and administration.

The officers must themselves set an example in all matters for their men to follow. Their first and foremost interest must be in their men, in their work, and in their regiment. The men instinctively know at once where an officer's chief interest lies, and the more obvious it is that the men are his first thought and care, the better will be the results attained. This interest in every aspect of the welfare and training of the men must be a genuine interest. Officers must willingly and frequently visit the J.C.Os' clubs and the men's nautches, and they must organize and take part in their games, which is one of the best ways of getting to know both recruits and instructors alike. Officers should take every opportunity of talking to instructors and recruits off parade.

Syllabus of Training

The next thing that affects atmosphere is the Syllabus of Training. Has this been worked out with imagination to make it interesting? It is of supreme importance that all training, whatever it may be, should be presented in an interesting manner and that the programme on a given day should be varied.

Instructors

It is also of supreme importance that the instructors should have a good manner of instructing and should know all the arts of keeping the men interested and alive. Much hard work and training are necessary to instil into the instructors the correct attitude towards recruits on all occasions, and this attitude will naturally vary to some extent in different regiments in accordance with the type of men to be trained. But the basic principles of it are identical. We will go into this more fully later.

Administration

The efficiency of the administrative arrangements plays a vitally important part in the building up of the right atmosphere and we shall have to consider more of this later.

Reception of Recruits

First impressions count enormously, as we all know from our own experience if we recall our first arrival at school or in the army. Therefore, great attention must be paid to careful arrangements for the reception of recruits on their arrival. The details vary in each regiment, but there is always the necessity for a carefully worked out reception programme framed with the object of giving them a warm welcome and making them feel at home from the very start. Recruits are most impressionable at this time and their reception has an immense effect on their future.

Happiness

Finally, it must be remembered that the man who is discontented and unwilling to learn takes longer to train and can never reach a satisfactory standard due to his lack of receptivity. Two thousand five hundred years ago a great commander told his officers to see that their men were happy and the rest would follow. To this one could add that in training, one must see that the men are interested. All parades can and must be made interesting. No form of training should be allowed to develop into a routine.

How Obtained

There can be no doubt that good discipline depends on atmosphere to a very large degree. The discipline of a unit varies in direct proportion to the care and interest taken by its officers in the men. The men must jump to one's least word of command if one is to be a successful officer. Courting popularity with the men will assuredly fail in the same way as will iron discipline. It greatly depends on the particular personality of the officer, who must himself find the border-line between considerate treatment and iron discipline. A cowed state of submission to authority militates against good training in peace and will crack in war. The ideal is to so well train the mental, moral, and physical powers that punishments are seldom necessary. But when punishment becomes necessary it must on no account be vindictive, but merely a warning to others. Whenever a man is given a punishment he should be told that he has let down the name of his regiment and that this is worse than the military offence itself. Pride in their race, regiment and in themselves, *i.e. esprit de corps*, maintain the men's morale in the stress of battle. Outward bearing is the first sign of discipline and *esprit de corps*. If the officers and men appear well turned out, smart, alert and efficient, the comment will be not so much "that looks a good soldier" as "that looks a good regiment". Much of what is said under this heading is taken from that excellent pamphlet "The Officer and Fighting Efficiency", which all officers must constantly study and act on.

Dress

Until an officer is sure that his own turn-out is good, he cannot expect a high standard from those under him. Although facilities must be made available for the men, the mere washing and ironing of clothes will not of its own produce "outward bearing"; it is something indefinable in the inner man. The will to do it must be there.

Drill the Bed-rock of Discipline

The bed-rock of military discipline is close order drill; briefly, good drill quickly instils submission of the individual to the sub-unit of which he is a member, instant obedience, meticulousness in executing an order, pride of race and *esprit de corps*. It is a spiritual rather than a physical training. Therefore, all drill on all occasions must be first-rate, anything less than this does actual harm. Once a recruit has

mastered his drill, he will enjoy short and sharp periods, but he will dislike dreary long periods and these will do definite harm. Drill implies the physical satisfaction to be derived from sinking one's individuality in the perfect timing of a mass movement, in which every individual is keyed up to the maximum personal tension.

To quote verbatim from the pamphlet mentioned above:—

“This form of discipline is something more than a blind and unquestioning obedience to orders; it is a rhythmic and automatic surging of the cohesive spirit of a body of men in times of crisis, so that all can draw on the common fund of courage and endurance. Experience has shown that the simple quality of good discipline is the mainstay of an army in the field. Any deterioration, however temporary, in the bonds of discipline that hold an army together must lead to risk of disaster in face of a determined enemy.”

Saluting—the Best Indication of Morale

Good saluting and a frank look into the eyes of the superior is a better indication than anything else of the morale of a unit. Salutes must always be acknowledged in the same manner in which they are given. An officer must in turn look frankly into the eyes of his subordinate so that the man gains the impression that his quality as a soldier is being appraised. When a man salutes his officer he is demonstrating that he will carry out the officer's orders. The officer, in acknowledgment, indicates that he will bear the responsibility of his rank.

Good saluting, therefore, really depends on atmosphere and there is no other way of achieving it in a unit. The will to salute must be there.

Drill, Saluting, Turn-out, and Physical Fitness

Drill, saluting and turn-out, which go hand in hand, make a man smart, respectful and clean and consequently proud of himself. The greater the pride in himself the better his drill, saluting and turn-out become, and the better they become the prouder he gets. The man whose pride will not permit him to look dirty or untidy will have sufficient pride to carry him through adversity. A man who has not sufficient pride of race and regiment to keep himself clean and smart under peace conditions, probably lacks the moral fibre which is so necessary to sustain him in war. It need hardly be added that powers of endurance in battle are greatly enhanced by a high standard of physical fitness.

Other means of maintaining morale are regular ceremonial parades, some regular ceremony such as Retreat, to which guests should be invited, and regimental history. The knowledge that a man is in a regiment with fine traditions which it is his responsibility to maintain and the confidence engendered by knowing that he is in a well-organised unit are half the battle.

This question of morale and *esprit de corps* is the most important thing of all in a recruit's training. It needs day to day and unremitting attention if it is to be attained.

But there is little hope of achieving it unless there is a good system of training and administration.

TRAINING

Officers

For an officer to wander on to parade without a set purpose is useless. He must plan his day. That is, he must know exactly which particular parades he is

going to attend, what he is going to look for, what administrative matters are to receive his special attention, and what time he will spend in office. He must always be punctual for the early morning parade; this has a considerable psychological effect. An officer's most important parade of the day is the Staff parade, when N.C.Os. are put through the next day's work, for this is the best possible means he has of influencing the training of his men.

While on the subject of officers, it must be mentioned that while the Army has been fortunate in getting a large number of excellent officers, one failing common to many of them may be noticed, and that is unreliability. Reliability may be defined thus:— The certain knowledge of an officer that when he has given orders to a subordinate, those orders will be carried out and more than carried out. When one comes to think of it this is the secret of the whole matter both in peace and war, and so reliability must be noted as one of the most important attributes of an officer. In training and administration there will be greater efficiency because it ensures the smooth working of a Centre.

N.C.Os.

The key to good training is good instructors, and these can only be produced if there is an exceedingly well-organized system of cadres in the regiment for the training of instructors. These cadres should go on unceasingly throughout the year, and the main object should be to instil into the students all the arts of teaching. They are very difficult to put across and it is only by constant hammering that it is possible to do so. This matter is of supreme importance as not only does it affect the efficiency of the training, but also the general atmosphere in the unit.

Syllabus of Training

It is hardly necessary to say that the Syllabus of Training must clearly show exactly what is to be taught in every period. It is also essential to prepare in advance daily programmes showing what is to be done on one day of the whole period of training. But a syllabus that is never amended soon loses its freshness, and therefore it should be under constant revision with the object of introducing new ideas and methods. Every officer has something to contribute and should be encouraged to do so. Some can be put into effect straightaway and others should be recorded in a note-book by the Training Major for inclusion in the next revision of the syllabus.

Specialisation

No manager of a big business organization would expect all his employees to be proficient in all aspects of the business. Specialisation is essential. It is the same in a Regimental Centre and only varies in degree. It is suggested that physical training, drill, weapon training, should be taught by specialists. The way this is worked out will naturally vary considerably in different Centres and is dependent on such factors as the inflow of recruits and the available instructors. But the specialists should be in the headquarters of the lowest sub-unit possible. The necessity for recruits to have the same platoon and section commanders throughout and for specialists as far as possible to teach the same sections each day so that they will have a personal interest in the results of their training must be emphasised.

Specialist educational instructors are also necessary, but these should be centralised under either Regimental Centre or T.B. H.Q.

Control by Regimental Centre H.Q.

There should be as strong a control as possible in Regimental Centre

headquarters over training, although some latitude in carrying out the training should be given to T.B. and Coy. Comdrs.

The Commandant's policy is put over by various means, but chiefly through the Syllabus of Training, the central cadres, and conferences. Where possible, there should be a strong central team for giving fieldcraft and other such demonstrations, since company commanders cannot afford the time to give all the thought and energy required to make a demonstration a success.

Catch Phrases

We must beware of catch phrases, such as toughening, and battle inoculation. These ideas suddenly come out, and for a time everybody goes mad about them. For instance, there is reason to believe that this idea of toughening did an immense amount of harm at one time, as did extreme forms of battle inoculation. The only kind of toughening that is of any use is that which ensures a gradual and progressive physical development throughout the whole period of training. Any idea that toughening can be done within a period of a fortnight or so is false. Battle courses and battle inoculation are very necessary, but battle courses are very impressive to watch, due to the smoke and noise, and we must not be deluded by this.

It is all the thousands of details of training in all the various subjects that go to build up the final products of a Centre and the daily unrelenting attention paid to them that counts. There is no short cut.

In 1941-42 it was all desert warfare, and then it was all jungle warfare. It is very necessary that the first 7 months at least of recruits' training should be based on training for fighting in any form of warfare, and if this done, specialised forms of warfare can be superimposed at the end.

Fieldcraft and Weapon Training

It is said that, in the past, people gave more attention to fieldcraft than weapon training. Now the pendulum is swinging the other way. There must be a proper balance between the two. In a pre-war recruits' training programme, the recruit usually did parade ground work for practically the whole of his training except for the last few days, when he did a little section work. There can be no doubt that the idea of carrying fieldcraft right throughout the course of training is an excellent one and makes the recruits eventually far more ready to take their place in a section in an active battalion. A high standard of shooting is vital, but this is of little avail in war unless the soldier knows how to make the best use of his weapons in the field.

ADMINISTRATION

No commander, however junior, will get the best out of his troops unless he is "administration minded". Unless administrative arrangements are good, the morale and the ability and willingness to fight of the individual man is impaired, and in a Regimental Centre, training and atmosphere are seriously hampered. Administration covers every sphere of unit life and is designed to ensure a soldier's happiness, well-being, health and morale; in other words "man management".

A purely superficial interest in the welfare of the men is useless. Good administration involves constant forethought on the part of commanders, and initiative to improve the administrative machinery of their commands. Officers must acquire detailed knowledge of administration by learning to carry out the duties of their administrative subordinates themselves. This means hard work at first but eventually the supervisory functions of commanders are simplified and time is saved

There must be full realisation of how dependent a soldier is on his officer and the administrative arrangements made for him.

Does the officer get down to it and see what things are really like for the soldier?—his rations, food, milk, drinking water, clothes, boots, washing arrangements. Does he visit sick parade, men in hospital? What is the food like in hospital? Are the men getting all their dues—pay, allowances, etc.? One could go on for a long time, but this gives some idea of what an enormous lot there is to be done to ensure the men's contentment. The officer has the honour to command men and this places on him a very grave responsibility. Their lives are in his hands. If he goes about it in this spirit he will find that "man management" is a fascinating study. His work in this connection is unending.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the foregoing will help to show something of what a Regimental Centre should be, and its importance in the modern army. To quote a parallel that most readers will appreciate: one's school, its atmosphere, its teaching, the master and boys whom one meets there, affect the whole of one's life. So with a Regimental Centre for a recruit. It is his school, where in the short space of a few months he gets the foundations of his military education, and more than that, where his character is moulded so that afterwards, dependent on the Regimental Centre atmosphere which is built up of hundreds of different things, he will be not only an efficient soldier, but something more, a man who has acquired subconsciously a set of ideals, and manners which will stay with him for ever, and make him of value to any community, civil or military where he may happen to be. This is not mere idle talk or wishful thinking, for it can be done, and the knowledge that it can be should encourage those of us who are selected to spend a period of our military service in a Centre. To accomplish it requires hard work, plenty of it and continuous, but it will be found well worth the trouble.

FILMS IN UNIFORM

An Account of the Indian Services Film Unit

MAJOR S.T. BERKELEY-HILL *

SINCE four out of every five recruits were illiterate, the method of training the former peace-time Indian Army had been, for the main part, with skilled instructors and repeated drills. This system was practicable only when the supply of instructors was sufficient to meet the needs of the untrained soldiers.

During World War II, with the wholesale expansion of the forces, the dearth of veteran instructors became most marked. It was then that the Directorate of Military Training (DMT) in India, searching for a supplementary medium to cope with the ever-increasing numbers of volunteers, decided to give films a tryout. There was nothing new in the experiment as films had long become an accepted part of the curricula of Britain's services. But what had been of undoubted assistance to the British soldier, became of vital importance in the rapid education of the illiterate sepoy. Moreover, films overcame the handicap of polyglot India. With multiple printing and dubbed soundtracks, the same vital information was made readily available to sepoys of different tongues.

Therefore, with this aim of stepping-up army training, the DMT founded in June 1941, the "General Staff Training Film Centre," with headquarters at Caltex House, Ballard Estate, Bombay. The original personnel consisted of one officer (Captain) and six civilians, but by the end of the year, four officers and eight civilians were added to the staff. A further increase took place in September 1942, when the total strength was raised to eight officers and thirty-five civilians.

In December 1943, films having proved their worth, GHQ drew up a programme to produce them not only for the Training Directorate, but also for the Recruiting, Propaganda and Security Directorates of the Indian Army. As this growth in production was outside the scope and responsibility of the DMT, the unit was absorbed by the Directorate of Public Relations and re-named the "Army Film Centre." Its personnel now numbered: officers, Other Ranks and WAC (1)s 29; civilians 130.

In April 1944, the RIN and the RIAF requested that films be made for their respective headquarters. Once again there was a reorganization and expansion for the benefit of the three services, and the new unit was re-named the "Services Film Centre". The strength of this establishment was 178, of which 36 were service personnel.

Towards the end of 1944, GHQ, NHQ and AHQ demanded an independent directorate for the production, distribution, exhibition and servicing of films and equipment. Consequently, in December of that year, the "Directorate of Services Kinematography" (DSK) was formed in New Delhi. The film unit, concentrating only on production, now became a part of DSK, and the establishment's staff was increased to 45 service personnel and 150 civilians. Its name was once again changed to "Combined Kinematograph Services Training and Film Production Centre". (To prevent physical exhaustion, the unit was always referred to as "CKS" 1).

*The author served for five years in this unit of which he ultimately became the Executive Producer.

With the termination of the war, DSK planned a series of films for the newly-established Resettlement Directorate, and the rundown programme of the CKS began. In December 1945, service personnel numbered 30 and civilians 150; and by May 1946, there were left 20 service personnel and 144 civilians. Either 'demob' or 'repat' had, by November of the same year, removed all of the British staff, with one exception; but by December 1946, it could be truly said that CKS was an all-Indian unit. On 31st March, 1947, on the eve of disbandment, the personnel numbered: Servicemen 10, civilians 65.

* * * *

When the Unit began its existence in 1941, only factual films were attempted, which were issued with commentaries either in English or Urdu. Although these were simple productions, photographed in Training Areas and then edited in Bombay, they did not lack reality. Soon, copies were in high demand by Forward Areas and Training Battalions. Production by the end of the first year totalled 12 edited reels (six English, six Urdu), while others were in course of preparation.

During January 1942, the first dialogue film was attempted. It was a three-reeler called: "Rank, Name and Number", produced in Hindustani at a Bombay studio, for the purpose of prohibiting careless talk among sepoys. For reasons of security, professional civilian actors were not employed in this picture. The hero, villain and minor characters were picked at random from a unit quartered in Colaba Barracks, Bombay. Surprisingly enough, the sepoys chosen for the production, who had never acted before, showed a remarkable aptitude in their roles, betraying no nervousness whatsoever in front of the camera. When the film was previewed in New Delhi, its realism was favourably commented upon by a GHQ audience. After the high standard of acting displayed in "Rank, Name and Number", personnel from the forces were, with very few exceptions, employed in all future productions. It was proved again and again that many a sepoy was a born actor.

In December, the first attempt at a newsreel was made. "She Sank a Raider" (featuring the exploits of an RIN sloop which accounted for two Jap raiders, twenty times her tonnage) was exhibited in English and Hindustani at the Bombay cinemas, within 48 hours of filming. An international newsreel company, that also covered the same event, had its issue out *ten days after* the screening of the service film. "She Sank a Raider" was produced in English, Hindustani, Bengali, Maharatti, Tamil and Telugu. A copy of the English version now reposes in the archives of the British War Office.

Production for 1942, apart from "She Sank a Raider", showed a decided increase over 1941. The average for each month was six reels in English and six in Urdu.

With considerable additions in staff and equipment that occurred in 1943 and 1944, production was stepped up. The number of reels for 1943 totalled 340 (170 films), and for the following year 520 (290 films). Training film prints* for distribution began to average as high as 80 copies in English and 90 in Urdu. Recruiting, propaganda and security pictures averaged around 15 copies for each version. But these productions, if they had commentaries, were often made in English, Hindustani, Bengali, Maharatti, Malayalam, Pushtu, Tamil and Telugu.

Dupe** negatives of all English versions were now being flown to the War Office in Britain, from where positives were printed and dispatched to Australia,

*Reels must not be confused with prints, e.g. a finished production of two reels might have 80 prints made from its negative. A yearly total production was calculated on the edited reels completed; not on the prints made from them.

**A dupe negative is a duplicate of the original negative.

Canada, Egypt (M.E. Forces), New Zealand and S. Africa. On occasion, films were also sent to the USA.

Apart from making original productions for the directorates already referred to, many suitable films from Britain, Australia and the USA were re-made for the Indian Services. For these the English commentary tracks were substituted by vernacular tracks. Among others, "British Movietone" and "USOWI" (the American forces newsreel) were issued each week in Urdu, and a hundred prints of each were not infrequently made.

Another weekly feature that came into being in 1944 was the production of "Calling Blighty" for the Welfare Directorate, a thousand-foot serial that was shot either in Bombay or in Forward Areas. "Calling Blighty" was a form of filmic greeting card in which the British soldier was photographed and his comments recorded for the benefit of his family back home. Each reel contained messages from personnel who hailed from the same town. After editing in Bombay, a copy was flown to the U.K. and screened, in the home-town, free of charge, to an audience of relatives and friends. The productions of "Calling Blighty" were considered top-priority on account of their high morale value. By December 1944, they alone were averaging over two thousand feet of edited film a week, with a total for the year of 125 reels.

An interesting assignment for 1944 was the making of a greetings film on the lines of "Calling Blighty," but in French. The shooting took place in Ceylon, when the Free French battleship "Richelieu" visited the island. The O.C. of the Calling Blighty film unit happened to be in Colombo, with his staff, at the time. He realized the importance of this historic occasion, and, on his own initiative, went aboard the battleship. The crew of the "Richelieu"—from Commander to cabin boy—were highly delighted with the visit. They co-operated handsomely on the shooting and the final edited film, with a foreword in French, was a great success. Unfortunately, the O.C. of the unit (a Flight Lieutenant) 'had a strip torn off him' by his immediate senior officer for not obtaining permission prior to the filming. The RAF officer's defence—that the visit of the "Richelieu" was so short that he could never have obtained the necessary permission in time from New Delhi—fell on unusually deaf ears. However, the finale ended in the RAF officer's favour, for when the film was eventually shown at GHQ, the powers-that-be realized its importance and commended the O.C. of the unit for his 'highly creditable operation'. As a further matter of interest, when France was liberated, this filmic document was publicly screened in Paris and enthusiastically received by the French audiences.

Production continued apace in 1944, when CKS became the largest organization of its kind in the British Empire. And, though the facts were never verified, it was reputed to be producing films in more languages* than any other similar unit in the world.

At the close of World War II, although training films continued to be made, the majority of the staff became engaged in productions for the newly-formed Resettlement Directorate. These were planned to help train the sepoys, awaiting demob, in trades and vocations that would benefit them on their return to civil life.

Production on the resettlement assignment commenced in December 1945, and by the end of May 1946, the programme was completed. The record was as follows: One four-reel, studio-dialogue film in three languages (Hindustani, Maha-

*By 1946, 14 languages had been in use: Bengali, Burmese, Canarese, English, French, Gurkhal, Hindustani (Urdu), Malayalam, Maharatti, Pushtu, Singhalese, Swahili, Tamil and Telugu.

ratti, Tamil), and eighteen one-reel commentary films, each in four languages (Hindustani, Maharatti, Malayalam, Tamil).

After May, 1946 and until the disbandment of the unit, production was again concentrated on training films. However, an occasional *events* film was undertaken, and two specially worthy of mention are: "The Gurkha Goes Home", portraying the visit of Field Marshal Auchinleck to Nepal (commentary in English and Gurkhali) and the "East African Tattoo" (commentary in English and Swahili), a film of the East African Division, taken in Ranchi, Bihar.

During this period CKS was also kept active in making vernacular versions of foreign pictures. The more notable ones that come to mind are: "Burma Victory" (UK), "India Strikes" (UK) and "Land Reborn" (USA), all of which were produced with Hindustani commentaries. "Land Reborn" dealt with anti-soil erosion methods and was technically a difficult assignment. Orders were received from DSK that the print was required on 35mm.* stock. The only size available to us was a 16mm. positive copy. From this a duplicate *picture* negative was made and from the negative an enlarged 35mm. *picture* negative. Since no facilities existed in India for enlarging the 16mm. soundtrack directly on to 35mm. film, the sub-standard soundtrack was *re-recorded* on to 35mm. negative stock. From the 35mm. *picture* and *sound* negatives, a combined positive print was made. Although much time and labour had gone into the production of the required 35mm. print (since it had to be enlarged from 16mm. stock), the final quality of the 35mm. film was exceptionally good.

Originally, films were produced for showing only on 35mm. projectors as there was not enough sub-standard equipment being used by the services in India. But by 1945, the use of 16mm. equipment had increased to such an extent that films were made also in that size. The procedure was to *reduce* 35mm. to 16mm. (a comparatively simple process) instead of re-filming the original subject, which in most cases would have been impossible. By the end of 1945, every film made by CKS was available in either size.

When the unit was first founded, its offices were located in magnificent, air-conditioned quarters in Ballard Estate, Bombay. In October 1945, however, the accommodation at Caltex House was requisitioned by the civilian owners and the whole unit was shifted to the Ack-Ack site at Kolivada Camp, Sion, Bombay. The 15-mile transfer of personnel and equipment, was made with a minimum of fuss and bother. Unfortunately, the new quarters, although serviceable enough for formidable artillery, was not sufficiently dust or water-proof for delicate film equipment. During the ensuing monsoon in 1946, much of the equipment deteriorated. It was impossible, under the existing damp conditions, to keep moviolas and soundolas in perfect working order, especially when editing room floors were under water. Wet wiring sometimes resulted in severe shocks to editing personnel. Furthermore, there was always a danger of serious fires starting by the ignition of film from electrical shorts.

Despite these setbacks, there was never much delay in schedule or loss of production, and, when it did occur, it was quickly cleared up by working overtime—for which no compensation was asked for or received. Until the very end of the unit's existence, the camaraderie and '*esprit de corps*' shown by all was an enlightening experience. Here was a body of men from all parts of India—of divers races, religions and speech, who served together in total harmony. Interest in their work

* 35mm. is the size screened in public cinemas. 16 mm. (sub-standard film) is used mainly for non-professional shows.

and the knowledge that it played a prominent part in the betterment of their countrymen, made their unity a reality.

* * * *

On 31st March, 1947, CKS, functioning under various names and with a life of 5 years and 10 months, came to an end. Its record is one of which any unit may well be proud. Since then, its service personnel has been demobbed or transferred, while its civilian employees have tried to find positions in public companies. It is regrettable that this organization, which played so important a part in the training of the forces during the war years, does not continue to function in some form, during the days of peace.

The rapid expansion of the centre from 1942 to 1944, is in itself fitting testimony to the value of films in the education of servicemen. Moreover, in 1943, the DMT recorded that films had helped in reducing the training time of the sepoy by as much as 45 per cent.

Today, in Europe and America, much of the training of the armed forces is done with films. If, therefore, the nations of the West realize their importance, they must serve an even more useful purpose to the fighting men of India and Pakistan, of whom so many are illiterate.

Films provide imaginative methods of instruction, and supply the necessary short-cuts to modern education. For the training of Indian and Pakistani servicemen, units, similar to CKS, should now be founded. By the full utilization of films, the future efficiency and welfare of their armed forces can be maintained at a level second to none.

WELFARE WORK OF VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES IN

INDIA DURING THE WAR, 1939-45

R. M. BROCKBANK.

WITH the departure of the British Forces from India came also the end of certain welfare activities connected with them. Most of the work of the organisations in question was done by women, of which the Women's Volunteer Service (W.V.S.) is probably the best known as it was the largest and the most noticeable. It organised and ran canteens for troops, a visiting service for hospitals where arrangements were made to do patients' shopping, write letters for those who were unable to write their own, provide amusements for convalescents, and so on. The W.V.S. also handled medical supplies and hospital comforts which came to India from England and the Dominions: receiving, sorting and distributing these during the war was a considerable task. Another activity was providing entertainment for troops, particularly in places where no amusements existed. Almost all the helpers were unpaid and gave a specified amount of time to the work each week. There were, however, some whole-time paid employees in the organisation during the war apart from the permanent officials and headquarters clerical staff.

Following the report by Lord Munster, who toured the country to report on conditions of British serving men, two other organisations both well-known in England for many years, sent teams to India. Of these, the Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Families Association (S.S.A.F.A.) had opened, in 1943, Enquiry Bureaux in Lahore, Calcutta and Bangalore employing Army Welfare Officers who were under General Headquarters. As the name implies, this association is concerned with the welfare of serving men's families. Knowing that life in the home a soldier has left behind continues satisfactorily, is a big factor in his morale, and during a war which affects the civilian population to the extent that the last one did in Europe, cause for worry is always present. The Association's Overseas Service Department was started in 1941 at the request of the War Office, so that men serving overseas, who could not be given short leave to visit their families in places which had been subject to air attack, would have their homes visited and a report on the conditions sent to them. Very soon afterwards the scope of the service was enlarged to include all matters of family well-being. It worked throughout very closely with the Legal Aid section of Army Welfare.

Before the war S.S.A.F.A. had held a Central Fund in India under the control of the Adjutant General's Branch, one of whose staff was Honorary Secretary and Treasurer of the Fund. This money was available to local Service Committees and S.S.Os in the principal stations for helping British service families in need. The fund existed until the final departure of British Forces from India, a small sum being left with the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom for cases still outstanding.

Amongst the problems for investigation at home were those connected with matrimonial differences, money troubles, clothing needs, the care of motherless children and children whose mothers were ill, the care of aged dependent relatives, and the supply of qualified nurses when needed.

During the war there were as many as 30,000 voluntary workers in the 1400 branches of the Association in the United Kingdom.

Help, within specified limits, could also be given to the widows and unmarried daughters of serving officers, but money grants were only for other ranks' families.

This society, under the name of Soldiers and Sailors Families Association, was founded in 1855 to help the families of men fighting in the 2nd Egyptian campaign and was incorporated by Royal Charter in 1926, having had "Airmen" included in its title when the Royal Flying Corps first came into existence. It is kept in existence by voluntary subscriptions, and at the Headquarters in London there is a department devoted to collecting funds by appeals, exhibitions and various money raising efforts.

The function of the Incorporated Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Help Society (I.S.S.A.H.S.) is to help serving people themselves and those who have been in the services at any time. This Society came into existence in 1899 to help men returning from the South African war. It is financially in a better position than S.S.A.F.A., as it now owns nine factories which are called the Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops, in memory of Lord Roberts who had been a member of its Executive. These factories employ ex-service men with a 50 per cent. or greater disability and train disabled men in a trade for work elsewhere if they do not have one. A factory's profits revert to the benevolent fund of the factory in which they are made. The products of these workshops are mainly furniture, brushes, lacquer work and such things.

The society also has homes for a certain number of disabled ex-service men who have nowhere else to live.

For the welfare side funds are raised by various means and the society makes grants in cases of urgent need to service and, more often, ex-service people. It has an employment bureau which has found work for a large number of ex-service men and assisted many others to obtain medical treatment when, for various reasons, they no longer qualified for it at Government expense.

The War Office accepts the independent reports of the representatives of both Societies when an investigation has been made in response to an appeal, such as a request for compassionate leave or an application for discharge before release is due, and the recommendations made in these reports are regarded as a sound basis for deciding on the merits of a case.

The similarity in the names of the two societies led to some confusion in the minds of Army Welfare Officers as well as the troops and the public, and it was frequently suggested that the two societies would have done well to combine their Overseas work. Had they done so some economy might have resulted, but possibly it might have led to complications at the home end where the two functioned separately. In India the distribution of workers was usually two S.S.A.F.A. workers and one Help Society worker in a centre, as enquiries and troubles regarding family affairs were more numerous than those concerning the service man or woman exclusively. There was perhaps more variety in the cases put to the Help Society workers, which ranged from enquiries as to how to take release in Australia, Canada or South Africa, how to set about getting a Class B release, what procedure to follow in order to take up some particular trade or business on release, where a certain "quack" treatment could be obtained for defective eyesight and its cost; to a request from an Indian soldier to find out if a relative of his had been "dragged through a town in chains, taken to the Red Fort in Delhi and shot", as a vernacular newspaper had, quite untruthfully, reported. It was seldom that any Indian members of the forces came with their queries. Only the families of British personnel were eligible for assistance from the Families Association, but in cases where Indians presented

problems to the Help Society, they were given the same consideration as those of British men or women.

An unexpected activity arose for a Help Society's representative when the released prisoners of war began to arrive in India from the Far East, some of them in such a poor state that they had lost all initiative and it was necessary to get them gradually interested in life again.

It was the men's own preference to come to a woman interviewer rather than a man with their personal and family troubles.

All Overseas workers were in uniform, somewhat similar to that worn by W.A.C. (I) officers. They were given the honorary rank of Captain (though not the pay !), and were generally housed in family messes. The pay was Rs. 200 a month from the Indian Government and a further Rs. 100 from their respective societies.

The work of these two organisations did a great deal to alleviate discontent, which tends to arise when large numbers of men are away from their homes for a long time. Much of it could have been avoided if the all-important factor of quick delivery of mail had received earlier and more efficient attention, as many family misunderstandings arose through non-receipt of letters. The Societies themselves have developed their present organisations over a period of 50 years and the fact that they grew in extent so much during the war indicates a need for personal interest in the serving man, and particularly his family, beyond what the official group welfare of the services for the troops themselves is able to supply. Sympathy and integrity of both interviewer and investigator are essential factors in the successful working of these Societies. Now that India and Pakistan have their own services and some of their womenfolk are enthusiastically taking up welfare work as a suitable outlet for the desire to serve their country people, there is scope for similar organisations in both Dominions, provided that the initiative and the money are forthcoming to start them.

DEEP PENETRATION PATROLS IN THE LIBYAN DESERT

MAJOR ERIC WILSON, V.C.

IF one wished to compare two theatres of war where conditions were in almost every detail completely different, one could do no better than to quote the Libyan Desert and the Burmese Jungles. In both theatres forces were trained and equipped for the special task of operating deep inside enemy territory. Some details of operations in enemy territory in Libya may afford an interesting contrast with those carried out later on in Burma.

This is a brief account of a special force which operated in the desert with outstanding success from Autumn 1940 until the enemy were driven out of North Africa. The official designation of the force was The Long Range Desert Group. "Lord Haw Haw", who felt on several occasions impelled to refer to its activities, used to speak of "Those Dick Turpins of the Desert". The events described all took place before May 1942, in which month I left the unit. During this period the fighting swayed backward and forward and the Jebel Akdar changed hands four times.

There is no need to remind readers that the desert battles were invariably fought at no great distance from the road which skirts the North African Coast. Not only was this the main L. of C. for both sides; it also ran through the only stretch of country where there was water enough to support two armies. South of the road the desert has usually been described as waterless and largely impassable for fighting formations. Some elaboration of this description is necessary to my story.

In Egypt, coming south from the road, the first major feature is the Qattara Depression which has at its western edge the oasis of Siwa. There is no arguing about the Qattara Depression being an obstacle; lying below sea level, it is an expanse of salt mud which will not at any time of the year support even the lightest vehicle. Nor is there any question of a military force by-passing to the south, for the Libyan Sand Sea adjoins the Depression and itself merges into an area criss-crossed with sheer sand-stone cliffs and ravines. The Gilf Kebir, as this region is called, extends south to about Latitude 24° further east, into Libya. The bulge of land with Benghazi about the centre of its coastline is known as the Jebel (Arabic = Hill). This is an area of broken hills which reach their greatest height near the road. South of the Jebel and, further east, south of the road, the country provides great variety of desert scenery. There are expanses of hard, firm sand or gravel, enormous seas of sand dunes; impassable barriers where erosion has produced a landscape which resembles the popular conception of the mountains on the moon; impassable salt marshes and, in some stretches near the coast, areas of undulating ground which support a little thin scrub.

At great distances apart are oases. Giarabub lies 80 miles west of Siwa. Jalo is a further 200 miles to the west, near the north-west corner of the Libyan Sand Sea, and far to the south is the Cufra group of oases. Any one of these would provide the perfect setting for a Beau Geste romance. In each a fort looks down upon small squares of cultivation and scattered palmeries with clusters of mud houses. The forts were no doubt excellent for repelling attacks by tribesmen, but they are equally suitable as an aiming mark for enemy aircraft.

The history of the L.R.D.G. is an interesting one. Before the war there were stationed in Egypt one or two officers who became bitten with the idea of exploring the

deserts which lie on either side of the Canal. They spent their spare time trekking in the Sinai Desert and the desert to the west of the Nile using Fords of what must now be considered antiquated design. During these trips they learnt much of such things as navigation and the maintenance of trucks in the desert.

Soon after the outbreak of war, Major Ralph Bagnold, the leader of these peace time expeditions arrived by chance at Cairo. He managed to convince H.Q. Middle East of the great results which might be achieved by a special mechanical force operating deep into the Libyan Desert. Broadly its role would be to keep a tag on the enemy's dispositions and intentions and to harass and mislead him.

Bagnold was able to gather round him nearly all his fellow explorers of peace-time and with these, and officers and men from the New Zealand forces, the group was formed. After a preliminary period of training and equipping, the first patrol left Cairo in the autumn of 1940.

The Group was soon expanded by adding to the New Zealanders, patrols of Southern Rhodesians, Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards and Yeomanry regiments. The establishment was later fixed as a Group H.Q. and about ten patrols.

At H.Q. was a large workshop section capable of dealing with major repairs; a Signal Section which kept continuous watch with all the patrols which were out; and Survey personnel who, in addition to normal survey work, collated the topographical information brought in by the patrols. An unusual feature was the two aircraft which were acquired by local purchase and used for intercommunication duties. These were single engined unarmed civilian planes made by W.A.C.O. The larger of the two was piloted and maintained by Lt.-Col. G.L. Prendergast who in the summer of 1941 took over command from Lt.-Col. R.A. Bagnold.

The Patrol was not a stereotyped formation, but for normal tasks its strength was about twenty men in five trucks. It is possible to draw an analogy between the duties of these men and those of the crew of a man-of-war; thus the members of a typical patrol might be distributed as follows: (the first named in each truck sitting in the front passenger seat, the remaining two on the tarpaulin covering the load in the back of the truck).

Leading Truck : O.C. Patrol who sets the course. Vickers gunner and his mate.

Second Truck : Wireless operator. Lewis gunner and his mate.

Third Truck : Navigator who plots the patrol's course and at dusk checks the position by astrofix. Lewis gunner and his mate.

Fourth Truck: Patrol Sergeant who acts as Q.M. and controls issue of food, water and petrol. Gunner and mate of 20 millimetre Breda.

Fifth Truck : Fitter. Vickers gunner and his mate.

The armament varied considerably. The Breda was often left behind because it reduced the "bat" load and therefore the range of the patrol. Most patrol commanders had managed to come by a number of quick-firing light automatics such as the Browning with which they supplemented the armament of each truck. Automatics were mounted in the trucks but were readily removable if required for ground action.

The trucks used were standard 30 cwt Fords or Chevrolets with three important modifications: a condenser was connected by quarter inch tubing with the

radiator to prevent loss of water due to boiling; the standard heavily treaded tyres were replaced by large balloon tyres and the cab was removed to give an unrestricted view and permit the use of a sun compass.

The loads carried by the trucks comprised mainly petrol, food and water. Provided the going in the initial stages of a patrol was sufficiently good to permit of overloading, it was possible to carry enough petrol for well over 1000 miles together with food and water for three weeks. The load of course lightened as fuel, food and water were consumed. The range of a patrol could be increased by using additional trucks, loaded mainly with petrol, to accompany the patrol part of the way and form a fuel dump where the patrol trucks could replenish both on the outward and the return journey. Dropping by aircraft was suggested but never adopted. It was considered that, with an active enemy air force, clear skies and almost complete absence of cover, this would involve serious risk of disclosing the patrols' position.

Such maps of the desert as existed generally contained large expanses of blank paper and the details shown were frequently wildly inaccurate. Map reading was therefore seldom possible. Meridians of latitude and longitude were printed on maps and these took the place of grid line references for describing positions. Two methods of navigation were used: Dead Reckoning and Astrofix.

Dead Reckoning demands a sun compass and either an accurate speedometer or one of which the error is accurately known. The distance traversed on each bearing throughout the trip is recorded. At every halt the navigator produces his note book, pencil and protractor and rules off to scale on the map the various legs of the course which he has recorded. Where the final leg ends, the map would show the patrol's position.

This method is fairly accurate but, especially if the going has been difficult and entailed twisting and turning to avoid obstacles, there may be an error of as much as 3 or 4 miles in a day's run. Therefore each evening the patrol's position is accurately determined by Astrofix. This method requires a theodolite, the necessary tables, a good watch and a wireless set on which Greenwich time signals can be received.

After the first few patrols it became possible to lay down fairly definitely the tasks for which the L.R.D.G. was particularly suited. These may be tabulated as follows:

1. **Reconnaissance**, for

- a. **Going** : That is, to discover what if any types of vehicle we or the enemy could use over various stretches of desert.

- b. **Movements** : Either by direct observation of vehicles on the road, by deduction from tracks left in the sand, by information from natives or by observation of such signs as the location of dumps or concentrations of vehicles.

- c. Location and strength of enemy garrisons.

- d. Water resources.

- e. Possible sites for advanced airfields to be used for close support of advancing troops.

2. **Raids**

- a. On traffic along roads.

b. On enemy forts or garrisons.

c. To destroy aircraft.

3. **Ferrying Tasks**

a. To ferry highly-trained saboteurs to and from "the scene of the crime".

b. To drop agents or intelligence personnel.

All patrols, besides carrying out their specific task, recorded on the map details of the country through which they passed. This information was collated on a master map kept at group H.Q., thus gradually building up an accurate map of areas hitherto unsurveyed.

A brief account of a few patrols will help to show how the above tasks were carried out.

Going: A strong patrol was sent from Cufra with orders to reach the coastal area by passing between the oases of Jalo and Marada. Here they were to split forming two patrols which would move westwards on roughly parallel courses until they were approximately south of Sirte. The northern patrol's task was to recce the going immediately south of the road and to find a suitable spot where future patrols could lie up to observe traffic on the road. The southern patrol was to cover a strip some miles further south and report on the going and any signs of enemy movement.

The patrol set off from Cufra soon after dawn and reached the outlying oasis of Taizerbo the same evening. Here they lay up until dusk before starting on the flat open stretch of desert immediately to the north of Taizerbo. They drove northwards all night keeping direction by the Pole Star. Seen from the back of the leading truck it was an impressive sight. The lights of a dozen trucks advancing in wide open formation seemed to be suspended almost motionless, only swinging very slightly as the patrol passed over small dips and rises. Twelve Ford engines broke the silence of the desert night with a roar like a squadron of bombers passing high overhead.

At dawn the patrol reached a large wadi which, with its hard surface and network of smaller wadis leading into it, offered an excellent hiding place. Here the vehicles were carefully camouflaged with nets and the patrol lay up until the afternoon when they set off again leaving four petrol lorries with their crews under command of the Medical Officer to wait for their return. Passing between Jalo and Marada they swung to the west. One night they camped a hundred yards short of the Ageila-Marada track and were woken by a party of natives shouting to each other to ward off evil spirits as they journeyed towards Marada.

On leaving this camp the two patrols split. The Northern Patrol found considerable stretches of good going and travelled parallel to the coast nearby as far as Sirte. They found an excellent easily approachable hiding up place from which a few weeks later our patrols were keeping continuous watch on enemy traffic along the road.

The Southern Patrol moved also roughly parallel to the coast but some miles further south. They soon ran into bad going which eventually became impassable and forced them to turn back after having tried several routes. Both patrols returned to the rendezvous which they reached within a few hours of each other and found that the Doctor's party had been undisturbed. The whole party then returned to Cufra without incident. They had covered well over a thousand miles and been out between two and three weeks.

The main fruits of this patrol were:—

A good deal of information about going.

Information, mostly negative, about the extent to which tracks between oases were in use.

The finding of a route to and from the coast and a suitable hide up from which to observe the road.

Observation of Enemy Movements: From Siwa a patrol was ordered to go and recce enemy dumps and concentrations in an area south of the Jebel bounded roughly by Msus, Antelat and Saunnu. The country here is very open and the patrol, being under constant observation, was forced almost continually to keep moving on. At times they were driving parallel with Axis vehicles and so close that they could only have escaped detection because so much of our own recently captured transport was being used by the Germans. From one of the few places where they were able for a while to hide they had the mortifying experience of watching one of our own L.R.D.G. trucks, still bearing our markings, drive past with a number of Germans sitting in the back. It had been captured a week previously together with half the Coldstream Guards patrol. They were able also to observe the efficiency of the enemy salvage organisation. Only a few days after we had withdrawn from the area, tools and spare parts had already been neatly laid out and parties were moving from vehicle to vehicle checking and painting on appropriate new markings.

This patrol owing to the hectic conditions prevailing was able to take only a hurried look at most of the parts of its allotted area. Considering the hazardous nature of the journey they succeeded in bringing back remarkably detailed information about enemy dumps, concentrations and movements.

Location and Strength of Enemy Garrisons: At one stage a raid on Jalo being contemplated, it was necessary to discover the strength and disposition of the oasis defences. The L.R.D.G. had been using Jalo as a base until the withdrawal of the 8th Army had necessitated its evacuation and they were therefore familiar with the local topography. A patrol from Siwa took two Senussi agents, natives of Jalo who had formerly served the Italians, and dropped them at the edge of their oasis. These men went to a kinsman's house and remained concealed there for two days. During this time they obtained in great detail information of the layout of the defences, movements of road convoys to and from the oasis and of aircraft using the local airfield. That no report of their presence came to the ears of the Germans or Italians was due probably to the Italian system of administration. In contrast with the English system which tries usually to administer using as far as possible the authority of a local hereditary or elected chief, the Italians would frequently confer a chieftainship upon a retiring N.C.O. as a reward for long and faithful service. Thus the chief of Jalo was an ex-soldier and a native of Derna, probably unpopular and not in close and sympathetic touch with the permanent families in Jalo.

When the patrol returned to Siwa a sand model of Jalo was set up and the agents were carefully questioned and cross-questioned. Their information was given in great detail and proved subsequently to be remarkably accurate.

Water Resources: In order to estimate the possibility of ourselves or the Germans manoeuvring round the southern flank, information was required about the water resources of an area lying to the south-west of Ageila. A patrol set off from Cufra to obtain the information. In addition to the usual loads they carried a number of sterilised bottles and ropes and buckets for drawing water. At each well

they drew and bottled samples of the water and tried to estimate the potential yield. Although this is a particularly wild and rugged stretch of desert they met with natives at several of their halts. All these they told that they were Germans and they shouted German oaths at each other. This stratagem quite patently failed to deceive the natives using the wells nearer the coast.

The samples of water duly reached Cufra whence they were sent on to Cairo. Here by a series of misfortunes the bottles were emptied before they reached the analyst. This was of little consequence because the area of the wells was reported to be quite impracticable for military operations, so that it did not matter whether the water was sweet or brackish. On one obstacle at least the patrol were able to report in great detail for they spent the whole of one day digging a truck out of a particularly vicious stretch of salt marsh.

Raid on Traffic: A patrol had been sent from Siwa with orders to do the maximum possible damage to traffic on the Benghazi-Barce Road. Just before sunset they took up an ambush position by the road from which they destroyed a small convoy. Fearing that the noise might have deterred further potential victims the patrol then motored east along the road with the sun setting behind them, and they spent the last quarter of an hour or so of daylight shooting up every vehicle which they met. Finally, when the light had almost faded, they swung off the road and picked their way slowly south across the desert. After a while they halted for food and a rest. The patrol commander was planning to derail one of the trains which occasionally ran from Benghazi to Benina and he was both disappointed and indignant when ordered by wireless to return and prepare for another task.

Raid on Garrisons: A patrol left Siwa to carry out a raid on the coastal garrison of Marsa Brega and arrived in the area the day before the raid was due. The patrol commander made a detailed recce on foot and decided that, with the sea to the north and extensive salt marsh to the south, the only possible approach was along the main road itself. The next night he accordingly led his patrol on to the road at a point some miles west of Marsa Brega. In the lead he put a captured Lancia lorry to be silhouetted by the headlights of the second truck. There was a moment of anxious suspense when the Lancia stalled its engine while turning into the road. Then the whole patrol drove eastwards passing a steady stream of Axis traffic.

They reached a point in Marsa Brega where there was a considerable cluster of enemy transport and a number of troops. Here the patrol commander halted and waited for the last of his trucks to arrive. Just as this truck arrived the enemy decided to start shooting. After a fierce battle at point-blank range, the patrol extricated itself and moved westward along the road until they were able to pull off and make a getaway into the desert. The patrol sergeant in the last truck stopped at intervals on the road and placed mines to deter any would-be pursuers; he had the satisfaction of hearing several loud explosions in his wake.

There is ample evidence to show that these patrols, quite apart from the material damage they caused and the valuable information they collected, had an enormous bogey value which gave the enemy a very exaggerated idea of the forces actually operating.

Probably the most dangerous opposition came from the air. While on occasions tracks left on the desert surface may become obliterated almost immediately, more often they remain clearly visible for weeks or months. This greatly assists an aircraft in following up vehicles which have once been located, but the patrol,

with its not inconsiderable fire power and manoeuvrability, did not always come off second best.

There was no Axis counterpart to the L.R.D.G. although the Germans had at least one officer with wide experience of the Libyan Desert. Being a German it is not safe to assume that his peace-time explorations had been entirely devoted to searching for the lost army of Cambyses.

It may fairly be concluded that in the L.R.D.G. we had a weapon which surprised and defeated both the Desert and the Enemy.

Jet Fighters for the R.I.A.F.

The acquisition of three jet-propelled De Havilland "Vampire" aircraft marks an important stage in the modernisation and expansion of the Royal Indian Air Force. These jet planes, it is understood, are only the first instalment, and yet more modern aircraft of various types will be acquired progressively.

THE GENERAL'S MAP

"Bow-Wow"

SMITH, the attached officer, had been told to go through some musty old files lying in the office with a view to destruction. A few minutes later, I found him poring over an old map.

"This any use, Sir; an old map marked 'G.O.C.'s shoot?'"

"Sounds like a nugget to me", I replied. "Bring it here me lad, and let's have a look-see."

Sure enough, small circles had been marked on a map; red for duck, at intervals along the wide river which ran in channels through the scrubby foot-hills; blue for sandgrouse, and green for Imperial sandgrouse. Against the circles were marked dates when the duck came through during their annual migration. The trouble was that the place could only be reached by a villainous road; too far for biking or riding, so the only solution was a car. Probably this forgotten spot of General Binks—he of the G.O.C.'s map, and a famous shikari of old days—must now have become almost a game sanctuary.

With difficulty, four of us managed to get a Sunday off, Smith being previously sent out, and warned not to return until he had managed to arrange for the hire of a taxi—no easy matter in those days.

Achieving the impossible, he ordered the car to come round to my quarters at a very early hour, for it was necessary to be on the ground at the crack of dawn.

Of course the taxi turned up an hour late, and four rather stuffy individuals had their bulging livers shaken up over the execrable, and somewhat terrifying, road.

A walk of about 800 yards brought us to the river. We found a broad expanse of water on which a large number of mallard and pintail were lying. A few wedges of duck were moving up and down the river. From the distance there came the chuckle of sandgrouse as they moved in packs from the water towards the scrub jungle beyond the banks.

There was very little cover on the river, so I put up my portable hide behind some stones, and then placed five decoys in the shallow water upstream. Three guns were separated, about 400 yards apart, but one gun was placed at a good settling spot about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles downstream to keep the duck moving.

How we cursed the lateness of the car, for it is during the first hour after dawn that the heaviest bag is usually made. The initial bang put up several packs which proved too high to tackle, for shots have to be picked, with cartridges at fantastic war prices.

* * *

The shoot now begins. One female mallard comes in from the right, crumpling with a satisfactory 'splosh' in the water. Then a pack approaches, far too high, but suddenly dives down towards the decoys, and a lucky shot brings down a gad-wall, pulled out of the sky.

The bottom gun has now got busy, faint reports being heard from downstream, followed by little black lines in the sky as the duck come back again. Then a surprising booming noise is heard in the distance, with an increasing crescendo, as a large bomber comes down the river flying only some fifty feet above the water; the R.A.F. are evidently prospecting a new venue for a shoot. Back it comes again upstream. The duck seem rather upset, for they are now moving in small parties, and, thank heaven, flying considerably lower.

There are a number of pops up and down the stream; all the guns seem to be rather busy; men can be seen wading into the water to retrieve the birds. Curiously enough, the first six duck collected at my butt are all of different varieties—mallard, pintail, gadwall, red-headed pochard, tufted pochard and a teal.

A figure emerges, after wading the river, doing a most elaborate snake-like crawl to my hide—quite unnecessary as there is nothing about at the moment; this turns out to be the shikari. Raising himself slowly on his arms, he points at my decoys.

“Look, sahib, shoot! A very big duck quite close to you.”

This appears to appeal to the sense of humour of my gun chokra who holds his sides with merriment, much to the chagrin and disgust of the shikari, whose dignity is ruffled at being made a figure of fun by a mere boy, so the lad gets a restrained but potent flow of abuse which temporarily sobers him.

“They took me in, sahib, and I’m an old shikari too. That’s a very good bundobast, and I only wish more sahibs would use them.”

“Take cover, sahib, more duck coming, but very high.”

We all creep in under the meagre cover as a wedge of teal, with several big duck among them, unexpectedly swerve down at the decoys. I pull on two of the big duck, and am lucky to get them both with a right and left. They turn out to be pintail, male and female.

Some more dull reports from downstream indicate that the lower gun has been getting some shooting, so the glasses are turned in his direction and show that two pin-points are coming up the river. They get closer, and from their size they are evidently geese. Fortunately, two B.B. have been inserted at the extreme end of the cartridge belt, and these are quickly loaded in the gun. They are flying low, so all may be well; as they get nearer it is fairly certain that they are Gray-Lag, rather uncommon visitors here.

No luck! They pass by a good hundred yards away, but, apparently, seem inclined to settle. They move over towards the left bank, landing on the edge of the water some distance below the top gun who is quite invisible in his hide. This gun has spotted the geese all right, and is now stalking them while the birds seem to be in blissful ignorance of the fact.

Now he has fired, and one goose is down—good work—No! He is up in the air, but a second barrel puts him down again. The bird recovers once again, flying slowly upstream and out of sight. The top gun is now waving his arms on the bank, and one can almost hear his language. What a tragedy.

It transpires, afterwards, that he had only No. 6 shot, for no bigger sizes had

been procurable locally in those war-time days. He kicked himself for not having got up to make a rush at the birds. A goose is a slow riser; by making a rush, it is often possible to gain some ten to twenty yards, thus getting in a near shot before the bird has time to get under way. When tackling a heavy bird, such as a goose, with small shot, this is not a bad plan to adopt. It often meets with success if one can get in a couple of barrels at really close range, even with number eight, when a hit in the head or neck may often prove fatal.

No. 2 gun has also been in action. A number of duck got up under his bank. Discarding two very easy shots at pochard, he concentrates on a drake mallard which is a bit too far off. Few can resist the magnetism of this glorious bird. However, the luck is mine, for the old drake comes downstream straight over my head—a very easy shot, and he drops right on the stone bund below the decoys.

No. 2 is now collecting his birds lying in the water, but there is one he cannot get, a teal swimming fairly strongly towards mid-stream, so he gives it another barrel without apparent effect. I get the glasses on to this wounded bird, watching with interest, for I may be able to collect it for No. 2 when it floats down the river. A little later, the teal's head goes flat on the water; it does not attempt to dive, and it will soon be a dead bird. Although coming down towards me with the stream, I can only see a black speck through the glasses, and then the speck suddenly disappears amid a circle of rings like a rising trout. There are some formidable mahseer and other predatory beasts about in the river, so it is quite possible that one of these may have pulled it down.

* * *

About mid-day, beyond an occasional bird, the duck were not moving and did not, according to the shikari, continue their flight up and down the river until 4 p.m. It was decided to investigate the sandgrouse who had been heard chuckling in the early morning. To this end, the bottom gun moved into the scrub jungle, where, from the number of shots, he appeared to be enjoying himself. A few flights came upstream, settling on the rough ground behind No. 1 gun who then went after them. The shikari said that they were not nearly so numerous as in former years. It was a pleasure to meet the black-bellied Imperial again, for in many localities he is rarely seen.

After 4 p.m. the duck started moving again, so the guns walked up the right bank taking cover in crops where they were quite invisible. Several packs moved into the wide expanse of water above the bund, settling with a splash, forming little wavelets with ever increasing circles which lapped against the banks.

Gradually these birds drifted towards their favourite feeding ground under the right bank. When they were well within shot, and at a given signal, the guns sprang into action. There was a roar of wings as they rose, which is music to the soul of the wild-fowler. The fun lasted for about a minute; some of the packs, confused by the firing from several points, came over the guns a second time before their final departure, consequently a satisfactory number paid the penalty for their indecision.

It was now time to make a move for home. When the beaters and the shikari had been paid off, it was pleasing to note that the boot of the car could only be closed with difficulty over a bag which had exceeded the most optimistic expectations. Not only had the cobwebs of long days of office work been swept away, but there was also a welcome change of the menu in prospect. On the return journey, the bumps over the miserable track, which called itself a road, were just as bad, but the knobs had been knocked off the livers, so the company was definitely affable and positively cheery.

* * *

Next morning, in the office, there was no appreciable decrease in the number of files piling up in the in-trays, but the atmosphere had undergone a marked change. Heads were clearer, and spleens had mysteriously vanished. Smith, the attached officer, was seen to be handling the General's map; heaving a deep sigh, he was looking lovingly at it.

"Oh, Smith!"

"Sir?"

"Just lock up that map in the bottom of the Security Cabinet will you? I don't want it left lying about—Valuable and highly confidential document that!"

"Aye, Aye", replied Smith, with a grin.

Helicopters

From the military point of view, the modern helicopter may be said to be a coming aircraft. It can take off and land on a place the size of a tennis court and can pick up and set down people and parcels without having to land. It is twice as fast as any ground transport. It can lift sections of a bridge and put them across a ravine.

PRIMUS IN INDIS

LIEUT.-COLONEL M.E.S. LAWS, O.B.E., M.C., R.A. (Retd.)

IN "News and Views" of the April 1948 issue of the Journal it is stated that "the first regiment of the British Army to serve in India as distinct from troops of the East India Company was the 1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment, which disembarked at Madras in 1775." This statement is not strictly correct, for although Colonel Aldercron's Regiment (later the 39th Foot and today 1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment) arrived in Madras in 1754 (not 1775), it was not the first unit of King's troops to serve in India or even the first King's infantry battalion. The former distinction truly belongs to 12 (Minden) Anti-Tank Battery R.A. and the latter to two battalions of Independent Companies of Foot, all of which reached Madras on 28 July, 1748.

In 1746 the East India Company was hard pressed by the French in Madras and appealed to the British Government in London for naval and military assistance. The application was accepted, but it was no easy matter to find the troops necessary for such a distant expedition since Britain was still engaged on the Continent. Moreover, the chief need in Madras was for Gunners, for the East India Company had as yet no properly organised artillery units of its own. The British Army only had 11 Companies (*i.e.* Batteries), of which one was in Minorca, one at Gibraltar, one at Louisburg (North America), five were in Flanders, one in Scotland and two at Woolwich. None of these companies could be withdrawn for an indefinite time to go to India, and so it was decided to raise a new company of the Royal Artillery especially for the expedition.

Nor was it any easier to produce an infantry force, since the British Army's limited resources were already strained to breaking point by its commitments on the Continent and in the overseas garrisons. Eventually, however, 12 Independent Companies of Infantry were raised and were hastily organised into two weak battalions. A considerable proportion of the rank and file of these units were prisoners of war taken during the suppression of the rebellion in Scotland, and from a diary left by one of them, it is clear that in most cases they had the alternative of facing trial for treason or enlisting in one of the infantry companies for service at Madras.

The new artillery unit was recruited on more orthodox lines though in almost equal haste. It was officially formed at Woolwich on 1 July, 1747 by Captain J. Goodyer R.A. and most of its men were enlisted within six weeks by a special recruiting drive around Gloucester and Birmingham. A cadre of thoroughly experienced officers and N.C.O.s and a few old Gunners was added from the other Companies at Woolwich, and on 13 October 1747, Captain Goodyer's Company R.A. marched out of Woolwich for Portsmouth where it arrived six days later and immediately embarked on board a naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Hon. E. Boscawen. Included in this squadron was H.M. Bomb Vessel Basilisk carrying two heavy sea service mortars which were served by a separate picked detachment of two Lieutenant-Fireworkers, one Sergeant, three Bombardiers, four Gunners and four Matrosses of the Royal Artillery.

Admiral Boscawen was not only in command of both naval and military forces of the expedition, but he was also given supreme command of all the land and sea forces (both King's and Company's) in the East Indies. He thus became in

effect the first of the long line of Commanders-in-Chief, India, a position only once again held by a naval officer—Lord Louis Mountbatten.

The expedition eventually sailed from Spithead on 25 October, 1747 and did not reach Fort St. David (then the seat of the Madras Government) until 28 July, 1748. There the troops were disembarked and were reinforced by a hastily formed battalion of Royal Marines collected from the ships of the squadron and by a body of over 1,000 seamen. There was also a weak battalion of the Company's European infantry and some independent companies of Sepoys as yet inadequately armed and trained. With this curiously mixed force, Admiral Boscawen, who commanded in person, set out by land on 8 August to attack Pondicherry.

After advancing slowly for four days, the British came upon the fort of Ariyankuppam which was held by the French and which blocked the approach to Pondicherry. With almost incredible rashness, the Admiral accepted without question the assurance of a deserter that the fort was not strongly held, and, with no attempt at reconnaissance, assaulted Ariyankuppam at dawn next morning. The attack was repulsed with heavy casualties, among them being Captain Goodyer R.A., who, after 17 years' commissioned service, was an exceptionally able officer and probably the most experienced and competent soldier in the whole force. His death—"by a Cannon Ball in his Legge"—was a serious blow, for the subsequent operations were almost entirely artillery affairs and his expert knowledge and exceptional activity were to be sorely missed.

After the failure of the attempt to rush the fort, the British began formal siege operations and laboriously brought up battering guns and heavy mortars. Admiral Boscawen complained bitterly of the inefficiency of his Engineer Officers "through Fear or some other Infatuation", as he baldly wrote in his official report. Eventually the artillery officers took charge of the construction of the siege works and matters progressed better, but a surprise sortie by the French garrison caused an ugly panic among the Battalions of Independent Companies and nearly led to disaster. At length, however, a heavy and accurate artillery bombardment was opened which blew up the fort's magazine and speedily led to surrender.

The British then repaired the fort of Ariyankuppam, installed a small garrison and on 26 August moved forward on Pondicherry. There was no question of a surprise infantry assault here, for the town was strongly defended and the heart-breaking business of constructing siege works had to be started all over again. Once more there were loud complaints that the Engineers "could get nothing produced" and in the end it took a month before the besiegers' guns were ready to open fire. Meanwhile the Bomb Vessel Basilisk had been busily engaged in shelling the enemy positions from the sea with her heavy mortars, but could effect little unsupported against the solid coast defences.

Then, just as the British were ready to open their bombardment, came torrential rains which flooded the siege works and drowned the magazines. Worse still, the young soldiers, worn out with constant labour, fell sick in alarming numbers and a Council of War advised the abandonment of the operation. The besiegers therefore destroyed their guns and withdrew with great difficulty, but fortunately without enemy interference, to Fort St. David.

Admiral Boscawen himself was convinced that the failure of the attack was largely due to the death of his C.R.A. "The Loss of this Officer", he wrote in his official report, "was almost the greatest we could have sustained, as he was a very able one and would have carried on our Approaches for Us in a quite different Manner to what the Engineers did." Captain Goodyer's death had other results, for it is now known that the East India Company intended to appoint him the Commandant of the three artillery companies which it had already decided to raise.

one in each of the three Presidencies. Had he lived, therefore, it is probable that Captain Goodyer would have raised these three Companies as parts of a single corps and would have been in effect the first British artillery commander for the whole of the Company's forces in India. As it was, no other R.A. officer of sufficient seniority and experience being immediately available, the scheme fell through and the artillery establishments of Bengal, Bombay and Madras were formed and developed separately without any co-ordinating authority as three entirely distinct regiments which were never amalgamated till all were absorbed into the Royal Artillery in 1861.

Admiral Boscawen's force remained at Cuddalore until peace was signed and had the satisfaction of re-occupying Madras before it sailed in October 1749 for England. Four N.C.Os. and twenty Gunners of the Royal Artillery remained in India to form the nucleus of the first Company of the Madras Artillery which was raised about this time, and a number of infantry-men of the Independent Companies also transferred to the Company's Madras European Regiment. The remainder of the force reached England in April 1750 when the Independent Companies were at once disbanded as later were the Marines. Captain Goodyer's Company R.A. however fortunately escaped extinction and is today the 12th (Minden) I Anti-Tank Battery R.A.

Four years later (in April 1754) Colonel Aldercron's Regiment (later the 39th Foot and today 1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment) embarked in Ireland for Madras accompanied by a detachment of one Captain-Lieutenant, two Subalterns, three Lieutenant-Fireworkers, 12 Cadets, two Sergeants, two Corporals, five Bombardiers, 20 Gunners and 24 Matrosses of the Royal Artillery. This artillery detachment (which was made up from drafts from six different Companies in England) was commanded by Captain-Lieutenant W. Hislop who had served as a subaltern in Captain Goodyer's Company in 1747-49. It is probable that he was selected to command this detachment on account of his previous service in Madras and it is obvious that Aldercron's Regiment must have been perfectly aware that it was not the first British unit to have served in India. There can therefore be no doubt that the proud title Primus in Indis belongs by historical right to 12 Anti-Tank Battery R.A., but since this latter unit already has the Honour Sub-Title "Minden" and cannot therefore be given another, it is probable that the claim of the 1st Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment, will not be contested.

THE FORD OF KABUL RIVER

LIEUT.-COLONEL C.C.R. MURPHY

There's the river up and brimming,
And there's half a squadron swimming
'Cross the ford of Kabul River in the dark.

—Kipling

THE incident to which these lines refer happened a generation ago. It was a disaster of the most distressing kind, that caused a great sensation at the time. No one was to blame; it was just one of those episodes inseparable from war when even the best of men may be caught in the clutches of adversity.

Ordinarily, of course, the fording of a river does not present any difficulty, and the long annals of military history show that our soldiers have performed this operation successfully under all conceivable conditions. The established practice is for the width of the ford to be carefully marked out beforehand on both sides by means of strong pickets driven into the bed of the river. The tops of the pickets, which should stick out well above the water, are then joined together by stout ropes, securely fixed to holdfasts on the banks. When these precautions have been taken, all is plain sailing; and if the bottom be hard and the current not excessive, cavalry can safely ford a stream up to a depth of four feet. On this particular occasion, however, the operation had to be undertaken without crossing-stakes and in the dark.

During the second Afghan War, in the spring of 1879, intelligence was received that a *lashkar* of about a thousand Ghilzais had collected in the plain which lies along the north bank of the Kabul River. Upon receipt of this news, Brigadier-General Macpherson was ordered at short notice to move against this concentration, with a squadron of the 10th (Prince of Wales's Own Royal) Hussars, another of the 11th Bengal Lancers (Probyn's Horse), a mountain battery, and about 900 rifles drawn from various regiments.

The column started from Jalalabad one night towards the end of March, and shortly afterwards began to ford the Kabul River at two points by moonlight. The lower of these two fords, which was used by the cavalry and which had upon the arrival of the British force in Jalalabad been staked in the manner just described, was of a difficult and winding course. The crossing-stakes, however, had been subsequently removed at the request of the friendly inhabitants, to whom the difficulties of the ford had hitherto proved to be an effective protection against the raids of the rebels. The latter were unfamiliar with its dangerous intricacies, and the people of Jalalabad, fearing that their blood-thirsty neighbours would now be able to discover its secrets, successfully petitioned the military authorities to have these tell-tale crossing-stakes removed. This significant fact is recorded in the regimental history of Probyn's Horse.

On the night in question, only two guides (both Afghans) were available to point out the line of the ford. The squadron of Probyn's Horse, with these two guides, led the way; they were 120 strong and crossed over in half-sections, namely two abreast, without mishap. Soon the banks became very slippery, and the stream being strong and rapid, the column tailed out considerably. By the time the Hussars arrived at the ford, it was ten o'clock at night and the moon had

become hidden by clouds; but as the success of the attack depended largely on the element of surprise, no lights were allowed, and the Hussars had to find their way by following the leading squadron as best they could. They were told to keep up with the *pakhal* males of the Indian Cavalry. Thus without crossing-stakes or guiding lights, and clinging precariously to the tail of an unseen squadron, the Hussars found themselves in a desperate plight; but desperate or not, the job had to be tackled without hesitation.

It is a well-known fact that when crossing a ford either by day or night, the eye insensibly follows the current. In the case of a column—and more particularly when there are no points to march on—each man without knowing it gets lower down the stream than the one in front of him, and the whole lot gradually incline towards the lower edge of the ford until those in rear miss it altogether. The further away from the head of the column, the greater the risk—especially at night.

No doubt this is what happened on the fateful night, for Captain Spottiswoode* says that almost immediately after he had entered the stream, the water came up to his boots and then to his knees, which looks as though the Hussars had struck the river at the very edge of the ford, if not indeed below it.

Captain Spottiswoode describes how he and Lieut. Hon'ble James Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) entered the water together, followed by three other subalterns, Greenwood¹, Harford and Grenfell and seventy-five rank and file in half sections. When they got out into the stream, the two *pakhal* mules (ridden by bhistis) which they had been told to follow, were swept away in front of them. The rear sections of Probyn's Horse had apparently inclined too much down stream because the Hussars seem to have got off the course of the ford almost at once. The ice-cold river, swollen by rain and melted snow, was running like a mill-race. Horses were swept from their footing, and soon the whole squadron was floundering in deep water. Officers and men, encumbered with accoutrements and wearing long boots² and horses over-weighted with arms, ammunition, forage and rations, were alike unable to swim. Somehow or other, a few managed to keep afloat and to struggle into the shallows; but Lieut. Harford, 46 other ranks, and 13 horses were drowned. Some of the bodies were washed down the river as far as Nowshera, many miles beyond the frontier. Captain Spottiswoode himself had a narrow escape, and was only saved by his charger, a magnificent horse called Malabar.

About midnight, the quiet of the camp at Jalalabad was suddenly broken by the distant sound of horses galloping, and in a few moments by the light of the moon riderless steeds to the number of five-and-twenty or more could be seen rushing into camp, bespattered with mud and foam, coming evidently from the direction of the Kabul River. There had been no shots heard in that quarter, and those in camp were at a loss to guess what dire news these messengers of death were bringing³. They were not kept long in suspense; for shortly after, a party of men, wet and dripping, came toiling across the fields, bringing the sad tidings of the disaster.

The official view of the accident was expressed by that famous veteran, Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., in the following words:—

The squadron of the 10th Hussars, following a squadron of Bengal Lancers across the Kabul River, and yielding to the strength of the current, left the ford, which is 60 feet wide, with an average depth of 2½ feet,

*Reminiscences, by Colonel Robert Spottiswoode, X.R.H.

1. Awarded the Royal Humane Society's medal for bravery at the ford.

2. Hence Kipling's allusion, 'their boots'll pull 'em under.'

3. "The Graphic."

and went over the rapids into deep water. It is assumed that just at that moment a wave or spate came down, as the column of the 10th, 140 yards long, were all at once carried into deep water. There is no other way of accounting how a long column could all instantaneously have been washed off the ford. Immediately after, the river was re-forded by some of the men without accident."

Within recent times this tragic episode was recalled by a strange circumstance. One of the troopers who was drowned had with him a sword belonging to a subaltern named Bryan, afterwards Lord Bellew. Many years later, this sword (which had the owner's name on it) was discovered in a village on the North-West Frontier. It was subsequently returned to him and now hangs in Barmeath Castle, County Louth, Eire.

Ich dien.

Battle Statistics

Of 20 soldiers in any army in modern battle, 19 emerge unscathed. If you are hit the chances are 4 out of 5 that you will not be killed. If you are wounded, the chances are 3 out of 4 that the part hit is a limb; 1 out of 8 that it is head or neck; if you are hit by a splinter, the chances are 50 to 1 that the splinter is smaller than one inch; 5 to 1, that it is smaller than 1 centimetre. —*METP.*

JAPAN AND THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST

CAPTAIN S.G. CHAPHEKAR

THE modern history of Japan dates from the Meiji restoration in the sixties of the last century. Before that time all the power was centered in the hands of the Shoguns (Regents). The regency used to pass from one family to another. The country was feudal. It stopped its intercourse with the outside world when the Tokugawa Shogunate forbade foreign travel and trade in the 17th century. For two hundred years Japan remained closed to foreigners except the Dutch who were allowed to establish a few trading stations. The 19th century drew the attention of western powers towards Japan. But Japan was unwilling to emerge from her isolation. The American Admiral Perry decided to use force and bombarded the coast of Japan. This drew Japan from her isolation. She was forced to open her ports to other powers. Had it not been for the new emperor Meiji perhaps Japan would have gone the way of many other oriental countries and might have become an American or British possession. But the new emperor was a godsend to Japan. He brought the Shogunate to an end and the emperor again became the real ruler of the country. It was lucky for Japan that the young emperor was able to gather around him statesmen, soldiers, literary men and social workers who were all fired by a desire to serve their country.

Meiji saw that the power of western nations was based on science and progress. He realised that Japan had no chance of competing with them, if she stuck to her old traditions. He felt sure that the only way to beat the westerners was to become western. The Japanese Government began to send hundreds of young men to England, Germany, France and America. They brought hundreds of English and American instructors and technicians to Japan. The progress which Japan made in 35 years was phenomenal. The whole country was westernised. Even music was imported from the west. In the beginning Japan bought everything from England and America. But the Japanese possessed a wonderful ability for imitation and assimilation. Japan began to manufacture light machinery. She learnt navigation from Britain, business from America and medicine from Germany. She modelled her army and government on German lines.

The social conditions were favourable to bringing about these changes. The people were used to regimentation under the Samurai war lords. The Samurai class responded to the emperor's appeal and gave up their privileges. The Japanese look upon their emperor as a god and believe that to die for him is the highest honour a Japanese can achieve. In western countries the king and country are two separate and distinct entities. But in Japan the emperor and the country are identical. The emperor had men like Nogi, Togo and Ito, etc. to help him in rebuilding Japan. Japan began to pulsate with a new spirit of nationalism. In western democracies people grumble against the Government. In Japan the Government is blindly obeyed. The Japanese parliament was more or less an advisory body. The Cabinet was not responsible to the Diet, but to the emperor. Cabinets were formed and dissolved at his will. A national system of compulsory education was introduced and the minds of the rising generation were moulded to suit the requirements of the nation. The Japanese worker works for ten hours a day on a comparatively low wage. He does not complain. He believes that he is working for his country and not for the owner of the factory. The Japanese are Buddhists but they also practise Shintoism. Nature too has helped in building up the character of the people. Beautiful scenery has created a love for arts amongst them. Frequent earthquakes have made

them fatalists. Thousands of houses fall down during these quakes but the Japanese people patiently re-build them. The typical oriental home life has also a share in the character-building of the people. The parent's rule is absolute. The Japanese borrowed everything from the west, except the home life of the latter, which was a blessing.

By the end of the 19th century, Japan was completely changed. From a backward medieval country she developed into a modern State. In 1895, she felt strong enough to go to war with China. Contrary to everybody's expectation she defeated the Celestial empire and acquired Formosa and other territories. This victory further strengthened the people's resolve to make their country great. In 1904, Japan thought that she was strong enough to challenge Russia. Russia was a first class European power and everyone believed that she would crush Japan. But the brilliant naval and military victories won by Togo and Nogi forced Russia to sue for peace. This unexpected victory of Japan attracted the attention of the world towards this little island empire. European countries began to take notice of Japan and began to treat her with respect. The Emperor Meiji can be rightly called the father and builder of modern Japan. He made Japan a first class world power.

In 1905 Britain made an alliance of friendship with Japan. The treaty was to remain in force for 20 years. In the First World War Japan joined the Allies and took possession of the German leased territory of Shantung in China and the Carolina islands in the Pacific. The League of Nations gave Japan a mandate over these islands. Japan took full advantage of the First World War. European countries were too busy in fighting and producing war materials. Japan's industries made rapid strides and within four years captured the markets in many parts of the world. After the war America and European countries found it impossible to dislodge Japan from these markets. Japan specialised in piece-goods, toys, rubber-goods, stationery, silk, rayon, ceramic-ware, tinned-foods, etc. Japanese inventors invented special automatic looms which saved manpower. Long hours, low wages, nationalism and regimentation of the people made Japan a great industrial country. After the war, Japan started heavy industries. There was no field in industry in which Japan lagged behind America and Europe. In certain fields she even surpassed them. Japanese goods began to invade the European and American markets. Japanese tea-sets sold cheaper in England than British tea-sets. She sold cloth in India cheaper than the Indian made cloth, though Japan had to buy the cotton from India, transport it, turn it into cloth and re-transport the finished goods to India.

The growing industrial expansion of Japan began to alarm Britain, America, France and Holland. Britain, America and Japan were maritime powers and the safety and expansion of their empires and trade depended upon their navies. In an attempt at keeping down the naval strength of Japan, Britain and America at the Disarmament Conference proposed the ratio of 5:5:3 in the Pacific. This was a blow to the building programme of the Japanese navy. Japan did actually scrap some of her ships to observe the naval ratio in the Pacific. Japanese politics were influenced by liberalism at the moment and the ministers sincerely wished for peace.

The army element in Japanese politics again came into power at the end of the twenties and a new policy was adopted. Japan's population was increasing rapidly. In 1900 Japan's population was 50 million. By 1930, it increased to 70 million. In 1940, Japan claimed to have a population of 90 million. Japan proper is too small to accommodate this large population. Japan's industrial expansion absorbed a large percentage of this population. To feed this growing population it was necessary for Japan to have assured markets for her goods and an assured supply of raw materials. Expansion of trade and expansion of her territories were the only two ways open to her.

Japan began to look around for markets. China is one of the biggest markets in the world, but Chinese foreign trade was entirely in the hands of the U.S.A., Britain and France. South-East Asia is the largest source of raw materials in the world. There is oil in Borneo, Sumatra and Burma. Siam, Burma and Indo-China produce millions of tons of surplus rice. The following tables taken from "Contemporary Japan", May, 1942, will give the reader some idea of the population, area, density of population, and the major raw products on the basis of world production:—

Country	Area (Kilo-ms)	Population	Density	Year
Phillipines	296,296	13,499,405	44.2	1935
French Indo-China	740,400	23,030,000	31.1	1936
Thailand	518,162	13,502,000	26.1	1936
Malaya	136,236	4,660,215	31.2	1936
Br.N. Borneo	75,586	284,813	3.7	1933
Sarawak	124,034	442,900	3.6	1934
Borneo	6,475	33,951	5.2	1936
D.E. Indies	1,904,346	60,731,027	31.9	1930
D.Timor	18,989	460,655	23.8	1934
Burma	676,000	14,667,146	21.7	1931

"It is to be noted that compared with the entire territory of Japan the South Sea region is larger by more than six times in area and by more than 30 million in population; but its density of population per square kilometer is less than a fifth of Japan's, showing that there is ample room for colonisation and development. With Japan, Manchukuo, China and India included, the population of Greater East Asia is more than half the total world population, while its area will correspond to a third of the total land area of the world".

Raw Materials: Raw products of South-East Asia region: (1) Rubber (production) 91%. (2) Sugar 6%. (3) Palm oil (export) 41%. (4) Palm seeds 5% (5) Copra 75% (6) Coffee 5.8%. (7) Tea 20%. (8) Tobacco 5%. (9) Bark 98%. (10) Hard Fibres. 55% (11) Rice 22%. (12) Tin 52%. (13) Tin Ore 54%. (14) Petroleum 3%. (15) Iron Ore 1.4%. (16) Coal 0.3%. (17) Gold 1.9%. (18) Silver 0.4% (19) Tungsten 11%.

The above-mentioned figures do not include the sources of raw materials of India, China and Manchuria. The powers which control the south Asiatic region control the entire rubber supply and more than 50% of the tin supply of the world. Japan naturally began to think of increasing her political and economic influence in these regions to meet the requirements of her growing population. Japan's national awakening had taken place too late to enable her to participate in the scramble for possessions in Asia, America and Africa. When she woke up she found that European countries had grabbed all the available territories of the world. Malthus or Mars was the problem before Japan. She decided to have recourse to the latter and began to look around for a favourable hunting ground.

Japan had not far to look. Next door to her lay the unhappy land of China. The unity which Chiang Kai-Shek had achieved in 1928 was short lived. The old provincial governors never liked peace because it was in the wars that they thrived. The old civil wars amongst the war lords started again. In addition to these war lords the Communists were trying to consolidate their position in the north. Chang Tso Lin, the Manchurian war lords, had died in an accident. The Central Government at Nanking controlled only a part of the country. Bandit chiefs ravaged the countryside. The conditions in China in 1931 were very much like those in India in 1802, conditions favourable to a foreign invading power. China and Japan were both members of the League of Nations. The Manchurian incident took place in 1931 and Japan invaded Manchuria. As a member of the League of

Nations, Japan should have invoked the League to settle the quarrel; instead, she sent expeditionary forces to Manchuria. China appealed to the League. Japan decided to leave the League. The Japanese delegate Matsuoka made a memorable speech in the League Assembly. He justified Japanese aggression by saying that in their time the western powers had done exactly the same. China pressed the League to take action against Japan. The members of the League and especially Britain and France were not willing to have recourse to arms. A half-hearted effort to stop their trade with Japan was made. That too fizzled out soon, and Japan conquered Manchuria in a short time. She outdid western imperialism by setting up a puppet regime under ex-Chinese Emperor Pu-Wei instead of directly ruling the country. If the League had taken strong and drastic steps in 1931, the Second World War might have been averted. Italy and Germany would not have dared to defy the League just a few years later. America too kept quiet. The League's inaction in 1931 was the end of her political existence.

In the early twenties Japan's export trade went up by leaps and bounds. Heavy industries were started in Japan. British and American statesmen began to visualise the growing power of Japan and began to think how they could safeguard their own interests. Britain's treaty of friendship with Japan ended in 1923. Britain did not renew the treaty. She went a step further and decided to establish a naval base at Singapore to act as a check to the south-western expansion of Japan. The Singapore Naval Base was to be the eastern defence line of India. The relations between Britain and Japan naturally became strained. In 1924 the American Congress passed the Asiatic Immigration Act, which forbade Asiatic races from colonising and settling in the U.S.A. Canada had already closed her doors to coloured races. "The Komagata Maru incident" was a result of Canadian action. The American Bill was apparently meant specially for the exclusion of Japanese and Chinese as very few people from other Asiatic countries went to America. America did not prohibit European nationals from coming to settle in America. Japan looked upon this act as a national insult. The growing population of Japan badly needed an outlet. There being no permission to the Japanese to colonise and settle in N.America, Africa, or Australia, she naturally turned her attention to the more thinly populated parts of Asia. But the major portion of Asia also was directly or indirectly controlled by European powers and the U.S.A. The European powers had grabbed a large portion of the globe and controlled the resources of the richest portions of the earth. America is practically self-sufficient. Of all the first class powers only Japan was without an empire under the sun. Even tiny Holland possessed an empire in Asia with a population of 60 million subjects and some of the richest islands in the world. Japan became jealous of these powers and began to mark time for a favourable opportunity to make herself the mistress of some of these areas. It was vitally necessary for her to possess some of the raw materials. She depended for over eighty per cent of her raw material requirements on other powers who could strangle her economically by stopping the export of these to Japan. She felt that she could gain her ends only by war as no other powers would be willing to give her a share in the raw materials required for her industries. Japan's prosperity was entirely dependent on her industry. The changing attitude of world powers towards Japan brought about a change in her political life. The liberal elements were eliminated and power passed into the hands of army and navy leaders. From 1930 Japan ruthlessly suppressed the labour movement and put the nation on a war footing. By 1932 she consolidated her position in Manchuria. The iron and coal deposits were fully exploited. She began to make preparations for her next move. Her budgets began to increase. She began a feverish programme of ship-building. Her armament industries were expanded. She was turned into a totalitarian country and preparations were begun for a long and total war. Knowing that other powers might later put a ban on exports to Japan, she began to buy raw materials in large quantities. The imports into Japan show a progressive rise from 1932 to 1941.

In 1936 Italy attacked Abyssinia. The League could do nothing to stop Italy. The members of the League were not ready to make sacrifices for a semi-civilised country like Abyssinia. Mere moral ostracism does not count for much in international affairs. The inaction of the League and especially of Britain and France made the Second World War possible. Japan was watching the Abyssinian incident with interest and being emboldened by the inaction of the great powers, she started the Sino-Japanese war on 7th July, 1937. Unfortunate China had to fight with a formidable enemy. She had no modern arms, tanks or planes. Japan launched a lightning attack and overran northern China and occupied the whole Chinese coast with the exception of treaty ports like Shanghai. China invoked the League and appealed to the Signatories of the Nine Powers' Conference, but received no active help from any quarter. Britain and America promised supplies to her but there were no means of delivering these supplies to the National Government. China tried to build a road from Burma to Chungking but only 7,000 tons of goods could be sent along this road. Russia being herself busy with her secret armament programme could give very little help to China. A few American adventurers went to China to help the National Government, but there were no planes and precious little supply of petrol. Most of the countries gave moral support to China which is of little use on the battle-field.

After occupying a large portion of northern and central China and controlling the coast, Japan decided to play a waiting game. China could not undertake a general offensive for want of materials. She had abundant manpower but this alone is of no avail in a modern mechanised war. Nanking was captured and Japan set up a puppet regime under Dr. Wang Ching Wei. A new Government was formed at Nanking. The Japanese-occupied area was nominally handed over to the puppet Government. It was an attempt to set Chinese against Chinese. Japan brought pressure to bear upon the British Government after the outbreak of World War II and Britain closed the Burma road for six months.

The military budget of Japan was alarmingly increased but Japan did not spend all the money on the war in China. About 25 per cent was spent in China and the remaining was spent in making preparations for the Far Eastern war. China was also a good training ground for her troops. Japan was not exerting herself to her utmost. This created a false impression abroad. Everyone believed that Japan was not really strong and was not able to complete the conquest of China in spite of the latter's want of modern armaments. Some critics compared China to a quagmire in which Japan was entangled. As Japan was making preparations for the Far Eastern war, she put the entire economic resources of the country on a war footing which created an impression that Japan's economic structure was crumbling under the strain of the war in China. Nothing was farther from the truth. Japan wanted this impression to prevail abroad to enable her to make her final preparations. Till 1940 Japan went on buying every available thing from other countries. She bought petrol, planes, trucks, guns, wireless apparatus and thousands of other items. She was buying scrap iron by lakhs of tons. It was only in 1941 that the U.S.A. froze Japanese assets in America.

After the fall of France and her occupation by German troops, Japan began to bring pressure on French Indo-China. The latter country was helpless. She could get no help from France. There was no navy to guard her shores, and the small air force consisted mostly of old planes. Germany too must have brought pressure to bear upon the Vichy Government. The result was that French Indo-China agreed to allow Japanese troops to occupy North Indo-China ostensibly for the purpose of stopping Chungking from getting supplies. Japan made a treaty of friendship with Indo-China undertaking to defend the country from foreign aggression. Already the Japanese propaganda machine was busy in advocating the establishment of an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere embracing the countries in the Far East. Japan

was to be the centre and leader of this new order in East Asia. This sphere was later increased and the new term "the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" was brought into use to include all countries from Burma to Japan.

Japan opened new negotiations with the Dutch East Indies. With the fall of Holland, the D.E.I. were left without any support from home. Japan demanded a greater share in the D.E.I. trade and the colonial Dutch Government had to make concessions to Japan. Early in 1941 a border dispute arose between Thailand and French Indo-China. Probably Japan had reached a secret agreement with Thailand. A little fighting on the frontier took place. Japan intervened in the quarrel and offered to settle the border dispute. French Indo-China had no other alternative but to accept Japan's mediation. A Boundary Commission was appointed which recommended the ceding of certain districts west of Mekong to Thailand. French Indo-China acquiesced. Japan established a position for herself as the arbitrator in East Asiatic affairs and as the leader of East Asia.

In the second half of 1941, Japan occupied south Indo-China and secured a number of air and naval bases throughout the country. A strong air force dispersed at Hanoi, Tourane and Saigon could control Yunan, part of the China Sea, North-east Burma, Thailand and the Gulf of Siam. Strategically Indo-China occupied a very favourable position. A secret treaty must have been signed between Thailand and Japan at the end of 1940 or early in 1941 in which Japan must have promised part of Malaya and Burma as the price for Thailand's help. The British seemed to have had no inkling of such an agreement. A Thai military mission was lionised in Malaya in the middle of 1941. This mission visited all the important military centres in Malaya and the information they gathered must have been passed on to Japan.

Japan had paid special attention to her navy and the naval air arm since 1931. The figures for Japanese naval expansion from 1934 are not available. There is no doubt that she must have undertaken a gigantic building programme since 1931. The naval air arm received special attention and its efficacy was seen in the early days of the Far Eastern hostilities. The Japanese General Staff and the Naval General Staff must have planned out every detail several years prior to the actual outbreak of war. The Japanese navy had secretly perfected a plan to attack Pearl Harbour. Canton was the starting point for the attack on Hongkong. Ports on the Chinese coast and Saigon were to be the jumping off points in the attacks on the Philippines and Malaya. Japan began her mobilisation from the early months of 1941. As the war in China was in progress no one could be wise about these mobilisation movements. The troops who participated in the attack on Kota Bahru were first sent to Manchuria, then transferred to Canton and ports in Indo-China from where they embarked on their final journey. The stage was nearly set by the middle of 1941 for the war in the Far East. Japan needed four or five months more to launch the actual attack. She was waiting for "D" day.

America and Britain began to grow alarmed at the steady encroachment of Japanese influence in Indo-China, Thailand and D.E. Indies. They began to suspect Japanese designs. Britain began to send more troops to Malaya. Both America and Britain realised the importance of giving aid to China to keep Japan engaged on the continent nearer to her own home. The Dutch had been forced to make some concessions to Japan and it was feared that Japanese demands would go on increasing. Already Japan and America were rivals in trade. Both wanted supremacy in the Pacific. A clash between the two was inevitable. America, Britain, China and the D.E. Indies decided to make a concerted effort to check Japan's designs and the outcome was the so-called A.B.C.D. collaboration. Japan immediately raised a cry against the A.B.C.D. alignment. She wanted to strike first and to lull the suspicions of the A.B.C.D. group. So she opened negotiations with the U.S.A.

These negotiations were purposely protracted. It should be noted that Japan had opened negotiations only with the U.S.A., though Britain and the D.E.I. were equally concerned in the Far East. By November it was clear that these talks would lead nowhere. Japan sent Kuruso as a special ambassador ostensibly to break the impasse.

On the 29th of November 1941, Japan began to move her forces. She believed that the psychological moment had arrived. Germany was pressing hard on Stalingrad. There was unrest in Iraq and Persia. The Indian political situation had taken a turn for the worse. Rommel's Afrika Corps was knocking at the gates of Egypt. German submarines had paralysed British shipping movements. The British navy and air force were tied up in the Middle East, Mediterranean, Atlantic, Britain and the North Sea. It was impossible to send reinforcements to the Far East. The American naval programme was still on paper. Russia was too busy with stemming the tide of the German advance towards Moscow and Leningrad. Germany was also pressing Japan to create a diversion. Japanese General Staff must have thought it the most opportune time to strike.

On 6th December, 1941 Japanese naval forces and transport flotillas were spotted in the Gulf of Siam. These forces afterwards changed course due north as if making for Bangkok. They suddenly turned due west and on 7th December they attacked Kota Bahru. Simultaneously attacks were made on Hongkong and the Phillipines and the Japanese naval air arm attacked Pearl Harbour. The war in the Far East had begun.

NEW ZEALAND NEWSLETTER—NO. 2

LIEUT.-COLONEL J. WILSON STEPHENS

MY last (and first) News-letter was unavoidably on somewhat general lines. I tried to paint a picture of this country such as one might obtain from the window of a railway carriage, and to colour it with a few observations, opinions and pieces of information. Thereafter I went on to speak of sport, and finally I promised that in my next letter I would have something to say of the Services and would touch on such things as taxes, cost of living, etc.

Having an eye to the present world situation and the nature of the Journal for which I am writing and also the amount of information that I have been able to collect, I have now decided that it were best if, in this letter, I devoted myself entirely to the subject of the Services. I will relegate taxes, cost of living and so forth, to a later date.

Here in New Zealand the armed forces have, of late, been much under discussion both in Parliament and elsewhere. Generally speaking, there has been a certain amount of understandable criticism of the Government in this connection. The Returned Servicemen's Association, through the medium of the newspapers, pointed out that although the War had been over for two and a half years and F.-M. Lord Montgomery had visited the country almost a year ago, the Government had yet to issue a statement on defence and the future organization of the armed forces. From such criticism as I have both heard and read it is clear that the thinking New Zealander is fully alive to his responsibilities not only for his own defence but also in the wider field of Empire strategy. Now, in July, in the person of the Defence Minister, the Government has spoken, and it is of this and subsequent utterances that I propose to write.

This first statement comes under the heading of National Defence. In this the Minister, in his basic principles, stressed that the zone of defence must include the South Pacific and that there must be co-ordination between the three Services in a balanced organization which can rapidly co-operate with combined forces in plans of regional defence. He laid emphasis on the fact that the Navy and the Air Force must be prepared to act immediately in the event of an emergency, and that their duties would be those of guarding the security of trade and communications. To this end bases were to be established outside New Zealand, and in this connection Fiji was particularly mentioned. The establishments of both these Services were to be considerably augmented. In the Navy the accent was to be on anti-submarine warfare, while the Air Force was to include long-range bomber squadrons, fighters, flying-boats and transport planes. It was also suggested that, in view of the reliance that must be placed on her in war, the liaison which had already been established with the U.K. and Australia should be extended to America. American defence plans would naturally embrace the South Pacific and would probably entail bases in that area; fullest co-operation was therefore necessary between the two countries.

So much for the general defence policy. Let us look at these Defence Services as they exist at present and then at the proposals as to what they shall be in the future. In plain figures the present strength of the New Zealand Forces is as follows:—

Navy 1,560
Army 4,763
Air Force 2,833
Total	..	<u>9,156</u>

The Army total includes 2,286 J-Force personnel who, together with No. 14 Squadron RNZAF, are expected soon to return to New Zealand.

The future establishments of the three Services are based on Government proposals endorsed by the opinions and suggestions of the Admiralty, Lord Montgomery and Lord Tedder respectively. I hope I will be forgiven if I quote the two Chiefs of Staff at some length.

So far as the Senior Service is concerned, there is little that is new. In the first place the New Zealand Government had proposed to buy six frigates and one survey vessel, and the Admiralty had agreed to this. They suggested, however, that the vessels should all be of the same class. These six frigates have now been bought, and the survey vessel is expected shortly. The proposed future strength of the RNZN is to be 2,500, to which will be added the part-time strength of the RNVR.

As regards the Army, the Defence Minister said that discussions had been held with Field-Marshal Montgomery during his visit, and that when asked he had given his advice. This had been found to be in general agreement with the Government proposals. The CIGS gave it as his opinion that, in order to raise the necessary personnel, it would be necessary to introduce some system of compulsory military training. He spoke as follows on the peace-time organization of the New Zealand land forces:—

"The nation", he said, "must be careful to avoid overstraining its basic economy in attempting to maintain in peace land forces which are beyond its capabilities. It is essential to balance carefully the size of the armed forces with the needs of the peace economy of the country as a whole. The nation must ensure that its young men are trained to arms, so that in the event of an emergency it is capable of defending itself within the homeland or further afield as the occasion might demand. The nation must be able to mobilise a proportion of its armed forces quickly so that it can handle any emergency without delay. It would be fatal to rely upon a period of respite at the beginning of hostilities in which to train an army or to repair unreadiness. The full military strength of any nation depends on its trained reserves. There must be a good scheme for expanding the national land forces in war to the fullest extent possible, having in view the needs of war production and of war-time economy. There seems no need for New Zealand," he continued, "to maintain any regular standing army in peace-time, but New Zealand should maintain a regular 'content' in her non-permanent army. Because of the needs of industry and the limitations of finance, this 'content' should be only that which is large enough to provide (1) a really good training for the annual national service intake—the provision of instructional, and administrative staffs in training centres and schools, (2) a good regular cadre in units of the non-permanent forces. This is essential if the non-permanent force is to be capable of taking the field in any reasonable time."

Lord Montgomery summarised the position as follows:—

- (a) "Base everything on the territorial army—whatever you can afford.
- (b) Maintain sufficient regulars to train the territorial army—no more.
- (c) If you can maintain the flow of men through the army with an even three months' training, your defensive organization will be reasonably efficient.
- (d) Training must be linked with needs of industry and seasonal trades."

The Minister for Defence said that the training of the regular force was now proceeding for this purpose. The proposed future strength of the army is to be 3,830, plus the Territorial Army Force.

So far as the Air Force was concerned, the Defence Minister said that the

following was the opinion of Lord Tedder on the Government proposals for post-war development of the RNZAF :—

"I have examined this plan carefully, and I find myself in agreement. As we see it here, the role of the New Zealand Air Force in war is to contribute to the defence of the main support area in the South Pacific and the vital strategic areas associated with it. It should be so designed and equipped that in the absence of a threat to this support area it can contribute to the defence of neighbouring strategic areas more immediately threatened. The regular force, which the plan provides with the backing of the territorial force, would seem to be properly balanced for the fulfilment of this role. To meet the requirements of the strategic area in question, I am in agreement that the primary role of the regular bomber reconnaissance squadrons should be that of long-range general reconnaissance. The proposed force is, in my opinion, properly composed and suitably balanced for the defence role in question. I am in agreement with the proposed peace-time distribution of the force. We agree that Fiji is a key point in our strategic area. Subject to inter-governmental agreement, I am of the opinion that one of the most important roles of the New Zealand Air Force will be to maintain bases in Fiji. For this reason, I agree it is desirable that New Zealand should maintain advance Air Force elements in Fiji in peace-time. The maintenance of these units would assist in the operational training of the peace-time Air Force."

The proposed future strength of the RNZAF is to be 4,150 and to this will be added the Territorial Air Force.

To sum up: These proposals are undoubtedly both excellent and adequate, for they have the sanction of great experts. The question is, how long will it take to put them into operation? To convert plans and figures into facts? To quote the Defence Minister: "It is agreed that a territorial force should be provided, and a decision has to be made as to whether it should be voluntary or under a form of national service". And again: "No decision has been reached in regard to the recruitment of this force. If we are going to call up 8,000 men each year, then I do not think there is any possibility of getting that number except under some form of national service." And that is how matters stand now. But talk won't produce men, and the crying need is to get on with the job.

I fear this is a long letter and overfull of quotations, but, so far as I am able, it gives a fairly complete picture of the Service situation in this country as it stands to date. My excuse for writing at such length and on one topic only is its tremendous present importance.

Finally, although New Zealand is so isolated — so much so that one often wonders if many of her inhabitants are awake to the outside world at all—there are yet those who fully realise the paramount importance of getting something done, and done quickly. As Field-Marshal Montgomery says: "It would be fatal to rely upon a period of respite at the beginning of hostilities in which to train an army or to repair unreadiness".

AMERICAN NEWSLETTER

WILLIAM SCOTT MILLS, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

IT may be of interest to the members of the United Services Institution of India and Pakistan to know that the British Empire Service League is well represented in this part of the world by the Western States Command of the Canadian Legion B.E.S.L. The name "Western States" is new, as prior to the last Convention held at Santa Barbara, California, on July 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1948, it was the "California State Command"; but as the organization is growing, and as we have posts in the States of Washington, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming, it was felt that "Western States Command" was a more suitable name.

The Convention at Santa Barbara was a great success, as these annual Conventions always are. It was quite interesting to see in that old California City, with its Spanish architecture, the cap badges of the British Empire Forces (which are worn on the Legion caps). Badges of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Africa, India, West Indies and Great Britain appeared. I have been attending these Conventions for many years, and get a thrill each time I see my old comrades again. Our ranks grow thinner and our hair grows greyer; however, the gang still put on a good show at the annual parade (usually held on July 4th) with the jingling of the medals and skirling of the bagpipes.

The looks on the faces of the Mexican children when they see the Scotsmen in their kilts, have to be seen to be appreciated. Several years ago the Convention was held in San Diego; the Police Chief's Secretary, who was a close friend of mine and who was himself a U.S. Navy veteran of World War I, was one of the officials arranging the parade. This gentleman then said to me, "You know, Bill, this is one of the most ironical things I ever heard of, a parade being arranged for British Veterans on July 4th, our Independence Day, with the U.S. Navy, Army and Marine Corps participating." This just goes to show the manner in which the United States has welcomed the British Veterans within its borders; many of the cities (San Diego for one) having furnished meeting places free of charge.

After taking in the Convention at Santa Barbara, I proceeded up the coast to Monterey, the first capital of California in the days when the kings at Madrid held sway, to another get-together, this time of an American group of Military Insignia collectors. The majority of this group are veterans of the armed forces of the United States, and at present I have the honour to be on the National Board of Governors. At this meeting we all gained much information and saw insignia we had no knowledge of, as some of us took our collections along. I am also a collector of British Empire Insignia, and I have a considerable collection of various types, as well as many buttons. However, as I am here all by myself, I get a great deal of pleasure out of this serious American group of collectors of U.S. Insignia. My American collection is chiefly of the enamelled type. A short time ago I received one of the 48th Field Artillery having the honours "Kwajalein", "Attu", "Kiska", "Leyte", and "Okinawa" of World War II. Very interesting, but enough about badges for this time.

* * * * *

The W.A.C.s are to be integrated into the Regular Army. The W.A.C. officers now on active duty or in an inactive status are eligible to apply for Regular Commission. The two-year goal of each service is as follows:

Army—500 officers, 75 warrant officers and 7,500 enlisted women.
 Navy—500 officers, 20 warrant officers and 6,000 enlisted women.
 Air Force—300 officers, 40 warrant officers, and 4,000 enlisted women.
 Marine Corps—100 officers, 10 warrant officers and 1,000 enlisted women.

* * * *

The Draft Act fixed the total strength of the Armed Forces at more than two million men. Present and authorized strengths:

Branch of Service		Present (approx.)	Authorized
Army	..	548,000	837,000
Navy and Marines	..	469,000	666,882
Air Force	..	382,000	502,000
		*	*

The Army expects to draft up to 30,000 men a month. To handle them four new training divisions will be activated. This will give the Army eight Training Divisions; the four old ones are:

9th Inf. Div., Fort Dix, New Jersey.
 3rd Armoured Div., Fort Knox, Kentucky.
 4th Inf. Div., Fort Ord, California.
 5th Inf. Div., Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

The four new training divisions are:

5th Armoured Div., Camp Chaffee, Arkansas.
 10th Inf. (Mountain) Div., Fort Riley, Kansas.
 101st Airborne Div., Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.
 17th Airborne Div., Camp Pickett, Virginia.

* * * *

Some 1,500 National Guardsmen are attending Regular Army schools, or will soon enter them, the National Guard Bureau announced, in revealing that efforts of the Guard to maintain in serviceable operation the equipment issued it, is a big problem. The courses include the Armoured, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Transportation, Medical, Anti-aircraft, Artillery and Guided Missile Schools.

* * * *

I will close this Newsletter by quoting part of a speech made by General Omar K. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, at the internment at Longmeadow, Massachusetts, of Corporal Edward G. Wilkin, Medal of Honour.

"This lad we buried today is partly the victim of your folly and the folly of all the peace-loving peoples who turned their backs on the ills of the world. For at the very time those aggressors at whose hands he met his death conspired against the peace of the world, we blinded ourselves to their threats and by our shameful inaction countenanced their starting attack.

"Secure in distant and peaceful towns like these, clinging to comforts, refusing risks, seeking safety in refuge and refuge in words, we recanted power and conscience to side with those who sought peace at any price. Too late we discovered the price was too high; and to keep our freedom we paid in the bodies of our young sons.

"If the United States ever again stoops to expedients to avoid the difficult decisions that come with leadership, the heavy burdens that come with defence, we shall once more run the dangers of all halfway measures and waste our strength and conscience as a weather vane rather than a force.

"If we cringe from the necessity of meeting issues boldly with principle, resolution and strength, then we shall simply hurdle along from crisis to crisis, improvising with expedients, seeking inoffensive solutions, drugging the nation with an illusion of security which under those conditions cannot exist. If we are to scamper from crisis to crisis, fixing principles and policies to the change of each day, we shall place ourselves supinely and helplessly at the mercy of any aggressor who might play on our public opinion and decimate our forces at will.

"To live bravely by convictions from which the free peoples of this world can take heart, the American people must put their faith in stable long-range policies—political, economic and military programmes that will not be heated and cooled with the brightening and waning of tension.

"The United States has matured to world leadership; it is time we steered by the stars, not by the lights of each passing ship.

"On this Memorial Day, as we take leave of this brave soldier—Corporal Edward Wilkin, Army of the United States, Medal of Honour—we pay homage as he would have us do, to all his fallen comrades—to the strong, the weak; the leaders, the led; the brave, the fearful; to all who perished where only God could witness their charity to their fellow-men.

"Proudly—but reverently, sadly—we honour them. We pray they will ever rest in peace."

REVIEWS

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A SHORT HISTORY

CYRIL FALLS

With Maps, Methuen, 15/-

WAR excites more interest than peace. There have been more years of war than of peace in the history of man in the last two or three millenniums.

This naturally accounts for the production of considerable literature on war. On the last two Wars, which rocked the whole world and provided a major shock to our entire conception of civilisation, there has appeared in recent years a spate of books, monographs, pamphlets and journalistic articles, mostly coloured by propagandist partisanship. This variety of literature was provided by the belligerent Powers for reinforcing the morale of their own people and depleting that of the hostile populations. Despite its utilitarian value such literature would not merit the attention of a scientific, critical, intelligent mind which seeks to gain an insight into the causes of war, the course of its events and the consequences which flowed from it. The victor governments, on their part, have undertaken to prepare official histories of the War, which promise to be objective surveys of their individual participation, based on their own records, both from the policy and operation point of view. But even the most optimistic estimate cannot expect their completion in less than a decade. The appearance of Professor Cyril Falls' book at this stage must be welcomed in so far as it seeks "to provide a short, general account of the War for the average intelligent reader". It lays no claim to be a comprehensive, critical account of the late War, for its size could warrant no such presumption. The author merely intends it to be "in the main a record of events", not political or economic but military, on which alone stress is laid. It is at best a story of strategy with a tendency to discuss tactics, interspersed with military commentary at places. The learned Professor has not, however, altogether omitted reference to political decisions, but has referred to them whenever they directly influenced the course of military operations. As a factual military history of the Second World War, in a brief compass, written largely from the British angle of vision, it is a valuable contribution.

The plan of the book is simple. It opens out with a short chapter on "Europe on the Eve of War" to focus attention on the comparative preparedness of the various nations of Europe for war. Of course, the author considers the War of 1939 to be "essentially a war of revenge initiated by Germany" and naturally attributes her greater preparedness to this cause. She had not only "more weapons than her rivals" but she had also perfected them by experiment and had a highly developed scientific research organisation. Russia's resources were comparatively unknown, but the strides she had made in her industrial output and the possession of immense natural resources and vast manpower made her worthy of respect, particularly for her potential strength. Her main weakness lay in her undeveloped communications which however could be turned into an element of strength in defence against a highly mechanised army, as that of Germany. France was weak both materially and spiritually. The United Kingdom too was militarily weak and in the inter-war period had suffered from inability to gauge the international situation properly. Love of profit had numbed the sense of national prestige. This analysis of the author provides the background for the early rapid successes of the Nazi arms.

In the subsequent chapters Professor Cyril Falls has recounted the story successively of early German victories in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France, leading to the first air invasion and blockade of Britain. The success of the Germans in this early phase of the war must be attributed to their superiority in armament, particularly mechanized divisions, air-power, specially the co-operation between aircraft and armour, and, above all, to their tactics and staff work which far excelled those of their opponents. The German Wehrmacht had developed a tactics of attack which dazed the defenders and demoralised the hostile forces. These consisted in discarding the linear tactics and employing the principle of concentration to the highest degree. By combining armour with air-support, the attack was "designed to pierce a deep system of defence at several points by armoured columns on a narrow frontage, covered by dive-bombers and supported by motor-borne infantry employed to widen the breaches. Once through the defences one column would converge upon another to envelop a section of the defence, which would then be mopped up by infantry". These tactics availed the Germans as long as they had air predominance and their tanks mounted with 85 mm anti-aircraft and 50 mm guns could sweep the defence which had no weapons capable of stemming the tide of armoured waves emitting deadly fire. In the later stages of the War, however, when the Luftwaffe lost its predominance and effective anti-tank weapons were perfected by the opposing forces and their own heavier tanks had been built, these tactics failed to create impression. The Russians had developed their own technique which consisted in containing the attack and then taking up the counter-offensive which succeeded in enveloping the German armies and destroying them, a process made easy by the terrain and winter of that land.

The author has devoted a few chapters to the Russian and African campaigns. The reason assigned for Hitler's invasion of Russia is the desire to possess the corn lands and mineral wealth of Ukraine, the oil-fields of the Caucasus and the passage to the Middle East, for by these means alone could Hitler realise his aim of seeking rich agricultural lands near German frontiers for settlement by his people and seizing the sources of primary raw materials which Germany lacked. It is only a half-truth and ignores the whole trend of history in the past hundred years which had made the Balkans the chief bone of contention between Russia and Germany. Only three chapters have been allotted to the Russian phase of the war, though in a way the most decisive factor in the destruction of Nazi Germany was the Russian counter-offensive which bled Germany white and made it impossible for Hitler to mete out telling blows on the Anglo-American forces in the West. Nevertheless, the story of this eastern campaign, the chase of Italian and German forces back into Europe, the battle of the Atlantic, the Blitzkrieg over England and finally the opening of the second front on the western coasts of France when Germany had been weakened, her air force had been crippled and her industrial potential pounded by air-raids, are extremely interesting and afford a critical survey of the strategy which finally brought Germany to her knees.

The author considers the Japanese war as an independent trend, almost a separate war, because there was little co-ordination or exchange of military secrets between the German and Japanese War Offices. The Anglo-American allies also endeavoured to keep the two phases apart, and could direct their entire energies to the liquidation of their eastern enemy only when the German danger had been laid to rest. To the United Kingdom, the German menace was primary and therefore the British Government assigned only a secondary position to the Japanese aggression in Asia. This may account for the halting supply of equipment to India on whom was imposed the task of resisting the Japanese. To the United States, on the other hand, the Japanese war was of prime importance. The Pacific war was their main concern. This divergence in the immediate objectives of the two Allies could not, however, affect the fortunes of war owing to the inability of the German forces to pierce into the Middle East and the ineffectiveness

of the Japanese thrust further owing to the vast expanse of their commitments. The Japanese defeat was made possible by the American strategy of hopping from island to island in the South-West Pacific to a base from where air-pounding of Japanese civilian population could be effectively prosecuted. The Japanese Army, unlike that of Germany, had not been defeated. It was her inability to protect the civilian population which compelled Japan after the inhuman ravages of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to sue for terms.

In his last chapter the author has indulged in speculations on the so-called "turning points" in the war. While ridiculing the very idea of "turning points", he mentions certain episodes or decisions which weightily governed the course of the war. According to him, the Russo-German pact, the German success in Norway, the "brilliant German offensive in the west" driving France out of the conflict, the Battle of Britain, the German invasion of Russia, the Japanese attack on the United States, the decision of Britain to cling to the Mediterranean, are some of the main determinants of the swing of the war and its ultimate decision. These had their influence on the individual phases of the war. But the ultimate end of the Axis resulted from the combination of planning and abundance of resources which afforded the Allies a superiority in every element of war potential. Germany owed her early victories to her prior planning and the fullest exploitation of her industrial and scientific advancement. Her limited resources could not however pull her through a long war which brought into the pit two giants with vast natural resources and industrial development, the United States and Soviet Russia. Germany lost because she failed to produce an unending supply of men and aeroplanes. Even in 1943, it is clear from Goebbels' Diaries, the Luftwaffe had been humbled and could not save German industry from the nightly and daily raids by the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. The air raids and the mounting fury of Russian counter-offensive had been gradually weakening the morale of the Wehrmacht, and with the ignominious exit of Italy, Germany was unable to stand up to the three-pronged attack by the Allies whose war potential had multiplied manifold. Modern wars are an exercise in planning and have been elevated from mere trial of physical strength to a competition in industrial output, scientific research and moral strength of the people. A "total war" is above all a test of endurance in which the civil population is as important—perhaps more important—as the soldier in uniform. The high morale of the people of Britain and the intense patriotism of the Soviet citizens triumphed in the end.

The Second World War has brought to the surface new terrors for humanity. What had been inherent in the previous wars became sinisterly explicit in the late war, which was "total" war in every sense. It involved "the devotion—one may call it the prostitution—of thought and effort to the purposes of war", and the author rightly calls it "a calamity for mankind". Then came "the increasingly effective harnessing of science to the offensive" which was intensified in its effect by the "increasing absence of scruple and disregard of convention" and the abuse of "rhetoric and the powers of persuasion" which characterised the propaganda carried on by every belligerent. The projecting of war with all its scientific barbarity and calculated cruelty against the civilian population is "one of the most terrible and ominous characteristics of warfare up to date" and is, in the words of the author, "the most unpromising for the future of civilization". Yet in spite of its terribleness the war has not lost its lure for the nations. Therein lie the seeds of destruction.

This book is a very successful attempt at presenting a picture of the late War. The vast material has been artistically condensed and presented in a very readable form.

A HISTORY OF RUSSIA

BERNARD PARES

Professor of Russian History, Language and Literature, University of Liverpool 1908-18, University of London, 1919-36.

Jonathan Cape, Rs. 26-4

This book, first published in 1926, has now been revised and additional material brings it up to 1944. It is a comprehensive story of Russia beginning with a description of the country and its people from pre-historic times, through the period of Kiev's glory, the Tartar invasions, early Western contacts, the rise of Moscow and the Time of Troubles (1583-1613). The period immediately following saw the peasants turned into serfs for the purpose of establishing order and settling the population, the gentry being accorded labour for their land on condition that they themselves did service for the State. After that came the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine II, during both of which great development took place. Educated Russians were much influenced by the trend of French thought which led up to the French Revolution. After this came the Napoleonic invasion of the country. Liberal views developed the reign of Alexander I, but under his successor, Nicholas I, opinion in Russia was suffocated. He was succeeded by Alexander II who determined on great reforms which were being carried out when he was murdered in 1881. A period of repression followed. This brings one to contemporary Russia, the two World Wars, the Revolution and Stalin's rule.

The author, who is one of the foremost authorities on Russian history and language, states in the preface that it has been his intention as far as possible to direct attention to the living conditions of the people, especially the peasants who form the vast majority of the population, but without limiting it to any particular class. The qualities of the Russian soldier as a fighter are also made clear.

The modern tendency to concentrate on economic factors is considered by the author to be particularly applicable to Russia.

Much of the earlier part of the book is based on the Russian Chronicles which are faithfully recorded local narrative made by the monks, first in Kiev and later in the various districts, for the purpose of teaching man to use the past for guidance in the present.

The Orthodox Church played such an important part in Russian history that considerable account has been taken of it. Military history is also inseparable from the general history of the country. As diplomatic history had much less to do with the common life of the Russian people, the author has treated it in detail only when great issues or remarkable personalities are concerned. Particular attention has been paid to the relations of Russia with Europe and the rest of the world, both as regards outside influences on Russian development and Russia's influence elsewhere. The age-long struggle with Poland plays a prominent part throughout, and the spread Eastward during the later centuries. A plan was made to replace the British in India.

In Russia Government and people were more separate than elsewhere in Europe and the Russian Intelligentsia which started to come into existence in Catherine II's reign had no exact counterpart in other countries. Opportunities for putting theories into practice were denied to thinkers and would-be reformers, unless such a one happened to be the Tsar. Efforts had been made by the Intelligentsia to rouse the peasants by socialistic propaganda, but they failed, as they found that the peasants were interested only in land and from long habit the

population had come to expect all decisions from above. Appreciation is given to the part played by the Intelligentsia in the course of events.

The last days of Tsardom came in November 1917, and it is made clear that the Communist rule which began then ended in 1921, after which came the rule of Communists but without the practice of Communism except for industry, a small part of the whole, which was socialised. Most of the country remained agricultural and entirely unco-operative in Lenin's plans. Stalin's first attempt at collectivisation of the farms failed. His aim was achieved only by what amounted to war on the peasants. There is a serious shortage of reliable material for the whole Soviet period, owing to the prejudiced view demanded by propaganda in everything that the controlled Press produces.

The preface to the 4th Edition mentions a number of authorities on various aspects of Russian life. The bibliography is comprehensive with helpful notes and titles grouped under periods and subjects.

Acknowledgment is made, amongst others, to the great Russian historian Klyuchevsky as the source of much of the material used in the book.

Family trees of the descendants of Vladimir Monomark, Michael Romanov and the Tsar Paul are given and a list showing Racial Distribution in the Russian Empire. There is a good index.

The absence of any maps, particularly for the earlier part of the work, is felt but doubtless the 640 pages to which the book runs precluded their inclusion. A few regrettable typographical errors have crept into what is otherwise an excellent production—printed in readable type on good paper and adequately bound. This book is likely to be a standard work for many years to come and is of inestimable value to both the young student of modern history and anyone wishing to reach an understanding of Russia and the problems raised by her policy towards the rest of the world. As the author points out, there can be no understanding of modern Russia without knowing what led up to it, and this volume gives that story in as concise a form as possible. It also gives an account of the activities of the Comintern in other countries. The writer, who knows and loves the Russian people, writes with the lack of prejudice one expects from the great scholar that he is.

R.M.B.

INDIA CALLED THEM

LORD BEVERIDGE

Illustrated Allen and Unwin, 18/-

This account of the lives of two people who came to India, married here and spent a large part of their lives in the country is compiled principally from the letters they wrote to one another during periods of separation and to their friends and relatives.

Henry Beveridge, father of Lord Beveridge, was one of the first men to join the East India Company in 1858 by competitive examination instead of by nomination, and the specimens of the questions then put to prospective administrators read strangely at the present time.

The title is a little misleading as Henry Beveridge's work was entirely in Bengal and Bihar. The only locality elsewhere in India which comes into the story is Mussouri when his wife and children went there in the hot weather, apart from the

places visited on a tour made to collect historical documents and data for literary work, after Henry Beveridge had retired, in 1899.

Henry Beveridge first married Jane Howison in 1871 but she and her baby died in January 1873. Meanwhile Annette Akroyd had sailed for India to teach Indian girls at a school which she started in Calcutta, having travelled out with Henry's mother-in-law. The difficulties in connection with the school are interestingly described and the reasons for its final closing, when Annette married Henry in 1875.

Henry did not reach the top of his profession, but failure to become a High Court Judge did not embitter him, as he was satisfied that his efforts on behalf of his Indian colleagues were justified though they did not tend to endear him to his seniors. He favoured the Ilbert Bill designed to obviate the anomaly of an Indian magistrate, no matter how senior, being disqualified from trying an English man or woman. Their attitudes towards Indians was a cause of disagreement between Henry and Annette as his sympathy for them remained constant while hers gradually lessened, though not apparently as a direct result of her difficulties with the school. (The word "native" is used by them in its literal sense without any derogatory implications: the term "Anglo-Indian", which occurs frequently, applies to British people resident in India). Their other main controversy was religious, but these two people had such resources within themselves and so many intellectual interests in common that they could discuss their differences without rancour and retain their independence of thought while growing to appreciate each other the more during the years.

The picture of Bengal which this book gives is entirely without reference to any communal differences or disturbances. At that time the urge towards Indian independence was developing and was the cause of increasingly strong feelings to which there is reference.

There are many sidelights on the domestic life of Europeans living in India at that time, the number and cost of the household staff, difficulties of travelling both by rail without sleeping accommodation and where there were no trains, and consideration of the advisability of buying an elephant for Rs. 800/-.

The earlier chapters on the Beveridge family will doubtless be of interest to the many descendants in various parts of the world and to people with Fifeshire associations, but are only of interest for anyone reading the book for what they have to say about India in so far as they give Henry Beveridge's background. The same applies to the account of Annette's parentage and girlhood.

The publishers have achieved a pre-war standard in the production of the volume, which contains a number of illustrations, a family tree, an interesting epilogue, notes on some contemporaries of Henry Beveridge in India, a glossary and an index. Quotations from letters which appear in the chapter following them are disconcerting as most readers prefer to decide for themselves what they consider significant or witty. That, however, is a minor point in this valuable contribution to the record of administrative and social life in Bengal in the second half of the nineteenth century.

THE INDIAN SAPPERS AND MINERS

LT-COL. E. W. C. SANDES

Published by the Institute of Royal Engineers, Chatham.

This book is an exhaustive research into the history of the growth and activities of the Indian Sappers and Miners, from their inception nearly two centuries ago up to their reorganisation in the period 1922-1932. The book also includes a chapter on "The Prelude to the World War, 1939-1945".

The evolution of the engineer arm of the Indian Army began when the East India Company first found it necessary, about the middle of the eighteenth century, to equip its Presidency Armies with a separate corps of trained engineers. The opening chapters of the book deal with the wars in Mysore, Central India, Burma and Nepal—the first in which the old Pioneers served.

The first unit to be raised were the Madras Pioneers in 1759. The Bengal and Bombay Pioneers followed shortly after, but there appears to be some considerable controversy regarding the relative seniority of the three Corps of Indian Sappers and Miners.

The three Corps seem to have experienced almost continuous operational activity from their inception, in some theatre or other. The First Afghan War was followed closely by the Sikh Wars. In the Mutiny, a high proportion of the Corps remained loyal and rendered distinguished service, especially in Delhi and Lucknow. The only Corps to rise seriously in the Mutiny were the Bengal Sappers.

After the taking-over of the Government of India by Her Majesty's Government in 1858, the officers of the Corps were amalgamated with the Royal Engineers. All three Corps fought in the Second Afghan War, where the Bombay Sappers earned undying glory by their gallant stand at Raiwand. The Mutiny was also followed by a period of overseas expeditions, beginning with Abyssinia in 1867 and spreading to almost every country in Africa and the Far East—Somaliland, Egypt, Sudan, China.

The detailed study of the North-West Frontier Campaigns since 1849 is a remarkable feature of the book, although the Indian Sappers and Miners themselves took no memorable part in these Campaigns until 1891. The value of these Frontier studies alone would make the book well worth reading to the military student.

The Indian Sappers found themselves very deficient in modern equipment, transport, and even weapons during the First World War, but their years of experience at improvisation and their history of almost constant warfare stood them in good stead. Their record on the Western Front was glorious, and their achievements in Engineer undertakings substantial. That they took a prominent combatant role in that war is amply borne out by the casualty figures amongst their officer ranks—over three hundred per cent officer casualties in the first five months.

The post-war period found the Indian Sappers and Miners engaged continuously on various Frontier Campaigns again, and in the Third Afghan War of 1919. Lord Rawlinson's policy of building roads through tribal territory became a major landmark in their history, because it brought to the Corps for the first time modern equipment for the building and maintenance of roads and water-supply plants.

It has taken the author over nine years to compile this monumental volume, consisting of over 700 pages of interesting reading. An appreciative foreword has been written by Lieut-General Sir Ronald Charles, late Chief Royal Engineer and Colonel of K.G.V's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.

The various campaign studies have been admirably presented, and this is a book well worth study, not only by engineer officers but also by all those interested in Military History. The maps and diagrams are exceptionally well produced and serve to enhance the value of the book.

D.K.P.

FIRST AIRBORNE

MICHAEL PACKE

Seeker and Warburg - 15/-

This is the story of the First Airborne Division, from its inception in 1942 to its epic stand at Arnheim in 1945. It has been written by an officer who served with this formation throughout the war.

The book is written in the form of a history-cum-novel—in that the facts and figures at the author's disposal were not sufficiently exhaustive to permit a strict historical narration and, on the other hand, though all the incidents recorded in the book did actually occur, the characters have been cloaked under assumed names. Also, because the book has been written from a purely personal viewpoint, there have been numerous gaps left in the overall picture.

In spite of this unorthodox nature of recording, the book makes very refreshing reading. It is a welcome departure from the usual crop of war-histories and personal memoirs which follows all wars.

The author takes the reader through all the stages in the life of this division. From its early days, when volunteers came to join the formation, through the thrills and hardships of the training period and the excitement of the first jumps, the long periods of waiting on the Salisbury plain and later in North Africa, the frustrations and disappointments of Sicily and Southern Italy, and the numerous "false alarms" back in England in 1944, the author strives to portray to the reader the type of people, their reactions, interests and associations, with a background of fact and correct historical perspective. Finally, he takes the reader through the landings and battle of Arnheim, one of the most glorious episodes in British Military history.

D.K.P.

CORRESPONDENCE

INDIAN STATES FORCES' INSIGNIA

MR. HURMUZ KAUS, HYDERABAD, DECCAN

I read with much interest Lieut. E. J. Martin's article, "Indian States Forces' Insignia", in the April 1948 number of our Journal. It is a fact that little or nothing is known of the Insignia of the Indian States Forces. I have no knowledge of the Insignia of the forces of the different States of India except those of my own country, regarding which I have to say something.

No records, either official or otherwise, exist of the Insignia of any unit of the Hyderabad Army. So far as my knowledge goes no researches have been carried out officially with a view to reconstruct the military history of Hyderabad. No collection of the appointments or accoutrements of the Hyderabad Army, either official or private, is known except my own collection, some of the items from which date back to the middle of the 19th century, when the Hyderabad Army was organised, and was for the first time put into uniforms of the European style, during the ministership of Mukhtar-ul-Mulk, Sir Salar Jung I (1853-1883).

Lieut. Martin says that he was not able to obtain any information of the badges of the Nizam's Forces, and that the details he has given regarding them were gleaned from the Hyderabad State Forces Contingent in the Victory Parade in London in 1946. The one shoulder-title (Pl : I, Fig : 11) and the three buttons (Pl: IV, Figs: 11, 12 and 13) described and illustrated by Lieut. Martin are now obsolete and are hardly available even for collection purposes. It is really strange as to how Lieut. Martin was able to glean information about them from the Hyderabad State Forces Contingent in the Victory Parade in London in 1946. I give below the correct description of the items described and illustrated by Lieut. Martin, including the ones he has described but not illustrated:—

- (1) Pl : I, Fig : 11. SHOULDER-TITLE. (Brass). 1st Lancers, The Hyderabad Imperial Service Troops.

This shoulder-title was in use during the Great War of 1914-18, and was worn by officers and men of one of the two Lancers,—1st and 2nd—of the Hyderabad Imperial Service Troops. These Lancers were formed in 1893, and were offered by the Nizam to the British Government for the defence of the Indian Frontiers. With the partition of India and the lapse of British Paramountcy they have ceased to be part of the Imperial Service Troops.

- (2) Pl : IV, Fig : 11. BUTTON. (Brass) 1st Regiment of Infantry.

This button dates back to the reign of His Highness Nawab Afzal-ud-Daolah, Asaf Jah V (1857-1869), the grandfather of our present Ruler. Lieut. Martin says that the stroke above the inscription is the Arabic numeral "1", but in fact it is the letter "Alif" of the Urdu-Persi-Arabic alphabets, and stands for "Afzal-ud-Daolah," being the initial letter of the name. Here I may mention that the coins of this period bear the hereditary title of the Nizams, namely, "Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah", with the letter "Alif" to indicate that the coin was struck by the Fifth Asaf Jah. This is the oldest button of the Hyderabad Army. These buttons were made by Firmin & Sons, London and Dublin, in two sizes, small and large.

(3) Pl: IV, Fig: 12. BUTTON. (Brass) 3rd Hyderabad Infantry.

This button belongs to the pre-1914-18 period, when the Hyderabad Army was reorganised by Nawab Sir Afsar-ul-Mulk, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam's Regular Forces. This Regiment being the "Nizam's Own" bears the "Dastar-e-Mubarak" or the Crown of the Nizam, surmounting the inscription. These buttons were made by Weber & Schenck, Secunderabad, in two sizes, small and large.

(4) Pl: IV, Fig: 13. BUTTON. (Brass) The Nizam's Artillery.

This button belongs to the last decade of the 19th century, and is found in one size only. These buttons were made by Weber & Schenck, Secunderabad. Here I may mention that in olden times guns of the Hyderabad Artillery were drawn by elephants and bullocks, but this button belongs to the period when the guns were drawn by horses.

During the termination of the Great War of 1914-18, His Majesty's Government were pleased to confer the title of "His Exalted Highness" on their ally, the Nizam of Hyderabad, for the services he had rendered to the British Government during the War. Hence the relics of the Hyderabad Army of pre-1914-18 period have "H.H. The Nizam" and post-1914-18 period have "H.E.H. The Nizam" in the inscriptions upon them. I will now describe those items which Lieut. Martin has described, but are not illustrated:—

(5) SHOULDER-TITLE. (Brass). 1st and 2nd Bns. Hyderabad Infantry.

These shoulder-titles are found in two types,—one with thick letters and figure, and the other with thin letters and figure. The initials "H I" stand for Hyderabad Infantry.

(6) Cap (or Pugri) Badge. (Brass). 1st Hyderabad Infantry.

This badge belongs to the middle of the 19th century, when the Crescent and Star device was introduced in almost all the departments. The postmarks of Hyderabad of this period are also of crescent shape with the name of the post office within the horns of the crescent, where a five-pointed star appears in the badges of this period.

The history of the Hyderabad Army lies still in darkness, and little or nothing is known of its insignia. With the help of my own collection, and the scanty information available here and there, I am on my way to prepare a monograph of the relics of the Hyderabad Army in the shape of appointments and accoutrements, which when published will be the first record of the insignia of the Hyderabad Army.

MEDAL COLLECTING

LIEUTENANT E. J. MARTIN, CHURCH BRAMPTON, NORTHAMPTON.

Owing to my being a new member of the Institution, I did not see Colonel Hayaud Din's letter, but he and Mr. Hurmuz Kaus may be interested to know that there are, in this country, Societies both for Collectors of Medals, and of Military Curios. The former already has corresponding members in India, and both would I am certain welcome other members from India or Pakistan.

They would not of course be able to attend meetings, but both Societies issue lists of their members' names and addresses, and the latter, of which I happen to be Honorary Secretary, has in preparation an address list, which will also give the chief interests of its members, thus enabling others with similar interests to get into direct touch with them.

For your information, the two Societies are:

The Medal Research Society of Great Britain.

Secretary:—Mr. L.F. Guille, Flat 3, Lapworth Court, 6 Fourth Avenue, Hove, Sussex.

The Military Historical Society.

As stated, I am Honorary Secretary.

The subscription to the Societies is *5s. od.* a year in each case.

ARMED FORCES ACADEMY, DEHRA DUN

BRIGADIER C. B. PONNAPPA, ALLAHABAD SUB-AREA, ALLAHABAD

In place of the present I.M.A. Dehra Dun, it has been decided to establish an Armed Forces Academy by the addition of an Inter-Services Wing. This decision is quite correct and in keeping with the modern methods of training officers for the services.

The Government has, also, sanctioned the construction of the Academy at Kharakvasla near Poona.

The candidate who joins the Armed Forces Academy has a four years' course of all-round instruction. This training is divided into two parts, firstly the inter-services wing which is for two years and could be called "Basic Training". The next two years are spent in pre-commission training for the particular Arm of the Service.

To my way of thinking the first two years are of paramount importance. The minimum age for a candidate is fifteen years which I think is a very impressionable age from the point of view of development of both the mind and the body. Accordingly great care must not only be given to the type of training to be undertaken, but, also, to the surroundings of the candidate which should be pleasant and convivial. It is well-known that a healthy mind and a healthy body are both essential if a person is to succeed in any task undertaken.

Dehra Dun has all the advantages of climate and pleasant surroundings. All these requirements were carefully considered before the Academy was built at Dehra Dun; and everyone is aware of the excellent results achieved by an institution which has become famous during the last world war. Therefore, I suggest that the basic training be carried out in the precincts occupied by the I.M.A.

Pre-commission training could then be carried out at the new Academy at Kharakvasla which would have added advantages if the Staff College were to be established in the vicinity. There should also be facilities for training in combined operations for the students of the Staff College and which could be watched by the pre-commission cadets.

This suggestion may require an alteration in the Kharakvasla scheme but is worth giving serious consideration.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Lieut. Ranjodh Singh, 4th Patiala Infantry, Patiala.

The U.S.I. Journal provides very helpful material for the young Army Officer.

Above all it offers opportunities for Indian and Pakistan Army Officers to assemble on a common platform.

I try my best to secure for it a good reputation among the State Army Officers.

I wish it a great and successful future.

Major Raghuji Singh, 8th Light Cavalry, Dhond.

I have been a regular reader of your Journal and have found it most interesting and useful.

There is no doubt that every officer should become a member of this very fine Institution.

Major G. B. Purves Smith, Territorial Army Directorate, Army Headquarters, India, New Delhi.

From reading some of the articles in the Journals you sent me it is apparent that you have at your disposal an abundance of material from officers of very considerable military experience and literary talent.

Lieut.-Colonel A. Mc Conkey, C/o Lloyds Bank, 6 Pall Mall, London, S. W. 1.

Congratulations on keeping up the high standard you do. As you can imagine the Journal is one of our few links with India.

Lieut.-Colonel A. N. S. Murthi, Headquarters, Western Command, New Delhi.

I have been a regular reader of your esteemed Journal for some time now. Wherever I had been I saw to it the Journal was subscribed for by the Comd Area.

As soon as I joined this Command, one of the first things I did was to subscribe for your Journal.

On receipt of your letter I am inserting a whole page in this Headquarters Monthly 'Education' for September, giving full particulars of the Institution.

I hope this will bring in a large number of applications for membership.

Please write if my service could be of use in any other way.

Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Nicholls, R.I.A.S.C., C/o The Bank of New South Wales, Perth, Western Australia.

The Journal has always been one of the most interesting of magazines, one of the few links I have with the Indian Army.

Lieut.-Colonel E.C.L. Wallace, D.S.O., 12, Salisbury Road, Hove, Sussex, England.

Ever since I retired (in 1922) I have continued to take a great interest in all that has happened in India, and always looked forward to getting my copy of the U.S.I. Journal.

Brigadier C.P. Clarke, Woodlands, Ruishton, Taunton, England.

I have just received the April number of the Journal which appears to be well up to standard and will make interesting reading.

N. H. Swinstead, Esq., O.B.E., C/o Lloyds Bank Ltd., 6 Pall Mall, London, S.W.1

Although I have not held a Commission since World War I, I have had many contacts, officially and otherwise, with officers of all three services, especially during World War II; consequently I have always found the U.S.I. Journal both interesting, instructive and valuable.

Capt. Surat Singh, Headquarters, Western Command, New Delhi.

I will consider it a privilege to be a member of such a distinguished Institution.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

This issue of the Journal, it is hoped, will follow close on the heels of the July number, having gone to press comparatively sooner. Gradually we seem to be making up for the time-lag. A suggestion has been received that we should combine two issues in one and thus gain time. That would be one way of solving the problem, but only as a last resort. If printing delays can be overcome with the next two issues, it is hoped we can have all the four issues out this year.

New Members

The following is a list of new members who joined the Institution from 1st September up to the time this issue of the Journal went to press :

AJMER SINGH, Lieut.-Colonel, Mahar M.G. Regiment.
 ANANT SINGH, Colonel, R.I.E.
 ANTIA, Major M.K., R.I.A.
 ANTIA, Major S.N., Indian Signals.
 AYYA, Lieut.-Colonel P. Gopal, 8 Madras Bn.
 BALBIR SINGH HOODA, Captain, The Jat Regiment.
 BALRAJ DEWAN, Major, R.I.A.S.C.
 *BANERJEE, Lieut.-Colonel P.K., The Jat Regiment.
 BAPAT, Lieut. (E) W.P., R.I.N.
 *BAZAZ, Lieut. (E) J.M., R.I.N.
 BAWA, Major S.S., Hodsons Horse.
 BHAGAT, Brigadier B.S., I.A.
 BHAGWAN SINGH, Captain, Central India Horse.
 BUTALIA, Major H.S., R.I.A.
 BUTTAR, Captain, J.S., R.I.A.
 CHHINA, Captain H.S., The Jat Regiment.
 CHOPRA, Major R.N., I.A.M.C.
 DEWAN, Colonel M.G., O.B.E.
 DHEER SINGH, Captain, Dungar Lancers.
 DRAVID, Captain G.V.
 D'SOUZA, Lieut. H.D., I.A.O.C.
 DUBE, Captain J.P., R.I.A.S.C.
 DUTT, Esq., D.R.
 GHUMAN, Lieut. Colonel G.S., R.I.E.
 GONSALVES, Captain M.D., R.I.A.S.C.
 GURDIP SINGH, Captain, The Sikh Regiment.
 HEERJEE, Captain R.J.,
 JAI SINGH, Captain, Sawai Man Guards.
 JEWELL, Captain H.E. St. C., R.I.A.S.C.
 JHIRAD, Major J.E., R.Garh. Rifles.
 JOGINDAR SINGH, Captain, Indian Signals.
 KALWANT SINGH, Captain, R.I.A.
 KANWAR, Lieut. J.S., Poona Horse.
 *KANWAR HUKAM SINGH, Captain, I.A.O.C.
 KAPUR, Major J.D., I.R.V.F.C.
 KARAMAT ULLAH KHAN, Major, Khyber Rifles.
 KHAN, Major I.U., F.F.R.
 KHURANA, Captain B.D., I.A.O.C.
 KHORANA, Captain L.C., R.I.A.S.C.
 *KOCHHAR, Brigadier R.K., I.A.
 KRISHNA, Major N.S., The Kumaon Regiment.
 KRISHNA MOHAN, Lieut.-Colonel, The Rajput Regiment.
 *KULWANT SINGH, Major, Royal Deccan Horse.

*Life Member.

- *KUTKY, Major S.P., The Rajputana Rifles.
- KYANI, Lieut. A.K., F.F.R.
- LALLA, Major H.G., 9 Gurkha Rifles.
- MALHOTRA, Major B.N., I.E.M.E.
- MALIK, Major R.R., R.I.A.S.C.
- MAN SINGH, Lieut.-Colonel.
- *MUKERJI, Captain (E) D.N., R.I.N.
- NAGLE, Lieut. A.L., R.I.A.S.C.
- NAIDU, Captain P.C., Indian Signals.
- NARINDRA SINGH CHADHA, Major, The Bihar Regiment.
- NAYAR, Captain T.N. RAMACHANDRAN, R.I.A.
- PARRY, Vice-Admiral W.E., C.B., R.N.
- *PROUDLOCK, Captain R.D., R.A.
- QURESHI, Captain M.I., 1st Punjab Regiment.
- RAJA, Captain U.V., R.I.A.
- RAMANAIAH, Lieut.-Colonel P.V., M.B.E. I.A.M.C.
- RAMRAJE BHONSLE, Major, Mahar M.C. Regiment.
- *RANA, Lieut.-Colonel B.J., 1st Tripura B.B.M. Rifles.
- RANDHAWA, Captain R.S., R.I.A.S.C.
- RANJIT SINGH BRAR, Lieut., Indian Signals.
- RANJIT SINGH GAREWAL, 2/Lieut., The Bihar Regiment.
- RAO, Lieut.-Colonel B. Amrit, I.A.M.C.
- RIKHY, Captain B.S., I.A.O.C.
- SAHASRABUDDHE, Lieut. Y.D., R.I.A.S.C.
- SAHGAL, Major N.N., 1st Bihar Bn., N. Cadet Corps.
- SATHE, Captain P.S., R.I.A.S.C.
- SAWHNEY, Major O.G., 5 R.G.R. (F.F.).
- SAWHNY, Major R.N.R., Indian Signals.
- *SEN, Captain S.K., R.I.A.
- SHARMA, Lieut. A.C., The Dogra Regiment.
- SIKANDAR, Major S., 1st Punjab Regiment.
- SINGHAL, Lieut. V.P., R.I.A.S.C.
- SINHA, Lieut.-Commander (E) B.P., R.I.N.
- SUBRAMONY, Captain S.V., R.I.A.S.C.
- SUJAN SINGH, Lieut.-Colonel, R.I.A.
- *SURI, Captain S.M., The Dogra Regiment.
- TEJA SINGH, Major, The Dogra Regiment.
- *THAPA, Lieut.-Colonel, P.S., 9 Gurkha Rifles.
- UBEROI, Major S.S., 5 R. Gurkha Rifles (F.F.)
- VASUDEVA, Lieut.-Colonel A.N., I.A.
- VIDYA SAGAR KAPOOR, Major, The Rajputana Rifles.
- VISHESHAR NAUTH SINGH, Brigadier, I.A.
- VOHRA, Captain M.D., R.I.A.S.C.
- WALWALKAR, Captain C.P., I.E.M.E.

SUBSCRIBING MEMBERS:

- C.E.O., Air Headquarters, India.
- 4 Divisional Officers Mess.
- G.S., 5 Infantry Division.
- Sholapur (Indep.) Sub-Area.
- P.M.C., 1st Bn., The Rajputana Rifles.
- Comd., 1st Bn., The Royal Garhwal Rifles.
- P.M.C., 6th Bn., The Kumaon Regiment.
- O.C., 13th Bn., The Kumaon Regiment.

Back Issues of the Journal

We have received two requests for back issues of the Journal from America and Canada. We shall be glad to hear if any of our members can help us meet these requirements even partially.

A firm of booksellers in New York (Duttons, Inc., 270 Park Avenue, 48th Street, New York 17, N.Y.) wishes to have a complete file of the U.S.I. Journal from 1870 up to date. (The Institution itself has only one copy each for record purposes.)

The Army Library, Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada requires the following copies of the U.S.I. Journal:—

Vol. LXXII—No. 308 July, 1942

Vol. LXXIII—No. 310 January, 1943

The Library

This is one of the finest military libraries in India and Pakistan, and full facilities are afforded to members to borrow books by post. The borrower pays only for the return postage. When any volume is not immediately available, the member's name is registered in the waiting list for that particular volume which will be sent to him at the first available opportunity. The library catalogue, supplemented by the list of additions sent out each quarter, should enable members to make full use of the facility thus offered. Demands are met strictly in the order in which they are received.

Suggestions are invited from members on books which will be of value to the three Services particularly.

